I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time.
The subject covered by this Bill is, or at any rate in recent years has become, a controversial one and in dealing with it, it is difficult not to become controversial. Indeed it is probably impossible not to become controversial. It will be necessary to talk frankly about the practical problems that have arisen in ensuring the impartiality and independence of our Television Authority. For my part, however, I shall try to keep the temperature down, and while going through the problem thoroughly and listing problems that have arisen and cases where there have been difficulties, I shall try to do so in as factual a way as possible.
I should like to say at the outset that in any criticisms I have to make in regard to this matter, criticisms which the Bill endeavours to meet in part at least, the problems that have arisen are not ones that arise out of actions by the present Minister. There is no evidence that the actions he has taken in regard to Radio Telefís Éireann at any time have belied his reputation for fairness and liberality. Nevertheless, although he is the responsible Minister, difficulties have arisen both before he was Minister and since and they are ones which we have to examine and tackle.
I would also like to recognise at the outset that the problem of political broadcasting is a thorny one. It is not susceptible of easy answer and this is not the only country in which we have difficulty in finding an answer. However, we have the advantage of a near neighbour, Britain, which in this respect offers a target for admiration because of the way in which the independence of the broadcasting authority has been maintained even in the face of intense pressure at some times from certain Governments. It offers us a model to work to. We have in any event in this country inherited several British traditions, several fine aspects of British traditions—the incorruptibility of the public service, the tradition of free speech—and while we have not inherited a tradition in regard to broadcasting because we secured our independence before broadcasting came into existence in these countries, nevertheless the fact that we have close by this example is something which we can properly have regard to in this area, unlike many other areas. For example, in other respects, I have criticised the fact that we tend to look towards Britain only. In this case I do not suggest that we should look towards Britain only but we should look for examples of how to secure an independent broadcasting authority and free speech on political matters and impartiality in broadcasting.
I should like to make a point—I shall come back to it later on—that Radio Telefís Éireann is a national service, not a Government service. This is a vital distinction and it is one which I think has given rise to some difficulties and some confusion. It is not clear that this is fully accepted by all those on the other side of the House. There has been, I think, some confusion of thought here, not surprisingly perhaps. In a Government in office for a long time there must necessarily be a tendency to identify the national interest and the interests of that Government. This must be true of any Government. I suspect—although I have not the historical knowledge to be sure—that it was probably true of the first Government. It was, I think, true of the second Government here. It would be surprising if there were not some tendency of that kind in the present Government but it is important that any Government should make this distinction, and if it fails to do so that it should be reminded of this distinction and public opinion should be alert to this distinction.
The Radio Telefís Éireann Authority is not an instrument of Government policy. It is an instrument—if instrument is the right word—of national policy. It must, therefore, be independent of Government, independent of Government to a greater extent than has hitherto been achieved. It must be seen to be independent of Government and the Government must not feel that it is so close to it that it has a responsibility for it in the eyes of its own electorate at home or in the eyes of the outside world. Here I think we can properly fault the present situation because, as I shall show later, for example, from remarks of the Minister for External Affairs in the Dáil on this issue, there was a clear feeling that the Radio Telefís Éireann Authority is so much a part of the Government machine that any action it takes would be regarded outside this country as an action of the Irish Government and one which the Government was directly responsible for. This is something which is certainly not true of the BBC. The distinction has always been maintained. I thought that in the earlier years of the Radio Telefís Éireann Authority that distinction was maintained here. It has been surprising and disappointing to find that this is not recognised fully by Government spokesmen.
The problem is how to secure a really independent broadcasting service which is nevertheless a national broadcasting service and not a privately-owned one. There are four aspects of this problem, four approaches we must adopt to it. First, to secure this result you need an alert public opinion and Irish public opinion has not always been alert to threats to free speech. It has become more so in recent years, and indeed much of the credit for this must go to the Radio Telefís Éireann Authority. As well as an alert public opinion, you need a strong Director General who is willing and able at all times to stand up to pressure from any source, Opposition as well as Government, should it come from that source. You need an independent board, seen to be independent of political pressures, dissociated from political Parties, independent in such a way that people will feel confidence in the way it runs the service, for the public quite properly cannot know the details of the relationships between the board and the staff of the Authority. It would be improper that they should, in any detail, and the only way the public can have confidence in the board, therefore, as they cannot know in detail how the board runs the affairs of the Authority, is by seeing that the personnel are independent, are not associated with particular political Parties or groups but are people who, having their own political views as everyone has, have not associated themselves particularly with one particular viewpoint.
As well as an alert public opinion, a strong Director General and an independent board, you need a fourth thing, that is legislation designed to protect the independence of the Authority. Legislation alone cannot do the job. Let us be clear on that straight away. I make no claims that this Bill and the amendments it proposes to make in the original Act would do the job singlehanded. It would make some small improvements I hope, improvements that will strengthen the independence of the Authority, that will offer greater assurance than we have at present of its impartiality and ensure that the Authority will not only be impartial but will be seen to be impartial and command the confidence of public opinion generally in its impartiality.
We need all of these and we need them more than other countries which are larger than ours and more impersonal because in this country, small as it is, there are strong pressures arising out of close personal contacts between people, much more pressure to hush things up, to keep things quiet, to keep things cosy, to avoid making trouble, much more than in a larger country where people do not come into quite so much close contact with one another and where clashes on issues of public concern are not so much liable to become clashes between personalities.
Before analysing in more detail those four approaches to the problem and ending up with the legislative approach which is what we are endeavouring to work towards in this Bill, I want to go over the record, not, as I said, with a view to being controversial but with a view to establishing that there is a need to take some action in this matter, and that standing back from it as far as one can go, and not getting too involved in the Party politics of it, there is a problem, that it is not simply a figment of the imagination of political opponents or of people with ill-will towards the Government, but a real problem that needs to be tackled.
The problem which could arise could be at two levels. It could be a problem of board intervention of an improper character in the affairs of the Authority, that is, seeking to influence it contrary to impartiality or it could be a problem of political intervention from outside, either from the Government or in certain circumstances from the Opposition. As regards the first, one cannot know what the position is because the relations between the board and the staff of the Authority are naturally confidential. In this area the situation is shrouded in mystery. That mystery is in no way surprising. As I said, it is natural because of the relationship there. However, it has given rise to some suspicion because of the particular character of the board to which shall have to return later on.
There are, I think, some cases, however, where there is some evidence that members of the board have intervened in a manner which causes a little concern. In one instance, for example, a member of the board sought to veto the names of lecturers in a particular series of lectures in a manner which did not seem proper for a member of the board of such an Authority. To the credit of the Authority and of the people concerned in the programme this attempt was, in fact, resisted but, nevertheless, it was made. That is not the area to which we have to direct our attention because although there may be other cases, or there may not, we simply do not know. What we do know is the public record of public intervention, or intervention which has become public, of a political character with the affairs of the Authority.
We also know something of one or two decisions the Authority has taken itself on political grounds which, I think, are open to question as to the judgment shown on those occasions. It is to those I should like to direct my attention now, approaching them as far as possible in chronological order, simply to show how events developed. The first case of which we have a public record, ignoring for the moment the re-audition of all the orchestra after Fianna Fáil came to power, which was one of the interesting developments of 1932. They all passed the re-audition and none, in fact, lost their jobs for any reason.
