I move amendment No. 1:—
To delete the second paragraph and to substitute instead the following words:—
"That the Seanad suggests to the Dáil that in accordance with established practice, when Joint Committees have been set up, the number of members of the Committee representing the Dáil and the Seanad respectively be equal".
The motion moved formally by Senator Quirke is a motion for the setting up of a Joint Committee of both Houses to consider the method of election of a certain number of Senators. The present proceedings arise out of a motion in the Dáil dealing with that particular matter, that is to say, dealing with the method of election of the elected Senators and with certain court proceedings and other matters which arose about it. The resolution moved in the Dáil sets in motion proceedings for a Joint Committee which will have 15 members of the Dáil and seven members of the Seanad and will have the Ceann Comhairle as chairman. It seems to me that proposal is one which departs from all precedent, which is unsound in itself and which, in the particular connection, that is to say, dealing specifically with the constitution of this House, is particularly objectionable and I think upon reflection it may be that the Taoiseach would not proceed with it.
In the first place, in order to get it out of the way, may I say, although it is not concerned with my amendment, that the prescription in the motion that a particular member of the other House, namely, the Ceann Comhairle, should be Chairman of the Joint Committee, is also without precedent. The practice always was, since 1922, that if the Ceann Comhairle were nominated by the Dáil to be a member of a Joint Committee he was always selected as Chairman of the Joint Committee. I have been on a number of occasions in that capacity Chairman of a Joint Committee and I have, of course, no objection to that procedure. I think it is a sound one and I think there can be no doubt that, if the Chairman of the other House were nominated a member of the Committee, when the Joint Committee met, exercising their right to elect a Chairman of the Joint Committee, they would certainly elect the Chairman of the Dáil, but I do think that it is hardly proper that when a Joint Committee is being set up the Dáil should prescribe that its Chairman should be Chairman of the Joint Committee.
There are a great many objections to a Joint Committee which would have 15 members of the Dáil and only seven members of this House and may I be allowed to say, Sir, in the first place, that my objection in this particular instance is not based upon any kind of politics. As far back as 1929, I took exception, as Chairman of the Dáil, to a proposal in the Dáil that there should be a greater number of members from the Dáil than from the other House on a Joint Committee. That ruling was given without notice, that is, I had no notice that the matter was being raised, and subsequently a ruling was given, after consideration, and when the matter arises now and I have given the matter further consideration, it seems to me, Sir, that the reasons which dictate, since 1922, that an equal number of members of both Houses should serve on a Joint Committee, are absolutely sound. Just as my stand on this particular matter has nothing to do with politics, neither has it anything to do with the kind of powers the Seanad has. Ever since 1922 this House has been smaller in number and inferior in powers to the Dáil, but, even so, I think when you come to appoint a Joint Committee you should certainly have equal numbers.
What, after all, is a Joint Committee of both Houses? It is a Committee of the Dáil which joins with a Committee of the Seanad on agreed terms of reference. They then proceed to elect their own chairman and they do their business. The Seanad is entitled entirely to control its own affairs and, although there has been a convention by which when a motion for a Joint Committee comes before either House, the number is suggested and an equal number in both Houses, the fact is that either House can put as many members as it pleases on a Joint Committee, although, as I say, as a matter of practice and a matter of convenience they have always been equal.
A Joint Committee is a body which meets to deliberate and consult and its deliberations and its consultations and its capacity for agreement should always, of course, be much greater than its tendency to vote and to divide. Its proceedings are not final—another point which should be remembered— that is to say, when a Joint Committee reports to each House, each House can then take its own decision upon any recommendations the Joint Committee makes. All the Joint Committee can do is, not to come to decisions, of course, but merely to make recommendations. When these recommendations have been made, each House is free to take its own line upon the recommendations and, in the Dáil, for example, neither the House nor the Government nor the Government Party nor any other Party is bound by the recommendations of the Joint Committee.
The motion does hit at all the precedents we have had so far and I should like to put this to you, Sir, to the House and to the Taoiseach, that the more often a joint committee divides, the more division lists it presents to both Houses in its report, the less useful it has been. The whole defence for this motion in the other House was that you need to have 15 members of the Dáil in order to give representation to all the different Parties in the Dáil. I think a little consideration will show that that is not sound. There is no necessity to represent all the Parties in the Dáil because the constitution of a Second House is a national matter of considerable importance and it is not a Party matter at all. There is not, I presume, a Party line upon what kind the Second House should be and there is no necessity to represent all the Parties in the other House or, if I may break a convention and say even all the Parties in this House in a joint committee because when the joint committee reports, as I have said, then there will be something to go on and anyone who has any ideas can express them. But there certainly is no necessity to have representation of all the Parties. What you really want in a joint committee is people who have given some thought to the subject, people who have some experience of the matter, or who have done some reading on the matter, who are prepared to put up a scheme or schemes. I think it can be said with truth of this House that we have at least as much knowledge and perhaps more experience of what is necessary for a Second House than the Dáil has, so that in that way we should get, I think, equal representation.
I think the Taoiseach in moving the motion in the Dáil said that he was making the number 15 because he wanted to give representation to everybody. Although I am accepting the Taoiseach's view that the Dáil motion is based on a carefully calculated Party view, it seems to me we need to get away from that view in constituting a committee to go into how the Seanad is to be elected, because there should not necessarily be in the Second House Party rivalry and the question of what kind of Second House you are to have is one which, I think, members of the other House and members of this House could sit down and consider free from any Party ties or Party obligations. Having said that, and having made an appeal that we should follow precedents heretofore established, that we should deal with the Seanad in regard to this business as an equal of the Dáil, I should say that I do not for a moment consider that the Seanad should have equal powers with the Dáil over legislation. I am not arguing for that at all, but I am arguing that, if you set up a Second House and give it any powers, then you must treat it in matters of this kind on an equal footing with the Dáil.
Now, with regard to what kind a Second House should be, a matter which this Joint Committee will have to consider, it has to be remembered that the Joint Committee when it meets will have very restricted terms of reference. It will not be able to deal with the powers of the Second House. Indeed, I should like at the outset to say that I have very little interest in that matter. I think the most important thing for a Second House of Parliament is not the powers it possesses, but the capacity its members show to deal with matters coming before it, the weight and influence it can have in public affairs, its own special knowledge and the experience which it brings to bear on legislation. These are, I think, much more important than the powers which may be conferred upon it in the Constitution of the State. Similarly, it seems to me that there need not necessarily be clashes between the two Houses. Quite clearly, under the Constitution, and I presume under any Constitution we are likely to have, whenever there is a clash between the Dáil and the Seanad, the Dáil is bound to win. But I think that at the present moment we are in the position that a clash between the Dáil and the Seanad is avoided by endeavouring to make the Seanad as nearly as possible a replica of the Dáil. I think that is an extremely bad scheme. The Houses should not be the same.
At the present moment we have a scheme whereby the Dáil itself is the electorate. The members of the Dáil elect, and they are themselves elected on a Party basis and on a regional basis, as they come from different areas in the country. They are joined as an electorate with the county councils, who are themselves, of course, regional, as they also come from different areas. The present Party in power, the Fianna Fáil Party, has always maintained the view that in the county councils politics should be of importance. So that, taking the Dáil and the county councils, you have an entirely Party electorate. The object presumably is to ensure that the Party which has a majority in the Dáil and in the county councils will also have an undisputed majority in this House. Now, that seems to me to sin against a fundamental characteristic of a Second House, which is, that it should be different from the First House.
In spite of the handicaps under which this House labours, in spite of the fact that it would appear, if one reads the Constitution and the Act which governs the election of members here, and looks at the nominees of the Taoiseach here that an endeavour is made to make this House as nearly as possible a replica of the Dáil, it has in fact, under very severe handicaps, I think, developed into being something rather different from the Dáil. Ministers, when they come here to argue Bills, have found that this House is a different kind of House from the Dáil, sometimes more satisfactory, from the point of view of discussions, than the other House—and that is essential. Inevitably, the Minister in the Dáil is influenced by the fact that, when all comes to all, he can ring the bell and call a division, and he is bound to win. I am not charging the particular Ministers now in office with having that point of view, but it is a point of view which Ministers everywhere, in the nature of things, have.
Now a Minister should not have that feeling in this House. The very fact that this House has limited powers and is going to keep on having limited powers, I presume, should absolve this House from having a Party complexion and Ministers coming here—I am not speaking now particularly of the present Ministers, but Ministers generally—should not encounter the same kind of opposition here. They should meet a different atmosphere in this House from the one which they meet in the other House. For example, I belong to a Party and I oppose the Government, but I have always refused in this House to put down amendments that were moved and defeated in the Dáil. I have always objected, as a matter of fact, even when other people moved them, to supporting here amendments put down simply because they were moved in the Dáil and rejected by a Minister. I think we should do our own business in our own way and that a Minister should encounter here a different kind of opposition, a different atmosphere, and a different kind of speech from those which he meets in the other House. He should meet, if it were possible, more specialised knowledge, more discussion of principles, less advertence to what the electorate thinks. I hope somebody will not tell me that I am undemocratic. But there can be no doubt—I have ample experience of it—that debates in a House elected on a popular franchise are bound to be influenced by the thought of what the man who reads the local newspaper will think of the Deputy's speech when published in that newspaper.
Now, as I said, this House is different from the Dáil, although every precaution has been taken to make it a replica. I think that on the question of how the Seanad should be elected we should provide at least as much brains and experience as the other House and, therefore, we ought to have the same number of members. If people will throw their minds back, there have been several occasions here when Ministers, who proved adamant in the Dáil—notably the late Minister for Finance—and refused to accept any amendments in the Dáil, were induced—and when I use the word "induced", I mean precisely that—to accept certain amendments here. Senators will recollect and the Taoiseach will recollect that when bombs fell here we had provision made for damage to property by bombs during the war. Certain proposals were made in the Dáil by the Minister in that respect and they were hotly opposed in the Dáil, but no change was made. In this House, when the matter was tackled in a different way and tackled from different sides of the House, the Minister made substantial alterations. Similarly, on the question of personal injuries through bombing or enemy action of any kind during the war, we had a very substantial change made in this House, simply because a different type of debate took place here and the Minister was tackled in a different way.
At any rate, I do not wish to delay the House by giving a disquisition on what I think of the constitution of a Seanad; but I do think that, a Seanad having been constituted, it should be treated as the equal of the Dáil for the purpose of Joint Committees. A Joint Committee should be looked upon as a deliberative and consultative body and not as a body which must be constituted on a Party basis, on which everybody must have representation, so that you can read in the division lists how everybody voted. I think that is a fundamental mistake with regard to this Committee. I am sorry that the precedents already established with regard to Joint Committees have not been followed in this case. Possibly, they were not adverted to at all. I have no ambition to be on this Joint Committee, and I am quite prepared to accept the decision of the selection committee, if it is decided to have seven members of the House selected from the point of view of their experience and for what they can contribute to a committee and to knowledge about a Second House, rather than on account of their Party affiliations. I think the same thing could be found in the other House. As far as we are concerned here, I am sure the Taoiseach himself must have remarked that, in spite of the fact that we began, perhaps, in a certain atmosphere of suspicion, we have succeeded in creating an atmosphere here where, for the conduct of our own business, we are able to make concessions, we are able to accommodate one another and accommodate Ministers when they come here and we are able to do all that without abandoning our opinions and in the best of good humour.
There is a lot to be said for establishing another House and making it substantially different from the Dáil. I would like to appeal to the Taoiseach to yield to the precedents already established in that respect and to let this matter be considered by the Committee in an absolutely non-Party atmosphere. It is a very restricted matter, as one cannot consider in this Joint Committee the question of nominations by the Taoiseach, or whether the Head of the Government should nominate 11, or less than 11 or more than 11; one cannot consider the remuneration of Senators or the powers of the Seanad. The terms of reference are very limited.
When the Joint Committee has considered the whole matter on that non-Party basis, it can be very freely debated in the Dáil and in the Seanad. It can be debated in both Houses on non-Party lines, without having to scrutinise the division lists of the Joint Committee to see who was in favour of scheme A and who was against scheme B. If that were done, if the matter got consideration by a Joint Committee of both Houses in equal numbers and were then considered in the same non-Party spirit and atmosphere by both Houses, we would arrive at a solution of a problem which we all agree very urgently cries out for solution. In that way, without having regard to politics, and without regard to quarrels between the two Houses—in fact, there have not been any such quarrels for a number of years—we could adhere to the original precedent and have a Joint Committee to consider this question of electing Senators, consisting of an equal number from each House.