When the Adjournment was moved on the last occasion, I was endeavouring to deal with two aspects of this motion which was moved by Senator Counihan. The first point I wanted to make was that if you accept this resolution you cannot restrict it within the narrow limits fixed by Senator Counihan. His proposal is that arbitration machinery should apply to agriculture only, but even then he wants to restrict it to the conditions obtaining in agriculture during the operation of the compulsory tillage regulations. I pointed out that was impossible. Agriculture cannot, in this matter, be treated as an isolated question — away from every other economic activity of the country. That, I think, was admitted very clearly by Senator Summerfield who, in order to give his imprimatur to the motion, took the opportunity of seconding it. The next point I drew attention to was that, in certain circumstances, one could see quite a good case for compulsory arbitration. I pointed out that, in fact, in certain circumstances the workers are not opposed to arbitration. They have, in certain countries which I mentioned, agitated for compulsory arbitration, and the countries in which it has been most effective are those in which there have been strong labour Governments for many years. The conception of compulsory arbitration that is in Senator Counihan's mind is not that which is known, let us say, in Australia or New Zealand. What is in his mind is a going back to those old ordinances of labour which were in operation in the 14th century when the British Government of the period appointed the local yeomen to be magistrates to determine maximum wages so that farm workers might not be permitted to make contracts, or to demand wages, in excess of those fixed by the magistrates. That, I suggest, is what Senator Counihan is thinking of. He even wants the Minister, as a last resort, to send out the Guards to arrest organisers, and in that way to go back to the 14th century principles. I do not think it would be wise to go back to the 14th century, even if you could, because there are other limitations, besides compulsory wage fixing, which could be imposed.
As to the purpose of compulsory arbitration, I would like to quote the opinions of two people who are in a position to say what exactly is the purpose it is intended to serve, and the manner in which the purpose has been achieved. The Prime Minister of Australia has said:—
"It was, and still is, the clear intention of the Government that the industrial court established under the Acts would assist rather than retard the efforts of the workers to improve their conditions of employment and raise wages."
So that in Australia, at any rate, the purpose of the industrial court, as established under the Compulsory Arbitration Act, is to improve the status of the workers and to raise their wages. I do not think that Senator Counihan would subscribe too readily to that conception of an industrial court in relation to agriculture in this country. In regard to New Zealand, the matter is discussed by Mr. Walter Nash, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in New Zealand, in a book of his entitled New Zealand: a Working Democracy”, which was published in mid-summer last year. This is what he says on the subject of compulsory arbitration:—
"Since the legislative code issued the workers with many benefits for which they would otherwise have had to fight strenuously, it was felt that the further amelioration of living conditions would best be attained by legislation rather than by direct action."
That shows clearly that the authors of the scheme desired to promote working-class conditions. They were not primarily concerned with preventing strikes. As a matter of fact, the industrial court, and compulsory arbitration, have not prevented strikes, as I will show in a moment. Here is a remarkable thing, that when a Conservative Government was in office in New Zealand they abolished the industrial court and suspended the Compulsory Arbitration Act. Senator Summerfield's friends and Senator Counihan's friends, or their counterparts in New Zealand, did not want compulsory arbitration. They suspended the Act and abolished the court away back in 1930, and when a Labour Government took office in 1935 one of the first things they did was to restore the court, but not, as I have pointed out, for the purpose that Senator Counihan advocates here, but rather for the purpose of increasing wages.
I often wonder whether those who advocate here, or elsewhere, the establishment of some form of compulsory arbitration ever address themselves to the question of how it is going to be worked in our conditions. Looking at the New Zealand Act, I find that it provides three principles. In the first place, it provides for the incorporation of employers' and workers' organisations and gives them legal personality; secondly, it provides for the establishment of district boards to which matters in dispute may be referred, in the first instance for conciliation proceedings; and, thirdly, it provides for the fixation of basic wages. These points are entirely overlooked by the advocates of compulsory arbitration in this country. Senator Counihan, for instance, talked on the last occasion about compulsory arbitration in agriculture as applied to agricultural workers. One of the points he made was that there was no organisation amongst agricultural labourers. The Minister for Agriculture made the same point. In that situation, who are to be the parties to the arbitration? Between what groups and what bodies is the arbitrator to intervene? Does it mean that, if Senator Counihan employs 30 workmen, each workman can have a separate arbitration court for himself? If not, then it clearly indicates that someone has to step in and organise the agricultural workers and farmers. He has not said that he wants that. He must contemplate organisation both on the part of the farmers and farm workers. I know that Senator Counihan, if he is a member of a farmers' union, will not be easily disciplined and he may find that farm labourers will be as hard to discipline as he is himself. If he wants compulsory arbitration, he must want compulsory organisation. You cannot have arbitration unless you have groups to invoke the machinery of the court or tribunal, make a case before it and carry its decisions into effect. The other point I should like to stress in this connection is that, so far as arbitration in New Zealand is concerned, the court is not the first element in the machinery but the last. In both countries, machinery is provided for conciliation between the organised employers and organised workers and it is only when that breaks down that the court is availed of.
One of the problems which will confront those attempting to implement the motion is that of giving legal personality to the employers' and workers' organisations. As a matter of settled policy, trade unions and employers' unions have not got conferred upon them any legal personality. It may be a surprise to some people to learn that, if a member of a trade union or employers' organisation feels he has a grievance against the organisation, he has no legal redress. He cannot go into court and enforce a claim against the organisation. I admit that there are certain remedies but, if a member claims a benefit from such a union and the union refuses to pay, there is no legal remedy. That is distinctly forbidden by the statute which gives recognition to these organisations.
If a court or tribunal were established, there would be this further problem—it would have to act according to some set principle in determining the issues brought before it. Let us assume, for instance, that a body of agricultural workers in County Dublin cited Senator Counihan or his organisation before the tribunal to get an increase in wages. The first question the tribunal would have to decide would be on what principle the issue should be decided. Senator Counihan would, I think, argue that it should be decided according to the ability of the employer to pay. The workman might argue that he was not concerned with the employer's ability to pay but with the amount of money he needed in order to live. Then, there are two conflicting arguments at the outset. The workman says: "I am concerned only with the demands which my liabilities as a citizen make upon me. I must satisfy those demands and I claim from the court an award which will enable me to satisfy them." Senator Counihan may come along and say: "We are not concerned with the workman's standard of living; we do not care what sort of house he has or what number of hours he works. We are concerned only with the question: how much can the farmer pay?" The court must have some principle to guide them. If you take any ordinary common law case in the courts—a workmen's compensation case, for instance—the court acts on certain guiding principles. The court knows the principles upon which the law was interpreted and applies them to the best of its judgment. In this case, there is no parallel.
I mentioned a moment ago some of the questions which would confront this tribunal. There are many questions, apart from wages, which might very well become the subject of citation before an industrial court—the question of the housing conditions of the workers, for instance. That, of itself, might be very important in some parts of rural Ireland. Then there are the questions of the hours of work, and disputes in regard to priority of employment. An employer may want to dismiss two or three men. He may say that he will retain the fellows who suit him best and sack the others. The organisation might say: "We cannot allow an arbitrary decision of the kind; the men who came in last must be the first to go." That could very well be the subject of dispute. I do not know whether Senator Counihan contemplates such an issue coming before the court, and I do not know whether the employer is willing to abide by the decision of the court on that issue. I am pressing that question on Senator Counihan, because he probably has the viewpoint of the farmer, who has had little experience of dealing with that kind of issue, rather than the viewpoint of the industrialist such as Senator Summerfield, who is accustomed to dealing with such issues.
As to whether the establishment of the machinery contemplated in this motion would prevent strikes, I think that it is worth while looking at the experience elsewhere. A number of people have discussed this subject over a period of years, and I think that the conviction of many of those in favour of compulsory arbitration is that it will not work.
I took up, some weeks ago, when this motion was first put on the Order Paper, a very illuminating description of a situation which arose in Newcastle-on-Tyne. Do not overlook the fact that, so far as war-time England is concerned, there is not merely industrial arbitration and compulsion but there is what might be described as industrial conscription. The Essential Work Order in Britain has in it most of the elements of industrial conscription and, in those circumstances, one would say: "That ends strikes." Here is a description from the Sunday Dispatch of 7th January last of a situation which arose in Newcastle-on-Tyne:—
"Mr. Bevin was faced with the danger of a major shipyard crisis at Newcastle-on-Tyne Police Court yesterday when 125 boilermakers of Vickers-Armstrongs' Walker naval yard, each fined £10 and 10/- cost, with the alternative of 31 days' imprisonment in default, instructed their solicitor to say they would not pay. Mr. Gerald F. Rutledge, defending the men who had been found guilty the day before of taking part in an unlawful strike, sentence being postponed pending the outcome of an 8 a.m. meeting yesterday of the 500 men concerned in a dispute that lasted 11 weeks, told the magistrates that the meeting had decided that the present position must continue. ‘I am instructed,' he said, ‘to put forward nothing in mitigation of the facts. What defendants have done has been in furtherance of the trade union principles. They maintain that are acting within their union rights. Whatever fines, penalties or costs are imposed will not be paid'."
Now, that is the situation which confronted Mr. Bevin last January. He had at his back all this machinery to compel the men to remain at their jobs, but they decided that they would not do so. Not only did they go out and incur penalties for doing so, but they refused to pay the penalties and decided they would go to jail. I think, much as you may deplore that situation, that you have got to face this fact, that the right to refuse to do something, the right to refuse to conform to regulations is, after all, the mainspring of human liberty. I believe, and I think every reasonable person will agree, that once a man is deprived of the right to say "I will not do so-and-so" then you are depriving him of his liberty.
Nor has compulsory arbitration in New Zealand prevented strikes. Here is a further passage from a book which I have already quoted:—
"The arbitration system has by no means avoided all industrial strife. Many serious strikes have occurred in spite of the arbitration court, but there is little doubt that the machinery, as provided, has served a worth-while purpose in minimising industrial friction and in securing to large sections of organised labour— especially unions which lack the strength and resources to meet employers on equal terms—benefits which they would have otherwise been unable to secure."
That is the case made for compulsory arbitration in New Zealand, that it has secured for workers in weak unions benefits which they could not secure for themselves, but even the Compulsory Arbitration Act has not prevented strikes in New Zealand. Mr. Walter Nash in the passage from which I have quoted adds:—
"Certain large and powerful unions, on the other hand—for example, the waterside workers and miners—have preferred to remain outside the scope of the Arbitration Act, relying on their collective bargaining power."
Therefore, from that it is reasonable to deduce that in New Zealand the weak unions and the badly organised sections of industrial workers make use of the machinery provided under the Compulsory Arbitration Act in order to improve conditions while the strong unions say: "We will not touch it; we will do our business ourselves and accept whatever the consequences may be."
Last week an English weekly paper contained a number of reports of work stoppages in England despite the measures to which I have already referred. Here are one or two quotations. The first relates to a district in the North-West of England, the name of which is not given, and says:—
"More than 16,000 workers had downed tools in protest against a return to day instead of piece rates."
Some industrial employers will know what is the significance of that. The men went on strike. The next report says:—
"Because Dundee busmen objected to the appointment of a conductress as a temporary inspector, the city's transport was tied up."
The next paragraph says:—
"After a War Office transport driver had been transferred from London to Oxford, and refused a subsistence allowance, 200 men at meat depôts went on strike last week."
Therefore Senator Counihan will not derive much satisfaction from the evidence which is accumulating in Britain of the inadequacy of these punitive measures to prevent strikes and to compel men to work when they do not want to work. I could cite a number of other instances. I have a number of cases here all taken out of one issue of a paper called the News Review of April 26th of this year but there is no need to give further quotations. It must be obvious to the Senator and to those who support him, that in fact compulsory arbitration is a complete failure except in so far as it can be used to raise the conditions of working-class people who are badly organised. Once it is enforced, or sought to be enforced, for the purpose of imposing on workers a labour ordinance of the 14th century, it is a complete failure.
One would imagine from the speeches of Senator Counihan and the Minister for Agriculture on the last occasion that everything is lovely in the agricultural world. You have the Agricultural Wages Board endowed with an almost superhuman capacity for doing the right thing for everybody and we are told that that should put an end to all cause or danger of conflict in agriculture. But the truth of the matter is that the much-lauded Agricultural Wages Board is defective in two respects. In the first place the board is not representative of the workers whose conditions it attempts to regulate and secondly the board makes no effective effort to enforce its own determinations. I can quote for the Senator a paragraph from a letter received from West Cork in the last week. I should explain that this man was present in a district court in West Cork when a farm labourer was suing a farmer for money due to him. This farmer who was sued was not his principal employer. He was a man for whom the worker did spare-time work in order to augment his wages.
