The principle sought to be established by this Bill is quite foreign to representative institutions, and, as far as I know, without any constitutional precedent in any other Parliament. The Bill proposes that the Deputy who is Chairman of the Dáil immediately prior to a dissolution shall, unless he expresses a desire to the contrary, have no necessity to offer himself for re-election, but shall be returned automatically as a member of the new Dáil and represent no constituency. When the new Assembly meets it may or it may not select this Deputy who represents nobody to be Chairman over its proceedings. If it does elect him he presides over its deliberations, but if it does not elect him he still remains a member of the House with all the rights and privileges of a Deputy duly elected. It is even possible that he can become a member of the Executive Council, Minister for Finance, or even President. That seems to me to be an extraordinary constitutional departure in order to meet what is obviously a difficulty, but not a difficulty which is peculiar to this State more than to any other. The arguments in support of the Bill have been to the effect that the Speaker of the House has not the opportunity that other Deputies have had of catering for his constituents, of voicing their opinions in the House and so forth, and that consequently he is at a disadvantage in securing re-election. That is one of the arguments. The other is that it is undesirable that the Speaker of the House should have to enter into the cock-pit of politics in the ensuing election. Although a Deputy may be Speaker it does not of necessity follow that he has not been able to do something for his constituents, because he is always in a position, if he so desires, to ask the assistance of Ministers and other Deputies in getting individual cases attended to, and in general doing the work of a Deputy which is apart from the ordinary public parliamentary work. In regard to the undesirability of his mixing in politics openly at an election there is nothing unnatural in that, because there is no guarantee that the same man will be elected Speaker again at the next Parliament, and it would be a poor Parliament that would be unable to secure a suitable alternative for a Deputy who was Speaker in the event of his not securing re-election.
A compromise on this unusual departure was suggested and turned down. It was to the effect that he would not be required to seek re-election, but that if the new Dáil did not select him as their Chairman he would cease to be a member of the Assembly. Otherwise he would not have to seek election at the polls. Even his own colleagues do not see fit to elect him to the Chair, so he does not command the confidence of the majority of the House, and yet he has all the powers and privileges of a duly elected Deputy. The compromise is reasonable, because it would be up to the Chairman of the day to say whether he would risk election or alternatively chance being re-elected by the Assembly and thereby retain his membership of the House. I think it is an undesirable departure to have anyone in the elected Assembly who is not elected, but who can go on from one Parliament to another without ever appealing to his constituents. If that is a good policy for the other House I contend it to be equally good for the Seanad, and that a case made in respect of the other House can be made for the Chairman of this House although I should oppose it. It shows how the principle can be extended, and eventually it might extend to the Vice-Chairman of both Houses. In that way the principles of a representative institution would be gradually encroached upon and eaten into. For that reason I shall vote against the Second Reading of this Bill.