The Bill the Minister has commended to us is a simple Bill but it is a reflection of a very complicated situation, complicated financially and complicated also in its physical aspects. We have a long history of legislation in regard to transport. If one looks back at the history of this legislation, the arrow is all the time pointing in the same direction: the hope that a settlement can be made which will involve a certain limited financial commitment on the part of the community, a reorganisation of the system and the holding of the line. It is proving as difficult to fix and hold a line in regard to transport policy as it is to maintain a shoreline in an area of active coast erosion. Some Members will recall that on the occasion of the 1964 settlement the Minister for Transport and Power brought to us a new Bill. The settlement was on the basis of the information available. The Government had made the decision that it should be possible for CIE to operate on a subsidy of £2 million per year and that CIE should be made operate on this subsidy, that the amount of subsidy should be fixed and it should then be the managerial responsibility of CIE to operate within that particular financial constraint. In making that decision the Government had the benefit of the Pacemaker Report, one of the most thorough studies done on the CIE system. I said at the time, and I repeat now: the Government did not read clearly the conclusions and implications of that report. They did not recognise clearly enough that the choice involved was a more clear cut choice and a choice which was larger in consequence.
I do not think this is the appropriate occasion to go through that debate again. What we are concerned with now is keeping CIE going while the new inquiry proceeds. When the Minister does come back to us with the new final settlement in regard to public transport I would ask that the information which will be obtained—and I hope made available to Members of this House—will be as broadly based as possible. There was reason to complain at the time of the 1964 settlement in regard to the availability of the Pacemaker Report to Members of the Oireachtas. One or two copies of this report were placed in the Oireachtas Library a short time before this important legislation was introduced. I would ask the Minister to arrange that, when the various reports or such parts of them as can be made public are ready, they should be made available to Members in good time. I think this is our due.
The Bill which we have here is entitled "An Act to make further provision in regard to transport." It is really only making provision for public transport, for the CIE system. We could make mistakes by looking at the CIE system in isolation rather than at the whole transportation problem which we have in all parts of the country. I am slightly worried. The Minister has told us that consultants have been asked to do a certain job in regard to this. Both in public enterprise and private enterprise it has happened a good deal more frequently than it should that the terms of reference of management consultants are written in such a way that the range of proposals which they make are necessarily restricted. Very often, because they are only asked to look at certain aspects of an operation and only, in fact, look at these, they do not get a complete picture. Transportation is a good example of the type of system in which grave blunders can be made by looking only at the work in this field of systems analysis, operations research, are warned against the dangers of sub-optimisation, that is of producing a solution that is clearly the optimum for that particular part of the system but is not an optimum for the system as a whole. It is, as it were, the peak of a local hill but it is not the highest point in the whole range. I would ask the Minister that he should ensure that, when consultants are brought in on this or when any other groups are asked to examine it, their terms of reference are as wide as possible. In particular, I would ask that their terms of reference should specify that, if they feel any need to go beyond their terms of reference, they should immediately seek extended terms of reference.
As is quite clear from the Bill before us today, the cost of making decisions in regard to transport is not merely rising but is rising with a tremendous acceleration. We have seen the steep rise to the public Exchequer over the years but it is not just rising along a sloping line—it is now curving upwards. The indications are that it will continue to do this. I am not suggesting it is possible to produce a public transport system that will not cost us money of these orders of magnitude. Subsidies at a high level are inevitable and as the cost of providing transport increases, so does the cost of mistakes. It would be well worth our while to have the most thorough examination possible. Money spent now on a complete examination of this problem, even if it means some delay in the decision, would, I suggest, be quite a small fraction of what is going to be involved.
While the experts are looking at this and that aspect of our transportation system, we, in public life—and, through us, the public—must prepare ourselves to realise what is involved here. I have said that the range of options and alternatives should be as wide as possible, but we want to start to prepare ourselves for the fact that on the basis of what was said in the last deep investigation in the Pacemaker Report, the range of options in regard to the railways is very narrow indeed. We have all got to reconcile ourselves to that. We do not have to make the decision on this Bill but we shall have to make the decision on the next Bill. Anything that I have heard or read since this matter was discussed—I think, in July, 1964, when I gave some views on it to the House—impels me more and more to believe that there can be no decision of running-down the railways in a piece-meal fashion. The decision that we are going to have to face is a decision of maintenance at any cost, at the astronomical costs that we may face ten or 20 years from now, and a complete shut-down.
The overheads of the railway system and the technological nature of this system are such that a policy based on getting-by, of doing the best we can, is apparently no longer an option. In the investigations no option should be neglected. It may be found that there is some way of doing this but, on the face of what is available to us at the moment, there is not. Therefore, let us be prepared. Let us, indeed, be gratified if some such solution can be found in some way, but there are no signs of such a solution. We must face this. We must clearly face the fact of what we are letting ourselves in for. We all know that there are social and economic arguments for the maintenance of a railway system but let us realise that this is not what we are concerned with. This is common ground between everyone on this particular problem. What we are concerned with now is that we are going into an era of transportation in which the costs are going to be orders of magnitude higher than those which the Exchequer has been asked to bear in the past.
I can speak on this with a clear conscience. During the 12 years that I lived in Cork, I used my car to travel to Dublin about once a year and no more. Now that I am again living in Dublin, I travel by public transport to my work every day and, it so happens, by train. In each case, the service which I enjoyed from Cork to Dublin, the service which I enjoy now from Seapoint to Westland Row, is a most excellent service and, to my mind, by far the best way of accomplishing these journeys. This does not blind me to the fact that we may well find the cost of the maintenance of these services too much to bear in the future.
On this occasion, I do not wish to go into the details but merely to make, firstly, the point that this investigation must be complete—that it must be not only an investigation into CIE but it must also take into account the relationship of CIE's operation to the whole transportation problem, the whole problem that we have, that people wish to move from place to place and that there are many alternative ways of this movement being facilitated.
It may well be that special investigations will be necessary in regard to the problem of the Dublin conurbation. Here, many more people are concerned besides CIE. It is disquieting to find that there is a decrease in the numbers using the Dublin passenger service. In his speech, the Minister tended to give a false picture here. It is disturbing that there are falls in the numbers of passengers carried which are expressed in millions but, when one talks in terms of these falls in millions, they are still a matter of an annual fall in the order of about 3 per cent. The fall in the public passenger service is not quite so catastrophic as suggested by merely stating the bald figure of so many million passengers lost between one year and the next. Of course, it is a serious factor but it is not catastrophic.
This problem of the Dublin conurbation is one, as the Minister has said in his speech, which involves many people. Any attempt to look at it must involve all these people and not just involve them by looking for their views but involves them all in a concerted effort to reach some sort of solution. I should like to make a brief comment on the suggestion that has been made by the Minister for Local Government of a trial period in which the centre of Dublin would be closed to private cars. If this is to be done, and if we are to get advantage for it, I would suggest that this should be used not just to see what public reaction is to such a proposal—not just so that we can have photographs in the newspapers showing the different appearance of this street or that. But if the decision is made to carry out this particular operation, then I suggest that this should be used as a controlled experiment in the study of the Dublin city traffic problem. If we are going to go to the trouble of keeping private cars out of certain parts of the centre of the city, it is of tremendous importance that we should find out what affect this has on the suburban areas. This proposal, I take it, has been agreed among the five or six authorities who are responsible for traffic in the Dublin area. They, with the possible aid of consultants already engaged upon our problem, should use this particular operation as a controlled experiment. Data could be obtained on this occasion which would be invaluable for the report of consultants reporting on the area of the Dublin conurbation. If this operation is carried out, there will be an opportunity to do something which otherwise would be simulated on a computer model because, undoubtedly, the question of the exclusion of private traffic from the centre of Dublin must be one of the possible strategies that would be considered by consultants when considering the problem of the traffic within the Dublin area. This is a possible solution and they would be concerned with its consequences. Take, for example, factors such as the numbers of people who attempt to defy it. This operation should be made an occasion of a very particular traffic census.
It may well be that what would be of much more interest for our traffic planning for the future might not be what the appearance of the centre of the city was like but the appearance of some of the ring areas. It might well be that the important thing in this is not how many letters are written to the papers afterwards, either in favour of or against it, but some sort of traffic census, a sampling survey, which would enable us to find out by how much were people's travel habits changed during this particular period. If disruption in the normal habits of the people of the city of Dublin is to take place then let us get value for it. We can get real value for it.
I do not want to go into the details of transport policy apart from the appeal that this should be a thorough operation and that the results should be made available to public representatives and indeed to the public in good time. Also, I do not wish, this morning, to discuss any details of the operation of CIE. There is a temptation to talk about this problem and that problem. This can be very useful. It can fulfil the function for this House which is served in another place by the Estimates debate.
I should, however, like to say one word which is not a point of detail but one which affects the whole of the CIE system. When we last discussed this matter in detail in 1964, I expressed myself as being very happy not only with the standard of management in CIE but with the management structure which had been developed there. I expressed the view that the deconcentration of decision-making in middle-management in CIE was mitigating the losses which might otherwise be made. There is some suggestion that, in recent years, this deconcentration of decision-making has been, to some extent, reversed. The indications are, and this is perhaps something which the Minister should investigate, that the managers in the areas throughout the country are not as free to make decisions as they were in 1964; that too much is being referred to headquarters for decision. If these indications are correct, if this has occurred, it is very undesirable. It was one of the strengths of CIE's management that real decision-making power was given out into the districts and into the areas. If there has been any drawing-back in that regard, it is undesirable and, if it should go any further, it may well be disastrous.
It is a shock to us to get a bill of this magnitude. The Minister came to us a year ago and said that the £2 million settlement of 1964 could no longer hold and, looking forward for five years, suggested £2.65 million as being the proper subsidy rate. While perhaps a little shaken by the rise from £2 million to £2.65 million, one could accept it as being due to inflationary costs. Even though it was a rise of over 30 per cent, it could be accepted as an adjustment of the 1964 settlement. But now, with another £2.98 million added on to the £2.65 million, we are moving into different territory. My fear is that we cannot say, even now, were we to agree here on a figure of £6 million, that this particular line can be held.
The Minister is wise and is to be commended that he comes to us and asks us to approve the amount of money that will keep CIE going for a year so that we can have the fullest possible investigation. Because CIE are doing what we charged them to do, we cannot do anything else but agree to the Bill which the Minister has put before us. It may well be that, following the range of strategies being made available to the Government, it will appear that this can be financed in different ways. It may well be that the fares should be made to bear the particular problem. It may well be that it will be decided to run the Dublin bus service without fares at all as has been done in a number of urban centres. It may be decided that the service of public transport, whether it be the railways or the Dublin public transport system, be changed from the present position to much higher fares, closer to the economic costs, or, otherwise, we should recognise that the social benefits of a public transport system are so worthwhile that we go to the very limit of subsidy where nothing at all is charged for the service. We have to make up our minds on these points. We shall have to make up our minds, above all, on the crucial point of our railways. The choice here is to maintain what we have, with an open-ended financial commitment, or else take a decision to close completely. In that connection, I should like to repeat what I said in 1964. I said then that I thought it unwise that there should be any heavy capital expenditure on the railways. The Minister's predecessor at that time indicated that he saw no great reason for restraining capital expenditure on the railways and that he was satisfied that the railways would always be with us. I do not know if the present Minister is quite so convinced on that point now.
I would make the suggestion again that there should not be a heavy commitment in regard to capital expenditure. It is no doubt technically good and no doubt it would improve the service if we had an all-welded track between Dublin and Cork. The provision of this might take five or six years and we are in the position, if we want to do that particular job, of making a decision now on which capital moneys would be spent over the next five or six years. It might well be, by the time the capital was finished, that we had eventually reached the stage, in regard to subsidy of these services, where the cry was for "halt". It is not usual for members on these benches and it is not usual for me to ask Ministers to suspend action or to suspend judgment but I think this is a case in which the plea can be made— certainly during the next 12 months.
With these reservations, let me plead for the fullest possible investigation— not just from CIE—of the complete problem of transport in Ireland. This may require the investigation of much of the present type of private transport, whether for passengers or goods. It is important that the investigation in this regard should be completely unfettered. A solution that would be half-way palatable on this may be something which none of us could think of at the moment, something completely outlandish, something so different from what we are accustomed to that, for the moment, it boggles our own imaginations. If such a solution could emerge, it can be done only if those who are asked to investigate this are given complete freedom, are given as wide a scope as possible, and if everybody concerned with transport plays a full part in the investigation.