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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 5 Jul 1978

Vol. 89 No. 14

Report of the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities: Motion.

I move:

That Seanad Éireann takes note of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities on the Commission's proposals on economic and monetary union which was laid before the Seanad on 28th June, 1978.

It is a happy coincidence that this motion should be before the House at a time when the Leader of the Government, the Taoiseach, is in Europe meeting the leaders of the other countries to discuss matters affecting fundamental aspects of the policies which will determine the future of the European Economic Community, and in particular as they affect the European Economic Community in relation to monetary policy.

The report which the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities produced recently and which was discussed in the open committee reviews the procedures and progress towards economic and monetary union particularly over the last decade. It explored some of the policies that governments or the EEC might follow and the effect that individual governments might have in relation to influencing the EEC as a whole.

It was not possible, nor was it the intention, that a committee of this kind should produce a policy as such. That is the function of government but it is somewhat a new departure that a committee of this kind—are now empowered to look at policies that are in the minds of the people in Europe in the form of communications. The committee looked at such matters and, as I said earlier, put a lot of emphasis on the monetary policy aspect of economic and monetary union.

In putting this committee report before the House, it is not possible for me to say that the committee are advocating a policy. That is not on. It is possible for me individually to take a particular view and, since our Government have not declared a definite policy as such in relation to the item that I am going to cover we are still free to speculate, shall we say?

The smaller countries operating in the EEC can have very little influence on monetary policy in terms of the quantity of money that the smaller countries use, but, it should be possible for them to have the power of knowledge and to use any knowledge they have to influence the European nations towards adopting policies that will be good for Europe as a whole but also, of course, will be good for each individual nation—in our case Ireland. The position is that at the moment there is a crisis in the sense that unemployment is growing—we have been discussing it in the Green Paper debate—but that unemployment is growing across the world and in the meantime nations, particularly the nations of Europe, are not moving quickly enough to put themselves in a position to deal with that crisis. My position is that a proper monetary policy is required to do that.

In the earlier days of discussion of economic and monetary union people spoke about the grand leap. Among other things the grand leap was to replace overnight all national currencies by one currency. What I will be advocating here is a little leap—a little leap which in effect involves the introduction of a new currency that would not replace existing ones but would exist side by side with them.

We know from comment in the press and elsewhere that Chancellor Schmidt is sitting there at the controls of a giant locomotive and everybody wants him to move it faster. If he moves it faster, then Europe can grow and countries like Ireland, striving for high growth rates that are required for full employment, will have a better chance of achieving those targets. What is going to come out of the discussion in Bremen when the heads of state get together is going to be the key point and I have some speculation about that.

We could look at the European situation rather like a train where the German is the lead locomotive, at the end there is the UK pushing or sometimes dragging its wheels, in the middle there is the French locomotive with its own carriages and squashed in between there are the Benelux countries and Denmark and Ireland. If Schmidt looks back from his driving seat and sees all those locos behind him with the carriages not coupled properly and without a proper medium of communication between them to pass one service from one to the other he says, "Why the hell should I move faster when I have those fellows playing around behind upsetting the balance and probably making the whole thing unstable? I will slow down until they make up their minds". Basically what I am saying is that if the game of free market enterprise is going to be played the rules of the game have to be agreed in the beginning and not made up as the game progresses because that is a formula for failure.

In particular the United Kingdom, which is the loco at the end which slows down and maybe switches off its engine periodically and drags the whole thing to a halt, is one of the big problems and the shuddering that arises from that loco can transmit a wave of disturbance right through the whole system. It can become acute when an election arises. It is interesting now in the press speculation about Bremen, people are saying that maybe Mr. Callaghan will not go along with it because he will not want to give up some of the autonomy of sterling at a time when he is moving into election. Mr. Callaghan in the past, speaking on the present exchange situation, said, "We cannot dignify the present arrangements with a name of an international monetary system. They are more like a series of ad hoc makeshifts in which the world stumbles blindly from one currency to another”. If he said that at one time he cannot unsay it when he is running up to election. I would hope that what comes out at the discussions will be something more positive than a delaying tactic.

The form of monetary policy which I would like to see used is the so-called parallel currency scheme. It is described in detail in the Joint Committee report. The idea is that the European Economic Community would issue a new currency which would operate in parallel with existing national currencies. One suggestion is that it should be called the Europa. One attraction of the parallel currency scheme as advocated by some people is that, given that the currency is linked to the basket of national currencies, it would have an extraordinarily powerful influence on inflation control, because these people are advocating that the Europa would have constant purchasing power which would be guaranteed by adjusting the link rate between national currencies and the Europa in relation to the way national inflation or the consumer price index goes. There are many advantages to this scheme. One of the main ones is that, once the Europa exists and currency notes are held in various countries in the form of Europas, then the countries concerned cannot welch on agreements. Once they have put themselves behind the launching of a currency they have to stand by it. Also, because it is a parallel currency it does not make that grand leap that everybody is afraid of. It takes a little leap and allows people to learn how the scheme would work over a period of time.

In relation to the Irish situation there are advantages in that it would immediately modify and eventually do away with the effects of the green £ and the monetary compensatory amounts. It would stop us depending completely on the UK in that every time they shift their interest rate or make a change in their own monetary policy we have to do the same because we are linked with them. If we are operating in the European scene, we sit at the same table as and will have a voice with the other European countries in determining the way in which the monetary system is going to be run. The regional policy, on which we have placed so much of our faith in bringing about a correction of the imbalance between the wealth of a country like Ireland compared to Germany and others, has not worked as effectively as we would have liked. We have a regional fund, but that is not a real policy. The existence of a parallel currency would highlight the differences and would force the EEC to come out with a more effective regional policy. In the past people have said "We will not go along with monetary union unless you get a decent regional policy". These should go in parallel. The monetary policy should not be played as an attraction or reward to countries like Germany for an exchange of an agreement in the regional policy. The two should go hand in hand.

We should have within the next few years a new note operating in Europe and called the Europa. We can think of it as a tree with as many branches as there are countries in the EEC—nine now, and maybe twelve when the enlargement occurs. The design could indicate that Europe has its own specialised culture to offer, and could suggest health because the blood-flow of Europe, which is money amongst other things, would be healthy and functioning properly. My prediction is that when the Bremen Conference is over Chancellor Schmidt will be thinking this way and will be proposing something like the notion of a parallel currency even if it is based on the European unit of account. That might be the first step in the development of a parallel currency. I would be willing to take bets on that. I hope that what I have said might stimulate my honourable colleagues to contribute to this debate.

I second this motion on behalf of my colleague who is absent. It seems to be common case throughout the European countries that economic and monetary union is desirable. The commitment towards achieving that aim was apparently first entered into as far back as 1969, but nothing really has happened up to this day. There is a great gap between the expressed commitment and the realisation of this goal. It would have been helpful, if undiplomatic, for the Joint Committee in their report to have indicated to us where the commitment has fallen down in the last ten years and who has been responsible for that. There is no point in various European institutions periodically pledging themselves in favour of economic and monetary union and then some of them at some critical point putting in a spoke. This seems to be what has happened. The reason why it has happened is that some of our European colleagues are not yet prepared to see political integration in Europe. Economic and monetary union will inevitably lead to political integration, and in the hope that it would I would favour as quick a progress to it as possible. It is only when Europe becomes integrated that its real value in the world today, and more in the future, can be achieved. Only an integrated Europe can preserve our civilisation and standards in face of the tremendous threats and pressures that are going to come on them from other parts of the world. That political integration cannot come without monetary and economic union first.

The committee will very likely say that one of the advantages of economic and monetary union is that it acts as a vehicle towards political integration. There is no doubt that this is what it does. This possibly is the factor which has inhibited some of the members of the Community from being whole-hearted in support of the idea. It would be interesting to know who they are, because there is no point in going on for another ten years with sham protestations in favour of this idea. Some of our European colleagues are quite hypocritical about this and it is time to pinpoint them.

I should like the Government to take whatever initiative they can with regard to the achieving of this ideal and to formulate a policy stance on it. The members of the Fianna Fáil Party who are with the European Progressive Democratic Party will have to use their influence on their Gaullist colleagues among whom there might be a nigger in the woodpile. Recently, Mr. Chirac indicated opposition to the extension of the European Community to include the new countries in southern Europe. The nationalism of that party has been an inhibiting factor towards integration in Europe, political, monetary and economic. There is a great opportunity for us through our membership of that European Progressive Democratic group, to let their partners see that, in spite of their nationalistic stance at home, in terms of Europe Fianna Fáil are committed Europeans I hope they will use all possible influence on their Gaullist partners to bring them along the same road towards a united Europe. That is important.

Another factor which may improve the situation in the future is the coming into being next year of an elected European Parliament. Up to now the voice of Parliament in this area has necessarily been somewhat muted and has not carried a lot of weight, but in future one can expect greater influence to be exerted by that institution in this debate. I am sure that the expressions of solidarity for the ideal which has been so common for the last ten years will continue to be expressed in the Parliament but, hopefully, they will be expressed with real meaning. One of the ways in which the Parliament can spread its wings and expand its influence is in general policy areas such as these where the moral persuasion that a directly elected body can exercise is considerable. I hope the Parliament will come to exercise it in favour of speedy progress towards economic and monetary union.

There are obviously divergent views at some levels in Europe on this policy and I would like to see them flushed out. There is no point in being coy about it any longer. If the Committee know who they are, or if people know who they are, they should name them. I do not know them. I can only speculate from what I have seen. The only thing I can recall is the announcement by the French Gaullists of an unwillingness to see the Community expand. If I am not doing them an injustice, a statement that would indicate a certain hostility towards political union in Europe—it would be in keeping with the nationalistic character of that party. It is a great opportunity for the Irish members of that party to demonstrate that they are committed to the ideal of European Union.

I welcome the Committee's report. I am seconding the adoption of the report as a person who was not involved it its preparation. It would be appropriate for me to compliment the Committee on the work they are doing and on the manner in which they have reduced what is a very technical and complex subject to terms which, while not simplistic, can be understood by a lay person not skilled in the intricacies of money management and all the rest. They deserve our thanks. I hope this debate will have the effect of encouraging from the Government a positive attitude on this question so that our contribution at all levels of Community activity, at the various councils, at the Summits, and at all secondary levels, will be a consistent one in favour of this idea. If we find what we think are unjustified obstructions being placed in the way of the attainment of the ideal I hope we will not be slow in showing our distaste for such obstructions. If necessary, we might be able to rally the parties in Europe who are in favour of this ideal against those who may be obstructing it.

I should like also to compliment the Joint-Committee on producing a well balanced and reasonable report on a very complex issue which, as Senator Mulcahy remarked, happens to be at the centre of the Summit's debate at the moment in the EEC. The objective is described as economic and monetary union. As Senator Cooney remarked, there is in the background all the time the ideal of political union. To my mind all three objectives are inextricably linked and I could never see that there could be much progress on one or the other unless that progress was articulated throughout the three elements. I always regarded it as a mistake that monetary union as an objective was put first as a practical programme. There were certain attractions in this but they were fatal ones. One can play around with "Snakes" and other devices and have European cooperation funds but one is only on the surface making any progress. Events have shown that even the most supple and serpentine devices have to be abandoned, at least by some members of the Community.

The primacy should always have gone to the ideal of economic union, of attempting to bring the development of the various countries of the Community into some kind of equality. If they are ever to reach any kind of tolerable equality in living standards, if the imbalances that the Treaty of Rome speaks about are ever to ignored out, there must be on the way to that different rates of development in different countries and different regions. The community and its organs will have to respect the different characteristics of these various entities. As we know, there are differing rates of productivity in different areas. There are in the less developed parts of the Community even more exacting, more exigent expectations of improvement in living standards than there are in the more wealthy ones. There are forces at large in the smaller countries which tend to make for more inflation there. There is a greater difficulty of reconciling aspirations with resources than in the wealthier countries.

All these differences, particularly that vital difference of productivity—lower productivity, higher expectations and therefore probably greater pressure on the value of money, greater pressure on prices and on the balance of payments—present in the less well-off parts of the Community have to be recognised. Monetary union, in fact, does not recognise this at all but asks one to take a sudden jump into a state of parity. Contrary to what the report says when it draws a parallel between Ireland's monetary union with Britain, the kind of monetary union we are asked to join in the EEC is one in which the rates of exchange between all the currencies would be irrevocably fixed forever. We always had the possibility, if we wanted to, of changing the rate of exchange with sterling. Indeed, after we had the free trade agreement with Britain and joined the EEC and surrendered all the other forms of protection, that was, in fact, the only instrument of protection left, the possibility of changing the rate of exchange, should we need to do so. In recent years the talk was not of using our right or facility to do so in order to depreciate but to appreciate in relation to sterling. We do not hear that talk now that sterling has taken an upward movement in recent times in relation to other currencies.

Ever since this issue came to the fore when we were negotiating our entry into the EEC, the Central Bank of Ireland, at any rate, were extremely cautious in the views they presented to Ministers and Government about monetary union, largely for the reasons I have said. If you get locked into a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates you have no recourse open in a developing country if your costs remain out of line, if your productivity does not jump ahead. If you want to stimulate employment, as we have been talking about, and proceed by the method of expanding your domestic demand in order to do so, what will happen if your exchange rate is irrevocably fixed? As in the gold standard, all the internal effects and imbalances will spill over and there will be a vast movement of funds out of the country, leaving us in a position where the banks and Government, unless they can borrow somewhere else, will have to deflate and aggravate the unemployment situation. No national Government could allow themselves to be put into such a straitjacket. Therefore, we must wait until economic union has greatly progressed and this will depend on the surrender of a good deal of political independence because it will mean concerting and agreeing with the EEC about what we are going to do in annual budgets, as well as what our overall planning will be for years ahead.

On the parallel currency idea I did have the opportunity, as Senator Mulcahy will remember, of making some views known to the committee in the course of their deliberations. I would not be as enthusiastic as he about introducing it side by side with national currencies. I raised the question of what happens in the less stable national currencies if people exercise their prerogative of switching into the hard Europa. Who is going to guarantee that they will always get back the constant value that the Europa is supposed to give them? In other words, who is going to guarantee that they will get more of their national currency back when they demand it? Who will bear the loss involved? Does it not mean that there has to be a good deal of political regulation, although one of the chimeras is that by hitching on to some kind of device of this kind political intervention will be ruled out altogether?

I hope there is some move made towards establishing a currency of that kind but it will have to start at the top rather than at the bottom. It will have to start by Central Banks using it as a means of setting debts between themselves and then gradually having its use encouraged on the part of commercial banks also for major trade settlements. That is the way forward rather than through some sudden device of placing it on sale, as it were, on the same counter as national currencies.

I should like to join with those who spoke in complimenting the Joint Committee on the production of an excellent report. It is one of the best reports the Joint Committee have yet published. It is an excellent synopsis of an extremely difficult and technical subject to which Senators Whitaker and Mulcahy have referred. They were particularly involved in this and our congratulations go to them for this production.

At the root of the problem of economic and monetary union is the fact that many of the countries with whom we share union in the European Economic Community look on the EEC in a completely different light to that in which we do. There is not a sufficient grasp within this country of this simple fact of life. Obviously membership has been very much in the interests of our country and these interests have been psychological as much as they have been economic. There is a very large consensus within the country that involvement in the EEC is good for us and there is a very strong commitment down the line to what the Community means in terms of ultimate union of some sort or other. But the Community looked on from the perspective of the British or the French—and to an extent the Germans —is an entirely different institution to that to which we subscribe. Obviously there have been great delays in even tentatively approaching the fundamentals of economic and monetary union.

We can see in the Werner Report of October 1970 that the ten-year period was to be reached in three stages. There was the Tindeman Report of 1975 and the Council decision of February 1974 which sought a high degree of convergence of economic policies. Today we are not very much further down the line, despite what we have been told in recent discussions by the Council concerning this question of economic and monetary union. It seems quite obvious that there is this lack of political will among the larger nation states to subscribe to the level of integration to which the Irish, the Dutch, the Belgians and the people in Luxembourg would subscribe.

The fact that direct elections will be held in June of next year must be very healthy. The present political base for the Community is unsatisfactory. The nomination of members to the European Parliament or Assembly or whatever you choose to call it by the various political parties in the different countries makes for an entirely different institution to a parliament or assembly to which members will have been elected by the popular vote of people throughout the Community. The election of that Parliament in June of next year will give a considerable impetus where issues such as this are concerned. There will be a demand from those elected to the assembly for debate on certain commitments by the Parliament in areas such as this. It may lead to a great deal more tension than there is at present because it seems there will be an obvious tension between the will of the members elected, including the members elected from the larger countries who, presumably, by aspiring to representation in the European Parliament would have an interest in this wider dimension, and the attitudes in some of the member states to these very issues. There should be further progress as a result of that.

The Jenkins speech was a very good setting out of what is sought in the Commission's prodding of the Council in November last and the reaffirmation of the commitment to this is very useful. But it seems there will not be very much movement until we get past the middle of next year on this issue.

On the issue of currency, I am not qualified to attempt any definitive viewpoint on what is desirable but Senator Whitaker's remarks seem eminently sensible. For a lesser developed country such as ours it would seem that there is a very great danger in getting locked into an irrevocably fixed exchange rate which could be very damaging with the differing levels of development in this country compared to other countries. The agreement to this fixed exchange rate irrevocably might make sense if the deal was good for the country in the context of a strong will within the European Community to redress the imbalance there is in the regional sector if there is to be this true commitment.

This was contained in the Tindeman Report where he looked on regional policy as an intricate part of this whole question of a European union and coined the phrase "the net transfer from the better off areas to the less favoured areas". This has not, in substance, come through in any sense. It is, singly, the greatest disappointment here about European union, despite the general consensus with union, that regional policy and the extent to which funds flow to this country and to the lesser developed parts of this country is only a fraction of what has been expected. This is partly due to changed attitudes in Germany and partly due to the oil crisis in 1974. It is a fact of life that it has been a disappointment. Any agreement locked into this fixed exchange rate, without a quid pro quo sufficiently substantial to give us an incentive to agree, would not be a good thing for this country.

The notion of a parallel currency does make a certain amount of sense and goes some way towards getting unity in the monetary field without tying countries irrevocably into the fixed exchange situation. It would probably be good practice that might lead to a further fixed exchange rate further down the line. I would agree with Senator Whitaker that for an institution such as the European Economic Community to tackle an issue as deep as economic and monetary union before certain political ideas may be foolhardy because it will be extremely difficult to attain this complete and abiding monetary union short of a large measure of political union and because at present we are much further from the Sending of the European economies of the last three to four years. We are much further from political union now than we were five years ago. We have problems in this area.

I would like to conclude by congratulating the committee on this lucid, most readable synopsis of an extremely difficult subject.

I would like to join in congratulations to the sub-committee involved in the production of this report. It is an excellent example of the sort of work which can be done by an all-party committee and is indeed an example, and only just an example, of the enormous amount of work which is done by Senators and Deputies outside this Chamber on matters directly concerned with legislation or other questions of substance which we later discuss here, or indeed, on some occasions do not have the opportunity of discussing here. This is totally apart from constituency work and some attention should be drawn to the amount of work which goes into the production of this sort of report but it is, in addition, an excellent report on its own.

However, I would have very considerable reservations about the trend of argument and attitudes which seemed to come through in the report. Probably we all agree that, in the long term, the EEC should be fully united, economically, politically and in monetary terms. For this country particularly, and especially in regard to currency, this is something which is a considerable way ahead and about which we should be extremely cautious and careful. I am a very firm advocate of support for the idea of the EEC, but let that not blind us to the difficulties and failures of the Community, particularly the failures in an Irish sense, and I emphasise "an Irish" sense. At times we have been a little too anxious to demonstrate that we are good Europeans. We have already more than demonstrated that. We had an 83 per cent vote in favour of joining the EEC. We are just as good Europeans as the English, the French, the Germans or any of the other states involved in the EEC. We do not need to go on proving it. We should adopt a much more hard-line attitude to the interests of this country visà-vis the EEC.

One of the matters which is extremely unsatisfactory is the failure of regional development within the EEC. This applies to us and to certain other areas in the EEC. It is, in all fairness, mentioned on page 20 of this report, pointing out that the tendency towards equalisation of costs could make it difficult for Irish industry to compete with those more developed regions of the Community and moreover, that Ireland might find it much more difficult to compete for the capital investment which she so badly needs. There is the caveat in the bottom paragraph of page 32 regarding a meaningful regional policy. It would not be sufficient to get reassurances on that matter. We would have to have practical proof, over the next few years, of a genuine active commitment towards regional development before we could, in any way, agree to monetary union which could have the most inimical effects and which, as Senator Whitaker has so correctly pointed out, would be a straitjacket. The link to sterling is one which we could only break under very difficult and very special circumstances but at least we could break it. If we once linked in monetary union with the other countries of the EEC we would certainly find ourselves in a very difficult position indeed if the regional policies are not developed as they should be.

The alternative which is put forward is certainly rather attractive. It is the idea of a parallel currency and, in particular, the Europa as advocated in The Economist by a number of prominent European economists. This would be European money of constant purchasing power issued by the EEC Central Bank in accordance with the European Monetary Treaty and purchasable by nationals of EEC countries with national money. The mechanism would be one in which there would be an inflation-proof parallel currency which would keep prices level, a representative commodity basket constant in terms of Europa's. A very distinguished gentleman from Kiel University suggests on page 17 that the parallel currency approach possesses at least nine characteristics of an optimo currency unification process. I am no expert on these matters but I would have very considerable caution in joining in his optimism that it would permit the speed and pattern of currency unification to be determined by the needs of the market and degree of money disillusionment and the temporary unemployment created by downward harmonisation of inflation rates and so on that it would be an automatic mechanism which works without political direction. I wonder could that really be so.

Monetary union is something which, in the long term, we here should readily and gladly work towards but in the short and medium term we should have the greatest reservations towards all these various reptiles of one type and another.

I should like to add a practical view to this debate and I agree with Senator Cooney on the gap to commitment. As regards economic and monetary union, there are still hundreds of non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by other countries on imports which we still have to deal with. Last year, my company submitted to the Department of Finance a schedule of non-tariff barriers to trade covering the European States. These problems unfortunately we will have to endure for the foreseeable future. But, while the Community are attempting to approximate laws to reduce technical barriers, progress is painfully slow and is also piecemeal as indicated in this report. Meanwhile, compared with what Irish industry has to be content with in exporting to the Community, exporters to Ireland find that there is little standing in their way and they have easy access to this market.

The other matter being reported in the debate is that there is little progress on tax harmonisation. Particularly, in regard to rates of VAT, for instance, this year we will be paying from our own resources to the European Fund 1 per cent on all items subjected to VAT. There has been harmonisation on the items but not of the rates. You find the position that on things like newspapers and biscuits that are subject to VAT here but not subject to VAT in the UK, we pay 1 per cent, but we are being compensated by the industries here, while in Britain they are paying 1 per cent at zero-rated VAT. In other words, this is another form of subsidy. The report states:

It is essential to strengthen the cohesion of the Community in view of the expected accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece.

I agree with this view because otherwise Ireland will be in a worse position because there will be another lift of non-tariff barriers to contend with and there will be more products with freedom of access to our market.

We have suffered and are suffering from lack of progress to economic and monetary union because we have been the good boys. We should introduce our own non-tariff arrangements until agreement has been reached in Europe to abolish those which affect our exports. I commend the report and all the work which goes on behind the scenes, outside the Seanad. I should like to compliment the people involved.

This is the second occasion in this session on which the Seanad has debated one of the reports of the Joint Committee, and as a member of that committee I welcome the opportunity we have in this House to debate important reports of this nature.

Like those Senators who have spoken before me, I should like to pay particular tribute to Senator Mulcahy for this report because a large part of it was written by him and, in fact, the whole report was directed by him. I realise as a member of the sub-committee the amount of time and effort he put into the drawing up of this report.

One of the pre-requisites for economic and monetary union must be the development of the regional policy. Part III of the report discusses the implications for Ireland of economic and monetary union. There cannot be any doubt that we will suffer greatly as a result of such a union unless there is a more extended use of the regional fund, the redistribution of resources between richer and poorer countries. Ireland will suffer greatly, as the report says, in competing for capital investment which is so necessary for the country. Irish industries will suffer, too, in the equalisation of costs as a result of economic and monetary union. The first thing our Government and our representatives in Europe must press for is the development of the regional policy and more extensive use of the regional fund in areas like Ireland and poorer regions of the Community. I realise, as Senator Conroy said, the long-term aim of the country must be to strive for economic and monetary union. In the short-term, unless we see the regional policy being developed, unless, as Senator Staunton said, poor regions of this country and of the other areas of the EEC are helped along, I would not be in favour of economic and monetary union. I realise the many advantages to be had from this union but they would only be as a consequence of a more extensive use of the regional fund which must be a prerequisite for economic and monetary union.

I, too, should like to welcome this report and the Seanad debate, not only on the merits of the report but also as an example of the way in which the House can make a contribution not only to the discussion but to the formulation of policy in many areas. I hope that in the future there will be greater opportunity given for both Houses of the Oireachtas to take a more active role in discussing policy issues at a sufficiently early stage so that they can indeed make an important and relevant input before policy finally has been formulated and legislated through the Houses.

In this case we are dealing with matters which affect many other countries apart from our own. It is an issue which is of some importance to the whole future progress of the Community. There has been reference to the need for caution because of the dashing of perhaps more optimistic programmes for bringing about economic and monetary union. It is important to recognise that progress was made in the period up to 1973 and that is was the series of upheavals associated with the oil crisis which led to the shelving of any further movement in the whole area of economic and monetary union.

In the pre-1973 discussions there was indeed the notion that there should be this parallel movement towards greater economic union on the one hand to match progress towards monetary union. In the contemporary debate there is more of an emphasis on pressing ahead simply with monetary union itself. There is a recognition that it will be many years before economic union can be brought about. I do not think anyone would expect to approximate to economic union in less than a decade. So we face the question: must monetary union wait that long also, or is there a case for pressing ahead more rapidly in that area? It appears that there is a case to be examined on its merits. One can take the obvious historical parallels or examples that countries like the United States were able to develop, a common currency area—monetary union, if you wish—without necessarily harmonising their economic taxation and other relevant policies.

In the circumstances of the modern world, especially in the context of the European Community, I do not think any of the member states would want to see monetary union by itself without some adequate safeguards or, if you wish, safety nets in the sphere of arrangements to ensure that the weaker member states would not be affected unduly in an adverse way by any monetary union which might emerge. In this context, of course, reference is always made here in Ireland to regional policy. While that appears to be the more likely vehicle for the formulation of adequate machinery to cope with the consequences of monetary union, it is by no means the only possible instrument.

I had the opportunity of serving as a member of the MacDougall Committee which examined the possibilities for facilitating faster progress towards economic integration in Europe in a way which would not pose difficulties for any of the member states and, in particular, would not jeopardise development prospects of the weaker regions. Essentially what was demonstrated in the report of that group was that you could indeed develop adequate mechanisms both for transfer of resources from richer to the poorer regions of the Community by methods which would not call for any major increases in the overall size of the Community budget, although they would, of course, call for perhaps fairly substantial changes in the composition of Community spending if it were to be done within the confines of existing budgetary arrangements.

Without going into the details of it I simply make the point that it is indeed possible to envisage effective instruments for catering for the needs of the weaker regions without pushing through to a fully developed series of instruments for economic union and, in particular, even without fully developing instruments for regional policy and regional development. That may come as a surprise to some Members of the House but it is a statement of the factual position.

Coming to the specific area of monetary union itself and the possible developments which might occur, while understandably there is a need for caution and a willingness to look at all the possible hazards associated with unions with "snakes" or "boa constrictors", nonetheless I do not think we need to be over-cautious in this area because there is rarely a good time for doing anything in this world. One can always think of very good reasons why one should postpone until some later date either some painful or nasty process or, indeed, some process that represents a major shift from the status quo. The one great thing about the status quo is that it is comfortable. Everybody knows what it is like and we know we can live with it, whereas we are never so sure we could live comfortably with a changed situation.

The particular questions which have to be faced up to, if we are to progress towards monetary union, hinge around three or four areas. The first is the question which has been touched on by a number of speakers, namely, do you go for something like a parallel currency on the one hand, or do you go for something like the Snake arrangement of fixed exchange rates on the other hand? One can produce arguments in favour of both viewpoints. The standard argument in favour of the parallel currency, the argument we have heard here is, in effect, that it leaves some freedom or scope for weaker countries who may need to devalue to do so, that they do not find themselves locked into a particular exchange rate with which they must then live for all time and which on occasions could force painful economic adjustments upon them.

The argument against that made by the advocates of the Snake, the fixed exchange rates, is that if you leave that freedom to individual member countries to devalue for simplicity as appropriate against Europa, then how will you ever satisfy yourself that member states will not always postpone the adoption of any form of economic discipline? How do you safeguard against the risk that any one member state may seek to gain a competitive advantage over other members by a competitive devaluation? For that reason stronger states would want adequate safeguards against the risks of a wrongful use of a parellel currency arrangement. That is one question which must be answered at the end of the day if we are to develop some European monetary system. Do we go for some form of parallel arrangement where there is flexibility in the sense of individual member states being able to adjust their exchange rate, or do we lock into some specific Snake arrangement?

The other questions that arise are whether, in the early stages at any rate, you should restrict the use of any European monetary arrangement—let us call it a Europa—simply to being a means of settlement between the financial institutions of the Community itself, that is, for settling payments between central banks or other banking institutions within the Community. Or do you allow it to issue as an actual currency which people can hold and use in day-to-day transactions? Once you contemplate the prospect of its being issued as any form of currency, you promptly face up to the next question: what is your attitude towards allowing a European monetary unit to be used in transactions with the outside world, or with any part of the outside world? In other words, do you try to confine it to purely internal European transactions, or do you see it being used for financial transactions with other parts of the world? If that possibility were to be contemplated you immediately go on to the question of whether or not it would start to emerge as a form of international reserve currency, something akin to the dollar at the present time or perhaps to the role sterling occupied in the previous decades.

Those are important questions which must be faced up to, which must be answered, if there is to be any worthwhile progress towards the development of a European monetary system. On the general question, I would have thought that, whatever the precise arrangements which emerge and which, of course, obviously must take account of the circumstances of individual member states, there is a case to be made for some progress in the direction of creating a European monetary system, because there was an understandable standing still over the years of the oil recession and its aftermath. Now that that recession is past, now that there is recovery, however modest, in some parts of the Community, it is fair to say the worst has passed. If we are making progress, however modest, we should be able to resume progress in the construction of the Europe which was the basis for the whole construction, the union of European peoples.

Whatever individual preferences might be, whether we would have preferred to start with economic union, or monetary union, or political union, we should be willing to press ahead with any opportunity which presents itself in the circumstances of any one time. At present, and for the foreseeable future, there is a strong case to be made for pressing ahead with some development in this monetary area. Although we have heard references to the difficulties which would arise from any regime of European monetary units, or a European monetary zone, it is important to remember that, when the world broke away from a régime of fixed exchange rates over recent decades, many benefits were expected to result from the free floating of exchange rates and, of course, surprise, surprise, most of those benefits did not actually materialise and very quickly we were into the area of what is known as managed floating or, put crudely, dirty floating and then we got half-way houses of semi-dirty floating, and so forth.

Experience in the realm of floating exchange rates seems to suggest a conclure sion we observe in all other areas of human behaviour, that is, the world is never perfect and, no matter which system we introduce of course there are always some problems or imperfections or difficulties to be resolved. The mere existence of those problems and difficulties is not in itself justification for failure to make progress.

I should like to join with other Senators in commending the economic affairs sub-committee of the Joint Committee and its chairman, Senator Mulcahy, on this very useful analysis of the Commission's proposals on economic and monetary union. One would have to say that the report is stronger on the descriptive account of the evolution of proposals for economic and monetary union—dating really from the Hague Summit of 1969—than improvising us with a thought-through and accurate summary of the implications for Ireland. I do not regard that as a major criticism. I have every sympathy for the sub-committee and its chairman in trying to assess the implications, but I note that part 3 of the report on the implications of monetary union for Ireland is a mere page-and-a-half. Indeed, part of the last page consists of acknowledgements to various people who had assisted the committee.

The major role of the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities is to draw the attention of both Houses—and specifically today the attention of the Seanad—to the major implications for this country of proposals for EMU which had been evolving at the European Community level for a considerable time. I would tend to join with Senators Conroy and Whitaker in being very concerned about the potential problems for this country of EMU. I join with Senator Conroy in saying that we have proved—if we needed to prove it—that we are good Europeans. However, he then began with references to the English and the French, which would not be the way I would list the order of those who might be considered good Europeans. But I take his point that this country has demonstrated a commitment to the idea of Europe, and has made a substantial contribution to thinking about the possible creation of a meaningful European Community. At the same time we have been disap-pointed—starkly disappointed as a people—with the fact that since our membership in 1973 far from being a closer economic development and progress at the European Community level, the disparity has increased between Ireland on the periphery and the economically advanced countries more centrally located.

This disparity has worsened. So the first priority in considering proposals for economic and monetary union must be to emphasise that this can only be a realistic political possibility for this country if it is matched with serious evidence—not just promises—of the various kinds of measures which can be taken at the European Community level to ensure that there is redistribution of wealth and that there is a levelling off of these disparities. I take the Minister's point that we should not simply call for a stronger regional policy; there is, of course, a whole range of other instruments. One instrument that is crucial and tends to be overlooked in any Irish debate is the actual size of the Community budget itself. The European Community must have a more realistic budget compared to the separate budgets of the nine member states if it is to ensure a gradual equalising of the economic policies and performance of the various member states.

I share the grave doubts and worries of those Senators who have noted that there is a considerable momentum now on the question of monetary union. It is clear that the President of the Commission has staked his reputation to some extent on there being progress towards an economic and monetary union, and in particular progress on monetary union. He even chooses agricultural meetings in Britain for major statements on the subject, and it is quite clear that he has made a personal commitment in the matter.

The Minister was correct to refer to the MacDougall report which played a substantial part in the developing debate. I was interested in his own contribution to this debate and I welcome the fact that he made a contribution. It is a great step forward now that the Seanad has not just the facility but indeed the requirement in our Standing Orders to debate reports when the Joint Committee have sought that the matter be debated within the text of the report itself. I therefore welcome the fact that on the two occasions when we had such debates a Minister has not only been present but has also contributed to the debate. The Minister of State, Deputy Ray Burke, made it clear on the last occasion that this was not necessarily setting a precedent. Perhaps the fact that the Minister has intervened here today makes it even more probable next time. The Minister's intervention is very useful, particularly on such a general report where the Joint Committee cannot spell out in detail—and I do not think any of us can spell out very clearly—what the implications would be for Ireland. Nonetheless I was surprised that when the Minister identified the relevant questions he then took off his ministerial hat and put on his professorial hat and spoke as an academic who has a very considerable expertise in this area. He did not express any preference—or at least I could not detect a preference—on the major question which this report identifies: whether it would be in our interests to opt for the proposals for a parallel currency or for some variation of the Snake type arrangement. That to me is the key issue. It is interesting that the Minister having identified it then declined to make it clear what his particular preference would be, or which he would see as being the better arrangement for this country.

Senator Mulcahy, in contrast, expressed very clearly his preference for a parallel currency. The main problem for this country is that the whole debate on economic and monetary union involves a language with technical terms which brings it outside the range not only of the ordinary citizen but of the ordinary politician—of most of us. It is very difficult indeed to assess what the real implications would be for this country. I fall back on the kind of things that I know about Ireland which are different from many of the other countries. The very high proportion of youth in the country will be a sustained feature of this country to a much more dramatic extent than the other countries of the community. We are later developing, so we have many of the characteristics of a developing country, whereas other countries have different kinds of problems and preoccupations in their economies. The kinds of priorities we must have as a developing country, as a country which sees a widening disparity between us and the other member states, should make us slow to give up unnecessarily some of our own economic instruments. We need to retain our own possibilities of establishing our priorities in trying to eliminate those disparities and trying to catch up with economic development elsewhere. We need to be able to attract industries here to provide employment for that very large number of young people who will be coming onto our labour market annually not just to the mid-eighties—as is the case with the other member states— but right on to the end of the century. In conclusion, I find this report stimulating. I find it very difficult to draw easy conclusions from it and I am somewhat heartened by the fact that this seems to be a problem which other people have as well.

Tá áthas orm deireadh a chur leis an díospóireacht seo. I am delighted with the debate which has developed in the Seanad and I thank my colleagues for contributing to this fairly technical subject.

I have a definite viewpoint and I want to express it unequivocally. Economic and monetary union is a two-legged process. On the one hand, it is economic—economic steps, economic policies like the regional development policy, the policy for the support of youth employment, policies for development in investment, such as regional drainage and so on. These economic policies are one-legged. On the other hand, it is monetary. How are you going to handle the situation where countries have declared that they are coming together by signing a treaty? They are coming together in terms of a common economic and monetary system, a common market. We are in that. We signed a treaty. It is not a question whether you like the economic and monetary union; it is a question of how it is going to come about.

I was extremely pleased to hear the Minister say he would not be impressed with notions such as "Maybe this is not the time", "I would be worried about the difficulties", "I do not fully understand", "We must be careful", and so on. That is not a formula for progress in my view. That is why I wanted to have this issue debated here. It is a very happy occasion that the Minister involved can debate it at a technical level. He was a member of the MacDougall Committee which looked at this and therefore he had a run up to it.

I am standing for the notion of a parallel currency. I differ from all the Senators who took the more cautious view. I think we should move. I differ from Senator Whitaker, Senator Conroy and others who say we should move forward slowly. From an analysis of this situation I believe that a move towards a parallel currency would be helpful for the Irish situation. It would stop the messing that is going on among the other countries, allow them to get on, develop their economies and get the growth rates we can ride on which will enable us to reach our employment targets.

I have a quote I wanted to put on the record because it seems to summarise the issue. It comes from the Europe: Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse, which issued on 30 March when there was some speculation about the next step leading towards the Bremen meeting.

All observers recognise that the present situation is strongly marked by monetary disorder. Monetary stability is at the same time an effect (because it reflects the disparities in national growth rates compared with production potential) and a cause (because it slows down investments and hampers ordered planning of firms' policies) of the decrease in growth, and even at the negative rates which are seen here and there.

I have come to the conclusion that effective investment policies are hampered by the uncertainties that exist mainly in this monetary disorder and that our representatives in Europe should go there ready to influence the situation. We are too easily falling back on this. We must get our regional policy right. We have to think in parallel with that. I am for a strong regional policy, not just thinking of the west but of the inner city of Dublin which is as bad a region as we have; but that does not take from the fact that we must think through the international situation. As far as I am concerned, at the moment the most important issue in the international situation is the European policy on money. The dollar and the yen are having problems. If the Europeans went to the international table with a common view because they are operating on a common currency, they would be realising some of the ideas of the Rome Treaty.

It is interesting that the Bremen meeting is a precursor to the Bonn Summit that President Carter is to attend. It is quite clear that the situation is such that our leaders in Europe have to come together and to to the Bonn Summit with a clear view of where they stand. One of the areas where there is confusion is in the area of money. That is why I stand so much by the policy I advocated here today. It is not a question of moving into a new European currency, getting rid of all the others, and being locked in the exchange rate, because the parallel currency allows adjustment depending on differential growth, the way the unit costs go and the kind of increases that will take place in incomes. When countries and trade unions take a line on incomes and do not take into account the effect it has on the broader scene, they are moving the country towards a point where unemployment policies cannot be met. I was delighted that the Minister, without committing himself, —obviously he cannot commit himself because the Taoiseach is in Bremen at the moment indulging in the development of European policy——

Not indulging too much, I hope.

I hope he is enjoying it. I thought the Minister was open to a move of this kind and hopefully that this matter will be further discussed in his Department. I would hope also that arising from the debate here today there will be further discussion throughout the country. I hope we will not just dismiss it because it is a bit complex and we cannot understand it, but would prefer to be bellyaching about the regional policy.

One or two points were raised in the debate by Senator Cooney and I could not let them go. He said the Gaullists were against this. That is wrong. President Giscard d'Estaing has been having many meetings with Chancellor Schmidt.

He is not a Gaullist.

He is developing a French view.

The Gaullists are much stronger on monetary union than any other party.

That makes me more suspicious.

The French are as interested in this as——

Mitterand also wrote in a reservation about allowing Spain to join because he was just as worried about French farmers as Chirac.

I believe strongly that economic and monetary union is a two stage process, but the stages go in parallel. We should not knock one because we do not understand it and go all out for the other. I have come to the conclusion that the monetary step must be taken as soon as can be. I predict that the outcome of the Bremen discussions will be a move towards a development of the European unit of account as a currency which can be used for settling exchange matters and debts between various countries and may lead to the establishment of an institution which will regulate this, like a European Central Bank. At the moment we have a system where central bank governors change their hats and turn themselves into a kind of central bank. It may well be that there will be a move towards setting up something of this kind. That would be the political step Senators were talking about. It would be a small leap, as I said when I opened the debate—not the grand leap—from which we can learn. Ultimately, if something like the European unit of account worked in that way and was successful perhaps we could move along then to the parallel currency idea that I advocate where the Europa could come into being, which could move from country to country and be exchanged for national currencies in an agreed way. Ultimately, over time—and I see it as being a good period of time— as a result of the learning process that would go on and the continuing evolution towards a convergence of the economic policies one day there might be a common currency. We should always remember that we have a common currency linking Scotland, Wales, Ireland and England. We have managed to have differential economic policies and to live together reasonably. The only thing is that if the UK policy is not to our liking it can depress us, as it did when we were not in the EEC and our agriculture was unable to expand at the required rate.

I should like to wind up the debate by publicly thanking all the Senators who contributed. President Jenkins of the EEC asked parliamentarians of Europe to debate the issues. The Seanad today has made a contribution. I would hope that at some stage he would come to realise what we have done and appreciate the Irish contribution. I should also like to thank all those who helped in preparing the report, which was so well received, of course, the staff of Leinster House who helped us all.

Question put and agreed to.
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