I am surprised that the Minister for Justice, himself a lawyer, should come forward with a proposal for the extension of the life of this Juries Act, but I am much more surprised at the reasons which he has given. He has informed the House that the Juries Act has been a success, that it has put a stop to the intimidation of jurymen. He has also informed the House that it is necessary to continue it because there has been one example of intimidation of jurymen by means of a circular. Of course, the Minister has sources of information that other people have not, and I take it, as he says it, that there has been intimidation. Now, in my opinion the Juries Act is a dead letter. There is a great deal of formality in relation to the empanelling of jurors. They come in, in a mysterious way, by number. They are not called by name, and they go into the box. You are not supposed to know who they are or what they are. I do not like to use a vulgar phrase in connection with this Bill, but it seems to me that there is a lot of fee-faw-fum and humbug about the Juries Act.
What is the reason suggested by the Minister for the continuation of this measure? The same reason that he urged originally for the introduction of this most reactionary measure. What is it? That a man who had served on a jury was wounded. That incident had occurred six months before the original Bill was before the House. Now, that incident is at least three years back in the pages of history. Does the Minister suggest that the ordinary principles of public liberty and the ordinary administration of justice should be, in appearance at least, completely subverted because a juryman was wounded three years ago? I do not know about the circumstances of that case, but seeing that no other juryman has been interfered with, I would be inclined to think that probably the assault upon the juryman on that occasion, three years ago, was not in consequence of his having served on a jury at all. At any rate that is a ridiculous excuse to give for such a flagrant invasion of the Constitution as this Bill is, in form at least. I say in form, because in substance the principles of human liberty are so firmly embedded in the minds and consciences of the people that they seem to run their course without much disturbance by reason of this Juries Act.
I want to tell members of the House this. If an ordinary prisoner wishes to canvass jurors—I dare say it is more difficult for him—but if an organisation wishes to canvass jurors there is no impediment whatever put in its way by the provisions of this Juries Act. I do not want to let people know—evil-disposed persons, well-disposed persons, or any persons—how the thing can be done, but once men go into the courthouse at Green Street it is perfectly obvious that an organisation can canvass them quite as easily as they could canvass them before this Juries Act was passed. My mind revolts against this Juries Act, not for any injustice that it has been capable of accomplishing, but because it is contrary to the free, open, unashamed and unafraid administration of justice. I am against it for that reason as my main reason. I have another objection to the Juries Act, and it is this. It provides for a majority verdict in criminal cases. I am opposed to a majority verdict in criminal cases, and for this fundamental reason: that the right of the State to punish is, I think, conditioned by this, that an offence must be committed against the laws of the State, and not merely that, but proved beyond reasonable doubt against the individual according to the laws of the State.
There are really three conditions which limit the right of the State to punish: there must be an act done; there must be proof that it was done, and that proof must be according to the forms of law and of such a character as to leave no reasonable doubt. Why I am against a majority verdict is this, that if there is a doubt in the mind of any one of the sworn twelve— that is, a reasonable doubt—it might be said: "Oh, why should we wait to try and persuade a boot-eater on the jury to agree with the others?" Now, sometimes the one man who stands out is the man who has formed a correct judgment on the evidence, but under this Bill if three men stand out a verdict of guilty can still be found against a citizen. If what one man considers in opposition to the opinions of eleven can be called unreasonable, can what three men consider be called unreasonable? Most assuredly not.
I say it is wrong in an ordinary criminal case to punish a citizen unless you have a unanimous finding with a regular trial, but it is a hundred times more wrong where the result of the verdict and of the judgment is death, where the sentence is irrevocable. It is absolutely and entirely wrong that a man should be sentenced to death and executed upon the verdict of a jury unless that verdict is unanimous. If the Minister considers that that is one of the matters that ought to be made permanent, I wish to let him know that it will have my undying hostility and opposition. We had a very long and very bitter discussion upon the original measure. It is a foolish measure and a futile measure. It is a measure which shows that men were prepared, for a temporary purpose, to turn their backs on what they knew to be long established principles of the administration of justice.
