I should like to respond to the tone which the Minister adopted in introducing this amendment. However, we should not overlook the importance of what we are doing today even though it affects, on the Minister's figures, only 30 cases in a year. The State is proposing by this amendment to take away powers which have hitherto been vested in the authorities of the churches mentioned in the section for which this section is to be substituted.
It is important that we realise that at present—for example, take the church which provided 57 of the cases over the two-year period mentioned— the canonical requirement would not be the age of 16. There is an academic clash as to what is to be the State law and as to what would be the canon law. If I understand the position correctly, the church and State are as one in viewing as undesirable marriages those that take place between persons under the age of 16. The church in question, which provides the largest number, will be glad enough to be able to say to people under 16 that they cannot marry because the law does not permit them to do so unless they get an exemption. Therefore, it is important to recognise this as an academic clash.
While I see the logical desirability of what is proposed, I do not see the objection to leaving in the alternative that was contained in the section for which this section is to be substituted. For example, with regard to the proposal before us, one knows that the exemptions that are required at present can be obtained free of cost to the persons concerned. I do not know how this will operate in the future. I should like to know whether additional costs will be imposed on those young people if they have to obtain exemptions which may not be incurred by them at present.
I find the language of subsection 3 (b) curious, it states:
It may be made informally through the Registrar of Wards of Court in accordance with the rules of procedure.
I do not know how one makes "informally" something which has to be made "formally", that is to say, in the form which will be prescribed in the rules of procedure directed by the President of the High Court. Are we to have as a result of this regulation 30 new causes of action per annum in the High Court? What is the position of somebody, afraid of the courts but not of his priest, who feels that he needs the assistance of a solicitor? Is there any procedure whereby the cost of that service will not fall on the unfortunate applicant for exemption?
I wonder if the Minister has considered the possibility of taking additional powers to himself to settle some scheme whereby the cost of this would not necessarily be borne by the applicant. I know he has gone a certain distance in providing that no court fees shall be charged, but we all know that court fees are a relatively small part of the court costs. If there was any question of employing lawyers, this would result in a cost which does not arise at present under the existing provisions. Under the provision contained in section 3 (c) it may be heard and determined in private. Surely this should read "It shall be heard and determined in private."
At the moment if a boy or girl in this sort of situation wishes to get an exemption, he or she is assured of total privacy in relation to the proposed spouse. Surely the same assurance should be in the statutory provision which is to substitute for the existing matter. Should the State not take steps to regulate that there will be no delay involved and that the rules will provide that the matter must be dealt with within a particular period, that it cannot get into somebody's delayed list and that they suffer as a consequence?
There is one particular paragraph of a subsection in the existing section which is missing from the proposed new section. I think it particularly unfortunate—I know there was a criticism made in the House on Second Reading which unfortunately I was not able to attend—in regard to the language used. I am referring to subsection (3) paragraph (c) which reads:
it shall not be granted unless the place of residence of the person in respect of whom it is made has, during the period of four months ending at the time of the application, been within the State,
There is no similar provision in the United Kingdom at the moment, so what is to prevent a flood of people coming here to take advantage of this section, to look for an exemption, even though they may have been residing here for only a relatively short period? Perhaps the Minister will tell me that the court in such a case would not regard there being in existence a serious reason for granting the exemption. However, I am not sure if the court would be necessarily free to regard, in the absence of provision about residence, this as an absence of a serious reason.
Again, I know that on Second Reading, some criticism was made about the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (3), which dealt with the considerations of propriety, and part of which reads:
(ii) the welfare of the person in respect of whom it is made shall then be the paramount consideration and, in considering that person's welfare, regard shall be had to the religion professed by him or her and his or her moral, physical and social well-being.
The main burden of criticism of that paragraph was the ordering of considerations of propriety in priority to the other matters. I should have thought it desirable to give some criteria to the court as to what they were to look to in determining what were the matters to be examined to determine the person's welfare. I know that in this the Minister is using language which is taken from the United Nations Convention. However, I believe that the language in the section which we are supplanting was the language which was used in the original Marriages Bill, 1965, and as seven years have passed, I wonder could the House be given a little more information as to why it has been decided to depart from language which I thought was helpful. I know that questions do arise for interpretation as to what would be regarded as moral, physical and social well-being, but these are just the sort of matters which courts are there to determine and to give meaning to.