I move:
That Seanad Éireann welcomes the Report of the Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown, urges the widest possible debate on its recommendations and calls on the Government to consider the holding of a Referendum on Article 41.3.2º of the Constitution.
It has become customary in this House to discuss the reports of Joint Committees and to discuss them under the formula of a simple "take note" motion. In most cases the motion is formally moved either by myself or by the Deputy Leader of the House and the debate then initiated by a spokesman on behalf of the Government. In this case the subject matter is so important — and indeed the motion itself calls for the widest possible debate — that therefore it is appropriate that I should do more than merely formally propose a motion initiating debate. I do not intend to speak at any great length and we will be relying on those members of the Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown to make major contributions so that they can bring into the debate in this House many matters that are not part of the report and indeed are not available in the public domain. We have, of course, here the report of the Joint Committee as presented and also the evidence of various organisations. But one of the features of the work of this committee is the extraordinarily large number of personal submissions which were received by the committee. From my private conversations with members of that committee I think that many of them were certainly affected in their thinking on this problem by the realisation, through these personal submissions, of the widespread and intense nature of the problem on which they were reporting. I certainly would welcome the fullest possible contributions from the Members of this House who were members of the Joint Committee and who, as it were, represented the rest of us.
In the words of the motion, I think we should welcome this report. Having read through the report I think the Joint Committee really deserve our congratulations. Members of the House know that I was critical — at times I think I was petulant — in regard to the continual postponement of the submission date. But, that being over, the successive postponements eventually finished. There was a postponement for six months, then another for three months and then one for one month and two weeks. At least it was going down and we did get the report in the end.
We are indebted to the members of the committee. The whole Irish public are indebted to the members of the committee for the way in which they did stick to the task, got it done and gave us this report. We should express our indebtedness also to the Chairman of that committee, Deputy Willie O'Brien. I have known him for many, many years, long before we were colleagues in this House together — I met him first when I canvassed him for a Seanad vote about 24 years ago. I have always been impressed by the thoroughness with which he tackled anything he had to do and with the high degree of common sense which he showed in regard to his attitudes and opinions on a wide range of matters. He was a good choice for chairmanship of this committee, he has done a splendid job and this tribute should be paid to him here publicly in one of the Houses which caused this committee to be set up.
The report is, indeed, welcome. We have here a great deal of information, information that, of course, was available to the experts but available now in a succinct form for Members of this House and, above all, for members of the general public. Information with regard to the legal situation is here in easily acceptable, readable form. Information with regard to statistics is here — perhaps not quite so readable as the description of the legal position. We have in the report a reflection of the thinking of the committee on the various topics which came up. We have a summary of the views that were expressed in the evidence which was submitted to this committee and, in the end, we have a report which contains a balanced approach to this extremely difficult problem. That is the headline we should follow in our discussion of the report — to maintain a balance. We have here now a basis for a public debate. It is indicated in the motion that it is the view of the Government side of the House that this should be a full public debate. Thanks to this report it can be an informed public debate. We have now a factual basis on which to go in regard to this report.
Before going on to discuss briefly a number of topics that are raised for discussion, I would like to say something about the structure of the report. I do not know whether it is the academic in me, used to looking at theses and reports, but I always tend to look at the structure of a report. I think this report would be more readable if a little more care had been taken about its structure. When we look at the way in which the report is divided up into chapters we find, for example, that chapter 5 is three and a half pages in length and chapter 7 is 57½ pages in length. This interferes to some extent with the question of easy reading. Having read the first six chapters which vary in length — some are one and a half pages; perhaps that is not a fair one to take because that is merely the reference to the statistics and if the statistics had been taken from the appendix and put in, it would be very large — we are plunged into this very large chapter dealing with the question of legal remedies. The report would have been easier to read if that chapter had been broken up. It does, indeed, divide itself into three sections. It deals with the broad question of nullity; it deals with the question of separation and maintenance and it deals with the question of divorce. I say this not because I am looking for something to criticise about the report but I think it is only right when we receive a report from a Joint Committee that we should discuss matters like this as a guidance for other committees. I say this because it is very important that this report should be the basis for a full discussion and this will be true of many reports in the future. It is important that these reports be as readable as possible.
Going on to discuss the contents of the report, the chapter which contains substantial opinion and recommendation is chapter 3 which deals with the question of the protection of marriage and family life. There are recommendations here with which we can all agree. It is inevitable that the age for parental consent should be reduced from 21 to 18 following the reduction in the age of majority. The recommendation is also here that equally the age for marriage with consent should be raised from 16 to 18. Whereas before those under 16 had to receive the permission of the court to marry, permission is now required for those between 16 and 18. In my view, — and I am not an expert — these are reasonable proposals which should be supported.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 can really be taken together. They deal with different aspects of the question of marriage breakdown. Chapter 6 deals essentially with the statistics, chapter 4 with the nature of marriage breakdown and chapter 5 with the problems caused by it. The subject is well treated in this report. The personal misery which is now present in far too many cases, were this problem to be ignored, was reflected in the personal evidence. It is a weakness that the extent of human tragedy which exists is not directly reflected in the report. The members of the committee had the advantage of evidence of the extent of the personal misery which those of us who read the report do not have. In reading the report we should not forget this aspect.
If I were to go into this in detail there are some aspects in the report with which I might differ. I would like to draw attention to paragraph 4.3.10 which deals with the question of the effect of alcoholism and drunkenness in marriage breakdown. It appears that the committee attempted to say here that drunkenness and alcoholism do not always lead to marriage breakdown and when they do, they are not the single determining factor but in trying to emphasise that point they have gone a little too far the other way. Paragraph 4.3.10 states:
The view held by researchers is that excessive consumption of alcohol which results in abuse of this nature is not in itself a cause of marriage breakdown, but may conceal a failure in communication or may reveal a personality defect which, for any number of reasons, is only released through excessive consumption of alcohol.
I think the committee have gone too far in the other direction in that sentence. There is almost a suggestion there that this is a factor which is present but that marriage breakdown would occur even though there were not this factor. I find that very hard to accept from what I hear from social workers who are dealing with the problem of marriage breakdown. One hears from lawyers who are concerned with the final stages of dealing with this problem.
I find it hard to believe that if we could conquer the question of excessive drinking in this country — whether it is drinking under the compulsion of alcoholism or whether it is drinking for social reasons that interferes with home life — we would not reduce the degree of marriage breakdown. There is no doubt that we would reduce the degree of misery. I feel, this added factor in a number of cases is the factor that pushes marriage beyond the threshold to final collapse. I take mild issue with the way in which the Joint Committee have expressed their opinion in this regard.
Chapter 5 which deals with the consequences of marriage breakdown is well written. We must ponder on what is being said here. It deals not at great length, because that was not their function, but it deals in outline with the question of emotional, social, legal and economic consequences of marriage breakdown. In regard to statistics, we have them here but we also have the comment by the committee that we do not yet have sufficient statistics in order to work out exactly what our situation is. I concur completely with what the committee say in paragraph 6.4:
The committee is of the opinion that any future census should seek to ascertain precisely the incidence of marriage breaksown as manifested by separation or desertion.
I support this fully. Let us have an end to the pussy-footing nonsense that went on in regard to the interpretation and processing of recent census forms. What we find out may be unpalatable; on the other hand, things may not be as bad as we fear but let us know the truth; let us quantify the situation as we seek to deal with it. Nothing is gained at all by endeavouring to fudge these issues. There is enough conflict between civil and canon law. There is enough difficulty in determining what the status of people is: at least let our census be factual. We cannot prevent people using the results of that census to bolster their arguments in favour of their own position but let the argument not get into the holding of the census and the very recording of the position.
The great length of chapter 7 makes it difficult to read. My comments are first devoted to what I think of as chapter 7a which deals with the question of nullity and occupies pages 33 to 43. This is a good discussion. It is not the first discussion we have had in recent years. We had the report of the Attorney General in 1976. We had the report of the Law Reform Commission a few years ago. We have had judicial interpretation of the law in recent years but the result of all these recent developments over the last decade or so has been in the direction of further confusion rather than in the direction of clarification on this problem. The discussion in the report about the situation that has arisen is clear and the recommendations made are ones that could be followed. We are operating here under an 1870 statute. We have all of the problems created by difference in interpretation of nullity in ecclesiastical and in civil law. This must be cleared and I think the committee has pointed the way well.
In what I look on as chapter 7b, on separation and maintenance, which is a quite substantial section running from page 44 to page 70, the committee has brought forward good sensible views. On the question of judicial separation, they have recommended the abolition of the technical defences. The most interesting thing which the committee have said in this regard is in paragraph 7.3.8.2. These recurring decimal points indicate my earlier point about this chapter being too long. This particular point which occurs on pages 49 and 50 is in one of the most important paragraphs of the report. It is important not only in regard to the question of nullity but it also represents a very substantial contribution to the question of discussion of divorce as a remedy for irretrievable marriage breakdown. The committee in paragraph 7.3.8.2 give a list of circumstances which in their opinion constitute irretrievable breakdown of marriage. I commend the committee for having done this. There must have been a temptation not to deal with this issue but just to keep talking about the phrase "irretrievable breakdown of marriage". I commend the courage of the members of the committee, and I include all the members of the committee in this, in coming forward with this extremely important paragraph.
There is no need for me to read out the points. My point is not even whether I agree or disagree with them but about the central importance of this. It could be easy to overlook it even though there is a reference back to it. We have a group of Deputies and Senators who, over a period, dealt with this problem and came up with their definition of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This is important not only on the question of judicial separation but it is important also in regard to the ultimate debate about divorce.
I have a problem on paragraph 7.4.14. I would like to quote it and then I would like to ask the members of the committee would they tell me what it means. Paragraph 7.4.14 which starts at the bottom of page 55 which deals with defaulting on maintenance payments reads:
In the above matter, the Committee is conscious of the considerable time and expense involved for litigants in pursuing maintenance defaulters.
Here is what I find is the difficult part
and the need to balance this against the constitutional responsibility placed on the State to protect marriage and the family.
I do not see a strict logical connection between these two ideas. I may be missing something in my reading of that paragraph, but I certainly would be glad if some of the members of the committee were to enlighten me as to why there is an actual balance and why there is a conflict at this particular point.
In regard to the question of property, again the report emphasises the need for study here and for legislation. I am glad that they say we should not rush into legislation. It is an extremely difficult area. The pity is that the study that was called for earlier has not yet taken place so that we could proceed directly to legislation. As the committee indicates on page 64 of chapter 7, there should be no further delay in getting down to a thorough study of this particular problem. One trusts that there will be no further delay.
In regard to the question of barring orders, this, in my view, is an essential provision: the law for the protection of women in an impossible situation. It is still an extremely crude instrument. There has to be more thought about this subject. We started off, with the 1976 Act, with the basic idea that this was good, but there were many disadvantages. There was no power of arrest; there was no power of enforcement of the barring order. That was remedied in the 1981 Act, but the legislation is still crude. It is true to say that there are other orders which would have the same effect as a barring order which can be obtained where physical violence itself cannot be proved. This is an area in which the committee does not point the way as clearly for us as it does in other areas. Then we have chapter 7c which deals with the question of divorce and occupies about 20 pages of the report. Here, of course, the report points out there are a number of questions. There is the question of the constitutional ban on divorce and the question of the advisability of subsequent legislation and the form which such legislation might take. I have no doubts whatever on the question of the constitutional ban on divorce. Indeed, I am one of the political survivors of the 1967 informal committee on the constitution which commented in regard to this particular constitutional provision and I quote from the report of 1967:
It can be argued, therefore, that the existing constitutional provision is coercive in relation to all persons, Catholics and non-Catholics, whose religious rules do not absolutely prohibit divorce in all circumstances.
That is true of Catholics as well as non-Catholics because let us be absolutely clear on this, divorce is not something that is, under all circumstances, contrary to natural law. It is not something on which there is an absolute prohibition in all circumstances. I stand by what was said then and it is my opinion today. I do not defend, and would not seek to defend under the circumstances today, the particular solution that was put forward by the 1967 informal committee on the Constitution. The position in that committee was that if all its members were unanimous that fact was recorded. If they were not unanimous there was no majority or minority opinion recorded, merely a listing of arguments. At that time, even though I had the greatest reservations about the particular solution put forward, I thought it was important not to break the unanimity of the committee when the committee were unanimous that the constitutional prohibition should be removed. That was the important thing. There have been many changes since then in regard to public opinion but, unfortunately, there has not been a change in regard to this particular matter. It is true to say that people are more ready now to accept such a recommendation than they were then and I trust that it will not be long before the people are so ready for such a change that such a change can be made.
We must take a balanced view on this question. The committee have done a good job in dealing with the arguments for and against divorce. They have summarised them well. It is important for all of us, no matter what our personal view is, to consider the arguments that support the side which we advocate as well as the arguments in the other direction. At least we have advanced in this country to the situation where most of the public protagonists no longer believe that this is a black and white question. The critics of the proposal to remove the prohibition from the Constitution are making very different arguments today from what they made in 1967 when an all-party committee recommended its removal. The arguments which are being made, for example, by the Catholic Hierarchy, are being made on the basis of public order and on the basis of a balance between the remedying of a situation of human difficulty and misery and, on the other hand, what they see as the requirement of public order and of the social order. This is a very distinct advance. This is the way in which the debate should continue. I do not believe that divorce is an absolute right which an individual can claim or that it must be allowed automatically. My opinion is that, on balance, in the situation as we see it in this country, the possible dangers to the social order by the introduction of a very strictly limited law on divorce do not outweigh the benefits that would flow from such an action. I take that, not as a question of black and white, but as a reflection of my own personal opinion on where the balance lies.
The committee have done a good job in what they have said here. They have set out what would be the effect if we do nothing and what would be the effect if we change and again we must commend them for going forward and discussing the question of the nature of possible divorce legislation.
What they said in regard to what they consider to be the conditions for irretrievable breakdown becomes of great importance here. I am quite sure that this question is going to form a large part of this debate but I do not want to go into it in any further detail now. I want to emphasise that this is not the only thing in this report. I want to emphasise that to act on the question of divorce is not the only thing we can do to improve the lot of people who are in marital difficulty or whose marriages have seriously broken down. There are, indeed, a number of immediate steps which can be taken such as immediate steps in regard to the establishment of a proper mediation service and immediate steps in regard to the establishment of family courts which can act in an objective and consistent manner, which is not true of our courts at the moment. I am not trying to suggest that our courts are not objective; our courts are objective but they are not consistent. We have inconsistency here, because of the way in which marriage cases are dealt with. They are not dealt with by judges who have specialised in this area or by judges all of whose work is in this area. Consequently, there is, inevitably, a degree of inconsistency which, in an area like this, is most damaging. What is recommended in this report in chapter 8, in regard to mediation in particular, is welcome. I think the committee have argued well that there should be an independent mediation process. The arguments they have put forward here stand up.
In regard to the question of a family court the committee have set the scene well. I certainly advocate that there should be the fullest possible debate on the question of the removal of the prohibition in the Constitution and the possibility of divorce legislation. I stuck my neck out in 1967, when it was pretty lonely to do so, on this matter. I believe there must be the fullest possible debate. It would be a tragedy if we concentrated entirely on the question of the prohibition if we had a debate in regard to the question of divorce. In particular, it would be an appalling tragedy if there were a premature referendum in this country before a fully informed debate had taken place, and if such debate resulted in the retention of that particular prohibition for a long time to come, due to a referendum failure. All of these results could be tragedies. One of the worst things that we could do is to start a long discussion about divorce and think that that was the only possible remedy to the problem.
In this report there is the basic material for such a discussion on divorce, but there is much else besides. There is a great deal of good sense in regard to the question of mediation and in regard to the question of the manner in which the law could act. There is a great deal of sense in regard to the manner in which the law could be amended to improve the situation without going into the question of divorce. There are excellent discussions in regard to the longer term problems of education. They refer to the fact that part of education is education for living, not just education for getting a job. Education for the formation of personal relationships can be the foundation of a solid marriage. Let us take everything that is in this report. Let us not look at one chapter only, even if it is a very long one. We have here the material for going forward on a large number of fronts. For that we are indebted to the Joint Committee and for that I thank them.