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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 24 Jan 1946

Vol. 31 No. 2

Method of Seanad Elections—Motion.

I formally move the motion standing in my name:—

Go n-aontaí an Seanad leis an Dáil ina Rún a cuireadh in iúl don tSeanad an 14ú de Shamhain, 1945, go bhfuil sé oiriúnach Comh-Choiste den Dáil agus an Seanad a bhunú chun breithniú agus molta a dhéanamh i dtaobh modh rialaithe toghchán na gcomhaltaí tofa den tSeanad is gá do réir an Bhunreachta a toghadh as rollaí d'iarrthóirí agus i dtaobh léirithe an toghdais i gcóir na dtoghchán san.

Go mbeidh chúig Teachta déag (gan Cathaoirleach an Choiste d'áireamh) mar ionadaithe ón Dáil agus mórsheisear Seanadóirí mar ionadaithe ón Seanad ar an gComh-Choiste sin; agus go mbeidh an Ceann Comhairle ina Chathaoirleach ar an gCoiste.

That the Seanad concurs with the Dáil in their Resolution communicated to the Seanad the 14th day of November, 1945, that it is expedient that a Joint Committee of the Dáil and Seanad be set up to consider and make recommendations on the method of regulating elections of those elected members of Seanad Eireann who are required by the Constitution to be elected from panels of candidates and the definition of the electorate for such elections.

That 15 Deputies (exclusive of the Chairman of the Committee) represent the Dáil and seven Senators represent the Seanad on the said Joint Committee; and that the Ceann Comhairle be Chairman of the Committee.

I move amendment No. 1:—

To delete the second paragraph and to substitute instead the following words:—

"That the Seanad suggests to the Dáil that in accordance with established practice, when Joint Committees have been set up, the number of members of the Committee representing the Dáil and the Seanad respectively be equal".

The motion moved formally by Senator Quirke is a motion for the setting up of a Joint Committee of both Houses to consider the method of election of a certain number of Senators. The present proceedings arise out of a motion in the Dáil dealing with that particular matter, that is to say, dealing with the method of election of the elected Senators and with certain court proceedings and other matters which arose about it. The resolution moved in the Dáil sets in motion proceedings for a Joint Committee which will have 15 members of the Dáil and seven members of the Seanad and will have the Ceann Comhairle as chairman. It seems to me that proposal is one which departs from all precedent, which is unsound in itself and which, in the particular connection, that is to say, dealing specifically with the constitution of this House, is particularly objectionable and I think upon reflection it may be that the Taoiseach would not proceed with it.

In the first place, in order to get it out of the way, may I say, although it is not concerned with my amendment, that the prescription in the motion that a particular member of the other House, namely, the Ceann Comhairle, should be Chairman of the Joint Committee, is also without precedent. The practice always was, since 1922, that if the Ceann Comhairle were nominated by the Dáil to be a member of a Joint Committee he was always selected as Chairman of the Joint Committee. I have been on a number of occasions in that capacity Chairman of a Joint Committee and I have, of course, no objection to that procedure. I think it is a sound one and I think there can be no doubt that, if the Chairman of the other House were nominated a member of the Committee, when the Joint Committee met, exercising their right to elect a Chairman of the Joint Committee, they would certainly elect the Chairman of the Dáil, but I do think that it is hardly proper that when a Joint Committee is being set up the Dáil should prescribe that its Chairman should be Chairman of the Joint Committee.

There are a great many objections to a Joint Committee which would have 15 members of the Dáil and only seven members of this House and may I be allowed to say, Sir, in the first place, that my objection in this particular instance is not based upon any kind of politics. As far back as 1929, I took exception, as Chairman of the Dáil, to a proposal in the Dáil that there should be a greater number of members from the Dáil than from the other House on a Joint Committee. That ruling was given without notice, that is, I had no notice that the matter was being raised, and subsequently a ruling was given, after consideration, and when the matter arises now and I have given the matter further consideration, it seems to me, Sir, that the reasons which dictate, since 1922, that an equal number of members of both Houses should serve on a Joint Committee, are absolutely sound. Just as my stand on this particular matter has nothing to do with politics, neither has it anything to do with the kind of powers the Seanad has. Ever since 1922 this House has been smaller in number and inferior in powers to the Dáil, but, even so, I think when you come to appoint a Joint Committee you should certainly have equal numbers.

What, after all, is a Joint Committee of both Houses? It is a Committee of the Dáil which joins with a Committee of the Seanad on agreed terms of reference. They then proceed to elect their own chairman and they do their business. The Seanad is entitled entirely to control its own affairs and, although there has been a convention by which when a motion for a Joint Committee comes before either House, the number is suggested and an equal number in both Houses, the fact is that either House can put as many members as it pleases on a Joint Committee, although, as I say, as a matter of practice and a matter of convenience they have always been equal.

A Joint Committee is a body which meets to deliberate and consult and its deliberations and its consultations and its capacity for agreement should always, of course, be much greater than its tendency to vote and to divide. Its proceedings are not final—another point which should be remembered— that is to say, when a Joint Committee reports to each House, each House can then take its own decision upon any recommendations the Joint Committee makes. All the Joint Committee can do is, not to come to decisions, of course, but merely to make recommendations. When these recommendations have been made, each House is free to take its own line upon the recommendations and, in the Dáil, for example, neither the House nor the Government nor the Government Party nor any other Party is bound by the recommendations of the Joint Committee.

The motion does hit at all the precedents we have had so far and I should like to put this to you, Sir, to the House and to the Taoiseach, that the more often a joint committee divides, the more division lists it presents to both Houses in its report, the less useful it has been. The whole defence for this motion in the other House was that you need to have 15 members of the Dáil in order to give representation to all the different Parties in the Dáil. I think a little consideration will show that that is not sound. There is no necessity to represent all the Parties in the Dáil because the constitution of a Second House is a national matter of considerable importance and it is not a Party matter at all. There is not, I presume, a Party line upon what kind the Second House should be and there is no necessity to represent all the Parties in the other House or, if I may break a convention and say even all the Parties in this House in a joint committee because when the joint committee reports, as I have said, then there will be something to go on and anyone who has any ideas can express them. But there certainly is no necessity to have representation of all the Parties. What you really want in a joint committee is people who have given some thought to the subject, people who have some experience of the matter, or who have done some reading on the matter, who are prepared to put up a scheme or schemes. I think it can be said with truth of this House that we have at least as much knowledge and perhaps more experience of what is necessary for a Second House than the Dáil has, so that in that way we should get, I think, equal representation.

I think the Taoiseach in moving the motion in the Dáil said that he was making the number 15 because he wanted to give representation to everybody. Although I am accepting the Taoiseach's view that the Dáil motion is based on a carefully calculated Party view, it seems to me we need to get away from that view in constituting a committee to go into how the Seanad is to be elected, because there should not necessarily be in the Second House Party rivalry and the question of what kind of Second House you are to have is one which, I think, members of the other House and members of this House could sit down and consider free from any Party ties or Party obligations. Having said that, and having made an appeal that we should follow precedents heretofore established, that we should deal with the Seanad in regard to this business as an equal of the Dáil, I should say that I do not for a moment consider that the Seanad should have equal powers with the Dáil over legislation. I am not arguing for that at all, but I am arguing that, if you set up a Second House and give it any powers, then you must treat it in matters of this kind on an equal footing with the Dáil.

Now, with regard to what kind a Second House should be, a matter which this Joint Committee will have to consider, it has to be remembered that the Joint Committee when it meets will have very restricted terms of reference. It will not be able to deal with the powers of the Second House. Indeed, I should like at the outset to say that I have very little interest in that matter. I think the most important thing for a Second House of Parliament is not the powers it possesses, but the capacity its members show to deal with matters coming before it, the weight and influence it can have in public affairs, its own special knowledge and the experience which it brings to bear on legislation. These are, I think, much more important than the powers which may be conferred upon it in the Constitution of the State. Similarly, it seems to me that there need not necessarily be clashes between the two Houses. Quite clearly, under the Constitution, and I presume under any Constitution we are likely to have, whenever there is a clash between the Dáil and the Seanad, the Dáil is bound to win. But I think that at the present moment we are in the position that a clash between the Dáil and the Seanad is avoided by endeavouring to make the Seanad as nearly as possible a replica of the Dáil. I think that is an extremely bad scheme. The Houses should not be the same.

At the present moment we have a scheme whereby the Dáil itself is the electorate. The members of the Dáil elect, and they are themselves elected on a Party basis and on a regional basis, as they come from different areas in the country. They are joined as an electorate with the county councils, who are themselves, of course, regional, as they also come from different areas. The present Party in power, the Fianna Fáil Party, has always maintained the view that in the county councils politics should be of importance. So that, taking the Dáil and the county councils, you have an entirely Party electorate. The object presumably is to ensure that the Party which has a majority in the Dáil and in the county councils will also have an undisputed majority in this House. Now, that seems to me to sin against a fundamental characteristic of a Second House, which is, that it should be different from the First House.

In spite of the handicaps under which this House labours, in spite of the fact that it would appear, if one reads the Constitution and the Act which governs the election of members here, and looks at the nominees of the Taoiseach here that an endeavour is made to make this House as nearly as possible a replica of the Dáil, it has in fact, under very severe handicaps, I think, developed into being something rather different from the Dáil. Ministers, when they come here to argue Bills, have found that this House is a different kind of House from the Dáil, sometimes more satisfactory, from the point of view of discussions, than the other House—and that is essential. Inevitably, the Minister in the Dáil is influenced by the fact that, when all comes to all, he can ring the bell and call a division, and he is bound to win. I am not charging the particular Ministers now in office with having that point of view, but it is a point of view which Ministers everywhere, in the nature of things, have.

Now a Minister should not have that feeling in this House. The very fact that this House has limited powers and is going to keep on having limited powers, I presume, should absolve this House from having a Party complexion and Ministers coming here—I am not speaking now particularly of the present Ministers, but Ministers generally—should not encounter the same kind of opposition here. They should meet a different atmosphere in this House from the one which they meet in the other House. For example, I belong to a Party and I oppose the Government, but I have always refused in this House to put down amendments that were moved and defeated in the Dáil. I have always objected, as a matter of fact, even when other people moved them, to supporting here amendments put down simply because they were moved in the Dáil and rejected by a Minister. I think we should do our own business in our own way and that a Minister should encounter here a different kind of opposition, a different atmosphere, and a different kind of speech from those which he meets in the other House. He should meet, if it were possible, more specialised knowledge, more discussion of principles, less advertence to what the electorate thinks. I hope somebody will not tell me that I am undemocratic. But there can be no doubt—I have ample experience of it—that debates in a House elected on a popular franchise are bound to be influenced by the thought of what the man who reads the local newspaper will think of the Deputy's speech when published in that newspaper.

Now, as I said, this House is different from the Dáil, although every precaution has been taken to make it a replica. I think that on the question of how the Seanad should be elected we should provide at least as much brains and experience as the other House and, therefore, we ought to have the same number of members. If people will throw their minds back, there have been several occasions here when Ministers, who proved adamant in the Dáil—notably the late Minister for Finance—and refused to accept any amendments in the Dáil, were induced—and when I use the word "induced", I mean precisely that—to accept certain amendments here. Senators will recollect and the Taoiseach will recollect that when bombs fell here we had provision made for damage to property by bombs during the war. Certain proposals were made in the Dáil by the Minister in that respect and they were hotly opposed in the Dáil, but no change was made. In this House, when the matter was tackled in a different way and tackled from different sides of the House, the Minister made substantial alterations. Similarly, on the question of personal injuries through bombing or enemy action of any kind during the war, we had a very substantial change made in this House, simply because a different type of debate took place here and the Minister was tackled in a different way.

At any rate, I do not wish to delay the House by giving a disquisition on what I think of the constitution of a Seanad; but I do think that, a Seanad having been constituted, it should be treated as the equal of the Dáil for the purpose of Joint Committees. A Joint Committee should be looked upon as a deliberative and consultative body and not as a body which must be constituted on a Party basis, on which everybody must have representation, so that you can read in the division lists how everybody voted. I think that is a fundamental mistake with regard to this Committee. I am sorry that the precedents already established with regard to Joint Committees have not been followed in this case. Possibly, they were not adverted to at all. I have no ambition to be on this Joint Committee, and I am quite prepared to accept the decision of the selection committee, if it is decided to have seven members of the House selected from the point of view of their experience and for what they can contribute to a committee and to knowledge about a Second House, rather than on account of their Party affiliations. I think the same thing could be found in the other House. As far as we are concerned here, I am sure the Taoiseach himself must have remarked that, in spite of the fact that we began, perhaps, in a certain atmosphere of suspicion, we have succeeded in creating an atmosphere here where, for the conduct of our own business, we are able to make concessions, we are able to accommodate one another and accommodate Ministers when they come here and we are able to do all that without abandoning our opinions and in the best of good humour.

There is a lot to be said for establishing another House and making it substantially different from the Dáil. I would like to appeal to the Taoiseach to yield to the precedents already established in that respect and to let this matter be considered by the Committee in an absolutely non-Party atmosphere. It is a very restricted matter, as one cannot consider in this Joint Committee the question of nominations by the Taoiseach, or whether the Head of the Government should nominate 11, or less than 11 or more than 11; one cannot consider the remuneration of Senators or the powers of the Seanad. The terms of reference are very limited.

When the Joint Committee has considered the whole matter on that non-Party basis, it can be very freely debated in the Dáil and in the Seanad. It can be debated in both Houses on non-Party lines, without having to scrutinise the division lists of the Joint Committee to see who was in favour of scheme A and who was against scheme B. If that were done, if the matter got consideration by a Joint Committee of both Houses in equal numbers and were then considered in the same non-Party spirit and atmosphere by both Houses, we would arrive at a solution of a problem which we all agree very urgently cries out for solution. In that way, without having regard to politics, and without regard to quarrels between the two Houses—in fact, there have not been any such quarrels for a number of years—we could adhere to the original precedent and have a Joint Committee to consider this question of electing Senators, consisting of an equal number from each House.

I move amendment No. 2:—

To add at the end of the motion the following words:—

"That, notwithstanding established procedure of committees, the joint committee be empowered to present minority reports if necessary".

I take it that the intention is to debate the motion and the two amendments together. Therefore, before dealing with my own amendment, I would like to deal with the subject and to show how it fits in with the amendment I propose. I agree almost entirely with what has been said by Senator Hayes. Whatever may be said for or against the present method of election, one thing we can say is that the members of this House have no responsibility for it. There was no Second Chamber at the time, so this Seanad had no say in the matter. There may be a few of the present members here who may have been in the Dáil at the time, but at any rate we can approach this problem with a reasonably open mind, plus a fair amount of experience—and experience of a somewhat different character from that which could possibly be obtained by members of the Dáil acting as part of the electorate.

I feel that the only possibility of obtaining proposals which will meet with sufficient general support to justify the Government in changing the existing legislation can come only from a committee of a reasonable size, in which there is no attempt to exercise Party whips and in which Party interests are largely forgotten. After all, it would be an extremely clever Party man, no matter how experienced, who could devise a new system of election and say with any certainty exactly how it would work, from the point of view of the Party, in five, six or ten years' time. Perhaps he could visualise how it would work now, but that would be of little value. I feel that it will be an extremely difficult task to devise amendments in the present law, keeping, as one must do, within the terms of reference of the committee and strictly within the Constitution—since one cannot recommend any amendment, however small, in the Constitution itself. It would be extremely difficult to devise something which would be fully satisfactory. Nevertheless, I believe the Seanad should agree to set up a committee and should agree to the principle of the motion, but I think it should not agree to uneven numbers.

I do not want to repeat in any great detail what Senator Hayes has said, as that would mean taking up time. It can be taken that I am in substantial agreement with him. I would like particularly to emphasise my very strong conviction that one of the difficulties in the present Seanad which has a very considerable bearing on the question of election, is the fact that, whereas 90 per cent. of our debates are not on Party lines, the divisions almost entirely and almost always are. I feel that it should be accepted by all Parties that a Second Chamber with limited powers of delay of only three months' maximum—less time than frequently it takes for a Bill to be examined in the Dáil—should not have any Party Whips and that every member elected to it should stand on his own feet and justify to those who supported him and to the public outside his action on a particular matter. Senators should not be put in the position that they have to obtain advice or instructions from a Whip of a Party or a group. I do not mean that there should not be groups of people, naturally formed and naturally working together—such grouping adds to strength—but when you come to divisions the Party system operates very definitely against the value of this House and very definitely against the respect in which the House is held.

We in the Seanad debate amendments rarely with any heat, frequently with very little reference to Party issues that may be involved, and we debate them with the Minister. If the Minister does not like them or says he cannot accept them, there is a division. Then the Whips are called and the amendment is defeated. Now, I do not think that is our function. Our function is to send suggestions to the other House to be considered there. Where, on a particular matter, we disagree with the Minister, that should be made known to the other House and to the Government as a whole, since there is collective responsibility. Then they will have an opportunity to decide the point. I would not quarrel if, when an amendment came back, there were Party Whips—though, in view of the fact that there is only a three months' delay period, even that should not be necessary. On several occasions, when I have been speaking to Ministers, I found they did not even know that amendments had been proposed here and rejected, as they were Ministers who were not directly concerned with the particular Bill. For that reason, I think this matter of amendments is one which should be dealt with on non-Party lines.

I think that has a very definite bearing on the subject-matter of the Committee, because I believe that if it could be accepted that the object of an election for this House is to get men and women who have had a fair measure of experience, who are respected because, whatever their views may be, they are honest views, who have knowledge and are able to express themselves, who can stand on their feet and who, by the very fact that they have accepted a position in the Seanad, should be, to my mind, relieved from attendance at, or close connection with, Party meetings on matters relating to the business before Parliament—I am not attempting to interfere with their free actions as citizens outside—if that could be accepted as what you want, then it would be very much easier for a Committee to get itself down to the best way of electing that kind of person. If, on the other hand, each Party is concerned simply with getting, first of all, as many members of the Party as they can into the Seanad, and only, as a secondary consideration, getting the best ones they can, then you will have a different method of election.

I suggest to all the Parties, particularly the three oldest and largest— Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party—that they could go a very long way towards meeting this problem by agreeing on openly and beyond any question, and not only agreeing on, but putting into practice, a procedure by which every member of the House would not only be not subject to Party Whips, but would not be able to obtain the assistance of Party Whips on the various matters before the House.

It is, to my mind, quite clear that the only object of this Committee is to discuss and, if possible, make proposals. The Bill provided for the election which was envisaged in the Constitution, and which had to pass into law before the Constitution could have effect, was a Government measure. Any amendment of it will, of necessity, be a Government measure. Therefore, the Government is not really very much concerned—at least, I assume it is not—with what the Fine Gael members, the Fianna Fáil members or the Labour Party members in the Committee think about it. They are concerned with whether or not they can get out of this Committee proposals which will meet with a good measure of consent and which they may think worth while bringing in as an amendment to existing legislation.

For that reason, I feel rather strongly that it would be a pity if there could not be a minority report. Being a Joint Committee of the House, what will happen is that in all probability there will be some type of a report drafted and an amendment will be put down and it will be rejected, if there is a division. Another amendment will be put down and it will be, perhaps, passed and you will get by that method a kind of amended draft in the way in which you get a Bill drafted, nobody being responsible for all of it, all voting on different lines and different amendments, and there is a very grave danger that out of it you will get a hotch-potch.

I think it was suggested in the Dáil that the Government would have been wiser if they appointed a commission, with persons outside the Oireachtas. I do not agree with that. I think it would be better, in the first instance at any rate, that we should try amongst ourselves to see if we could not find a solution of this problem. I think that when we meet the method of report should be not unlike that of a commission. It would be far more valuable to the Government to have, for the sake of argument, a definite suggestion, complete in itself, proposed by a certain number of members of the Committee and, if it may not so occur, if necessary another suggestion, complete in itself, proposed by other members of the Committee. I believe that out of that we will get a clearer report, something which will be very much easier for them to make a decision on.

The procedure which is set out in the Standing Orders was really devised for the purpose of considering Bills. This is not a Bill. The Committee will not have any report before it, to commence with. I am not going to press this if it does not meet with a measure of support, but I feel that you will get a better result if it is possible to have that and, if the members of the Committee so desire, one or two or even three reports which would be reports complete in themselves.

I have very little to say in support of the amendments that have been so clearly put forward by Senator Hayes and Senator Douglas. I have heard it said pretty often by members of the Government Party in this House that the Taoiseach at least is not anxious to have the Seanad run on Party lines. I believe that statement. I believe he wants a non-Party Seanad. In view of that, it is surprising that when it was proposed to set up this Committee he made the statement in the Dáil that he wanted representation for the different Parties in the House and that is the reason he gave 15 representatives to the Dáil and only seven to the Seanad.

Senator Hayes has pointed out very clearly that the members of this House have had more experience of Seanad elections than the members of the Dáil. There are some Senators here still— their numbers are getting small—who were elected in 1922 and who successfully contested practically all forms of election to the Seanad since that time. That gives them a wide range of experience as to the proper method of electing a Seanad and I think that point alone should be given serious consideration when setting up a Committee to consider some better scheme of election.

The case for them has been so very clearly put I do not think there is very much more to be said in favour of the amendments. The Taoiseach stated that he wants to give representation to all. As a member of the Selection Board, I cannot see how we can give representation to the different elements in this House if we have only seven representatives. I think the number should be increased to 15. We are more interested than any members of the Dáil in having a Seanad properly selected. We are anxious to have a Seanad that will be a credit to the country and that will be useful in doing the work of the nation. We want a Seanad that will put down all kinds of corruption, and I think the Taoiseach would be well advised to accept the amendments suggested by Senator Hayes and Senator Douglas. I appeal to him, as one of the founders of this House, to accept these amendments so that we may have a satisfactory Committee to consider some better scheme for elections to the Seanad.

Perhaps it might help if I were to intervene at this stage. When this matter originated in the Dáil, Opposition members had criticisms to make of the method by which the Seanad is elected. They pointed out that abuses of various kinds could arise and that practices had arisen which tended to lead to abuses. I do not think that in the whole of that debate there was any reference to the question of representation of the Seanad at all on the Committee, so that I am afraid I shall have to bear the blame of being responsible for the troubles that have arisen, because it was I myself who introduced the question of representation of the Seanad or who suggested that certain members of the Seanad should form part of the Committee set up to examine this question. I am afraid we could argue for a long time on the principles on which a Committee of this sort should be set up. Arguing the matter with others, I was met with the counter-argument, for example, that, after all, this was a fundamental Constitutional question, that, in the first instance, it should be considered by the House, whose members were directly and immediately elected by the people, and that the Seanad should not come into it at all.

The argument was also put up that as the criticism was against practices which had grown up—there have been suggestions, for example, that perhaps some members should not be in the Seanad at all—it would be desirable not to have the Seanad represented. That was one view. The next view was one which Senator Hayes put forward, that if we have a Joint Committee or a Committee consisting of members of both Houses, each House should have an equal number on that Committee. I know those who are anxious for the prestige of the Seanad might strongly hold for that. It was, I think, provided in your Standing Orders at one particular period and also in the Standing Orders of the Dáil that that was the manner in which a Joint Committee should be constituted. That provision has dropped out and it is no longer provided in the Standing Orders of either Houses that Joint Committees should be constituted in that way. If it could be said to have been an established practice—I have not gone into the matter in detail to find if there were any exceptions to it——

There were no exceptions.

Possibly there were not. If there was no particular Committee in question, I would be inclined not to base the Committee in that way, if it is a Joint Committee. In fact when the matter was mentioned, I considered the advisability of leaving out the word "joint" and putting in instead "a Committee of members of the Dáil and the Seanad". I did not think that it was, in fact, going to be joint, in a certain sense, and I considered that the matter was hardly worth settling in that particular way. I can see that some Senators might desire that the word "joint" should be left out and then you could constitute a Committee consisting of members of the Dáil and the Seanad.

Another basis on which one might try to set up a Committee of this kind would be to say: "Very well, we shall have man for man in the Dáil and the Seanad." There are 138 members in the Dáil and there are only 60 in the Seanad. On that basis the Seanad would be getting full representation under this proposal because the membership of the Seanad is slightly less than one-half the membership of the Dáil. There was, I think, some little bit of confusion in suggesting that the Committee was to be selected somewhat on the lines of proportional representation. I have not checked up to see how it is that you usually select Committees. I suppose you have a Committee of Selection——

I do not think I suggested that our committee should be selected on the principles of proportional representation. We select a committee here for any purpose by going to the Selection Committee who are representative of all Parties in the House and they nominate the members. They do not necessarily have to nominate the people they think best for the particular purpose. That is identical with the Dáil scheme that was originally operated.

I did not suggest that it was Senator Hayes caused the confusion but one of the speakers who followed him seemed to be confused in his mind as to what Senator Hayes had been speaking about. Senator Hayes was talking about the Dáil. The number seven was selected as being roughly in proportion to the strength of the Seanad as compared with the strength of the Dáil. Senator Hayes suggests that we should not have a committee constituted in the Dáil on Party lines. Well, if I were proposing such a motion in the Dáil, and I were going to leave any Parties off the committee or any Parties unrepresented, I think I would hear about it. It would be suggested that the views of certain groups or Parties, and of the people they represented, were not being taken into account. The practice has, at any rate, grown up in the Dáil that when committees are being formed there is representation of the different Parties on the committees and I think, on the whole, wisely so because you get an opportunity, when the report comes along, of hearing an expression of the different views, if you have a fair number on the committee. If any strong views are taken by a particular section you will have these views represented. There is a number of Parties in the Dáil and you want to have each of these represented. Then there are the Independents, each of whom might be regarded as a Party in himself. Nevertheless, they like to have some unattached view and to select some person to represent them.

He would no longer be unattached.

They cannot select them otherwise. You come back therefore to the point where you have to deal with some of the fallacies underlying these attacks on Parties. When you come to examine it you will find that democracy cannot work without Parties, that people who have a particular point of view in common, group themselves together—people who can work together in order to get a particular point of view accepted. I think the natural number to take for this committee is 15. I was disposed at the start to have equal numbers but I was already in difficulty with the number 15. Even if you add seven more to that number, you have a very big committee and if you double it you will have 30 members. I do not think that you can get a group of that kind together who will be able to give you a report with any chance of its being accepted. I could probably name half a dozen individuals to whom I could say privately: "Will you put your heads together and give us the best scheme you can?" That would be one way of doing it and I often thought it would be the best way—to get half a dozen people who know something about the subject. If you had any difficulty in finding a solution, you could say to these half dozen persons: "Look here I am in difficulties about this problem. I have given a certain amount of thought to it. I have got no satisfactory solution. Will you go and see what you can do?" Well, that would be very helpful to myself but it would not be of much use publicly. It would be of very little use, I think, and it would not help me either in trying to get it through the Dáil unless the solution happened to be intrinsically a very good one. I admit that if I had a really good solution it would be able to carry itself. But that is not the position I anticipate will arise here. A great deal of attention has been given to this particular problem. We have already had some commissions and committees upon it. When the Bill was going through, we had a committee of the House considering it, and we did not get very far, so much so that we had to withdraw it from the committee and proceed straight through the House with it. My own belief is that, even when this Committee is considering it and putting up a solution, it will be one which could very readily be found fault with. You will find difficulties in it. I do not think it would be likely, if I were to select a half dozen individuals and put them to work, that they would be able to give me anything which of itself could get acceptance either in the Oireachtas or with the public outside.

There are two things that I see against it as it is at present. First of all, even as it is, it is very big. That is the first point. Secondly, it has the objection that it seems to give fewer members to the Seanad than to the Dáil, and I will admit that I should like, for the prestige of the House, to have equal numbers. But there is this in it—assuming it was not going to be accepted in any way as a precedent— that it does say: "Individually, taking a Senator with a member of the Dáil, you are given equal representation"; that is, there is no question of saying that in this particular matter we are likely to find more brains in one House than in the other. We are taking them on a proportional basis. I must say that I do not see any solution except this, and I would urge the Seanad to accept it. I do not want to do anything that would seem to lower the prestige of the House. I think that in most cases where a Joint Committee is in question—I would be inclined to say, but it might not be true—we would find we could have equal numbers. I must say that the number 31 is too large for a practical Committee.

Definitely.

The question is what to do next. You cannot manage in the Dáil with less than 15, as it is constituted at present. You cannot hand-pick. You cannot ask the Committee of Selection to hand-pick. The Committee of Selection is constituted in proportion to the strength of the various Parties, and if, for instance, the Party that is supporting the Government wished, it could have as many as it chose on the Committee. Consequently, we are here in a real, practical difficulty. It is not a question of principle at all; it is a real, practical difficulty. I do not see any solution of it but the present one, and it is on that basis I put it forward. It will be argued that I could hand-pick. I could, but I am not going to be given permission to do that, and it would vitiate any results that would be got at the end. It would be said: "This is the finding of a hand-picked Committee." I should not like people to think, as was suggested by one of the speakers, that it does not matter what sort of report the Committee gives us. I think it does. I think if there is a carefully thought out solution, even though it may not be perfect, the fact that, in circumstances like the present, it is recommended to the Dáil would put a serious obligation on the Government to accept it, unless there is something in it that they can definitely improve upon, or unless there is some fatal flaw in it which would render it patently unsuitable. I do think, therefore, that in setting up a Committee like this the report which we get will be of importance.

The next point brings me to the other amendment. I have given some consideration to that. I have been a member of some Parliamentary Committees, and it seems to me that within the existing rules you can get a complete scheme put forward. If a member of this Committee finds, in talking to the others, in general discussion, that there is a certain solution which appears to him to be a good one, what is to prevent him from putting up this scheme as a whole? I think it could be put up as a whole, as a definite motion.

I do not wish to interrupt, but I should like to make the point clear. It could be put up, but it would not appear to the public in the report.

Oh, I think so. Committees, so far as I know, could even have a verbatim report, but the usual thing, if my recollection is right, is to give the motions, divisions, and so on, in the report. Consequently, if there is any complete scheme that any member of the Committee has, he can put up that scheme as a whole. He can put it before the Committee as a whole, get it discussed as a whole, as a motion, and get it accepted or rejected by the Committee. If it is rejected, there will be a vote on it. The number of people who will support it will be given the very same public indication as would be given by a minority report.

I think it would be given in the proceedings but not in the report. I am not trying to make any point, but I think the public probably would not see that.

In any published documents that I remember, submitted to the Dáil after a Committee of that particular kind, you would find: "Proposed by such and such", and the result then would be given, such and such members voting one way and such and such members voting the other way. I am not against the idea. I think the idea is a good one; that it is better to have a complete scheme and not a series of motions, the coherence of which and the co-ordination of which one with another might not appear to the public. But I do think, if there is a group working as a Committee, they could, without changing the existing practice at all, put forward a complete scheme, have it discussed as a whole, and then it would be voted on as a whole, so that the public would know that this thing was put forward and that such and such members of the Committee supported it, which is really the same, it appears to me, as a minority report, and it would be introducing something new to bring in the idea of a minority report as such.

Taking the two together I am in a real difficulty. It is not a question of any desire on my part to do anything which would lower the prestige of this House in any way, but I am in the practical difficulty that the only way I could get equality would be to increase an already too-large Committee by adding seven more members to it and making it 31, and I think that our efforts should be somehow to reduce it. Senator Hayes seemed to indicate that he would like to reduce it, but my trouble is how am I going to do it. Could I go and ask the Selection Committee in the Dáil to do something which they are not accustomed to doing? Their usual method is to work in this particular way, and I could not hand-pick them myself because if I do I am prejudicing the value of any report that may issue from this Committee.

Perhaps this is not strictly in order, but, as we are dealing with an abnormal case in which the Taoiseach points out we do not want to follow precedents too closely, would it be quite impracticable for the two Selection Committees to meet somewhat informally on a committee of, say, 18, nine of each? That means that with the two meeting together there would be no difficulty in seeing that all the various interests—after all, they are the same in both Houses —were represented. It would be a better sized Committee.

I do not think I could agree to that, because it would be starting something new and final, and, when all is said and done, the vote in the Dáil will have to be taken into account, and I am afraid that in that particular way it would be open to the objections which I am putting before you, the objections to hand-picking.

If I wanted, personally, to get advice, I think I could select seven or 11 people, or some number about that —I would not like to go beyond, say, 11 at the utmost—who would give me, privately, advice, and I believe I could get advice and suggestions from them as to a solution which would be as good as I could get from any Committee that could be formed. The fact, however, is that I believe that will not bring conviction to other people. They will say: "Of course, he will have the selection of them himself, and we know the sort of people he will select— people who will give him the kind of report he wants—but look at all the other people that he has not selected." Then they will come along and give me not the seven or the 11 that I would choose but many times that number— perhaps 77 other people who would be chosen by somebody else. So we have the practical difficulty here, and I think that, taking all the circumstances into account, this is almost as good a solution as we can get at the moment, and it is on that basis that I put it forward in the Dáil.

Before I sit down, I should like to say that the Dáil did not take upon itself to dictate to the Seanad. This is merely a proposition coming from the Dáil to the Seanad, saying, in effect, that the Dáil thinks it is expedient that this thing should be done and that it is looking for the concurrence of the Seanad. There is no attempt, however, on the part of the Dáil, to dictate to the Seanad as to what it should do.

Might I put this suggestion to the Taoiseach? He has very considerable influence in the other House with, at least, 70 members—70 members odd, I take it. Is it not possible that a committee of selection could agree on nine members? My recollection of the members of the Dáil Committee of Selection is that they have always been amenable, and I think it would be better to have it suggested that nine members of the Dáil should be put forward instead of 15; and if the nine members of the Dáil were elected, the Seanad would have advertence to that. I think that the Taoiseach underestimates his own influence with the Dáil.

Oh, I hope I do not underestimate or overestimate my influence there, and I hope that I have a fair appreciation of whatever strength or weakness it has. Now, first of all, we have got to give representation to the four or five Party groups, to start with, and naturally you will then be brought up against the question whether, if this report is going to have real influence, it would be one to which the majority of the members of the Dáil might object. I mean that you have to try to get people to give the assent of their commonsense, so to speak, to questions of this kind.

Is it not representation rather than proportional representation?

Yes, but the Senator knows perfectly well that these propositions will be voted upon or that, even if not voted upon, there will be certain views expressed. Again, a great deal of this argument is based— and I am sure Senator Hayes does not mistake this, because I am satisfied that he has given sufficient thought to this question to know that Parties are formed on the basis of things which the members of these Parties fundamentally agree and to which other Parties fundamentally disagree, and when such questions come up, these Parties, naturally, will want to have their representation taken account of. There is growing up a sort of view that Parties are something to be ashamed of in a community. There is, undoubtedly, an attempt to make it appear that there is something wrong about political Parties or about having political Parties in the State and people having Party affiliations and Party views. I am not one of those people who believe that and I never have been. I believe that it is quite natural for a group of people in a community to put forward certain views which they hold in common, and that when questions that affect these fundamental matters arise it is only right and natural that the interests affected by them should have representations effective in accordance with the votes of the people. Not merely do I believe that that is right and natural, but I am absolutely convinced that democracy could not work without it. If each one of us in this community were to act without any idea or view as to what other people might consider in the matter we would get nowhere. You have to have Parties, and one of the things that would be important in our community, I think, would be to have proper respect for Parties, as long as Parties do not abuse the powers which they naturally will have as Parties.

However, I did not approach this as a Party question, except from the point of view that ultimately it will be voted upon. This Committee will take part in the discussion of various propositions, and when matters arise which they regard as fundamental it is only right that the community as a whole, in so far as it can be proportionally represented, should be proportionally represented, but I did not approach it from a narrower point of view than that, and I think I am justified in saying that any attempt to say that this should not be approached from the Party point of view is wrong because, so long as you have a democracy, you will have parties, and the various Party views, in so far as they affect fundamental questions, will be expressed and will insist on being expressed. I think that you might as well face that at the beginning as at the end. I think, Sir, that I shall say no more about that.

Ag smaoineadh dom ar an gceist seo agus ag iarraidh dom m'intinn a dhéanamh suas i dtaobh abhair an rúin agus abhar na leasaithe atá molta, facthas dom go mb'fhearr dom breathnú ar gach rud, ní mar Sheanadóir, ach mar ghnáthdhuine den phobal. Fachthas dom, go gcaithfinn, má bhí mé le breithiúnas ceart a thabhairt ar an gceist, mé fhéin a chur i mbróga an phobail.

Ceist an-neamhchoitcheanta ar fad is ea an cheist atá le scrúdú do réir brí an rúin. Tá gearán déanta ar an Seanad. Thuit rudaí amach le linn toghcháin a chuir cuid mhaith den phobal in aimhreas ina thaobh. Rinneadh órádeacha, sa Dáil agus taobh amuigh dhe, ag lochtú an tSeanaid. Ag á lán daoine tá droc-mheas féin ar an Seanad. Ar an abhar seo féin, creidim go mba chóir go mbeadh an Seanad sásta an tromlucht bheith ag an Dáil ar an gCoiste seo. Má bhíonn an dá Theach meath ar mheath, maidir le líon Teachtaí ar an gCoiste, cuirfear an chumas an tSeanad féin, cuid mhaith breithiúnais a dhéanamh ar a gcúis féin. Má bhíonn an oiread comhaltaí ag an Seanad ar an gCoiste seo, agus a bheas ag an Dáil, agus má sheasann lucht an tSeanaid le chéile, rud a d'fhéadfadh tárlú, annsin, le cúnamh duine amháin féin ó thaobh na Dála, bheadh an láimh uachtarach ag lucht an tSeanaid ar cibé moltaí a déanfaí i dtaobh an abhair a bheadh á scrúdú acu. Ní thaithneóchadh sin liom agus tá mé cinnte nach dtaithneochadh sé leis an bpobal. B'ionann é, mar adúras, agus an chumhacht a thabhairt don Seanad a cúis féin a phlé agus breithiúnas a dhéanamh ar an gcúis sin.

Ba cóir dúinn cuimhniú, freisin, go bhfuil tábhacht fá leith ag baint leis an Dáil thar mar tá leis an Seanad. Is é an Dáil an phríomh-institiúid agus cibé socrú a déanfar, ba chóir go mbeadh an Dáil páirteach go láidir ann. Ba é leis an tSeanad dá réir an tromlucht bheith ag an Dáil ar an gCoiste seo; is mar sin ba tábhachtaí imtheachta agus molta an Choiste.

Rinneadh tagairt do phointe eile, sé sin, neamhspleachas Seanadóirí, le linn na diospóireachta, pointe nach mbaineann, is baolach, go ro-dhlúth leis an gceist atá luaite sa rún sna leasaithe atá os ár gcomhair. Níl fúm an phointe seo a phlé go mion; cé go mba mhaith liom sin a dhéanamh. Is pointe í nach mór a scrúdú lá éigin agus b'fhiú í a scrúdú.

Is cosúil, do réir cuid den chaint atá á dhéanamh, nach duine feiliúnach le bheith ina bhall den Seanad an duine a bhfuil tuairimí poilitíochta aige. Is cosúil, go háirithe, nach duine feiliúnach a bheith sa Seanad an duine atá ar aon-intinn leis an Rialtas. Is aisteach an tuairim í agus ní féidir glacadh léi. Bheinn go láidir i gcoinne aon ní a laghdódha tábhacht agus údarás agus gradam an tSeanaid. Sílim go ndéanann an chaint seo i dtaobh neamhspleachas andochar do institiúd antairbheach mar an Seanad. I mo thaobh féin de, tá poilitíocht agam agus níl aon náire orm é sin d'fhuagairt agus d'admháil. Is beag ceist phoilitíochta mar thuigeas go leor daoine an téarma sin, a thagas os ár gcomhair. Go deimhin, munab í ceist na Sé gCondaethe, níl mórán eile ceisteanna poilitíochta, mar thuigeas an gnáth-dhuine an téarma, le réiteach againn.

Na Billí a thagas os ár gcomhair, na díospóireachtaí bhíos ar bun anseo, is leis an ngeilleagar agus leis an sóisealacht a bhaineas siad. Tá spéis anmhór agam san ceisteanna seo. Tá polasaíthe éagsúla ann ina dtaobh. Tá siad scrúdaithe agam. Tá mé sásta gurb é polasaí an Rialtais an polasaí is sásúla ar na ceisteanna seo. An peaca agam é é sin a rá, an peaca agam é cuidiú leis an Rialtas? An duine mífheiliúnach mé le bheith sa Seanad de bhrí go n-aontaím le polasaí an Rialtais?

Is é mór-thábhacht an tSeanaid, dar liom, gur ionad é ina bhféadfadh daoine tuairimí éagsúla ar na neithe a bhíos os ar gcomhair a chur in iúl don Rialtas trí na hAiré thagas isteach chugainn. Ní géilltear do na tuairimí sin i gcomhnaí. Ach muna ngéilltear, is é an fáth atá leis nach gcruthaithear go sásúil go mba é leas an pobail go generálta go nglacfaí leis na tuairimí sin.

Is minic a thagas daoine chugam, is minic a thagann mion-aicmí chugam ag plé a gcúise agus ag iarraidh orm a gcúis a phlé annseo. Bíonn cúis mhaith acu go minic: ba mhaith liom go mór go ndéanfaí beart do na daoine agus aicmí sin do réir a gcúise. Ach ar an taobh eile, caithfe mé, agus caithfe gach Seanadóir an rud céanna a dhéanamh, cuimhniú ar leas an phobail i gcoitinn.

Má chuirim, do réir mo thuisgiona, leas an phobail go generálta os cionn leasa dreama bhig, nó leasa duine aonraict, a bhfuil me le lochtu. An gciallaíonn sé mé bheith neamh-spleách go rachfainn i gcoinne mo chomharsa agus cur i gcoinne cibé Aire atá os ar gcomhair nó i gcoinne an Rialtais?

Má thaspánann aon duine annseo go bhfuil moladh nó leasú foghainteach aige, foghainteach ó thaobh na tíre go hiomlán de, ní diúltaithear é. Ach ní leor ní a mholadh le go nglacfaí leis; ba chóir cúis mhaith a bheith leis.

Mhínigh an tAire Dlí agus Cirt annseo inné, agus é ag caint ar an gceist seo, gur cuma cé uaidh a thiocfas moladh, más ceann maith, foghainteach é ó thaobh leasa an phobail, go nglacfaidh sé leis. Sílim gur mar sin atá an scéal ag na hAirí eile chomh maith. Ní fhéadfaí a rá nach bhfaghann gach Seanadóir éisteacht aireach, cúramach anseo ná ní fhéadfadh aon duine a rá nach bhfaghann sé cothrom na féinne. Ní éiríonn le Seanadóirí maidir le gach moladh; gach áit éiríonn le daoine agus claoitear daoine—sna cúirteanna, i ndiospóireachta sa Dáil agus sa Seanad. Muna n-éiríonn le Seanadóirí a gcuid moltaí a chur i bhfeidhm ní hionann sin agus a rá gur daoine gan chiall gan phrionsabal na daoine a chuireas 'na gcoinne. Ar an tuairim seo a scrúdú siar go dtí an foinse, is é an bhrí atá léi go ndéanann Airí éagcóir ar dhaoine áirithe gach uair nach ngéilleann siad do mholtaí agus leasaithe na ndaoine sin.

Ní dúradh é sin inniu—ná faghann lucht an tSeanaid cothrom anso.

Tá sé ag rith trí chuid maith de na díospóireachtaí a bhíos againn san Tigh seo. Mar adúras, ba mhaith an rud an cheist seo a scrúdú go mion ach ní hé seo an t-am chuige. B'fhéidir go bhfuighmais an deis chóir chuige ar ball.

Thairis sin, ba mhaith liom a chomhairliú don tSeanad diúltiú do na leasaithe atá os ár gcomhair. Ar sin a dhéanamh beidh meas ar an Seanad i measc an phobail. Ar ghlacadh leis an Rún mar atá sé cuirfear cliú, gradam éifeacht agus údarás an tSeanaid a bheas ann feasta i n-áirithe.

This is a motion which concerns this House most intimately, because it relates solely to the method of election to this House. Under the Constitution this House consists of 60 members of whom 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach and 49 are elected. Of the 49 elected members three are elected by the National University of Ireland, three by Dublin University, and 43 from panels of candidates constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This motion deals, therefore, with the mode of election to this House of 43 members, these 43 members being selected from the panels. The resolution to my mind could be criticised, at least, its form. In the first place, I think that the use of the word "joint" is unfortunate. If the word "joint" were omitted nothing would be lost. The resolution sets forth:—

"That it is expedient that a Joint Committee of the Dáil and Seanad be set up to consider and make recommendations on the method of regulating elections of those elected members of Seanad Eireann ..."

It is certainly expedient to consider and to make recommendations on the method of regulating elections of the 43 elected members but it is by no means expedient that a Joint Committee of the Dáil and Seanad should be set up to consider and make recommendations in connection with that election. However, there is a problem there. Apparently, it appears that some change must be made in the mode of election of the 43 members. The Constitution sets forth that the Houses of the Legislature, with the Uachtarán, are called the Oireachtas. Dáil Eireann is totally distinct and separate from the Seanad in the Constitution. Strictly speaking, it is difficult to say why Dáil Eireann should be concerned with the mode of election of the 43 panel members who are, according to the Constitution, to be elected from panels of persons having knowledge and practical experience of certain defined interests which are set forth in the Constitution:—

"i. National Language and Culture, Literature, Art, Education and such professional interests as may be defined by law for the purpose of this panel;

ii. Agriculture and allied interests, and Fisheries;

iii. Labour, whether organised or unorganised;

iv. Industry and Commerce, including banking, finance, accountancy, engineering and architecture.

v. Public Administration and social services, including voluntary social activities."

The Constitution is not complete, because Article 18, sub-article 10, paragraph 1 states:

"Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article elections of the elected members of Seanad Eireann shall be regulated by law."

So it is merely for the purpose of enacting legislation to implement the express provision of the Constitution that this Committee has to be set up, in order, perhaps, that a more suitable form of legal enactment might be ultimately obtained. Therefore, as this law must be enacted by both Houses, by the Dáil as well as by the Seanad, it must be sponsored by the Government and, of course, the Government must, in the end, take responsibility for the initiation of legislation to implement the Constitution. This Joint Committee is to be set up nominally to advise both Houses, but really to advise the Government, so that nothing appears in the Constitution which would give the recommending Committee a Party complexion. Of course, it would be quite open to the Government to say that some outside body might be quite satisfactory for the purpose of giving advice on this matter, but apparently the Government have considered that a Joint Committee of the two Houses should be the body to make recommendations.

The Taoiseach has stated that in order to give political Parties proper representation in the Dáil the minimum number for the Dáil is 15, and by putting one man in the Dáil against one man in the Seanad, the number on the Committee to represent the Seanad is seven. Of course, this is not in our common acceptance of the term "a Joint Committee" at all. It is a committee, no doubt. At the present time, when we speak of a joint tenancy or a joint agreement it is a question of share and share alike. A tenancy in common in law is where people have different shares. This idea of a joint committee, consisting of equal numbers, is not quite new, as more than 150 years ago in England, whenever there was a joint committee between the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the number of members from the House of Commons on the committee was double the number of members representing the House of Lords. But that has been abolished since 1864. Now, it is commonly recognised in Great Britain and here that a joint committee should consist of an equal number of representatives of the interests concerned. If this Joint Committee is not to be regarded as a precedent in respect of Joint Committees of the Oireachtas, no harm will be done. While I have no rooted objection to the use of the word "joint" in this case, I do not think that it is apt. While supporting the resolution, I should like to make the reservation that this is not to be taken as a precedent for Joint Committees which may have to be set up hereafter to consider legislation. In legislation, each House controls its own business, so to speak. The members of the Dáil pass a Bill through its various stages and then it comes on here. If it should be advisable at any time that a Joint Committee of both Houses be set up, then both Houses should be represented on that Committee on what I might call an equal basis. The purpose which the Government and the Taoiseach have in mind would be just as well achieved by calling this body a Committee simpliciter instead of describing it as a Joint Committee of both Houses. Therefore, I think that the amendment by Senator Hayes is unnecessary. I think that the Taoiseach did say that this was not to form a precedent.

I do not think that he did.

I was about to say flatly that it would not form a precedent, but then it occurred to me that, if there were other such Committees to be set up, we might have the same difficulty.

Exactly.

That is why I did not say flatly that it would not form a precedent. If I were dealing with the matter in the first instance now, I should describe this body as a Committee of both Houses, leaving out the word "joint". I think I indicated that there was a certain amount of doubt in the matter at the beginning. As this was to be a Committee of both Houses, I thought that the use of the word "joint" would not carry any connotation regarding numbers. However, we have lost a great deal of time in setting up the Committee——

You will be meeting next week.

If the motion were to be amended now, it would mean that this whole question would be discussed again in the other House.

May I endeavour to give some assistance to Senator Ryan on this question? No matter what the Taoiseach, Senator Ryan and I may say, if you pass this motion it will be a precedent and will suggest that the only way you can appoint a Joint Committee will be by having the representation in numerical ratio to the Dáil and Seanad. Once you do this you are "sunk".

I should not say that, but you will have to meet the difficulty each time.

While reserving rights as regards Joint Committees of both Houses, I cannot see any objection to the appointment of this Committee to make the necessary recommendations. As regards the amendment by Senator Douglas, that the Joint Committee should be empowered to present minority reports, if necessary, I think that that would largely confuse the issue. It would be confusing if every members of the Joint Committee were to present a report of his own. The reports might make very interesting reading but they would be of little use as authoritative guidance. In the end, it is quite possible that, notwithstanding our talk here to-day and the talk in the other House, the Government might be compelled to adopt its own solution owing to divisions of opinion in the reports of the Committee.

The Taoiseach mentioned a couple of times that there were four or five Parties in the Dáil and that each should have representation. I assumed that there were five Parties and, adopting the suggestion of the Taoiseach, that each should have representation, I got certain figures which I shall cite. Assuming that the largest Party should have five representatives, then Fine Gael would have two, Clann na Talmhan one, Labour two—since there are two divisions of Labour—and Independents one. That gives a total of 11. If you allow a representation of 11 to this House and take an exactly similar division of Parties, you will get a Committee of 22, which is the maximum proposed in the motion before the House. I suggest that that would be a reasonable solution of the difficulty. You would have the maximum number of representatives and all Parties would be fairly represented. There might be one objection—the Government Party would have a total of only ten out of the 22. That, however, would not be a serious difficulty since the representation would be mixed owing to the inclusion of representatives of all Parties and it would be most unlikely that all would combine to vote against the Government Party. In addition, the chairman of the Committee would have a balancing effect and would probably keep things right from the Government's standpoint.

I should not like to accuse the Senator of political sympathies but he is taking every possible precaution to ensure that the Fianna Fáil Party will not run this Committee.

Mr. O'Reilly

I had no intention of doing that.

I suggest that the Senator start at the other end.

I should like to offer two suggestions. I should like to see this a Joint Committee in the sense of the term used by Senator Ryan. It is not as if we were meeting to recommend some abstract or remote conclusion. We are really meeting to take steps to decide what will be the fate of our House. We are meeting to make recommendations which will, presumably, be acted upon in part, if not in their entirety, thus deciding the composition of this Chamber. Since we seem to be the focus of world attention with regard to a great many things, it is quite likely that our struggles with this problem will provide very interesting material for other countries who are facing the same problem of the composition of a Second Chamber. The first suggestion I offer is that we should go straight ahead and have a Joint Committee of 30. I have nothing like the experience the Taoiseach has regarding large committees but I have been on a sufficient number of such committees to view them with horror. I suggest that that Committee of 30 might appoint a subcommittee which would report to the Joint Committee. The other suggestion has merely occurred to me now and I have not thought it fully out. Would it be possible to have joint action by the selection Committees of the two Houses?

I am personally indebted to the Taoiseach for his defence of the Party system. It is the inevitable consequence of groups of men thinking alike. The thoughts and actions of such men are crystallised in the Party system. Anybody who wants to defend the Party system has merely to look back on the history of Europe for the past six years. There, he will see what the Party system has saved nations from and what its absence cost other nations. Like the Taoiseach, I notice a certain amount of diffidence in this House in referring to the Party system, as if it were something not quite respectable. I think it is inevitable among people who are at liberty to form and to express opinions, but the point I am wondering if I can make is: Suppose you want to represent the various Parties and your two Joint Selection Committees meet, what is to prevent them getting their 15 members from both Houses lumped together? Why need you chop up the two Houses separately? Can the two Selection Committees not meet and say: "We want a Committee of so many members and it does not matter from which House they come"? I think it might be possible to work it out on those lines.

I should like to express my gratitude for the lucid and most cogent way in which the Taoiseach showed us how he reached the conclusion step by step. It is a case of the irresistible force and the immovable obstacle. I am not endeavouring to put up any immovable obstacle, but I would like to put forward these points. In view of what the Committee has to decide on—the fate of the Upper or the other Chamber—and in view of the extraordinary difficulties in which we find ourselves regarding the number of the Committee, my two suggestions may possibly be deemed worthy of consideration by some subsequent speaker.

Listening to this debate, without having any formal views at all when I came into the Chamber, I have been wondering whether, in our effort to achieve reality, we have not become a little unreal, and whether, in attempting to say that we are sound, practical men with our feet on the ground, realising the existence of Parties, realising the necessities of Parties and realising the compelling force of Parties, we have not really tended to overlook the kind of solution which may be found by the Committee, or, perhaps I should say, the efforts towards a solution which are likely to be the result of their labours. I for one certainly do not anticipate that this Committee will be able to bring forward a satisfactory solution of the problem which it is asked to face. I do not suppose that the solution it brings forward will be one which cannot be criticised and soundly criticised by members of nearly any political Party and nearly any abstract political school. The most that I hope for is that the scheme or schemes which this Committee, after its labours and deliberations, presents to the country will be better than the present scheme. As I said on another occasion, I think experience has shown that it could hardly be worse.

But you are setting up a Committee to give you ideas of something better than you have and if you get ideas of something which will be better than you have, I think you should be thankful. It would be an advantage if several ideas, not necessarily completely antagonistic—they may be complementary or supplementary — with the arguments for them can be put in the same paper, presented to the Oireachtas and to the Government, and if it is then left to the Government so far as they can to select either one scheme in toto, or to combine elements of each. Whatever scheme they select, there will be something wrong with it. Whatever scheme any body devises, subsequent experience and the logic of subsequent events will show that it is not only not perfect but full of objections; but if we are really practical, what we are looking for in this is an improvement on the present system and not an ideal one. That is why it seems to me an unreal thing to approach this from the point of view that, by carefully balancing political representation, we will get the best ideas.

It is all very well to say that political Parties are united in their attitude to certain subjects. I doubt very much whether the members of any political Party are united at the present moment in their ideas as to how best you can elect what I may call the vocational part of the Seanad. The problem will be one of abstract politics, and, although you can find a difference between an approach to abstract problems when considering extreme left or extreme right, I think the divisions of the Committee to be elected will, and should, naturally cut across the present largely accidental political grouping. That is the only reason why I do not accede at once to the plea of the Taoiseach that we must regard political Parties as being natural and proper, and that we must have a representation and a somewhat proportional representation of them on the Committee to be set up. I suggest that you, first of all, want to ensure that it is a Committee of people who know something about this matter from the point of view of abstract politics; and, secondly, a Committee on which are represented some people who know now the abstract works when translated into the concrete.

The scheme on which this House is elected at present is, in the abstract, beautiful. The practical politician would probably have foreseen that, when translated into the concrete, it would have a number of disadvantages. There are, or there used to be, certain South American Republics whose constitutions, viewed from every abstract point of view, were models of all that a constitution should be, and it was not, perhaps, a coincidence that these States were accustomed to date their chronology from their last revolution. I anticipate that if you can get a certain number of people who have an abstract approach, and if they can be checked by people who will say: "That is all very well, but what is likely to happen is this," you will get one idea or two ideas which the Government will be able to take hold of and to utilise as the basis of a new system.

The responsibility is the Government's in this case. The responsibility of the Government is to be advised and to make their choice, and, having made that choice, having made it not on political grounds, then, if they like, let the matter be debated in the Houses in a way in which inevitably a certain amount of political considerations will come into play. I am very anxious that this Committee—and I tender to all who may sit upon it my anticipatory condolences because they will have an almost impossible task— will be so constituted that it will have, first of all, representation not on proportional political lines but rather on the lines of containing people who have certain knowledge of abstract politics, certain knowledge of the course of history and certain practical knowledge of how things work in this country. Those are the three types of people that you want, and not three types of existing political Parties. I hope, secondly, that its procedure will be so formulated that it will be possible for different groups to present different reports, not merely in the form of schemes which have been put forward in the Committee and voted upon, but schemes which are presented to the Government, together with the arguments of those who put them forward. I hope, thirdly, that the Government in formulating their own plans will not be afraid to adopt something out of each type of proposal.

It has been suggested that the method of putting forward schemes by motions and then voting upon them would be an adequate safeguard to ensure the ventilation of the good ideas which may be contained in each scheme, but, speaking subject to correction, I think that in practice the report which is presented to the House, and certainly the report which would be reproduced in the newspapers, would not contain the motions and the voting on the schemes. They could be discovered if you looked at the proceedings in full, but in practice they would be as effectively buried as the evidence given before a commission which occupies the blue books in England. They are of enormous thickness and are never looked at except by an occasional student of the subject. Everyone merely looks at the conclusions in the report. I do not think that should be so. I think there should be an opportunity for people to produce a minority report, or minority reports, and I think that at the very beginning we should not accept the point of view that those must necessarily be the reports of political Parties. What we want them to be is reports of people from various political Parties who, on certain issues of current politics, might vote against each other, but who might yet approach the abstract question of the best way of constituting the Seanad in a way which is dictated by their own experience and training, and cuts clean across Party lines. I can quite conceive that, on a Committee of that nature, Senator Magennis and I might find ourselves producing a minority report of two, because it is more than probable that in the abstract certain questions might be approached by us from the same point of view. That might not happen if it was a question or a matter of immediate political heat.

If we want this Committee to operate with the greatest advantage, I think we are stultifying ourselves at the very beginning by trying to elect it upon political lines. We should do everything to emphasise the fact that its report should be non-political, that it is to get a good Seanad and not a Seanad that is going to favour A, B or C. It is a confession of failure to suggest that it is going to be in proportion to the strength of political Parties. It might even be a weakness in argument to suggest that the numbers for Dáil and Seanad should be exactly the same, and that is where I agree that it should not be called a Joint Committee. But if there is an argument in that, inasmuch as that the Seanad can bring to bear on the problem the practical experience of those who have been elected, and that the Dáil can bring to bear on it the practical experience of those who voted for it, I have no doubt whatever that in both Houses there are people who would be able to shed a great deal of light on what practically happens at an election. For that reason, if for no other reason, I think there is a very good reason why the Seanad should have equal representation, and as it is the Seanad whose reputation is at stake, it is still more important that its representation should not be liable to be swamped on the Committee, and I do not use that word in any sort of a deprecatory way. Let us get away from the whole idea that this Committee is going to be a battle ground, that it is going to be a Committee which, in fear and trembling, approaches an insoluble problem in the hope that it is going to help the Government with ideas for something better than you have got. Solutions only grow. They are not made in the minds of men or committees. They grow out of the essence of political action and the essence of political man. Let us be content with that, but do not let us approach this from the point of view that it is to be settled in any schematic or planned way. Let us take the practical attitude of having equal numbers of Dáil and Seanad, with everyone expressing his opinion, and everyone producing a report and giving it to the public for what it is worth.

At this stage of the debate it is not my intention to take up much of the time of the House. I have been wondering, during the course of the various speeches that have been made, what kind of a Seanad was being envisaged. There has been a reference to this political Party and that. I think that the general problem should be more concerned not with the size of the Committee but with the fact that it is to be created at all. The public want this Committee and its composition is far more important than its size. My own position in this House is, I think, unique. I, personally, was nominated at every election to the Seanad that has been held since the State was created. On more than one occasion I got several nominations, but on most occasions I got zero votes, but the first and only by-election that I was nominated for saw me heading the poll. There may be a lesson in that. I speak subject to correction when I say that my position in this present House must be unique in that I am the only Senator who was selected at a by-election.

Another important thing is that this Committee, when it is set up, must not fail in the job that it is given to do. The Seanad is part and parcel of the machinery of State. We are carefully cultivating, and I am delighted to see it, all the trappings of State from Arus an Uachtarain down the scale. We will only get respect for the trappings of State to the degree that we ourselves develop that respect. No one can say that the system which obtains for the election of members to this House encourages the public to have that respect which they should have for the Upper House of the Oireachtas of the country.

In listening to all the discussion that has taken place as to whether this Party or that Party is to be represented on the Committee, I have been wondering what the position of people elected like myself is to be. The general public outside, the vocational bodies which are considered to be of sufficient importance in the life of the community to be nominating bodies, as they have been in my own case, have felt over a period of years that the scheme of election is a mockery and a sham and should go. Therefore, I feel very strongly that, in the selection of the Committee, Party considerations should not be paramount, that a strong effort should be made to get the best possible brains that the country has got, men who can unselfishly evolve a scheme that will recommend itself to both Houses of the Oireachtas and, in the ultimate, to the nation and thereby secure the election of a Seanad that will be looked up to and respected by everybody, and not form the subject of music-hall jokes as it has hitherto.

It appears to me that the discussion is wandering over a very wide field and that in the end we are not going to be very much further on than when we started. As I understand, the question is whether or not this House is willing to agree with what the Dáil has submitted for our agreement. Objection is taken to the proposal made by the Dáil on two grounds. So far as objection is taken to it regarding the respective number of members of each House to be on the Committee, it appears to me that the proposal to make the Committee 31 does not differ materially from the proposal that it should be 23. In either case the number is far too big. A Committee of 23 members will not be a practical body to deal with this problem. In the first place there will be a bad and irregular attendance of members. Each group and Party will endeavour to secure representation for itself on the Committee without any regard whatever to the contribution which the representatives will make to the solution of the problem confronting them. If we could get a Committee of 11—nine would do me—but not more than 11, with the Ceann Comhairle as Chairman and five members from each House, it would be a far better attempt to secure a working body than the present proposal. I do not know whether that can be done or not. I do not know whether or not we can induce the Dáil to agree that there should be a Committee of not more than 11 members.

The Taoiseach raised the difficulty as to how the body is to be constituted and at the same time give representation to all the groups and Parties in both Houses. No matter what you do you cannot give representation to all the groups and Parties in this House. I am trying to estimate, looking over the House, how many possible groups there are in the Seanad. There are at least ten. There may be 60 for all I know. There is no use in attempting to get a representative body on the pretence that you are giving representation to all groups. You are not. I suggest that if we cannot get the Committee of Selection to select five competent people in this House and the corresponding body in the Dáil to select five competent people from the Dáil then we ought to allow each House, on the basis of a proportional representation vote, to select five people to represent them hoping all the time that the House would select impartially the five most competent persons they could nominate to the Committee.

When I hear Senator Summerfield talking about getting the best brains in the country I begin to wonder are we living on the earth at all. Do not we know that that is the last thing we will get? We are not going to get the 23 best people and we do not want them. If we did, we would not ask the Committee of Selection to select them on a political Party basis. What we are proposing to do is to count heads.

Irrespective of their contents.

It does not matter. If they can put their hand up when it comes to a vote, that is all that matters and that is the way the Committee of Selection will see it. I would urge strongly that the Taoiseach should reflect on what has been said here and reflect on the kind of problem that he is asking the House to face and see whether he cannot go back to the Dáil and tell them that he is convinced that this Committee is too big, that it should be a smaller Committee, and ask them if they will agree to a scheme by which a smaller Committee can be selected impartially aiming, as far as possible, at getting the most competent people to act on the Committee.

Up to now nobody has suggested that this matter be referred to the U.N.O. Unfortunately, we are not affiliated to that organisation because I am sure it would present enormous difficulties to them as it appears to present to the people here. To me there is no difficulty whatever about the matter. With Senator Hayes' amendment I am in entire agreement. With the motion I am in entire agreement except as regards the proportion of representation. I recognise the need, the great need, for reform in connection with the election of this House. On former occasions I tried to call attention to the various abuses that occur during the elections for the Seanad. The result is that this Seanad does not occupy the place in the public mind that the Seanad should occupy. It will not occupy that place until we put ourselves beyond reproach.

With very little change, we could make the present system of election to the Seanad a perfect system. We will not get a perfect House because we have not perfect people in the country. I suggest that if we abolish the postal voting we have solved the whole problem. In order to prove that I will have to descend to the level that was descended to in the Dáil. For instance, in the last election one of the Parties to the Seanad election decided to call in all the panel papers of their adherents and, having called them in, appointed a committee of three to mark these papers in a certain way. One of the three failed to turn up. Two people took on the marking. One of them was a candidate and he switched a vote, which ensured his own election. The other switched a vote which ensured the election of a particular friend of his. I have heard that story time and again, repeatedly. It may or may not be true but this is true: A committee was appointed to investigate the marking of the papers. That is a long time ago. That committee has not reported its findings up to now. Whether that is true or not, so long as it is possible for that to occur, this House cannot stand high in the estimation of the people of the country. That is the root of all the trouble. The panel system is a good one; the arrangements are good; but the postal voting damns the whole proposal and will continue to do so. There is no doubt whatever about that.

There is no difficulty to my mind in getting over the trouble of postal voting. The total number of electors to this House is in the neighbourhood of 300. One hundred and thirty-five of these are Dáil members. There is no earthly reason why the Returning Officer would not bring the ballot papers to the electors or why the electors would not come to the ballot box, the same as any other electors in the country, and cast their votes and preserve the secret ballot, because this House is not elected on a secret ballot so long as you have postal voting.

I suggest that that would go a long way to have this House elected on a basis that would bring credit to it and to the Oireachtas in general. To my mind, it does not present any difficulty. As I said, I am thoroughly in favour of Senator Hayes' proposal, but I am altogether opposed to the amendment proposed by Senator Douglas. We know that one man on the Committee from any House who wants to advertise himself will be sure to put in a minority report. If we have 30 on the Committee, we can safely say that we will have eight or nine minority reports. I believe that the Taoiseach and the Dáil and the Oireachtas in general would be well advised to accept the amendment proposed by Senator Hayes and let us have a unanimous agreement on the motion; otherwise I seriously suggest to the House that they should stand by Senator Hayes' amendment and send back to the Dáil our opinion on the matter as represented by a vote of this House.

I do not know that Senators fully realise the problem there will be for me, for instance, if I have to go back and try to urge the Dáil to change the number. In the course of the debate here it was suggested that counting heads without counting what is in them is not a very good way of arriving at a decision. That hits at majority rule. Everybody knows that a case can be made against majority rule. But it is a practical rule. It is accepted and it works. The same thing is true of the Dáil about giving proportional representation to members of Parties. You get your work done. Otherwise, on each occasion, you will have a discussion as long as the discussion we have had here on this particular matter. You are anxious for your prestige as a House and that is the only basis— perhaps also a reduction of the number —on which objection to my proposal is taken when all is said and done— that it would lower the prestige of this House compared with the Dáil unless you had the same number as the Dáil. The Parties in the other House will also be anxious for their prestige and will ask themselves or ask other members of the House to consider whether they are to be rated man for man as of less intelligence and less value than their neighbours. Therefore this question could raise interminable discussions.

One of the values of having a rule like this adopted in the Dáil is that, when a Committee is proposed, each particular group is left to select its own particular representatives and the Committee is able to get on with its business and do its work. Otherwise you will have interminable discussions as to what are the proportions for the different people, unless you settle it by some sort of secret vote or, again, by proportional representation. I had to bear these practical things in mind when I put down the number of 15 in the Dáil, and I knew I was not going to have a long discussion as to whether the proper representation was given to each Party. Everybody recognised it. It meant that each particular Party, even the small Parties, were given reasonable representation in proportion to their strength.

When I come here you are anxious about it, naturally, and I admit that, if I were doing it again, I would probably knock out the word "joint". I do not think it necessarily has the connotation of equality. Nevertheless, a case could be made, and, therefore, I would wish to get rid of it. But, even to do that now, would mean going back to the Dáil again and, after all, the main thing is to put this Committee at work.

The other solution is that possibly you could give equality by giving the Seanad 15 members. There is objection to that—apart from the objection that it would make the number on the Committee still greater—that it would be an undue proportion of the members of the House, which is a sound objection, particularly when it is the present constitution of the House that has been the cause of the setting up of this Committee. If it could be suggested outside that the members we are putting on this Committee would have any interest in preserving the existing mode of election, objections would be raised to it.

Therefore, I do think that, when all is said and done, the solution that is proposed by putting in this number is as good as you can get. I know there are objections, but you cannot get perfection in a lot of things and you must do the best you can. The thing was to get the Committee at work and to get a Committee which will have a fair chance of being put rapidly at work and a Committee composed in a manner in which it cannot be said that from the start the dice were being loaded in one way or another, except in so far as they were loaded by the people voting at the last election not doing the work in a fair way.

Notwithstanding the objection raised to this, I ask the Seanad not to send this back to the Dáil. We will have, first of all, this question as to whether in a case like the present one there should be equal representation; I am talking of the particular case that is under discussion. As a matter of fact, rather than do that, I would be inclined to say: "All right; as the Dáil does represent the nation in miniature, being elected by proportional representation, we will get the Dáil as representing the people and the democracy of the country, to consider this matter from their point of view and leave the Seanad out of it altogether". That was a way of doing it.

It was not explicitly approached in that way in the Dáil, but in the whole of the discussion from which this motion arose there was no suggestion, so far as I remember, of a Joint Committee or a Committee on which the Seanad was to be represented at all. There was a complaint from the other House that the method of election to this House has grievous objections to it; that it worked out badly in practice; and that the Dáil should set about setting up a Committee to try to get a better mode of election. My own feeling is, if we cannot get agreement between the Dáil and this House, we should do that rather than face in the other House again all this question in which, just as happened here, discussions arise which are not to the credit either of this House or of the institutions generally. These things in connection with recent elections are almost certain to crop up, even though they may not be strictly in order or may not be so regarded by some people, and the Chair may be willing to give wide scope to people who are speaking on a resolution of this sort. I have tried to do my best and I admit that it is not as satisfactory as I would like it to be. From listening to the discussion here, I cannot see any more satisfactory way of doing it, unless I approach it from the point that the Dáil would set up a Committee for which it would have sole responsibility. The Committee would have no authority whatever and its only purpose would be to examine the question and make suggestions. That is not what is proposed now. The report of this Joint Committee should have a considerable amount of authority behind it and the Government would certainly have to justify its failure to implement the Committee's suggestions. If I were to do it another way, which occurred to me, by getting together a number of people more or less experts on this subject and asking them to submit proposals, it would be possible then for the Government, if it saw something it could put forward and take responsibility for, to bring forward its proposals in the ordinary way. However, we have started in this particular way and I suggest that the important thing is to go ahead with the work. Even though Senators may not agree with me otherwise, I think they will agree that I have tried and that my approach has been to try to get a practical solution to a fairly difficult question.

I take it that the Taoiseach is concluding instead of Senator Quirke?

Then may I add a word of explanation, since there have been two speeches from the Taoiseach? I approach this matter from the point of view of the House. I agree that there have been abuses which need to be investigated. I do not see anything in the point about the word "joint". If you join some members of the Dáil with some members of the Seanad, whether you call it a "Joint Committee" or a "Committee", it seems to my simple untutored mind to make no difference whatever. I think the Taoiseach's idea of a Committee of the Dáil to consider this whole question would not be a bad one and I would have no objection to it. The Dáil has an absolute right to do that, if it likes.

However, when you are setting up a Joint Committee for the first time—I think this is the first time—you are certainly making a precedent here, a precedent which is a wrong one. Particularly in the case now at issue, where you are considering the constitution of a Seanad, it is a mistake. As I said before, by way of interruption or explanation, I think the Taoiseach under-estimates his own influence with the Dáil and the influence of other people with the Dáil. I do not think the Dáil would stand up on its hind legs and say it wants 15 members and will have nothing else, no matter who says so. I believe that nine members of the Dáil would give just as much representation to Fianna Fáil as 15, and the only difference would be that there would be only one Labour Party representative instead of two. My amendment does not mean that we want 15 members of the Seanad. As the Taoiseach very properly said, that would be a fantastic idea; and I am against it. If there were two fives, as Senator Duffy suggested, it might be small, but if the representation were nine from each we would get a much better Committee and a much better discussion. However, what is being done here, whether it be called a Joint Committee or not, is to make the precedent that every Joint Committee of the two Houses will have at least 15 members of the Dáil and only seven of the Seanad. Further, if there are more Parties in the Dáil—as there might very easily be at some future date— then there will probably be still more Deputies on such Committees.

I am interested only in the constitutional aspect, which I think is important, in the way in which this House should look on itself. If we are ousted from the position, with regard to Joint Committees, of being a free and equal number with the Dáil, we have lost very considerably. It would be preferable for the Dáil to set up a Committee of its own, rather than come to us and say it wants 15 members, while we are to get only seven, and that it insists beforehand that the Chairman of the Dáil be the Chairman of the Joint Committee. That is a bad scheme and it will effect really nothing. Perhaps the truth is that there is some fear as to what this Committee will decide and there is a desire to make absolutely certain that there will be a particular Party majority on it. That is an entirely misguided attitude, as the Party element should not enter into it at all. I am in agreement with the Taoiseach that we must have Parties, but I cannot see that we must have consideration from the Party angle of the constitution of a Second House. That is what has ruined this House and that is what will ruin this Committee.

Amendment No. 1 put.
The Seanad divided: Tá, 18; Níl, 20.

  • Baxter, Patrick F.
  • Butler, John.
  • Counihan, John J.
  • Douglas, James G.
  • Duffy, Luke J.
  • Fearon, William R.
  • Foran, Thomas.
  • Hayden, Thomas.
  • Hayes, Michael.
  • Horan, Edmund.
  • Keane, Sir John.
  • Meighan, John J.
  • Moore, T.C. Kingsmill.
  • O'Reilly, Patrick John.
  • Parkinson, James J.
  • Smyth, Michael.
  • Sweetman, Gerard.
  • Tunney, James.

Níl

  • Clarkin, Andrew S.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Corkery, Daniel.
  • Farnan, Robert P.
  • Hearne, Michael.
  • Hogan, Daniel.
  • Honan, Thomas V.
  • Johnston, Séamus.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kelly, Peter T.
  • McEllin, John E.
  • Magennis, William.
  • O Buachalla, Liam.
  • O'Callaghan, William.
  • O'Dea, Louis E.
  • O'Donovan, Seán.
  • Quirke, William.
  • Ryan, Michael J.
  • Stafford, Matthew.
  • Summerfield, Frederick M.
Tellers:—Tá: Senators Butler and Sweetman; Níl: Senators Hearne and S. O'Donovan.
Amendment declared lost.
Amendment No. 2 put and declared lost.
Motion put and declared carried.
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