I move:
That Seanad Eireann would welcome the introduction by the Government of a Bill generally amending the law in relation to trade disputes, and in particular providing for the establishment of a permanent industrial court for the examination of industrial disputes and the promulgation of advisory judgments.
I would like, first of all, to thank Senator MacDermot for his suggestion. I confess that I was particularly desirous that the suggestion I wish to make should be made now, and not postponed for two or three weeks. One of my principal reasons is that, for pretty obvious reasons, the public mind has been very much concerned with the question of strikes and the possible methods of avoiding the loss sustained through labour disputes.
It is frequently stated by Senators who support the present Government that members on this side of the House have nothing to contribute to the solution of urgent present-day problems except hostile Party criticism. I do not agree that this is true, as I consider that many of the speeches delivered during the last six months from this side of the House provided criticism of a definitely constructive character which would have been helpful if there was any evidence that the Government had paid serious attention to the suggestions made.
Be this as it may, I am convinced that the most useful part that the Seanad can take in the Government of the country during the crisis caused by the European war is to provide constructive criticism and to provide a platform for the ventilation of carefully considered proposals for the solution of some of our national difficulties.
Under abnormal conditions such as those caused by a war, it is inevitable that certain problems which have existed for a long time in a more or less chronic form will suddenly become acute. During the past ten years or so we have had a very large number of trade disputes in this country. Many of these have been settled by negotiation, but there have been a very large number of strikes. We have put up with these disputes and strikes, regarding them as a more or less inevitable part of our development; and public interest is aroused only when a strike takes place on a large scale or in some industry or public service that directly affects a large number of citizens. I believe that the time has come when the whole position should be considered and examined from the point of view of its effect on the economy of the nation as a whole.
I would advise every member of this House to study carefully the figures set out on page 130 of the 1939 Statistical Abstract compiled by the Department of Industry and Commerce. I do not propose to quote many figures from the valuable statistics to be found on this page, but the seriousness of the problem can be seen by the fact that during the years 1931-1938, inclusive, there was a total of 805 disputes, involving 87,426 workers, and altogether 3,169,990 working days were lost. No figures are available to show the cost of the loss of those days to the nation in the increased cost of production, to the workers in loss of wages, or to the companies concerned in loss of profits. The average number of days lost per annum was 396,248. The period 1931 to 1938 includes the years of the so-called economic war, when our agricultural industry was suffering serious hardships.
Whether or not the nation was able to afford the loss resulting from past disputes need not now be considered, but is there any member of the House who will deny that we cannot afford to lose 396,248 working days this year through strikes when we are faced with the possibility of a shortage of important supplies, with increasing unemployment and higher taxation?
Already this year we have had serious strikes, and unless something is done there is a very grave danger that the number of disputes may be as large as ever. The resolution I am moving does not refer to any one dispute, past, present or future, and I do not propose to discuss the merits or demerits of any particular dispute.
My object is to draw the attention of the House to the magnitude and the urgency of the problem and I hope to convince you that the existing legislation dealing with this subject is not wholly suitable to the conditions of this country as we know them, and that new legislation is both desirable and necessary. I do not believe for one moment that it is possible to prevent disputes or even to prevent strikes taking place by legislation, except by methods like those adopted in totalitarian States, and in that case I believe the cure to be worse than the disease.
I do believe, however, that under a wise policy supported by the necessary legislation, it would be possible to reduce drastically the number of strikes and lock-outs and, more important still, that it would be possible to secure that the benefits obtained by workers as the result of collective action would be spread more equitably over workers as a whole than at present, and that the terms of settlements of disputes would take into consideration, not only the interests of the employers and workers concerned in the dispute, but also the interests of the people as a whole.
Generally speaking, the legislation now in force in this country dealing with trade disputes was devised in Great Britain before the Treaty at a time when Great Britain was almost entirely a free trade country. The most important of the Acts taken over from England are the Trades Disputes Acts, 1906, Trade Boards Act, 1909, and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. As far as I can remember, the only legislation passed by the Oireachtas on the subject is to be found in Section 50 of the Conditions of Employment Act and, to the best of my knowledge, this section has proved to be of little or no value in practice—in fact it has scarcely been availed of at all.
That disputes as to wages and conditions of employment will arise in a progressive State is only natural, and I do not believe that anyone who believes in democratic freedom, as I do, could support legislation which would prevent workers from endeavouring to improve their lot by collective bargaining. I would like to make it clear at once that I do not advocate legislation for the purpose of denying the right of workers to withhold their labour and to make strikes illegal. We have at present several kinds of conciliatory machinery, the most important of these being trade boards which recommend rates of wages for particular industries, joint industrial councils which exist in certain industries and, of course, the general conciliation work carried on by the Department of Industry and Commerce. Now I do not want to discount the value of such machinery, but we must recognise that it has two serious defects. Firstly, it has failed to prevent the loss, on an average, of a very large number of working days per annum; and secondly, it fails to take into adequate consideration the extent to which the country as a whole can afford to pay the increased prices which may result from an agreement between the employers and the workers themselves.
The conciliatory machinery of the type to which I have referred is much more suitable for industrial disputes in a free trade country because, under free trade conditions, there was no danger of employers and workers in any one industry agreeing together to raise the prices to the consumer beyond a reasonable level. If they did, the industry would be destroyed by outside competition.
But, in a country where most of its industries are protected by tariffs or quotas, there is a very strong temptation to representatives of employers, for the sake of peace and in order to avoid possible loss, to agree to demands which they consider excessive, if they can recoup themselves for doing so by raising prices to levels which would still leave them protected by the existing tariff or if they have reason to hope that the State would increase the protection to cover the higher prices.
As far as I know, the Government always refused to discuss tariffs in relation to any demand for wage increases, but during the last five or six years tariffs have sometimes been increased to further protect industries for which demands for higher wages have been previously acceded to by the employers. I do not say that this is necessarily wrong. Whether it is justified or not depends on the circumstances of the case and I am not attempting now to deal with particular cases.
I believe, however, that in the majority of cases where disputes have been settled as the result of conciliation, very little, if any, regard has been paid to the possible effect of the resultant higher prices on agriculture which, after all, is the primary industry of this country. Speeches made by Ministers during the past year show that they are beginning to appreciate this aspect of the problem to a much greater degree than they did during their earlier years of office.
Every effort has been made by the State to prevent profiteering, at any rate in the majority of our industries, and any price increases by an industrialist are liable to close scrutiny by the Prices Commission. But if an industry raises its prices or the prices of its products solely as the result of an increased cost of labour, the Prices Commission can do nothing, because that is not considered to be profiteering. An employer must not increase his profits on production for home consumption above what is regarded as a reasonable level, because he can only do so at the expense of the community as a whole. Is there any sound reason why a trade union should be allowed to demand wages above a reasonable level if it can only do so at the expense of the community as a whole? In the case of the employer, the Prices Commission has power to decide arbitrarily what is a reasonable level. In the case of the worker, there is no State machinery even to suggest what is a reasonable level. I suggest that, in that respect, there is a gap in our existing legislative machinery.
Now, that there are workers at present whose wages are below a reasonable level I do not deny for a moment but, as a general rule, these are workers who are badly organised or who are unable under existing conditions to improve their lot by collective bargaining. There is a danger that our existing system of dealing with disputes may only further improve the position of the best-paid workers without doing anything for those whose wage level is low. Where demands are made and strikes are threatened, the Minister for Industry and Commerce usually calls a conference of employers' representatives and workers' representatives and an effort is made at a compromise. These conferences, very properly, are private, and only on rare occasions does the public have any opportunity of forming an opinion as to the merits of the dispute or the justice of any settlement arrived at. Frequently these conferences are presided over by an experienced official of the Department, who would be quite competent to form a judgment, but all that the official can do is to hold the balance fairly, and if he does make a suggestion or expresses any opinion, he does so privately and the public have no knowledge of his views.
As a civil servant he can only take definite action on the instructions of his Minister and it is no part of his function to decide what is a reasonable wage level having regard to the capacity of the people generally to pay any higher prices which may result from an agreement and there is no one present at any of these conferences to represent the interests of the consumer.
During the years 1931 to 1938 a total of 506 disputes were terminated—I am taking it from the statistical abstract—by the admission wholly or partly of the workers' claims and 166 by the rejection of the workers' demands. It may have been that the workers' demands agreed to in all the 506 cases were just or it may have been that in some cases the employers were badly organised and weak and submitted to demands which they considered unreasonable because they believed they could pass on the cost to the public. It is pretty safe to assume at any rate that a considerable proportion of the disputes which were settled by the whole or partial admission of the workers' demands, whether they were just or not, resulted in price increases and some addition to the cost of living affecting every class of the community both rich and poor.
At the present time there is a very general demand for increased wages to allow for the increased cost of living since the outbreak of war. This presents, to my mind, an exceedingly difficult problem. If the total income of the nation increases with the cost of living then it is clearly fair that these demands should be met. If, on the other hand, the total national income is reduced, as I very much fear will be the case this year, then a general rise in wages equal to the cost of living increase only means that one section of the community may succeed in avoiding the hardships due to war conditions at the expense of another section which is probably largely composed of those engaged in agriculture. In addition, a rise in wages as cost-of-living figures increase will only further raise the cost of living and a vicious circle will be created.
Exactly the same argument as to a vicious circle would apply if the rates of profits in industry were increased without a corresponding increase in the national income but the Prices Commission has announced its determination to prevent any such increase in profits.
The rising prices caused by such a circle would have to be borne mainly by agriculture and other sections of the population who are unable to increase their incomes in accordance with the cost of living figures. Personally I am of the opinion that where existing wages are so low that the increase in living costs is causing real hardship a rise of wages should be granted as a matter of justice in the interests not only of the low paid worker but also in the interests of the nation as a whole.
But, whatever view may be taken, whether in favour of granting increased wages in accordance with cost of living figures or against it, I do submit that it is a question that affects the nation as a whole and that it is not a suitable question to be settled haphazardly by strike methods or even by conciliation conferences between workers and employers.
To a certain extent the cost of living has been increased by additional taxation recently imposed. Some of this taxation, such as the heavy increase in income-tax, was meant to be borne by the more fortunate section of the population whose incomes rendered them liable to this tax. Other taxation such, for instance, as the tax on sugar, was meant to be borne by the population of the country generally. Any persons who are able to increase their incomes in keeping with the full rise of the cost of living are simply passing on such taxes as affect living costs to that other section of the population who cannot do it.
It is comparatively easy in this as in many other matters to prove that our existing methods and the law which supports them are inadequate to meet the situation but it is not quite so easy to suggest a satisfactory remedy. I would not have brought forward this motion and taken up the time of the House if I did not believe that I was in a position to put forward suggestions, at any rate, worthy of the very serious consideration of the House and of the Government.
A strike or a lock-out is, in effect, industrial war. The workers, when a strike is on, endeavour to injure the employer by every method the law allows in the hope that the economic effect will force the employer to yield. The employer, on the other hand, hopes that union funds will run out and that economic conditions will force the strikers to yield. As in war between nations the neutrals or non-belligerents also suffer to a greater or lesser degree according to the importance of the industry. When municipal employees go on strike the public feel the results more surely and more quickly than in most other strikes, but the fact remains that the losses caused by any strike have to be borne by someone and it is usually the public who pay, in some form or other, by higher prices.
It seems to me, therefore, that any change in the law should be directed towards making it less easy to strike or to lock-out and, if possible, to provide that there will never be a strike or lock-out until the dispute has been considered by an independent person or independent persons and a proposal for settlement made.
As I have already said, I do not advocate the abolition of the ultimate right to fight out an industrial quarrel by means of the strike or lock-out, but I do desire to make it illegal to strike or lock-out before a genuine independent effort has been made to solve the problem by other means less injurious to the nation as a whole and, if and when a strike does take place, that the public should be in a better position to judge the issue than they ever are in normal present conditions. It is quite common to see pickets outside a shop in Dublin and the public have not, as a general rule, the slightest knowledge of the merits of the dispute. Some persons boycott the shop because there are pickets outside. In doing so they are supporting one side. Other persons continue to shop at the establishment and thereby support the other side. But whichever side they support they do so without knowledge. If the dispute had been examined by an independent tribunal and an advisory judgment given before the strike took place the public would be in a much better position to judge and could act according to its judgment.
It, therefore, seems to me that new legislation is required, firstly to provide easy means for the investigation of all disputes not settled by negotiation and for an independent judgment thereon and, secondly to remove the facilities for strikes legalised by the Trades Disputes Act until after such judgment has been pronounced and also to prevent employers from taking any unfair advantage of the delay.
I suggest the establishment of one or more permanent Industrial Courts— as to whether the term "Industrial Court" is the best, I have an open mind—each of which should be presided over by a president who should be independent in his functions and appointed to and removed from office in the same manner as a judge of the High Court. The president should be a man of high character and experience, and should be precluded from holding any other office or having a direct interest in any industry or business. His salary should be similar to that of a High Court judge. He should be assisted, from time to time, by assessors who would act in an advisory capacity only and be chosen from panels nominated by employers' organisations and trade unions.
The court should have power to sit in public or in private, and to enforce the attendance of witnesses, including, if desired, witnesses from Government Departments and representatives of consumers' interests.
It is my suggestion that when any dispute occurs between employers of 10 or more persons—for the moment I am leaving out the very small businesses—and their employees, or between public bodies or workers employed by them, it should be the right of the employer or the trade union concerned to appeal to the industrial court for an advisory judgment. If and when an appeal has been made to the court, it should be illegal for any picketing to take place, or for any trade union to declare or advocate a strike in connection with such a dispute, until three weeks after such court has heard the case and pronounced its judgment. I suggest that any employee who has withdrawn his labour as a result of a dispute should immediately return to work when an appeal has been made to the industrial court, and, if he fails to do so, he should be dismissed from his employment and the employer should not be expected to reinstate him under any settlement of the dispute. No employer should be entitled to dismiss an employee as a result of such a dispute until after the judgment of the court has been promulgated. During the period from the appeal to the court until three weeks after the promulgation of the judgment, it should not be legal to picket or otherwise interfere with the employer's business.
Judgments of the industrial court should be advisory and acceptance not legally binding on either side until they are accepted by both sides. Should the representatives of a trade union concerned in the dispute refuse to accept a judgment of the court which has been accepted by the representatives of the employers, the dispute should cease to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Traders Disputes Acts, and picketing or other hostile action should be illegal if a strike does take place. Should an employer refuse to accept a judgment of the court which has been accepted by the representatives of the trade unions, or should neither side accept the judgment, then the rights of picketing as provided in the Trade Disputes Acts should be as at present. If the court so recommends, judgments accepted by both sides should, in so far as they relate to wages in industrial work, be automatically registered by the Minister for Industry and Commerce under Section 50 of the Conditions of Employment Act. Every judgment of the industrial court should provide for a period of time during which the terms should be operative, and the minimum period should be one year, with a provision for automatic extension unless cancelled by one side on three months' notice. Once a judgment has been accepted by both sides, the court should have power to make decisions on all questions arising out of the operation of any such settlement, and such decisions should be legally binding.
I do not believe for one moment that the scheme I have outlined would eliminate strikes, but I am confident that it would reduce the number substantially and that it would make lightning strikes practically impossible. It does not provide for compulsory arbitration, which I believe to be unworkable, and it does not interfere with the right of Labour to combine and to refuse to work if it cannot obtain its just rights. As time goes on, the presidents of industrial courts would gain experience, and I believe that the judgments given would be accepted in a steadily increasing number of cases. It would provide a measure of protection to reasonable employers who are genuinely desirous of giving a fair deal to their workers, while, at the same time, recognising their responsibility to the public with regard to prices. I cannot see that it would adversely affect the trade union movement. Indeed, it might strengthen the unions, as it would not be easy for employees to appear before the court unless members of a union. Likewise, it would be difficult for employers to take full advantage of the court where their employees are not union members. I do not propose that individual employees should have a right to appeal to the court, I reserve that right to trade unions.
It may be argued that the setting up of industrial courts would be expensive. To this I reply that the saving to the nation would be much greater than the expense involved, and also that there should be a considerable saving to the Department of Industry and Commerce. If, however, the cost is considered a serious barrier to the carrying out of a scheme such as I have outlined, it might be met by charging a fee to employers and trade unions who appeal to the court. This fee should vary according to the number of persons involved in the dispute. As I have already pointed out, my motion avoids dealing with any particular dispute, but it may help to enforce my arguments if I point out the advantage in the case of the present Dublin Corporation dispute, if such a court had been available. The corporation or the city manager could have appealed to the court as soon as the demands were made and, when hearing the case, the court could have heard not only the workers' and the corporation point of view, but also that of ratepayers. It could have considered the wages demanded in relation to the wages generally paid for similar work in the country, and whether or not there were good reasons for higher rates of pay. During the court hearing, a strike would be illegal, and if by any chance the corporation or the workers refused to accept the advisory judgment, the public would be in a position to judge the issue fairly.
I believe that where essential public services are concerned, such as the fire brigade, water, essential food supplies and the like, it should be obligatory that any dispute should be submitted to the court before a strike takes place, and it should not be left to the employer or a trade union to appeal to the court. Many persons feel that strikes should be made illegal in such cases, but I believe it would not be found necessary to take so drastic a step if legislation was passed on the lines I have suggested. I do not suggest that the setting up of an industrial court, with the consequential amendments to the Trades Disputes Acts, are the only amendments to the law required to deal with the situation, but I do suggest that it is a step which could be wisely taken at once and that it would ease the situation this year. There is a number of less urgent alterations in the law I would like to see made. I would restrict the right of picketing to members of trade unions acting under union instructions. I would also like to make trade unions responsible for any illegal acts by their members during a strike, such as the destruction of property. I have felt for some time that many of our industrial disputes are due to the want of adequate organisation among employers. I believe also there are too many trade unions. I would like to see one strong, well-managed union and one properly organised employers' association for every industry. It is almost impossible for a trade union to deal with a number of unorganised employers in any industry, and likewise the existence of several trade unions in one trade creates an almost impossible position for employers, and often prevents the amicable settlement of differences.
Many persons will not agree with me in this, but I would like to see it ultimately obligatory on every worker to join a trade union and on every employer to join an employers' association. I am convinced that, if that were practicable, it would reduce the number of strikes, especially if you had an industrial court, but before I would be prepared to advocate legislation on such drastic lines, it would be essential to provide a well-thought-out code which would regulate the relations between individual workers and their unions, or between employers and their associations, in order to provide for the maintenance of reasonable liberty and in order to prevent coercion on matters outside the proper functions of the associations or of the unions.
A study of the system of organisations and agreements relating to employers and workers in Sweden is well worth while, but I could not very well take the time of the House in an attempt to describe it. In that country employers and employed are exceptionally well organised, and both sides are powerful. As the organisations grew in strength and in power, the number of strikes decreased. I believe the same would result here. The frequent failure of employers to work together and the existence in certain trades of competing trade unions is, in my opinion, one cause of the large number of disputes during the past few years. If adequate organisation existed on both sides, it would then be quite feasible to create an industrial council with an annual conference, as recently suggested in a lecture by Father Coyne. I believe the proposals made by Father Coyne were very valuable and well worth consideration by the Government, though I think, to get full benefit from any such council, a higher degree of organisation would be essential. I do not propose here, however, to deal generally with the problem of organisation, because I imagine that is a matter which will be fully considered by the Vocational Organisation Commission which is now sitting.
As I am vice-president at the moment of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers, I think perhaps that I ought to make it clear that the views I have expressed here are my own, and that I do not claim to speak on behalf of members of the federation, or any other employers. I can say, however, that the council of the federation is strongly in favour of the setting up of an industrial court, more or less on the lines which I have advocated. My main object in moving this resolution is to draw attention to the problem, and to enable this House to discuss it. I hope the House will eventually be willing to pass the motion and that the Government will give the matter sympathetic consideration, but I am strongly convinced that it will be a national disaster if the potential danger to the economy of the country as a whole, through strikes, is simply ignored and allowed to go on as at present. I believe that in the suggestions I have made there is something, while it might not fully meet the case—I do not claim in any sense to be an expert, or that all my details are correct—which would be well worthy of debate and of an endeavour to discuss the way in which I may possibly may have made mistakes; but I am strongly convinced that the majority of workers and trade unions do not want hasty strikes and that if we could get a way by which reasonable proposals could be put forward without undue delay before a strike took place, you would reduce the number of strikes very considerably. Employers are very reluctant to refuse a reasonable proposal when their workers are still working. When they are out on strike, you generally get the same mentality on both sides as you get in a war situation—you have sustained loss and must show something for it, and so it goes on. The time to settle disputes is before strikes take place, and not afterwards.
