The purpose of this Restrictive Trade Practices Bill is to provide machinery for the investigation of restrictive practices in trade and to provide the means for taking appropriate measures where trade practices are considered to be restricting competition unfairly or to be in any way contrary to the public interest.
There is at the present time no statutory machinery for the investigation of trade practices which are alleged to be restrictive of competition or detrimental to the public welfare. Neither has the Minister for Industry and Commerce nor any other Minister power to take action to prevent such practices or to remedy any situation resulting from them where he is of the opinion that the public interest has been contravened. I think that apart altogether from any question that may arise as to the best method of meeting the problems which these restrictive trade practices constitute it will be agreed that it is time that something should be done about them and that as a minimum there should be machinery for investigating them and machinery for doing something about them if the investigation shows it to be necessary.
The problem of restrictive trade practices action by trade associations or combinations of manufacturers or traders to reduce or eliminate competition in their own interests is of comparatively recent growth in this country. I think it would be true to say that it developed very largely as a result of the conditions which prevailed here during the war years. These conditions necessitated frequent consultation between Government Departments and trade associations on the distribution of scarce commodities. They necessitated the promotion of trade associations, to facilitate such discussions, when they did not exist and they accustomed traders to a situation in which trade in particular classes of goods was confined to those previously engaged in dealing in them and in which new entrants to particular trades were not encouraged. Furthermore, the frequent announcements in the Press that regulations regarding the distribution of goods had been discussed with and agreed with particular trade associations tended to enhance the prestige of these associations and give them an authority in the trades concerned which they had not previously enjoyed.
In many cases arrangements for the equitable distribution of scarce supplies or the utilisation of such supplies for necessary purposes were carried on voluntarily without statutory authority and through the co-operation of the trade associations. That was particularly the case in regard to commodities which offered special problems which could not be easily resolved by the machinery of regulation and control. While attributing the growth of what are now generally agreed to be undesirable practices to the circumstances of the emergency years, it would only be fair to say that many of these trade associations did extraordinarily useful work in that period and many of the difficulties of that time could not have been resolved without their co-operation. Whatever is the explanation of the recent growth in restrictive trade practices, it is obvious that they are fairly widespread and that a number of trade associations and organisations are now disposed to maintain the special conditions which developed during the difficult circumstances of the emergency and have adopted practices for the regulation of their trade which are designed to serve the interests of their members and are often in conflict with the public interest. It is perhaps also only fair to say that our experience in that regard has been not dissimilar to the experience of other countries in the same period.
The most obvious of these practices —that which evoked the largest measure of public criticism—has been the exclusion of new entrants from a particular branch of trade or commerce. It was the most likely extension of wartime arrangements into the present peacetime economy. That prevention of new entrants into a particular trade or a particular branch of commerce was effected either by overt act or by the imposition of conditions so onerous as to make it impossible for new entrants with limited capital resources to comply with them. A number of complaints have been made in recent years to the Department of Industry and Commerce alleging the extension of arrangements of that character, arrangements designed to exclude new people from entering into any branch of commerce. The purpose of these arrangements was to restrict competition in the trade for the benefit of those previously established in it. There have been, of course, many complaints about other restrictive practices, most of which Senators will have heard in or outside the House.
The allegations made to the Department of Industry and Commerce may not have covered them all but they covered an extraordinary number. They related to the imposition and the maintenance of unreasonable qualifications for trade discount, refusal of supply on trade terms to people who were not members of a trade association or approved by a particular association, exclusive dealing arrangements between suppliers and retailers— that is, agreements on the part of retailers to sell only the products of particular suppliers.
There were complaints of unreasonable limitations of wholesale channels for particular commodities and of resale price maintenance agreements affecting a number of commodities. There have been, as Senators probably know, allegations that boycotts have been arranged against traders who attempted to sell goods at a price lower than the minimum retail price fixed by manufacturers or importers and in other cases the threat of boycott has been used to force manufacturers to refuse to supply goods to traders. The indications that these practices are fairly widespread in trade necessitate a thorough examination of the position, directed to determining whether the public interest is adversely affected.
I am sure the Seanad will expect me, for the purpose of enabling Senators to assess the gravity and extent of the problem, to indicate the trades covered by these complaints but in doing so I should make it clear that I am not in any way anticipating the investigation of any practice under the machinery proposed to be established under the Bill and I am not in a position to discuss the merits or demerits of any case, either to sustain or assail the justification sometimes put forward for the operation of these trade practices. I am mentioning trades in respect of which I have received complaints merely to indicate the extent to which ground for complaint exists and the magnitude of the problem with which the Bill is designed to deal.
The greatest volume of complaint expressed in the form of communications addressed to the Department of Industry and Commerce or voiced in the Dáil or other public assemblies throughout the country related to the distribution of petrol and the principal ground for complaint in regard to petrol related to the withholding of supplies in certain cases from persons wishing to enter the petrol retailing business. But that practice was also alleged to apply to trade in a large number of other goods: radios, paper bags, wrapping paper, newspapers and periodicals, cinema films, bicycles and the component parts of bicycles, boots and shoes, rubber footwear, coal, motor cars and accessories, electrical goods, glass, pottery, sanitary ware, building materials and requisites of various kinds, certain tools like files and saws, agricultural machinery, certain pharmaceutical supplies, drapery goods and many classes of foodstuffs.
In respect of motor cars, wireless sets, agricultural machinery, boots and shoes, some drapery goods and foodstuffs, cigarettes and tobacco, it has been alleged that restrictive practices in operation included resale price maintenance agreements. Again I want to say that it is not to be assumed that in every case in which a complaint was made it was well founded or that the regulation of distribution by trade associations or by arrangements between manufacturers and retailers is necessarily injurious to the public interest. Whether those practices are or are not in the public interest can only be determined in my view by a special investigation process. There is, as I said, no statutory authority for such investigation at the present time and it is to provide the means of carrying through such an investigation that many of the provisions of this Bill have been designed.
In framing the proposals in the Bill, I was guided by two main principles. The first is that, as a general rule and within such protection as may be afforded to any industry by tariffs or other import regulations, free and fair competition in distribution is desirable in the public interest. The second principle is that even though circumstances may in exceptional cases warrant some degree of trade regulation, trade associations or combinations of traders cannot be allowed to arrogate to themselves the right to impose that regulation or to limit competition. The very fact that our industrial economy has been based of necessity to such a large extent upon tariff and quota protection makes it all the more necessary that the Government should be vigilant in ensuring that there is effective internal competition.
Where competition from external resources has been removed or has been lessened, conditions necessarily exist which facilitate the making of agreements between producers or between producers and distributors or even between distributors themselves of a restrictive character to regulate trade so as to limit competition and secondly so as to facilitate price maintenance, because the operation of these restrictive practices or price maintenance arrangements can only be adopted where the persons desiring to engage in trade have no alternative source of supply open to them. For that reason many of these agreements and arrangements and many of these combinations between traders are facilitated.
I think we should approach this issue with the view that, where combinations exist between traders who should in the natural order of things be in competition with one another, the combinations must be looked upon with deep suspicion, they must be regarded as a potential source of injury to the public and liable to be detrimental to the interest of consumers. I do not want it to be understood that the problem this Bill is designed to deal with is confined to goods manufactured by protected industry. Some of the complaints of unfair restrictions which have been received relate to traders trading in commodities which are imported. It is equally essential in the public interest that no arrangements or agreements between importers and distributors for the restriction of competition should be permitted, just as in respect of protected goods. Neither are these restrictive practices necessarily confined to internal arrangements. Agreements which are restrictive of competition and which can be detrimental to the interest of the consuming public can also be made between importers and external suppliers and these agreements may cover market sharing or profit fixing arrangements of a most objectionable kind.
Similarly, on the export side, individual exporters or intending exporters may be subject to unfair coercion or restraint by combination between other exporters in this country and importers in foreign markets. The effect of these arrangements would be to canalise trade through certain channels and so to make it difficult or impossible for the individual exporter here to survive outside the ring.
I have stated as a principle that associations of traders should not be allowed to arrogate to themselves the right to regulate trade restrictively. Where they may do so, it is to be feared that the stronger the trade organisation the more likely it is that, if no check is applied, the regulation of trade will eventually prove harmful to the public interest. In saying that I do not want it to be thought that I am opposed to trade associations. On the contrary, I think that trade associations are valuable and are in many respects indispensable for the efficient conduct of industry and commerce. There are many legitimate and useful fields in which these trade associations can be active, but it is natural and inevitable, perhaps, that their primary concern is with the interests of their members and there are obvious inducements to them to limit competition in the interest of their members. To the extent to which any particular group or association of traders have taken it upon themselves to exclude other citizens from particular trades or of otherwise regulating trade restrictively, they have—regardless of what justification they may advance for their actions—usurped functions which are properly exercisable only by the Oireachtas.
The experience of recent years in that regard has made it clear, I think, that the time has come when the Oireachtas must consider the provision of machinery for the review and the control of restrictive trade practices in the public interest. The problem is not an easy one nor is it possible to find a short cut to its solution. Agreements and combinations and conspiracies in which producers and distributors, or both, co-operate to secure a monopoly or to fix and maintain prices or price levels must, as I said, be suspect because they involve the power to control the market; but there are agreements and regulations in operation in many trades the effect of which is not monopolistic and which are genuinely designed and operate to prevent abuses of various kinds and which have the effect of assisting in the orderly distribution of goods.
While the aim of legislation must be the development of the fullest and most effective competition in every trade in the interest of consumers, care must also be taken to ensure that it is fair competition. Senators are aware that specious arguments are advanced in justification of restrictive trade practices and the commonest justification is that they improve efficiency in distribution. I am prepared to recognise that that possibility cannot be ruled out, that a degree of regulation in some trades may be desirable in the public interest; but I think we should proceed on the assumption that it should be done openly, if at all, and then only after justification to a competent authority established for that purpose.
Before deciding on the approach in this Bill, I considered various alternative methods of tackling this problem. It would be possible to propose here a Bill which would lay down a general prohibition upon unfair competition or restrictive practices or on resale price maintenance agreements which are contrary to the public interest and then leave it to the courts to decide in particular cases what particular actions were in conflict with that law. I think, however, it will be apparent to Senators who have given thought to this matter, and from what I have already said, that legislation upon these lines would achieve no real purpose, and probably would not provide any more satisfactory means of redress than are available at present. The duty of the courts generally is to interpret and apply the law as it is enacted here by the Houses of the Oireachtas. I feel that it would be undesirable, and indeed impracticable, to impose on the courts the duty of determining whether a wide range of commercial practices operating in varying circumstances and in different degrees in different trades are unfair and harmful to the public interest.
Another way of dealing with restrictive practices would be to schedule and declare unlawful in every trade specific practices considered to be contrary to the public interest. I decided that it would be objectionable to proceed on these lines, that to draw up a list of these practices on the basis of our experience and the experience of other countries would be very unsafe, partly because our experience is limited and partly because of differences in the conditions and in the commercial philosophies of one country and another. The list of practices which could be prohibited without risk of interference with legitimate customs in various trades could not easily be declared with finality. It would take an inordinately long time to make the investigations, if indeed it would be possible to make the investigations at all, which would be necessary to establish such a list, that is to say, a list of practices which could be banned in all trades, in all circumstances, but the most obvious objection to that course is that, even if a satisfactory list could be prepared and incorporated in an Act, the many forms which restraint of trade might assume in order to circumvent the law could not possibly be foreseen or guarded against in the list of specific prohibitions. Commercial ingenuity would always find a way around a law of that kind and get the same results by methods differing slightly, but differing nevertheless, from those banned by the legislation.
Another method of approach would be to prohibit all trade practices of a restrictive kind carried on by trade associations and, at the same time, provide that such practices as the Minister for Industry and Commerce or some statutory authority might approve after investigation could lawfully be carried on. That was the approach to the problem I favoured in 1947 and certain provisions were inserted in the Industrial Prices and Efficiency Bill introduced in that year designed to make that approach possible; but on reconsideration of the problem and having taken note of the increase in the dimensions of the problem since 1947 as well as having benefited by the advice secured from authorities in the United States responsible for the administration of similar enactments there and given to officers of my Department who visited them for the purpose of getting guidance in that connection, I have decided that it would not be desirable at all to proceed upon that course since not all restrictive practices are necessarily harmful nor is it definite that even resale price maintenance arrangements should not be tolerated in any set of circumstances.
A total prohibition of all these practices, subject to the possibility of subsequent approval of them in particular cases, would also, I think, disorganise trade very considerably and put an almost impossible burden upon the Minister or the authority responsible for administering an Act of that kind. Our approach to this problem must necessarily be experimental within limits and I believe that the measure I am proposing provides the quickest and most effective way of dealing with this problem, or at least of dealing with the problem as we see it at present. Whether the investigations of the Fair Trade Commission, as they proceed, will give us new experience of it and show directions in which the legislation can be improved or not, it is impossible to forecast, but this Bill is not presented to the Seanad as representing necessarily the last word in legislation for dealing with this problem. If experience over a period of time shows that improvement in the legislation is possible, that can be achieved. It can be said, however, of the Bill that the procedure it contemplates will enable conditions in individual trades to be examined independently and will enable particular practices to be prohibited only when it is first demonstrated to the Oireachtas that they are unfair and operate contrary to the public interest. The functions of the courts in cases of prosecution will then be simply to determine whether a particular practice which has been banned by the Oireachtas under the procedure set out in the Bill has been adopted and, if so, to determine the appropriate penalties.
The Bill provides for the establishment of a commission, a permanent commission, whose functions will be to investigate these practices. It provides for the making of reports by the commission to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, on the basis of which Orders may be made by the Minister prohibiting restrictive practices affecting the supply or distribution of goods or the rendering of services ancillary to the supply of goods, or prohibiting resale price maintenance arrangements which appear to be contrary to the public interest. The Orders made by the Minister under the appropriate section of the Bill will not have any force until they are confirmed by legislation passed by the Oireachtas. The intention is that the confirming Bills will be of a simple kind with which the Seanad will be familar in connection with the confirmation of Orders made by various Ministers under different statutes, such as Orders imposing customs duties, or harbour works Orders.