Belfast Court Decision: Motion.

Mrs. Rogers

I move:

That Seanad Éireann expresses grave concern at the implications for peace and stability in this country of the decision handed down in a Belfast Court on April 3rd, 1984 in the case involving the shooting dead of an unarmed civilian in County Armagh.

It is significant and most heartening that this motion has the support of all parties in Seanad Éireann. This is a clear indication of the deep concern which exists in regard to the implications of the court case in question and the recognition that the erosion of confidence in the whole system of law and order in Northern Ireland over the years threatens to develop into a landslide as a result of this case.

In proposing this motion I am not unaware that what I have to say will be seized upon by spokesmen for the Provisional IRA and used in an attempt to justify their vile campaign of murder and intimidation. The simple answer to such claims is that justice and human rights are indivisible. The posturing of such people as defenders of human rights and champions of the oppressed must continually be exposed for the hypocrisy that it is. They would claim for themselves and their associates, whilst denying it to their victims, the right to a free and open trial as laid down in Article 6 of the European Convention. They protest vehemently at the "kill, don't question" policy of the security forces, yet remain silent about, even seek to justify, the murder of a judge or a young teacher as they leave Sunday Mass, or indeed the summary execution of a young Protestant farmer as he ploughs his fields on the Fermanagh-Donegal border. Their championship of human rights is entirely conditional on whose human rights are at stake.

By the same token, any criticisms of the forces of law and order will undoubtedly bring forth accusations from Loyalist politicians of giving succour and solace to the IRA. The truth is that those who are genuinely concerned about law and order should be the first to express concern at any evidence of an erosion of confidence in the police and the courts. Such an erosion has been, and will continue to be, exploited by the paramilitaries and it is from this that they garner most succour and solace. The spectacle of public representatives from major parties congratulating the security forces on the use of maximum force to shoot dead unarmed civilians is indicative of the depths to which Northern Ireland has sunk.

The Diplock Commission, set up to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, stated in 1972 — at the beginning of the troubles — and I quote:

Northern Ireland has always been a province whose inhabitants have been divided into rival factions by difference of creed and politics. The judiciary has nevertheless managed to retain a reputation for impartiality which rises above the divisive conflict which has affected so many other functions of government in the province; and the courts of law and the procedures that they use have in general held the respect and trust of all except the extremists of both factions. We regard it as of paramount importance that the criminal courts of law and the judges and resident magistrates who preside in them should continue to retain that respect and trust throughout the emergency and after the emergency has come to an end. If anything were done which weakened it, it might take generations to rebuild it.

I agree with that. Therefore, the considerations which I have just outlined cannot and will not prevent me or my party from speaking out on matters of such crucial importance. My concern is with the steady erosion of confidence in the judicial system and with it the increasing alienation of increasing numbers, particularly within the Nationalist community. I do not have to tell this House that such confidence is fundamental to stability in any society. How much more important is it in the divided and conflict-ridden society of Northern Ireland?

The conflict in Northern Ireland is, as we know, rooted in community division, in the failure to accommodate the Irishness of the Nationalist population, in their exclusion from participation and in the consequent alienation of Nationalists from the institutions of the State and from the forces of law and order within it.

Over the last ten years in particular we have witnessed attempts by successive British Governments to resolve the conflict by the introduction of stronger and more oppressive emergency laws and by an increasing emphasis on police and military offensives. We have seen convictions obtained in the courts on the basis of confessions extracted by ill-treatment in centres such as Castlereagh and Gough Barracks. We have seen the use of plastic bullets, banned in England because of their lethal nature, and the refusal to ban them despite the fact that they have been responsible for 11 deaths, among them a young girl running a message for her mother, and a housewife on her own doorstep in West Belfast. They have also been responsible for many serious injuries including blinding a number of young people. From time to time we have seen spates of killings by the security forces in highly suspicious circumstances. And in recent years we have seen the courts themselves literally put into the front line of the campaign against terrorism. I am referring to the policy of using supergrasses in order to obtain convictions in the courts.

Given the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland, it is self-evident that such an approach was bound not merely to fail, but to compound the problem and it has. The trial resulting from the killing of Séamus Grew in December 1982, which is the one in question in this motion, and its disclosures about the deliberate issuing of false statements about the circumstances of the shooting, the attempt by four senior police officers to pervert the course of justice, the intrusion of the RUC into the Republic and finally the failure of the prosecution to prove its case have served to confirm the worst fears and suspicions of the Nationalist community about the even-handedness of the judicial system and the credibility of the forces of law and order. As a result of a security and military approach to what is, in effect, a complex political problem and particularly as a result of the trial to which this motion refers, the view of the judicial system in Northern Ireland which was held by a small extremist minority some 15 years ago has now become the view of an ever increasing and large section of the Nationalist community and indeed of a small section of the Loyalist community.

A considerable number of practising lawyers are concerned about the situation, a situation which is summed up in The Irish Times editorial of 4 April last, and I quote:

But the Robinson trial, following as it did on many other events, casts a lurid light on the administration of justice and the conduct of the security forces in Northern Ireland. It raises questions which demand urgent and honest answers from the relevant authorities, answers which regrettably are unlikely to be forthcoming.

It is that last line which will strike a cord of almost despair with every member of the Nationalist community with few exceptions. I repeat "answers which regrettably are unlikely to be forthcoming".

The editorial continues:

A system of law and order characterised by conspiracy and corruption cannot ensure present rights or a worthwhile future of society, for either Catholics or Protestants.

The Irish News in Belfast commenting on the judgment on the same day stated in its editorial, and I quote:

Even moderate Catholics are outraged. And rightly so. Yesterday was a bad day for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, the latest in an unending catalogue of such bad days. The judgment at Belfast Crown Court undermines the law and gives comfort to the law breakers ... it encourages the shoot to kill mentality, undermines further the independence of the judiciary and further alienates the Nationalist population.

In order fully to appreciate the serious implications of the judgment in question it is necessary to view it in the context of the cumulative effect of what is referred to by the Irish News as the “unending catalogue of bad days”.

A study carried out by Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Dermot Walsh for the Baker review last year concluded that of the 267 fatalities caused by the security forces between January 1969 and September 1983, 83 of those were caused in what they called "disputed" circumstances. The manner in which these contentious killings have been dealt with by the authorities — that is by the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts — has countributed in no small way to the alienation of the Nationalist community and to an increase in paramilitary recruitment and therefore to further voilence and instability.

The killings which caused most outrage were carried out by members of the security forces on duty during the periods of December 1977 to December 1978 and more recently between August 1982 and August 1983. During both periods all the evidence pointed to a policy at the highest level of "kill, don't question". Some people call it "shoot to kill". I think "kill don't question" is a better description. In the latter period a total of 14 people were shot by security forces on duty in Lurgan, Armagh, Belfast and Derry in controversial circumstances. Nine of these 14 were unarmed. Calls for full inquiries for the immediate pressing of charges against those responsible, for full and detailed publication of evidence, were made by responsible leaders in the Nationalist community, among them Bishop Francis Brooks of Dromore, Bishop Daly of Derry, Cardinal Ó Fiaich and spokesmen for the SDLP. Even the Alliance Party expressed public concern. John Hume accused the security forces of, and I quote "legalised murder" and he alleged, and again I quote: "a fundamental change in British security policy which amounts to the abandonment of the rule of law." Those comments will sum up the public concern at the time of those killings.

All of those comments met with the same bland official response, and again I quote from the Northern Ireland Office:

The security forces operate under the same rule of law that applies to any other member of the community.

During the 1977-78 period similar protestations were met with similar denials. Altogether in the course of that particular year ten people were killed in controversial circumstances. In only one of those killings was a charge brought. It was a particular horrific case of the killing of a 16 years old lad called Conn Boyle, in Dunloy, County Antrim, who had stumbled on a cache of arms in a graveyard. He told his father. His father, co-operating with the security forces, told the police. The following day, the young lad went again to the graveyard — I suppose out of curiosity — and was shot dead on the spot by soldiers who were lying in wait. Following a sustained campaign of pressure led by the SDLP Justice spokesman at that time, Michael Canavan, and after a delay of ten months, a charge was eventually brought against two soldiers. Both were acquitted.

Fourteen persons have been killed by the security forces on duty between 1982 and 1983. That is the latter period which I referred to. So far few cases have come to court and all have ended in acquittals. The fact remains that no member of the security forces in Northern Ireland has ever served a prison sentence for the killing whilst on duty of a civilian.

I understand that in deciding whether or not to bring a charge against a member of the security forces, the DPP consults with the Attorney General. It is difficult, particularly in view of the statistics what I have mentioned, to ignore the possibility that political considerations may well take precedence over purely legal ones. Commenting on this very point, Boyle Hadden and Walsh in their submission to the Baker Review stated:

All this lends support to the view which is widely held among the minority community in Northern Ireland and by many foreign observers that the security forces are not in reality subject to the rule of law, whatever may be claimed to the contrary.

There is, moreover, a stark contrast in the view taken of killings by the security forces in England and in Northern Ireland. During the very period last year when a spate of killings in controversial circumstances had taken place in Northern Ireland a young man called Stephen Waldorf was shot in London by mistake by the police. The shooting caused a major outcry. Not one of the major parties in Britain condoned it, nor did the Home Secretary, Lord Whitelaw, calling it a "most serious, grave and disturbing incident". He said that "nothing like it must happen again". In the event a charge was brought within three days. In Northern Ireland, in the rare event of a charge being brought at all, there is invariably a delay of ten to 12 months. Expressions of concern such as those made by the Home Secretary are not heard in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, in the case of Stephen Waldorf, that young man was rushed to hospital within two or three minutes of the shooting. In a case of the shooting of three unarmed IRA suspects in Lurgan in November 1982 there was a delay of two to three hours before they were brought to the nearby hospital where they could have been within five or six minutes of the shooting. Such, then, is the background against which the implications of the Robinson trial have to be viewed.

With regard to the killing in question, may I, first of all, say that all reasonably minded people would accept the right of a policeman or soldier to defend himself with reasonable force. I would acknowledge that in Northern Ireland policemen and soldiers have a particularly dangerous job to do. However, in the instance of the Grew killing, it seems to many reasonable people that excessive fire power was used causing the death of two unarmed men. If murder was not considered to be an appropriate verdict why not then a verdict of manslaughter, therefore indicating that the use of excessive force by the police would not be excused? Complete acquittal on the basis of the defendant's claim that he feared for his life, and in the absence of any objective evidence of such threat to his life, and in light of the defendant having twice changed his own account of events, seems to many people to be inexplicable.

Other aspects of the case would also raise the question of double standards. Ordinary suspects in Northern Ireland are brought to interrogation centres and held for 48 hours incommunicado without access to a solicitor while they are interrogated. The defendant in this case and indeed in all cases, I understand, of the security forces had access to legal advice before he was questioned, and that gave him an important advantage over ordinary suspects.

Furthermore, forensic evidence was made available to the defence long before this case came to trial. It is inconcieable that such an advantage would be given to any other member of the community. So much for the claim that the law applies equally to members of the security forces and any other person in the community. Comparing all the circumstances of this case with the circumstances in which many convictions have been gained in recent times on the uncorroborated evidence of supergrasses, witnesses who themselves have been guilty of the most heinous crimes and who have been offered inducements in order to give evidence, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that double standards apply in the judicial system in Northern Ireland.

Other disclosures were made too during the course of the trial and they raise serious questions. The matter of incursions into the Republic by the RUC has rightly caused anger and deep indignation. The matter has indeed been taken up by the Irish Government at the highest level and I do not intend, in the time allotted to me here today, to dwell on it.

The disclosure, however, that four senior police officers asked a man facing a murder charge to tell lies in his defence raises a serious matter of police integrity and credibility. Worse still the officers concerned would seem to be prima facie guilty of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The Belfast Telegraph in its editorial on the day after the judgment expressed concern about this disclosure. The Belfast Telegraph, by the way, is a liberal or moderate Unionist paper. The Telegraph, editorial stated:

The majority of fair-minded people look to the Chief Constable to uncover the truth whatever embarrassment it may cause.

A few days later the Chief Constable indicated that he was asking for an investigation by senior members of the British police force. At the same time and in the same statement he added:

I can only say at this stage that I do not believe there was any criminal conspiracy to cover up.

Such an extraordinary prejudgment of the proposed investigation, far from assuaging public concern and suspicion served to heighten it. Indeed, the Taoiseach in a statement to Dáil Éireann on 10 April referring to the Chief Constable's remarks indicated that he had expressed to the British authorities the Irish Government's belief that it had "reinforced existing concern".

For the record, the statement issued by RUC Headquarters Information Centre in East Belfast four hours after the shooting of Grew and Carroll said that an unidentified RUC member had been knocked down and injured by Grew's car on the Armagh to Keady road. The policeman at the scene had radioed to another patrol who, they said, had identified the car as belonging to a "leading terrorist" and intercepted it. The statement added:

The driver jumped out of the vehicle and the police, believing they were about to be fired on, themselves opened fire. Both occupants were shot.

That was the police statement a few hours after the shooting.

It was disclosed, of course, during the course of the trial that this statement was a fabrication, a cover-up. Was it, we can ask, concocted as a cover-up for police intrusions into the Republic as we were told, or might it have been concocted with a view to justifying the use of maximum force? Conflicting police statements issued after a similar type of killing of three unarmed IRA suspects in Lurgan in November 1982 did little for police credibility.

Only a full disclosure of the facts and a complete impartial investigation and the pressing of charges against those who are prima facie guilty of a criminal conspiracy can hope to restore any measure of police credibility or to remove the suspicion that the forces of law and order are themselves above the law.

The Gardiner Committee in its report in 1975 stated:

Before leaving the question of the powers of the security forces, we should like to re-emphasise one aspect which we consider in many ways likely to make a more important contribution to the restoration of law and order in Northern Ireland than all the powers included in Part II of the 1973 Act. This is the acceptance throughout the whole of Northern Ireland of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the force responsible for the full range of normal police functions.

However regrettable, it is certain that the "acceptance" referred to by Gardiner has now been rendered an even more remote possibility than ever. The police themselves and the community as a whole are the losers. The winners are all those who thrive on conflict and mistrust and who are only too ready to exploit the deepening alienation of a large section of the community. The resulting deterioration and downward spiral in Northern Ireland has grave implications for the peace and stability of the whole island. This has all too tragically been demonstrated in recent months and years.

The need for a radical re-appraisal of attitudes and the urgency of making political progress has been recognised by the New Ireland Forum. The Nationalist parties have expressed their recognition of the realities and their willingness to face those realities. Alone, however, they cannot resolve the conflict. Britain must act decisively. For the rest of us on this island, whether Unionist or Nationalist, the time for posturing is long since past. We face a serious and deteriorating situation. It cannot be resolved by party politicking. Now is the time for dialogue and compromise on all sides.

Mr. Robb

I second the motion and I would like to start by reminding the House this evening that according to the figures I have available up to June 1983 at that stage 375 members of the British Army had been killed throughout the last 15 years in Northern Ireland, 176, and that figure has risen considerably since, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary Volunteer Reserve had been killed, 132 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment had been killed and approximately 20 prison officers. That was the state with regard to the killing of members of the security forces up to June 1983. There were 1,233 civilians killed and of the paramilitary organisations, 178 members of the Provisional IRA, 26 of the official IRA, 13 of the Irish National Liberation Army, 38 of the UDA and 23 of the UVF.

As you all know, to our cost in Northern Ireland these numbers have increased substantially since that time. With that in the foreground and with literally tens of reports of the last 15 years in the background we must pursue the debate in hand. Who remembers what was in the Cameron Report, the Hume Report, the Compton Report, the Scarman Tribunal Report, the Parker Report, the Diplock Report or the Gardiner Report? Since those we have had the Bennett Report and the improvement that took place in its immediate aftermath in regard to the interrogation of people who had been arrested, although it is sad to record that in the years 1981-82 there has been an increase in the number of reports of assault under interrogation. Then there was the Jellicoe Report on the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Widgery Report and more recently the Baker Report.

Against a background such as this we must decide two things: one, the significance, the importance, of what happened in Armagh on the night in which Séamus Grew was killed. We must put this in the context of the whole management of affairs in Northern Ireland and see it as a very unresolved deep-seated, long-lived political dilemma. Secondly, we must ask, as Senator Rogers has already asked, when will the people of Ireland, both South and North, find that degree of compromise in their hearts in which they can reach out to their neighbour to try to resolve this vexed question before another 2,300 people have been laid to their rest in a name of or defending the particular tradition to which they belong in this benighted island? Extrapolating those figures for killing and for wounding to England, as I said not long ago in this House, would mean some 70,000 people killed and 750,000 injured. Little wonder then that those of us who have to debate this issue despair because we see the people involved in it caught up in a web of an unresolved historical dilemma, a web which at last — in recent months, in the last year — the people of this part of the island have tried to come to grips with first hand in the deliberations which have been taking place in Dublin Castle. There was therefore a ray of hope when the Forum's deliberations had been completed and the report was published. It is on that ray of hope that I would build my hope to look ahead for a new future so that the bitterness which percolates the whole society in Northern Ireland as a result of actions such as the one we are to debate, may at last be defused and so that with goodwill we can look to a future where killings such as those of Séamus Grew will no longer take place.

There are three things interwoven here. There is the question of violence, its perpetration and the legitimacy for it, there is the need to monitor the legitimate forces which have the State's imprimatur for actions taken on the State's behalf, and there is a need to look at the unresolved dilemma which has caused so much killing in our country.

Let us start with the violence. I have always defined violence as the penetration — psychological, sexual or physical — of one human being by another against his will. The definition cannot change by putting a uniform on a man's back. The uniform gives the legitimacy to the action but it does not help the man to cope with the consequences of that action. I have spoken to old men from the First World War, the Civil War, the Second World War and the Anglo-Irish War who find that their Gethsemane was the moment in which they killed, or penetrated, another human being in an irreversible fashion. We must ask ourselves about this legitimacy in a divided country where there is no consensus because inevitably where there is no consensus the violence or the force used by the forces of law and order, the inevitable violence and force of all the nation states, will be perceived by those who feel ruled or oppressed as belonging to them. It is their laws, not our laws, their action, not our action. Therefore, we must remember that side of the coin when we come to argue on behalf of the legitimacy of the State that is, that the State's legitimacy is in question where there is no consensus.

The other side of it is to ask ourselves what are we doing for the men who will carry to their graves, be they paramilitaries or members of the police or armed forces, the memory and the guilt which they may presently be able to suppress in their consciousness but which as sure as day follows night will either rise to haunt them in later life or be expressed in the form of falsehood about what they have done in relation to acts or crimes against the humanity to which they themselves belong.

The third issue is the issue of the unresolved dilemma. We have inherited in Ireland, both South and North, a very limited concept of what the democratic process is all about. We are only beginning to realise that the claims of consensus democracy must take precedence over the claims of majority-rule democracy if we are sincere democrats and whether we are Irish Republicans or Northern Loyalists. It is only by reaching an accommodation which can give a feeling of consensus that there will be the ultimate legitimacy which gives to the State's forces of law and order the right to act with the unquestioning support of 99 per cent of the people who live on the island. Therefore, there is hope that there is a struggle going on to cope with the claims of consensus, what this means and the pain of what it means to people who have traditionally seen their rights in terms of majorities versus minorities.

The whole situation in Northern Ireland against the background I have tried to portray has been complicated further by the emergency legislation which has now been in existence for so long, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act in particular. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, section 12, one can be apprehended for seven days for questioning on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in the commission of an offence. Under the Emergency Provisions Act, although one cannot be held in detention for as long — the maximum being 72 hours — one can be arrested on the ground of suspected status or the suspicion that one has committed a certain act. Under the various sections of that Act one may be apprehended for 48 or for 72 hours by the police and one can be apprehended also by the military for up to four hours. The problem only starts there, because 80 per cent of those so apprehended are discharged without a charge being brought against them. If one considers the number of people who have been arrested under these two Acts — 22,378 and only 20 per cent charged — one can imagine the enormous effect if all those were different individuals and not some who are arrested and re-arrested. This must have an enormous effect in small, working-class communities, especially since it involves largely men and women under the age of 30 in the most deprived sections of the country, in relation to the extended family and the effect on community alienation. Again extrapolating these figures it would work out that during the years from July 1972 to June 1983, 55,000 to 60,000 people have been detained. Of those, 45,000 to 50,000 have been released without charge. Those figures would be equivalent to 6 million arrested and subsequently discharged after being detained under the Acts I mentioned in the United States or 1,500,000 in the United Kingdom. These were people arrested on suspicion but released without being charged, but nevertheless subjected to interrogation in the meantime.

We have a most terrible social, economic and political problem in Northern Ireland. When a policeman, of a force who have lost more than 180 men, shoots dead an unarmed terrorist — we know that the unarmed terrorist was alleged to have had a reputation for terror — we have to ask ourselves first how we would react in such a situation and then as responsible citizens, how we can allow a member of the law-providing force in a divided society where there is so much alienation, to kill in the circumstances as we have read them and in the first instance to be persuaded to fabricate his statements. There was also the situation that despite being a soldier, well trained and belonging to a special branch in the stress of the moment, and for whatever reason, discharged 15 to 19 bullets into the car at very close range.

It is, therefore, with great concern that I share with Senator Rogers in putting forward this motion. We are not talking here about the judgment or the judge. In the context of Northern Ireland, he, too, in the light of the law as it exists and of which I have been critical, has shown courage. Anyone who lives in Northern Ireland and who is trying to act with integrity in regard to what he believes, has to show courage. What you fellow Senators have got to do and what the people of the Republic have to do is, starting from what has been discussed through the last year, help to create the climate which can engage us in the North of Ireland in constructive debate with you about the future of Ireland in which the people can live at last with peace and hope for their children.

Mr. E. Ryan

I should like to join with the proposer and seconder of the motion in expressing great concern and disquiet in relation to the incident which took place on 3 April last. Having heard the statistics given to us by Senator Rogers in relation to the number of cases that have been taken against members of the security forces in the North in the past year or so and the fact that in no case was the accused found guilty, our concern must be very much more than if this was simply one isolated case.

I read in the newspaper report the description of this incident. From that it appears that Constable Robinson first fired 15 shots into the car. It was argued on his behalf that he mistakenly believed the occupants were armed, that a shot had been fired at him and that his life was in danger. On this basis it could be argued that he had justification for firing some, at least, of those 15 shots. However, it is the second part of the incident which is impossible to accept because at the end of firing 15 shots, he reloaded, walked around the back of the car, opened the door of the car and fired four shots at the occupant, Séamus Grew, at point blank range. Séamus Grew was unarmed and there was nothing in the report to suggest that he did anything at that stage to provoke the further shooting by Constable Robinson. In these circumstances it is extremely difficult to understand the decision of the judge. But in saying that I have to acknowledge that it is always dangerous to reach any conclusion in relation to any case, and particularly a case of this kind, without having been present to hear all the evidence. What is clear is that the reports of the case led many people to the conclusion that justice was not done in this case. It led many people to believe that the decision was in the nature of a whitewash of the security forces.

Any suggestion that the security forces or the courts in their turn take one view if the accused is a Nationalist and another view if the accused is a Unionist or a member of the security forces has very grave implications indeed for peace and stability, not only in Northern Ireland but ultimately in this part of the country. That attitude, suggesting that that is taking place, will certainly undermine still further a situation in regard to law and order which is already extremely grave. Consequently, though I am not in an adequate position to arrive at a firm conclusion as to the merits of the judgment in this case, it can certainly be said without hesitation that the legal axiom that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, was not fulfilled in this case and having regard to the statistics we have heard was not fulfilled in many other cases of this nature.

Impartiality in the administration of law is a sine qua non if any improvement is to be made in the very serious position in Northern Ireland. The problem there is, of course, basically a political, rather than a security, one. But while there is some hope of a political solution in the coming months arising from the contents of the New Ireland Forum Report, unless the solutions pursued under the terms of the report are accompanied by impartiality in the administration of the law, then the political settlements would be very seriously endangered. For this reason we must be deeply concerned to ensure that on the one hand every possible solution is pursued to achieve a political solution and new structures for the North which would ensure peace and justice for all. On the other hand, we must ensure that this is accompanied by impartiality in the administration of the law.

This incident has been described as reaching the lowest ebb in the confidence of the minority in Northern Ireland in the security forces and in the courts and law and order generally. In so far as this implies that the position cannot get worse and can only get better then perhaps there is a ray of hope. I hope that the position will improve very much. I hope that that particular incident which has shocked so many people, shocked even the most moderate of people, will be seen to have been so bad that from now on the position will improve. If that case has the effect of improving the situation, then some purpose will have been served.

Professor Dooge

I, too, wish to join with the Senators who have spoken in regard to the very wide disquiet which was caused by the whole course of the trial of Constable Robinson. I agree with Senator Ryan that it is difficult if one has not heard the whole evidence to be firmly critical of what was done. Nevertheless, there are elements in this particular case that cause disquiet. The evidence has been that it would be considered normal in an incident such as has occurred on this particular occasion that the members of the security forces should not only discharge the full contents of a semiautomatic weapon but should reload and continue to fire. It seems to go beyond the common acceptance of self-defence and beyond an appropriate degree of force in protection of one's own life.

I do not want to say any more on this aspect because I think our rule in this House of not criticising individual judgments is probably a good rule. But we are also told equally that the obiter dicta of the judge are not part of the judgement. I have absolutely no hesitation in criticising some of the obiter dicta of the judge as reported on this particular occasion. Even if the judge were firmly convinced as he was entitled to be, that Constable Robinson was genuinely in fear of his life and genuinely of the opinion that it was necessary for him to fire to the extent that he did including the final firing then, of course, he was entitled to reach the judgment which he did. But for a judge in that troubled province to have delivered that judgment including the obiter dicta which were in it, to commend Constable Robinson for his marksmanship and to use similar phrases, is to show a degree of insensitivity to the tragedy and the boiling crisis of Northern Ireland that really appals one.

It is not only these aspects that give rise for concern. The evidence which came forward in this trial must give us a great deal of concern on a number of counts. I would like to identify three elements here that are causes for grave concern. Firstly, something which was reflected in the actions of Constable Robinson was the nature of the training which he was given which caused him to act as he did, even if he were acting bona fide on this occasion. That is something that gives rise to grave concern. Secondly, the admission that there was an incursion into this jurisdiction which was concealed from superiors and done without the normal reference to the Garda in accordance with the routine that has been established when permission is sought for a temporary minor incursion. Thirdly, the question of the covering up and the continual change in the statements by Constable Robinson. These are all matters of grave concern. As Senator Eoin Ryan said, the perceptions which are so vital on occasions like this have been utterly violated. The evidence and the judgment and the whole course of this case have had the most serious effect on the alienation of the minority community. They must have confirmed many people in their alienation from the security forces and from the whole judicial system. It is not only the effects on the perception of the judicial system. It naturally has affected temporarily Anglo-Irish relations and must have had its effects on the relations between the Garda and the RUC in their common cause against terrorists.

We are dealing with a problem here that is faced by every civilised state in the world today since terrorism is a problem in practically every civilised state. The dilemma is how can one counteract the determined anonymous terrorist. To seek to counter these terrorists who flout both the moral and the civil law by the use of extra legal methods is the ultimate surrender to the terrorist. The terrorist seeks to destroy the fabric of society, but society will destroy its own fabric from within if it seeks a temporary advantage in going beyond the law. And if there have been actions — and the appearance would be that there have — in Northern Ireland in which the security forces have either been held or have held themselves to be above the law, then indeed we are getting into a condition where there is not much room for hope. I see this as a universal problem, and it is a problem that we must watch ourselves. We here are also subject to forces who do not keep within the law and we should be ready to look for any undue reaction which seeks to counter lawlessness by methods that themselves go beyond the law.

We must be concerned in reading the evidence of Constable Robinson's actions to ask ourselves do those in political authority realise the nature of the training of the members of the special anti-terrorist unit of which Constable Robinson was a member? Do they realise that apparently this training with its concentration, as Constable Robinson himself said, on aggression and on fire power, involves very little training in regard to what are the limits of adequate force in different situations? There is a grave responsibility on all of those in authority in this regard.

We must be concerned as well in regard to the revelation that there was an incursion into our territory. I am very glad that the Government reacted to this immediately, and there is no need for me to go over all that was contained in the statement made to Dáil Éireann on 10 April by the Taoiseach in this regard, but merely to mention some of the highlights. The Taoiseach expressed serious concern with the departure from the normal rules of inter-State conduct and indicated to the British Ambassador that it was harmful to the spirit and practice of security co-operation and damaging to Anglo-Irish relations. Indeed, all will be glad to note that the British Ambassador on that occasion expressed his Government's concern and formally conveyed its apologies. The Ambassador indicated then that it was and would continue to be RUC policy enshrined in explicit instructions that members of the RUC should not cross the Border while on duty.

There is a grave responsibility on the shoulders of those in authority in Northern Ireland at the highest level to ensure that those instructions are absolutely adhered to. I do not think that the discussions about to take place between the two Governments can possibly prosper unless it is made absolutely clear from the top down that such discussions cannot progress if in fact the integrity of this State is to be disregarded in this fashion in the future. We understand, of course, that there has been a decision to hold an inquiry into what happened on that occasion. We must await that inquiry when the facts will be known. I can only hope that when the facts are known as a result of that inquiry they are not going to make the matter worse. I would hope that the Taoiseach and the Government would continue to press for the results of that inquiry to be made known as speedily as possible and to continue to press for information already asked for in regard to the reasons why the Garda were not contacted on this particular occasion.

In regard to the question of the coverup, which was the third point which must be a matter of major concern, I think here again we have a serious situation. In order to cover either the incursion or the particular nature of the anti-terrorist operation a story was concocted in a case where there was an inquiry into how a killing had come about. I think we must reject the premature misguided proclamation of the Chief Constable of Northern Ireland that there is nothing of a criminal conspiracy in this, that this is normal police procedure. I would certainly hope that it is not normal police procedure in Northern Ireland, in the United Kingdom or in this State that, on the excuse of covering up the operational methods of combatting crime, people might be expected to enter into a conspiracy of lies in regard to the question of how the killing of an unarmed person came about.

We must read all of this case with very great misgiving. Of course, we should acknowledge the very fact that a prosecution was taken did at least give us the opportunity to know the worst here, did at least reveal not only the things which gave rise to concern but managed to uncover what had been sought to be covered up in a most unhealthy fashion.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Senator Dooge to conclude in one minute.

Professor Dooge

On the three elements of the nature of the training of members of the special anti-terrorist force, on the question of the incursion into this jurisdiction and on the question of the coverup, we have in all these three aspects a reflection about the nature of the reaction to terrorist operations in Northern Ireland that gives rise to anxiety, an anxiety which can only be deepened unless we receive very early assurances that these are not the norm or if they have been the norm are not to be the norm or the occasion of isolated instances in the future.

Mr. B. Ryan

It has not been part of my normal fashion to make speeches about Northern Ireland for various reasons, one, lack of expertise in the area that influenced me, also, a quite profound concern about the complexities of the problem and a long process of change in my own part over 14 years. In 1969 I, reflecting the traditions that we all had grown up in, marched in military formation at the funeral of a Provisional IRA member who had blown himself up in County Laois, as did many other people in those days when the IRA and military violence were seem to be a natural, understandable and, indeed, almost romantic part of the traditions of the country. Now I find myself unable ever to justify the use of violence. People ask me what happens, for instance, if the people of Nicaragua are invaded by a hostile power and I have to keep saying wherever the example arises that I will not tell other people what to do in the case of oppression, I do not believe I could ever justify to myself becoming involved in organised violence to achieve a political end, whether that be official or unofficial. I support a slogan that a pacifist movement in this country have always used "Do not join any army, legal or illegal." I do not mean to be offensive to people who are in the security forces in this or any other State but it is a position I have developed, very painfully, over 14 years of thinking and reflecting on the nature of political violence in this country. One of the few things on which I agree with Conor Cruise-O'Brien is that the whole history of the romanticisation of violence as the method by which this country achieved most of its progress could well be re-examined.

I often feel — and I said it before in this House — that those in our history who achieved very many great things for us are somehow lower in the pantheon of heroes for the fact that they did not use violence than those who, perhaps in a futile way on many occasions, rose up in the romantic Irish rebellions of this or other centuries. In that context I have been very slow to speak about Northern Ireland. On the other hand, some time ago in a debate on extradition in this House I said something about which I have had no reason to change my mind, that if I, in the pretentious way of politicians, claimed to have a noble or an overall objective in being involved in politics other than the fact that I happened to enjoy the process — as most of us do and probably one of the real motivations for us becoming and staying involved is that we actually enjoy it — in fact, I had a more altruistic motive. It was a certain commitment to those whom I felt to be the oppressed and downtrodden in our society, and in that context it could be difficult politically and in terms of striking romantic poses.

By any criterion the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland, particularly those of the urban working class of Belfast and Derry, must rank as perhaps the most oppressed minority in Irish society, outside some of the marginal groups such as travellers and the like. As well as the problems of mass unemployment, which has been, unfortunately, part of their tradition for 50 years, and appalling housing, they have for the last 14 years lived on the one hand with security forces who make them feel fundamentally and totally insecure, and on the other hand they have to live with people on their backs, who claim to be their protectors, who inflict yet further violence upon them. Yet it appears that we have now moved tragically from a position where the use of violence by certain groups in Northern Ireland was passively tolerated to the position where it appears to be almost actively encouraged and supported. The political process of this and its development is very complex. On one of my occasional, and not half as frequent as they should have been, visits to Belfast, I visited a social club in a part of Catholic West Belfast and heard words of a song: "Go to sleep my weary Provo, and don't you hear those bullets fly". We are reading then that in Northern Ireland there was no support for violence under any circumstances in tiny minorities, and yet at the word "bullets" all there rattled their glasses on the tables to do a very good imitation of what sounded to me like machine-gun fire rattling around this club, which was the social centre for a large section of the population in that area. In the middle of all this the British Army arrived to search the place and I, good Southern Nationalist that I was, was frightened out of my wits — because a good Northern Nationalist beside me turned around and said: "Ah, I see your friends have arrived" at which point I wanted to retreat quietly and carefully. In many ways I, as a Southern Nationalist, was almost as alien at that stage to those people in that area as were the forces of the British Government.

I would not claim to speak with the insight of people living in Northern Ireland, but it appears to me that that group in particular, as distinct from many other Catholic minorities who were living in rural areas or close to the Border, feel themselves entirely outside and alone, unsupported by either the British Government or any of the political organisations down here, and totally alienated from the political structures within their own community. As well as that they carry the burden of unemployment. Hence the conclusion that they represent possibly the most oppressed minority in the whole of these islands — not just in this country — because there is no political forum or structure within which their views can be heard.

That process, unfortunately, developed over the 14 years as we all tried to persuade ourselves that the problem was an unrepresentative minority using violence in a mindless way and that if we could come to grips with this 1 or 0.5 per cent of the people, we could come to grips with the problem of Northern Ireland and then reasonable people would surface once the problem of violence was out of the way and everyone would be reasonable to everyone else. We spent an enormous amount of time persuading ourselves to that effect. Only in the last couple of years has the reality begun to dawn on us that the problem is much more deep seated. For the Catholic people of Northern Ireland at least the security forces are seen almost as much as oppressors as anything else, and for people down here to talk about security co-operation, which may well be necessary, is to be seen by many people in Northern Ireland as effectively part of the British establishment. That may not be palatable down here; it may not be particularly acceptable, but it is the way we here are seen by many people in Northern Ireland today. One hopes that recent developments in the Forum will do something to remedy that situation.

I listened with great interest to Senator Dooge and there was much in what he said that I agree with, which may surprise him. Quite rightly he identified the fact that if the forces of any state anywhere are forced or allowed or demand the right to resort to tactics that in any way resemble the tactics of those they are fighting against or those they are attempting to deal with, then that is the ultimate victory for the terrorist. I quoted Terence McSwiney's words here on another occasion when a particularly appalling murder had taken place in Northern Ireland: "It is not those who can inflict the most, it is those who can endure the most, who will conquer." If we as a society are dealing with the problem of political violence, that problem must be analysed and dealt with in terms of our capacity to remain civilised in the face of whatever appalling violence is imposed on us. In this context we must examine the recent events in Northern Ireland. In some ways it is just as well that we had a few weeks of reflection about this, because many of us were extremely angry at the time and at least we have had time now to think about it further.

What has happened in Northern Ireland seems to have been an increasing commitment of powers to the security forces, largely done in a vacuum of political inactivity, and as one initiative after another has failed people are moving towards what they believe in a very cold, detached and quite ruthless way to be the only way to answer back, and that is by violence. That is quite frightening. On a recent "Today Tonight" programme on the killing of the young Catholic teacher and the attempt to assassinate her father, the judge, people who I presume were selected at random from the Catholic areas of Belfast were interviewed. Women when they were asked if they did not regret the death of this young girl effectively said no, that she was part of the system. I found it quite spine-chilling that ordinary Irish people could be so alienated, hostile and embittered and that the assassination of a girl of about 19 years of age who happened to be the daughter of somebody who happened to be a judge could be discussed in that manner by people who did not identify with any political organisation, who just happened to live in certain areas. That such a level of callousness, ruthlessness and alienation is being engendered is a fairly good indication of the scale of the problem which in many ways was crystallised in the recent judgment and the revelations that surfaced from it.

We must move now beyond condemnation of political violence — though probably, to our regret, we will have to revert to it again and again — and talk about responses to political violence and recognise that it is the product not of manipulation by evil men — though I accept that they are there — but of political failure by politicians North and South of the Border and by all of us. Senator Robb often talks about the need for repentance and in his generous way usually identifies the need for repentance by Northern Protestants in particular. There is a need for repentance by all of us because of our sins of omission and commission, not just in the last 14 years but in the last 60 years, which have culminated in the dreadful mess ahead of us. There are signs that we have begun to realise that a new, more complex, more difficult and in many ways quite traditional approach is necessary. The speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Drogheda, in which he clearly underlined his commitment to the welfare of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, followed a line that was not too fashionable in this country for a number of years because a very defective and slightly over-simplified analysis and an attempt to analyse the problem entirely within the context of Northern Ireland made it less than fashionable. However, we must go a great deal further if we are to do anything to deal with the frightening alienation of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, almost as much from what they would call the Free State as from the Government which has legal jurisdiction over them.

Within these 15 minutes I will not attempt to produce an analysis of the solution in Northern Ireland, other than to say that I wish that the process which has been initiated by the Forum can be successful. I regret that we will not get a chance to discuss that Report, but my political betters have their reasons for such things. In the context of what happened in Northern Ireland and since the details have been gone into over and over again, what troubles me is the fact that, because we have the same problem here and because the problem of political violence and of crime generally is beginning to frighten us, we may be tempted to move — at least to some extent — in the same direction as the people have moved in Northern Ireland. In a very significant speech about two years ago the present Garda Commissioner accepted the fact that in large areas of urban Ireland our own security force were now treated as an alien force and were not regarded as particularly friendly or supportive or part of that community.

I am not for a moment suggesting that the degree of alienation or the process of developing hostility is anywhere near as badly developed — if I may put it that way — in the South as it is in Northern Ireland, but once that process is begun it will take enormous effort, resources, commitment and generosity and a capacity to suffer from unacceptable levels of crime to prevent it becoming complete. When you add in to that process here the fact that, unlike most other countries of western Europe, we have, in our history, a tradition of violence which may or may not be too well romanticised but which is very real in our tradition, in the context of a society which is beginning to strain at the centre because of pressures, internal and external violence, unemployment and other things and of the progressive alienation of our police force, I worry that the people who will see themselves as being without hope, South or North of the Border, will respond yet again in the traditional Irish method of resorting to violence of one kind of another.

Senator Dooge said that to respond to violence in the tactics, or even anything that approaches the tactics of the terrorists is to give them the final victory and to create the conditions in which they can only create more and greater chaos.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

Senator Ryan has one minute to conclude.

Mr. B. Ryan

I have made the point I wish to make, that a total alienation of a large minority in Northern Ireland has been achieved. We are in danger of moving in the same direction here for reasons that are connected not entirely with Northern Ireland but which have a good deal to do with Northern Ireland and also with our own social and economic problems. We need to be careful to avoid simplistic solutions, legislative, judicial, economic or otherwise, which simply accelerate a process of alienation. For a long time we persuaded ourselves that it did not and would not happen in Northern Ireland. It has happened there. The signs are it is beginning to happen down here. We need to be extremely careful. This motion reflects concern for the implications for peace and stability in this country, not just in Northern Ireland. The implications are very clear-cut and very definite. I support the motion wholeheartedly.

An Leas-Chathaoirleach

We have now two minutes. Would the Leader of the House like to indicate to me what is happening?

Professor Dooge

It would be unfair to ask the proposer of the motion to speak for one minute now and then speak for 14 minutes the next day. I suggest that none of us looks at the clock until the proposer of the motion has concluded.

Mrs. Rogers

That is an Irish solution to a Northern problem. I was taking notes when people were speaking. I thank those who have contributed to the debate. I will make a few comments about what was said. I missed a little part of Senator Robb's contribution because I was called out to the telephone, but he made an important point about the emergency legislation in Northern Ireland and its misuse. It has been used not for the purpose for which it was introduced but for the purposes of gathering information, which means that hundreds of young people are arrested on many occasions. The alienating effect of that is a very important factor, which he mentioned. It brings to mind the point referred to in all the reports of the reviews of emergency legislation regarding the need for care in enforcing this emergency legislation. The question we need to ask ourselves is: when is an emergency an emergency? When we find that once every six months in Westminster the emergency legislation — with hardly a discussion — is rubber-stamped for the next six months — I think they are now considering doing it on a yearly basis — we realise that to deal with Northern Ireland by emergency legislation is to ignore the problem and, in fact, to compound it.

Senator Eoin Ryan made an important point when he acknowledged the danger of discussing a judgment or making any comment on a judgment without having been in the court and heard all the evidence. That is something about which I was very much aware myself. I agree wholly that justice must be seen to be done. Judging from the reports in the newspapers — the matter was fairly widely reported in the Northern papers — what is important in this area, and particularly in Northern Ireland, is very often not what has happened but the perception of what has happened. The perception in Northern Ireland in this instance was that justice had not been done. Whether it was or not is beside the point. The alienation, the frustration and the danger of that situation are quite clear. It must be seen that the law is impartial. Leaving aside the case, the indication from the statistics which I gave in my original speech is that the law is not impartially enforced in Northern Ireland. So long as that impression is the view of most of the Nationalist community then we are in a very dangerous situation indeed.

Another important point which I am glad Senator Ryan made is that he hoped the strong reaction to this particularly bad case would lead to an improvement. I would like to think that he is right and that we might see changes in the way the authorities deal with such cases in the future, although on the basis of my past experience I have concern about that.

Senator Dooge shared the disquiet of all of us about this case. Like the rest of the Senators, he was reluctant to comment — rightly so — on a judgment that was given, but he was quite right in pointing to the insensitivity of some of the comments of the judge, in particular the comments he singled out where the judge commended Constable Robinson for his marksmanship. That was certainly interpreted by one section of the community in Northern Ireland with a "hear, hear" and by the Nationalist section as meaning what I am quite certain the judge did not mean, that he was commending this man for what he had done. Of course that has implications for peace and stability.

Another important point was raised by Senator Dooge. The nature of the training being received by these special units of the RUC was disclosed during the trial. In relation to what I have already said about the need for acceptability of the security forces and the need for a police force which can have the confidence of all the people of Northern Ireland in the divided society we live in, it is absolutely essential that police should not be trained in the manner that those police were trained in carrying out police duties.

Senator Ryan talked about the need for a new approach. That sentiment was expressed by all of the speakers. One of the problems we have in Northern Ireland is that political violence has tended to take the centre stage. Not only the British Government but many people internationally think that the problem of Northern Ireland is one of political violence, particularly because of the violence of the Provisional IRA. The truth, of course, is that political violence is a symptom of the problem. The fact that the world spotlight has come in recent years on the violence has done a great disservice to all of the people of Northern Ireland, both Unionists and Nationalists, and to all the people of this island. It has deflected attention away from the real problem of the divided community, the divided loyalties and the different identities of the people which have not ever been accommodated within Northern Ireland.

It is good to note that the New Ireland Forum, at least, has now started a new initiative which will allow people to look at the real political problem — the underlying problem and not the symptom. I would hope, and the same hope was expressed by a number of Senators, that the New Ireland Forum would lead to new political initiatives being taken now that the ball has been started rolling, so to speak, by nationalist Ireland. It has to be congratulated for taking the initiative.

Over the years the problem has been that instead of dealing with the problem the British Government have tended to start off by bringing in emergency provisions. In 1973 we had an Act which was stiffened in 1975 by further provisions. Then we had an attempt to deal with what was called the terrorist problem by confessions extracted in Castlereagh and places like that. The Bennett Committee put an end to that for the time being, but there are worries at the moment that things may not be exactly as they should be. For a while it was stopped. Most of the convictions in the courts in Northern Ireland were gained on the basis of confessions. Then we have the Diplock courts where a judge sits without a jury. We had a further bending of the law when the supergrass system was introduced in order to gain convictions. In effect what happens is that the law gradually becomes more and more bent until eventually the law is brought totally into disrepute. Instead of dealing with the problem, that method of approaching it makes it much more difficult to resolve, because in the process you have further alienated those who were already alienated from the State anyway.

Therefore, after 15 years of dealing with the problem in that manner, with the honourable exception of one British Government at the time of Sunningdale, it is long past the time when the problem should be dealt with as it ought to be dealt with by firm political action and by a decisive response from the British Government when they have studied the Forum Report, a decisive action on a political level to deal with the complex political problem we face in Northern Ireland. If that is not done, I am afraid that the situation will continue to deteriorate.

I resent people who contend that in saying this we are riding on the backs of terrorists and so on. We are simply stating the truth and stating that if there is not a political solution, if accommodation is not to be found for both traditions in Northern Ireland, there is only one corollary. It is that the conflict will get worse and that the violence will increase.

All Senators would agree that the only way forward is by political means. The Forum has started that. It is now a matter for the British Government to respond. It is the hope of all of the Irish people, North and South, Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Nationalist and it is in their interest that this should happen.

Question put and agreed to.

Seanad Éireann debate - Wednesday, 9 May 1984