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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 2 Feb 1927

Vol. 8 No. 4

PUBLIC BUSINESS. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 2) BILL, 1926—SECOND STAGE.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be read a Second Time."

The principle sought to be established by this Bill is quite foreign to representative institutions, and, as far as I know, without any constitutional precedent in any other Parliament. The Bill proposes that the Deputy who is Chairman of the Dáil immediately prior to a dissolution shall, unless he expresses a desire to the contrary, have no necessity to offer himself for re-election, but shall be returned automatically as a member of the new Dáil and represent no constituency. When the new Assembly meets it may or it may not select this Deputy who represents nobody to be Chairman over its proceedings. If it does elect him he presides over its deliberations, but if it does not elect him he still remains a member of the House with all the rights and privileges of a Deputy duly elected. It is even possible that he can become a member of the Executive Council, Minister for Finance, or even President. That seems to me to be an extraordinary constitutional departure in order to meet what is obviously a difficulty, but not a difficulty which is peculiar to this State more than to any other. The arguments in support of the Bill have been to the effect that the Speaker of the House has not the opportunity that other Deputies have had of catering for his constituents, of voicing their opinions in the House and so forth, and that consequently he is at a disadvantage in securing re-election. That is one of the arguments. The other is that it is undesirable that the Speaker of the House should have to enter into the cock-pit of politics in the ensuing election. Although a Deputy may be Speaker it does not of necessity follow that he has not been able to do something for his constituents, because he is always in a position, if he so desires, to ask the assistance of Ministers and other Deputies in getting individual cases attended to, and in general doing the work of a Deputy which is apart from the ordinary public parliamentary work. In regard to the undesirability of his mixing in politics openly at an election there is nothing unnatural in that, because there is no guarantee that the same man will be elected Speaker again at the next Parliament, and it would be a poor Parliament that would be unable to secure a suitable alternative for a Deputy who was Speaker in the event of his not securing re-election.

A compromise on this unusual departure was suggested and turned down. It was to the effect that he would not be required to seek re-election, but that if the new Dáil did not select him as their Chairman he would cease to be a member of the Assembly. Otherwise he would not have to seek election at the polls. Even his own colleagues do not see fit to elect him to the Chair, so he does not command the confidence of the majority of the House, and yet he has all the powers and privileges of a duly elected Deputy. The compromise is reasonable, because it would be up to the Chairman of the day to say whether he would risk election or alternatively chance being re-elected by the Assembly and thereby retain his membership of the House. I think it is an undesirable departure to have anyone in the elected Assembly who is not elected, but who can go on from one Parliament to another without ever appealing to his constituents. If that is a good policy for the other House I contend it to be equally good for the Seanad, and that a case made in respect of the other House can be made for the Chairman of this House although I should oppose it. It shows how the principle can be extended, and eventually it might extend to the Vice-Chairman of both Houses. In that way the principles of a representative institution would be gradually encroached upon and eaten into. For that reason I shall vote against the Second Reading of this Bill.

The object of this Bill, as explained by Senator O'Farrell, is to meet the special case of the Speaker or Ceann Comhairle of the Dáil. I may perhaps mention that this difficulty is not peculiar to this State. It exists elsewhere and has been met elsewhere in a rather special manner. In Great Britain the Speaker's seat, by agreement between the heads of Parties, is not contested. It is ear-marked for him and he is returned automatically at each succeeding General Election. The result of that is practically to disfranchise an important constituency. It is, I think at present, a constituency in the City of London but that provision for the Speaker can be made where you have straight voting system of election. It cannot be made where you have proportional representation. It would not be possible here to earmark a seat and say "that is the Speaker's seat" and by agreement between Party leaders it should be left uncontested so that it did seem necessary to make some other provision to meet the special case of the Speaker.

Let me remind Senators of what happens when Parliament meets. Some one member of the Parliament is called from the services of his constituency to the services of the Assembly. That is what happens. As from that date the assembly in fact becomes his constituency. He is divorced from the cut and thrust of active party politics. It is undesirable that he should adopt a partisan attitude on any issue, that he should appear on public platforms, that he should, in other words, exercise the liberty which attaches to all other members of the House. When a man over a period of four or five years had been completely aloof in that way from party politics, from the active service of his constituency, from the voicing of the views of his constituents, his prospects in a competitive election under proportional representation against five or six others who throughout that long period had been free to nurse that constituency might be very slender indeed.

This is a special provision. I have shown that a special provision is made elsewhere in a manner in which it cannot be made here owing to the existence of proportional representation. The suggestion is, therefore, that the person who has presided over a Dáil during the lifetime of a particular Parliament shall be deemed to be elected, shall be returned automatically to the next Parliament, leaving the next Parliament quite free on the issue of whether or not it will select that particular individual to be its Speaker. The Senator says, and of course he is accurate, that it is an encroachment on the representative character of the Assembly. It is to the extent of less than one per cent. In an Assembly of 130 or 140 members you will have one person who was not elected by a constituency unless you take it in the sense that his real constituency during the lifetime of the last Parliament was the Dáil itself.

We have not been able to devise any other provision. The alternative is to leave the Speaker free to take his chance, in an intensely competitive election, against persons who have been under none of the disabilities which he has been under by nature of his office. That does not seem sound. But the Senator spoke of a suggested compromise, that this person should be returned automatically to the next Parliament, retiring therefrom and stepping clean out of public life, so to speak, if not selected as the Speaker. Is that desirable? Does it not put a degree more of pressure, of coercion on the next Parliament, to select him if the result of his non-selection is that he disappears entirely from the arena of public life? The case would then be the stronger for the election of that particular individual. It would be pointed out that if he is not selected he disappears for five years as a factor in the public life of the country. It is better to leave the ensuing Parliament quite free in the matter as to whether the person who had acted as Speaker for the previous Parliament would be Speaker in that Parliament or not, and it is a degree or two less free if you say: "Here is a man in your midst; if you choose him as Speaker he remains, but if you do not choose him as Speaker he goes out from your midst and disappears from the scene for five years." We think that this is a reasonable proposal. It is certainly not devised in any spirit of party, but simply to meet a special situation which undoubtedly exists as part and parcel of our scheme of representative institutions. We cannot meet it as it is met in Great Britain because we have a different system of election, because we have proportional representation, and it would be impossible to earmark the Speaker's seat. This is the best method that we have been able to devise, and we recommend it accordingly.

I hope that the Seanad will support this Bill. Possibly we are better able to consider it even than the Dáil, because it does not affect us and we can look at the thing without any regard to personalities. It is not our concern who may or may not be Speaker of the other House. But it does seem to me that the arguments for this Bill are not quite as stated by Senator O'Farrell, though I recognise that he was endeavouring to state them quite fairly. It is not so much that there may be certain hardships on an individual, who cannot do what he would like in order to get re-elected, as it is that you require to have the Chairman of the popular House as independent as it is possible to make him, as free from partisanship, to make it beyond question that he cannot and ought not, while in office, or while a prospective candidate for office as Chairman, express his opinions, whatever they may be, on the legislation that is before the House. Quite, true, the Chairman of the Dáil, when he went for election, would have difficulty in making as good a case as another member. It is equally possible that he might be better off, because sometimes the speeches that people have made cause their failure to be re-elected. But I do not think that that is the point. My point is that, for good or evil, he ught not to go to the hustings and state that he is for or against the particular Bills which, as frequently is the case, have been introduced into the House but not passed, with regard to which he has been acting impartially and on which he will be expected to act impartially as soon as he is re-elected, if he is re-elected.

The main point, to my mind, is to provide the best way to secure the independence of the Speaker, to secure that he shall not be expected in public as long as he holds that office, or as long as he is likely to be elected to that office, to express any opinion, good, bad or indifferent, about the Bills with which he will have to deal. For example, a certain number of Bills, I understand, are to be introduced by the Government between now and the time when we are likely to have a General Election. The Chairman of the Dáil acts impartially; he expresses no opinion about any of this legislation. I think it is indisputable that much of this legislation will not or cannot be passed into law before the General Election. Is the Speaker to go out, as soon as the House dissolves, and express his views upon all these measures? I suggest that that would weaken his position, and that, no matter how independently he was prepared to act if he was re-elected as Chairman, certain people would feel, knowing as they would then what his own views were, that he would be acting other than impartially. Then, again, what I consider is the most serious problem of all is the fact that we have the party or group system here at present. It is extremely difficult to get a man elected as an independent candidate. If he is wealthy he may manage to run an election campaign all by himself, and one or two of that type may get elected. In practice that is rare. That means, in fact, that the Chairman of the Dáil has to be adopted for election purposes by some one or other of the parties, and must be run by that party. I suggest that that is not desirable.

The question then arises: If we agree as to the end, what is the best means? I have not heard any method suggested other than the proposed compromise by Senator O'Farrell, that the Speaker should not be a member of the House at all. There is a good deal to be said for that, but the Committee which considered this in the first instance and made recommendations to the Executive Council of proposals somewhat like this, considered the matter carefully and came to the conclusion that he should be a member. As to the compromise, my own impression is this: it is not a matter of a man taking a risk as to whether he will be re-elected Chairman or not; it is simply this, that you want the Dáil to be as independent as possible of other considerations in choosing its Chairman. Senator O'Farrell says—and he may be right—that the failure to elect him as Chairman would show a want of confidence in him on the part of the House. Perhaps I had better not argue that; it might be correct, but I do not think it would always be the case. There may be cases where considerations other than purely a matter of confidence would lead to the selection of somebody else. A new Government, a different complexion in the parties, led to a change in South Africa some time ago, and it is quite possible that there are other questions which would be considerations in deciding whether the Chairman ought to be re-elected or not.

One other point. Senator O'Farrell said that this man would represent nobody. Let me say, in passing, that the case of one man representing a constituency does not apply under proportional representation; there are five or six, representing groups in the constituency. Under the old system the man elected looked after the general interests of the constituency, but that has practically gone. He now represents one-fifth, one-sixth, or one-seventh of the interests in his constituency, and he speaks for that portion, not for the whole constituency. For example, Mr. A.B. is elected, and when he takes his seat in the House, finds himself called to the position of Chairman. He does not function at at all as an ordinary Deputy. I do not agree that he can take very much interest in his group in the constituency by going to Ministers or by asking other Deputies to act on his behalf. In fact, he has failed to carry out what he was elected for. All that this does is to provide that if, during the lifetime of the following Parliament, he does not continue in the Chair, he carries out these duties, and when it it said that he is not representative, in the strictest sense, as he was not elected at that particular moment, it must be remembered that he was elected previously and was, therefore, considered a fit person to act as a Deputy. I hope, having regard to all the circumstances, that the Seanad will support this Bill.

I am still among those unconverted to the Government's view. I do not know that any particular emergency has arisen to urge us specially to interfere with what has been the immemorial parliamentary practice as far as the Speaker is concerned. It is said when the Parliament elevates one of its members into the important position of Speaker, that, ipso facto, he is unable to give proper attention to the interests of his constituents, or, as it may be, that he is not able to keep sufficiently in touch with the affairs of his constituents, their wishes and their interests. But I should have thought that that argument could not possibly apply in a country as small as this country. Surely the Speaker of the Dáil must know what his constituents think about various questions, and he will surely be able to assist them in many respects. As a matter of fact, the Speaker has exceptional facilities, exceptional opportunities, for serving his constituents' interests, as we all know. In fact, most constituencies might look upon it rather as an honour if their representative were appointed to the most important position in the gift of his colleagues.

We are told that a Speaker should not mix in politics. Well, how did he get elected? Was he not a member of some political party? It does not follow because a man is a Speaker of an Assembly that he must therefore have no views of his own. I think it is a most unwise thing for a politician, a representative of the people, to have no views of his own. I am afraid that a person occupying the position under these conditions would hardly conduce to the dignity or efficiency of a Parliament. There is no reason whatever why a Speaker should not have his individual views in regard to politics, and there is no reason why he should not express his views even at election times. Of course, when he takes the Chair it is his bounden duty and first principle to act with absolute impartiality. While he is in the Chair he pays no attention, of course, to political considerations. Political considerations, after all, do not arise very much in the interpretation of the Orders of the House. All he has to do is to carry out the ordinary duties of Chairman and see the business of the Assembly is conducted in an orderly fashion.

There is another point which has escaped general notice. Under the arrangement now proposed you will have one member of the Dáil elected to represent no constituency; but that member must belong to one of the political parties or groups into which the Dáil is divided. You can imagine something approaching equilibrium being arrived at amongst the various groups and parties and the party to which the Speaker, or the ex-Speaker, belongs will have one vote more than it is entitled to. To that extent I think it will be a negation of constitutional and representative principles.

The Speakers in other Assemblies, in the United States, Canada and Australia are in this position: their seats are contested in the ordinary way, and if they are defeated they are not in the running for the Speakerships of their Assemblies. They seem to carry on quite satisfactorily in those countries under those conditions, and I do not see why we should make an exception in the case of the Saorstát simply because we happen to have proportional representation. It may be that some day or other we may change the system of proportional representation. If that is done I presume we will have to amend our Constitution again.

I do not think a case has been made out for such a departure from established constitutional and representative rules and regulations, and I will certainly vote against the Second Reading of the Bill if the matter is pressed to a division.

I think anybody who knows anything about the Dáil and its proceedings will agree that the present Speaker is unexceptionable and that it would be hard to get another as good. But, after all, he belongs, like anybody else, to a party. I do not know whether, when he was first elected, he was put in for that purpose; but no one had any experience of him as a Chairman before, and, therefore, I presume that, to a certain extent at least, if not entirely, he was put in because he was a member of a party.

That also would apply equally, as has been pointed out, to the Deputy Speaker. As far as I know, the Deputy Speaker is not permitted to go about the country making speeches wherever he likes. I do not think that there is any order against that, but I think, unless I am misinformed, it has been suggested to him that he had better not do it and that it would not conduce to his retention of the Deputy Speakership if he did. If that is so, the same thing should apply to him. Why is it not applied to him? I do not know of any reason why it should not be. Perhaps the Minister will explain why the exception should be in the case of the Speaker only.

As has already been pointed out, it might also be made apply to the Cathaoirleach and Leas-Chathaoirleach of the Seanad. As a matter of fact, the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad has on more than one occasion made political statements.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Senator, since I was elected to this Chair I have never made a speech on controversial politics.

I am far from objecting even if the Cathaoirleach did so. I am not sure that he has not done anything of the sort inside the Seanad.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I am not talking of the Seanad. I understood you referred to outside. In the Seanad I have spoken when I thought it my duty.

And also outside.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Never.

On one occasion our Cathaoirleach said it was important for the country to continue its support of the present Government.

CATHAOIRLEACH

Do you call that controversial?

If that is not controversial I do not know what is.

CATHAOIRLEACH

If it is, Senator, I plead guilty.

Well, that is only in passing; I am only saying it for the sake of my argument. The Leas-Chathaoirleach here might do the same. What I am going to say was already hinted at. We know of the English agreement and it has been pointed out that under proportional representation such a thing could not happen. That is an extraordinary thing to say. It means that even if all the parties in a particular constituency—say the University—agree that the present Speaker should be elected, he may be put out and given no chance. That is a very extraordinary statement. Even if all the parties agree in the University that the present Speaker should be elected—and I think that all parties will agree—we are told he may have no chance of being put in.

The English situation is made up, I said, by agreement between the heads of parties. Persons are not nominated in opposition to the Speaker for what is called his seat; it is left free for him. No such arrangement is possible under proportional representation and it would be a matter, not for the heads of parties, but for the electors.

Can the Minister say if there is any guarantee that that arrangement will continue in England? On one occasion the Speaker was opposed.

What the Minister has stated was not always, to my knowledge, the case in the House of Commons. I remember when an important party question arose in the House over the election of a Speaker and the choice of a Speaker at the time tended to show which party was in the ascendancy. I believe that since then the selection of a Speaker has been made by agreement, but it is only a private agreement and if there was strong party feeling in the House I am not at all sure that it would continue. It might or it might not. My contention still holds good. There is no reason why the different parties, in the case of the University or some other constituency, as it might happen, should not agree to support the Speaker in the election and that would probably ensure his return. In England the Speaker goes up for election but he is not opposed.

This is a matter touching the Constitution. It is not so long since the Constitution was drawn up for the Seanad and Dáil and we were told then that it was almost inviolable. But now so many changes are made in this Constitution that I think, after a little while there will be only one Article of the original Constitution left and that will be the Oath. It seems to be the tendency at present to wipe out all the other Articles. Another argument put forward in favour of this Bill was that it was only a question of one member in a Dáil of 120 or 130. That comes back to the old argument of the girl who had a baby and in mitigation said it was only a little one. However, that is not so in this case because there are three or four more "babies" coming on to-day. I do not think there is any necessity for this Bill under all the circumstances. I believe the difficulty has not arisen and will not arise. I believe if the Ceann Comhairle goes up at the General Election he will be elected. I see no reason why he should not. I think we should follow the practice in England where they do not make theoretical changes, but wait until the difficulty arises or until the question arises. I believe we would be wise in not making a change of this kind and for that reason I oppose this Bill. I do so with regret because the Bill does not concern the Seanad. For that reason I am sorry in a special way for having to oppose it. I rather regret giving a vote in this House on a matter concerned with the other House, but under the circumstances I feel I must do so.

It appears to me that there is a great danger in passing legislation of this kind. We have no guarantee that in future the Dáil will be able to get such as efficient a Ceann Comhairle as they have to-day. I think every Senator here as well as the Deputies in the other House would regard with much regret anything that would deprive the Oireachtas of the services of the Deputy who occupies the position of Ceann Comhairle in the Dáil. At the same time we must not forget, if we pass this Bill now, that we are passing legislation not for the present but for the future. It is rather a dangerous thing that we should pass legislation amending the Constitution for the purpose of providing a seat in the Oireachtas for a member who represents nobody. Senator O'Farrell has suggested a reasonable compromise, that in the event of the individual who was the outgoing Ceann Comhairle at the dissolution, not being re-elected the Ceann Comhairle of the new Assembly, he would cease to hold his position.

CATHAOIRLEACH

He would in that case be eligible for re-election.

At the next election.

CATHAOIRLEACH

He would be eligible for re-election if he automatically resigned: on his failure to be elected Ceann Comhairle would he not be eligible for re-election?

I think that the whole principle underlying this Bill is a want of confidence in the good sense of the electors. At the last General Election the present Ceann Comhairle was elected for two constituencies. The intelligentsia of the National University and the democrats of Dublin City (South) elected him as Deputy, so that I think we rather forget that fact when we suggest that the ordinary electors, men and women, citizens of the country cannot appreciate the good services that he is competent to carry on on behalf of the State. For that reason I say that I do not think there is any danger that the man who has given service in the position of Ceann Comhairle would not be re-elected or that the people outside would be unmindful of the services rendered and would be unmindful of the fact that he conducted the business of the Assembly in the manner in which it has been conducted since the Oireachtas was established. I do not believe that the people outside would forget that and I have no hesitation in saying that neither the Government nor the Dáil need have any fears in that respect. We are told that because the Ceann Comhairle was divorced more or less from his constituents and because he was not in the position to deal with the ordinary work the ordinary Deputy does, that there was danger that the people outside would be unmindful of the fact that he was unable to do ordinary work outside. When this matter was under consideration in the Dáil itself a considerable difference of opinion arose amongst the Deputies. If my memory serves me right the majority in favour of it was only a mere handful.

How big a handful?

I think it was seven. I think if there was such a difference of opinion in the Dáil itself with regard to this matter then, that is all the more reason why the Seanad should seriously consider it. It is unnecessary for me to say that the opposition from this side of the Seanad is not to be taken as any disparagement to the present occupant. Because I think no Party has more admiration and no Party has reason to have more admiration for the present occupant of the Chair than has the Labour Party. I will say no more than that. I do not want to offer my own personal views on this question because I do not want to say the nice things that I would wish to say about the Ceann Comhairle. The reasons I have given are the reasons why we are opposed to this Bill.

I hope the Seanad will vote for this Bill, and carry it by a large majority. There are certain objections to it about which we have heard. There is a small infringement of the representative character of Dáil Eireann, but that is so small as to be almost an academic point, whereas I think on the other side it must be universally recognised that the position of Chairman of any legislative Assembly is an exceedingly onerous one. The position of the occupant as regards the work to be done in the House and the sittings in the House is one that involves a great deal of hard work. The Chairman of that Assembly should as far as possible be an entirely impartial person because the efficiency and smooth working of the House depends so very much on the amount of general confidence felt by all parts and sections of the House in the Chairman and in his efficiency. If he is to reach that efficiency and if he is to do the work that he has to do in the best possible way, it is necessary that he would be free to look upon himself as being not a member of any party. For that reason I think the principle involved is very sound and I hope the Bill will pass.

Question—"That the Bill be now read a Second Time"—put.

I challenge a division.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I do not want in the least degree to dictate to you but in a matter of this kind that so directly affects the domestic arrangements of the other House I suggest that you should be content with your protest and not press it to a division.

I am sorry that I cannot take that view. It is not so much a matter affecting the other House as a matter affecting the representative institution that controls the destinies of this country.

CATHAOIRLEACH

I will say no more. If you take that view you are quite right.

The Seanad divided: Tá, 31; Níl, 8.

  • Thomas Westropp Bennett.
  • John Bagwell.
  • William Barrington.
  • Sir Edward Coey Bigger.
  • P.J. Brady.
  • Samuel L. Brown.
  • John C. Counihan.
  • Countess of Desart.
  • James Douglas.
  • Sir Nugent Talbot Everard.
  • Michael Fanning.
  • Oliver St. John Gogarty.
  • Mrs. Alice Stopford Green.
  • Sir Henry Greer.
  • Sir John Purser Griffith.
  • Henry Seymour Guinness.
  • Benjamin Haughton.
  • Arthur Jackson.
  • Right Hon. Andrew Jameson.
  • Sir John Keane.
  • Cornelius Kennedy.
  • Patrick Williams Kenny.
  • Thomas Linehan.
  • John MacLoughlin.
  • General Sir Bryan Mahon.
  • William John Molloy.
  • Joseph O'Connor.
  • Bernard O'Rourke.
  • James J. Parkinson.
  • Mrs. Jane Wyse Power.
  • Thomas Toal.

Níl

  • James Dillon.
  • Michael Duffy.
  • Sir Thomas Henry Grattan Esmonde.
  • Thomas Farren.
  • Thomas Foran.
  • Colonel Maurice Moore.
  • John Thomas O'Farrell.
  • Michael F. O'Hanlon.
Motion declared carried.
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