I would like to thank Senator O'Brien for his appreciative comments and for his moving words which-will, I am sure, set the tone for this debate. He has reminded us of the appalling tragedies that have occurred and in particular of the litany of attacks on and murders of elected representatives that have occurred during the past 15 years. It is against that background that we have to debate and discuss the agreement that has been reached between the Governments of Ireland and Great Britain. I know the discussion in this House will follow the tone which Senator O'Brien has set.
Since the agreement was signed we have seen reactions from around the world, most of them overwhelmingly positive. Reaction in Ireland on the part of Nationalists has also been predominantly positive. I am glad that Nationalists in the North and in the South have scrupulously refrained from exaggeration of the content of the agreement. Those constitutional Nationalists who have expressed concern about aspects of the agreement have moreover done so in a restrained and relatively open-minded way.
Reaction from Unionists has been, on the whole, negative. This was to be expected. Unionists, like the Opposition in this State, were understandably concerned about the secret nature of the lengthy negotiations. Although it was necessary that they should be secret, it was perhaps unfortunate that they were so long. It is clear that it will take some time for Unionists to realise that the agreement does not threaten or diminish their rightful position, that it provides reassurances about their future which are significant and solid and that the agreement provides real benefits to Unionist interests as well as to the interests of Nationalists.
I am deeply concerned, of course, about the strength and tone of the reaction from the Unionist side. I regret to say that ordinary Unionists have been systematically misled by some of their leaders since Hillsborough. The agreement has been in some cases presented in a way which cannot be described as other than inflammatory. Misrepresentations have been expounded on public platforms, on television, on radio and in the press about the content of the agreement and about the commitment of this State to help to ensure the security of ordinary people in Northern Ireland.
Let me say in complete sincerity and with all of the authority at my command that this Anglo-Irish Agreement does not threaten the interests of the Unionist people. It does not weaken the commitment of the British Government in Northern Ireland; on the contrary, for the first time it removes uncertainty about the British position as it does about the Irish position. The agreement does not involve the Irish Government in the executive decision-making of Government in Northern Ireland. It creates a framework within which Nationalists can for the first time begin to identify but which does not itself involve the Irish Government in any system of dominion over Unionists.
What the agreement does is to recognise that there are two conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and that they must both be catered for in the structures and processes of Government. The agreement takes literally nothing away from the rights of Unionists: Northern Ireland continues to be governed, as Unionists still wish, by the British Government. What the agreement does is to add a significant Irish Government dimension to the present government of Northern Ireland. The British Prime Minister and I hope and believe that in making these arrangements we will, while taking nothing of any substance away from the existing legitimate rights of Unionists, add a dimension which will help to reconcile the minority and allow them for the first time to participate fully in the affairs of Northern Ireland without prejudice to their aspiration or indeed to our aspiration to Irish unity.
It is absurd and it is offensive to represent this State and our people — as we have been represented — as hostile to the interests, including the security interests, of the Unionist community. Only a day after these wild accusations were made in Belfast, an attempted prison escape in Portlaoise reminded the whole world of our commitment and effort to confront and deal with those whom the Unionist people rightly regard as their enemies, the Provisional IRA. Those foiled by our security forces in their attempts to escape were members of the Provisional IRA who had earlier been apprehended, charged, convicted and locked up by this State, most of them for offences in this State but some for offences in Northern Ireland and one indeed for an offence in Great Britain itself.
The agreement itself provides specifically for closer security co-operation. We are utterly committed to this co-operation. Our commitment is to protect every innocent Nationalist and Unionist man, woman and child in this island — without exception. While I can understand that Unionists might, in a moment of emotion and confusion, criticise the agreement for implications which they mistakenly read into it, it is not acceptable that our State and our security forces who have sacrificed life and limb in their opposition to subversives, should be so falsely and so unworthily traduced.
It was also distressing to hear long-serving politicians uttering words, only thinly qualified by circumlocution, which effectively threatened violence against innocent people in this State, innocent shoppers visiting the North and honourable public servants carrying out the tasks set for them by the British and Irish Governments. These words did not represent the decent man and woman of the Unionist tradition — of that I am absolutely certain. These words only demeaned those who uttered them.
In this part of Ireland the people, while they have consistently deplored the excesses of Unionism in the treatment of a minority, have always recognised and taken a vicarious pride in the great qualities of Northern Protestants — their loyalty, their probity, their humanity, their capacity for honest hard work. We do not regard Unionists as our enemies; we wish to regard them as our friends. As we have said repeatedly, we would reject with outrage any suggestion that we seek or have sought through this agreement anything for Nationalists beyond justice and equality.
At this point I want to make one thing absolutely clear. The agreement and the communique stand on their merits. There are no secret agreements and no hidden agendas. When we started this negotiation both sides insisted that this was the principle on which they were acting and both have fulfilled this understanding in complete good faith. Let there be no ambiguity on this crucial point. The transparency of the agreement is an essential prerequisite to its future acceptance by the parties most intimately affected.
Let me now add that both sides are determined that the agreement will work. That was demonstrated as clearly yesterday in the House of Commons as it was in the Dáil last week when we addressed ourselves to this accord. We will implement all parts of it wholeheartedly, we and the British Government. No one should imagine that we will do less.
Having expressed the just resentment which we feel against the groundless abuse hurled at us by some Unionist leaders, I want to ask ordinary Unionists to read this agreement, which has been published in Northern as well as Southern newspapers. They will see, if they read Article 1 in particular, that, while as Nationalists we retain our aspiration to Irish unity achieved by free consent and agreement, we repudiate formally, and do so now in an international agreement, any question of seeking the unity of this island otherwise than with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.
This is no longer just a unilateral commitment of a British Parliament which because of the nature of the British Constitution cannot bind its successors and cannot, therefore, offer a total re-assurance to Unionists who have feared that Northern Ireland might at some time be forced into a United Ireland against the will of a majority in that area. It is now a binding commitment in an international agreement. In time Unionists will see through the fog of confusion being generated around this agreement and will come to understand the value to them of what has been done. This is not merely an assurance of good intentions. It is a commitment that this State will not be a party to any attempt to constrain the people of Northern Ireland against the will of a majority to any change in the status of Northern Ireland. Unionists who, following the publication of the Forum report, criticised that report because the Forum did not acknowledge the current reality, which is that a majority in Northern Ireland are against change, should be reassured by the acceptance of that fact by our Government in the context of the re-affirmation of the principle of consent being required for any change in the status of Northern Ireland.
I want this message to get through. I want it to penetrate the emotion and the fear into which some political leaders in Northern Ireland have sought to plunge the Unionist population in the period before and immediately after the signature of this agreement. And to those Unionists who believe that we are seeking a role in Northern Ireland akin to that of a Trojan horse, I ask them to read those sections of this agreement, which have been included in it on the proposal of our Government, providing that, if devolved Government within Northern Ireland can be agreed upon, the Inter-Governmental Conference now being established shall no longer have any competence in those areas affected by devolution. I have been very struck in the week or so since the agreement was signed by the repeated expression of views by Unionists both publicly and privately that the agreement in some way is going to be inimical to devolution, that once it is signed and once we have a toe in the door we will not take it out, that once it is signed the SDLP will no longer have an incentive to participate in devolution. This is absolutely false. We have designed the agreement to provide an incentive to devolution. The SDLP, through its leader, John Hume, in the House of Commons yesterday, committed himself firmly to this. He held out to Unionists across the floor of the House of Commons the hand of friendship and offered to sit down with them and work out with them, now or at any time, how such devolution can be secured. The belief that in some way this agreement is an obstacle to devolution is absolutely false. It is designed to have the opposite effect and that commitment has been given by our Government and has been given by the Leader of the SDLP. That, too, needs to be made clear.
I want to say to the Unionists of Northern Ireland, as someone who has always been concerned for both communities in that part of the island, that what has motivated me, and our Government, most powerfully towards seeking and securing this agreement with the British Government has been the objective of ending the alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland. We have sought this for its own sake because that alienation reflects the effects of injustices, injustices over many decades, but also because, if that alienation can be ended, the terrorists of the IRA, who are the scourge of the minority population, the Nationalist population themselves, and who have also the objective to maim and murder members of the Unionist community in the hope of bludgeoning them into submission, will suffer such a profound rejection among the minority in Northern Ireland that those terrorists will no longer be able to continue their bloody campaign.
The Northern Ireland poll published in The Sunday Times of 24 November shows that whatever misgivings ordinary people may have about this agreement — and it is natural that they should have some misgivings — half of the Nationalist community and one-third of the population as a whole in Northern Ireland believe the agreement will draw support away from the men of violence. That is precisely the hope and belief the British Prime Minister and I want to give to ordinary people in Northern Ireland. I know we can build on this new hope and belief and can create a basis for political progress. The reaction, as I have learned of it, among the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland reflects already the kind of movement we have sought to induce. The reports we have had directly from people on the ground show that the Nationalists recognise the value of what is being done, that they wish to respond to it and, that just as we hoped would be the case, many people who have allowed themselves to be drawn to support Sinn Féin as a political party at election time have reconsidered their position. Many of them have come individually to members of the SDLP to say that they think this is a good agreement and that their support for Sinn Féin is something which they will now look at again. Already, the first effects of what we sought to achieve are being seen on the ground.
Through this agreement all the people of this island, together with the people of our neighbouring island, Britain, can join together, not merely to confront terrorism by measures of security — though this we shall do together by joint action of the most effective kind — but also, and in the long run perhaps more importantly, by undermining the very basis of support for these evil men who seek to destroy society in Northern Ireland. Their objective, as we in this State know well, is ultimately to destabilise our State also and to establish throughout this island the kind of reign of intimidation and terror which they have already brought to bear in many parts of Northern Ireland. We shall fight the battle against these terrorists to the utmost of our power, for ultimately our survival as a democracy is at stake as well as peace in Northern Ireland. In this we — and I believe in saying this I speak for all parties represented in the Oireachtas — make common cause with all the people of Northern Ireland of both communities who abhor violence and terrorism; and I ask them to make common cause with us.
The Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, led by John Hume, Seamus Mallon, Austin Currie, Eddie McGrady, Joe Hendron, Senator Brid Rogers and the rest of that courageous team, upon whom the survival of the democratic system in that part of our island has depended for so long, are now sustained by the knowledge that henceforth the Irish Government will be playing an effective role in removing the causes of Nationalist alienation, and will be playing that role not from a distance, but in Northern Ireland itself, in its capital city Belfast. The leaders of the Nationalist people in the North have given their wholehearted support to what we have done in negotiating and signing this agreement.
But they, and those whom they represent, are potentially at risk if this agreement is successfully misrepresented or widely misunderstood amongst the Unionist community, enabling evil men — and there are just as evil men in that community as in the IRA and INLA — to incite violence against the Nationalist minority in the weeks and months ahead. That is why we must try to convey our convictions, and our sincerity, to the Unionist people of Northern Ireland. That is why I have taken some of their leaders to task for their misrepresentations of this agreement.
The Government, together with the British Government, have sought painstakingly, employing every resource of knowledge and imagination they possess, to find the optimal way forward between the dangers that beset us on either side: the danger of Nationalist alienation overflowing into such widespread tolerance of or support for the IRA as to risk an escalation of violence by the terrorists of the persuasion; and the alternative risk of so destabilising the Unionist population as to create the danger of an escalation of violence by the other terrorists in the loyalist camp. I believe we have, together, come as near as is humanly possible to achieving the right balance at this time.
Before coming to the actual content of the agreement, let me now go back a few years to the origins of the process which culminated at Hillsborough on Friday week. I need not recount to this House the history of the years from 1969 onwards, filled with dramatic and tragic events. Let me start with the failure of the power-sharing experiment that was the product of the tripartite Conference at Sunningdale. The years that followed the destruction of that unique attempt to bring representatives of the two communities to work together in undertaking devolved executive functions in Northern Ireland, led to a vacuum. Repeated attempts were made by successive British Governments, almost half a dozen I think, to fill this vacuum, but all of them failed. And with each failure the alienation of the minority from the system of government of Northern Ireland intensified. Faced with the resolute refusal of the political representatives of the Unionist majority to contemplate any form of participation in executive power for the representatives of the minority, an increasing proportion of that minority began to despair of the constitutional process itself. And increasingly those who retained faith in constitutional politics looked towards this State to find some way to break this deadlock.
The Hillsborough Agreement rests on twin pillars — the maintenance of the aspiration to Irish unity, as a legitimate objective of Irish Nationalism on the one hand now recognised formally as such by the British Government in this binding agreement and the acceptance of the need for the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland for any change in the status of that area on the other, also recognised formally in this binding agreement. These pillars are the construction of successive Governments and not this Government alone, as we have made clear. Upon them we have built a firmer and wider stage on which political leaders in Northern Ireland will have a better chance to find agreement.
It was the clear view of this Government from the outset and is a view that I formed myself during 1982, that in the situation that had come into existence in Northern Ireland by the end of 1981 it would be impossible to end the alienation of the minority from the structures of Government and from the security and judicial systems, unless there existed within the structures of the Government of Northern Ireland a significant role for the Irish Government, towards which the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland look — just as the Unionist majority look to the Government of the United Kingdom.
It was in that conviction that I proposed the establishment of the Forum, a concept which indeed had been put forward by John Hume some months earlier at the end of 1981 in a slightly different form. It was on that basis the Forum was established. It was on that basis that the Forum worked and it was on the basis of the conclusions of the Forum, the principles set out in paragraph 5.2, that this agreement has been brought up. As I pointed out in the other House, and I shall not repeat it here, almost every word of those principles drawn up by the four Nationalist parties, set out in paragraph 5.2, are to be found in the preamble to the agreement. The preamble to the agreement is based most closely on those principles.
It says much for the combined wisdom and generosity of the four Nationalist parties, working together on the Forum that the principles they devised and which they proposed as the basis for progress — indeed the only actual proposals set out in that report, if the report is carefully read they can be seen quite clearly — have stood the test so well that a British Government have been able to agree with us on a binding international agreement, the preamble of which is based so completely and almost verbatim on the principles established by the four Nationalist parties. That achievement has been underestimated. I do not think people, even in our own country, yet recognise just how well the Forum worked and just how far we went towards redefining the objectives of Irish Nationalism and the means of achieving them in a manner that made progress possible, whereas up to that time, because we had not thought through our position, we had not created a basis upon which it was possible for an agreement to be made so that progress might be achieved in bringing the minority in Northern Ireland into the system from which they have been alienated for the last 65 years.
I believe the debate which has so far taken place inside and outside the Dáil has shown that people, especially young people, are impatient with legalistic arguments that are strained beyond anything that could be regarded as sensible and which ignore the practical need to bring improvements in the lot of all the people of Northern Ireland. Yet, I want to make it clear that the Government have been authoritatively advised that Article 1 of the agreement is entirely constitutional, and of course it goes without saying that the Government would not otherwise have entered into this agreement.
We are dealing, and we have to deal, with the facts, the fact is that no sane person would wish to attempt to change the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of its people. That would be a recipe for disaster and could, I believe, lead only to a civil war that would be destructive of the life of people throughout our island. All parties in the Dáil and Seanad repudiate violence, or the threat of violence, as a means of attaining our national aspiration. Nonetheless, the value of this affirmation in this agreement, as approved by the Dáil and by the Westminister Parliament as it will, I believe, today, and then ratified, is not to be underestimated as an eventual stabilising factor in the Northern Ireland situation, whatever may be the turbulence that exists at present in one of the communities there on this subject.
This affirmation involves no diminution of the Nationalist aspiration, which has indeed, as I shall have occasion to point out later, been incorporated specifically in the third paragraph of the preamble to this agreement, and has been given formal recognition there by the Government of the United Kingdom. For our aspiration to the political unity of this island is, as a matter of political and moral principle, conditional on the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. We do not, and could not, seek to attain this aspiration against the wishes of a majority of the people of that part of our island, as was recognised by Deputy Haughey and his Government in May 1980.
But while this provision in the agreement diminishes in no way the Nationalist aspiration to unity, and, of its very nature cannot affect our Constitutional position, the third clause of Article 1 of the agreement advances that aspiration significantly. For in that clause, the British Government, as well as the Irish Government, declare that if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland they will introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish. I would refer Senators to the words used by the British Prime Minister on this point in the House of Commons yesterday, which were significant in their formulation. The commitment in this clause to introduce such legislation is the first clear affirmation in any binding Anglo-Irish Agreement since 1921 that Britain has no interest in the continuing division of this island and that its presence in this island, undertaking the responsibility of government in Northern Ireland, continues solely because this is the wish of a majority of the people of that area, and will not continue beyond the point where that consent is changed into consent to Irish unity.
A major part of the negotiations with the British Government was devoted to the result contained in Article 2 (b) of the agreement in which the British Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference, in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. The British Government agree moreover that, in the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The range of issues that are within the field of activity of the Conference are described in the communiqué as political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural, namely most of the matters in respect of which the public authorities of a State exercise responsibility.
When the new Inter-governmental Conference meets at ministerial level, as it will soon do, it will be presided over by an Irish Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative, and by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Senators will be aware of the decision to designate the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Peter Barry, as the first Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and Joint Chairman.
Senators will also be aware that within the framework of this Conference other Irish or British Ministers may hold or attend meetings as appropriate; that when legal matters arise for consideration, the Attorneys General may attend; and that Ministers may be accompanied by their officials and their professional advisers so that, for example, when questions of economic or social policy or co-operation are being discussed, Ministers may be accompanied by officials of the relevant Departments, or when questions of security policy or security co-operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. And the Conference will, of course, be serviced on a continuing basis by a secretariat to be established by the two Governments, in Belfast, where the Conference itself will normally meet.
The terms of reference of this Conference, as set out in Article 4 of the agreement are that is shall be a framework within which the two Governments work together for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland, and for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism, and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation. Those terms of reference represent a noble aspiration. The objectives are ones to which all civilised people can give their adherence. The importance of this Conference can be seen from the fact that those are its terms of reference.
The responsibilities of the Conference will extend to the whole range of matters mentioned earlier. Both Governments support the policy of devolution of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community, namely on a basis of power-sharing or participation at executive level. To the extent that devolution on this basis proves practicable, and I hope and believe it will, the Conference will obviously not have to concern itself with these matters. But should it prove impossible to achieve devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, or if devolution once achieved is not sustained, the Conference will be, or will once again become, a framework within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues which are within the purview of the Northern Ireland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
We strongly hope that devolution will be achieved on a basis of widespread acceptance across the two communities. If it is achieved, we will gladly withdraw from the devolved areas. It is important to understand, however, that even in the event of devolution the Conference will still be concerned with issues of particular interest and sensitivity to the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. These include measures to recognise and to accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions, including measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, measures to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of a bill of rights in some form in Northern Ireland. It will consider the security situation in Northern Ireland, both addressing policy issues, and considering serious incidents and forthcoming events, including parades and marches. It will also be concerned with the relations between the security forces and the community, establishing a programme of special measures to improve these relations, with the object, in particular, of making the security forces more readily acceptable to the Nationalist community.
The communiqué issued at Hillsborough makes clear that at its very first meeting the Conference will be considering the application of the principle that the armed forces, which include the Ulster Defence Regiment, operate only in support of the civil power, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community. The Conference will also at this first meeting consider ways of underlining the policy that the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the armed forces in Northern Ireland, discharge their duties even-handedly, and with equal respect for the Unionist and Nationalist identities and traditions which are now given equal value and to both of which equally the institutions, including the security forces in Northern Ireland, must apply themselves.
Moreover, the Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons, as well as individual cases involving prisoners, so that information can be provided or inquiries instituted.
All these matters, together with the possible harmonisation of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively and measures to give substantial expression to the aim of ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences, will be the responsibility of the Conference, and will under the terms of this agreement remain so, even in the event of devolution.
At its first meeting, the Conference will also consider its future programme of work in all the fields — political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural — assigned to it under the agreement. It will concentrate at its initial meetings, both on ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments, and on relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland, as well as seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The communiqué adds that in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland, the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters, and against this background I have said that it is the intention of my Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
Other matters covered by the agreement include the functions of our Government with regard to putting forward views and proposals on the role and composition of a number of bodies in Northern Ireland, including the Police Authority for Northern Ireland, the Police Complaints Board, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Fair Employment Agency and the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights.
Also included is the whole area ot cross-Border co-operation, not merely in relation to security, but also in relation to promoting the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years. Provision is made for the two Governments to consider the possibility of securing international support for this work, and this aspect of the agreement has already attracted interest and a promise of tangible support from the Government and Congress of the United States. Other indications of similar interest have come from a number of other Governments in Europe — both in the community and elsewhere in western Europe — and from other countries overseas.
There are two other matters to which I must refer before concluding this analysis of the agreement. These are the provision for a review by the two Governments of the working of the Conference at the end of three years, or earlier if requested by either Government, to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable, and the indication, for the first time, of a readiness by both Governments to lend support to an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body of the kind referred to in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981. This last matter is, or course, one for this House itself, and Dáil Éireann, to consider. There is evidence already from the debate in the British House of Commons that there is a will to give consideration to it in that body as I am sure also in the House of Lords.
There are indications of widespread support in the British Parliament for the establishment of such a body and there have been for some time past. They found vocal expression yesterday and I am sure the same will be true today. I would hope that in the period ahead our two Parliaments can agree on such an initiative, which I believe will be a constructive development for it will give to the Opposition parties and to parties in Northern Ireland, in addition to the two Governments, a role with respect to the whole range of Anglo-Irish relations, including naturally those to which I have just been referring.
I should tell the Seanad that this agreement will enter into force on the date on which the two Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance of this agreement, which will follow shortly after the approval of this agreement here and at Westminster, where the agreement is now being debated, a debate which will conclude today. Like all international agreements this one, must, of course, be registered with the United Nations under the mandatory requirement of Article 102 of the charter of that body.
This agreement is not an end in itself. It is a framework for progress, which must be worked with understanding and goodwill by all parties to it, if we are to achieve the results of which it is capable, namely, an end to the alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland from the processes of government, and progress towards peace, stability and reconciliation between the two communities in this island which have been for so long so bitterly divided. I have no illusions, and would not wish by any word of mine, or by omission, to convey that I have any illusions about the difficulties that this will entail. In many ways this agreement represents not so much the culmination of a process of intricate and complex negotiation — although it is that, of course — as the beginning of a difficult, and — let us face it — even dangerous, process of implementation.
Quite apart from the normal hazards that such a process will inevitably face, given the room for legitimate divergences of views on how various issues and problems should be handled, there may well be deliberate attempts to contrive situations that will test the capacity and the will of the two Governments to agree on how contentious matters should be dealt with. We have seen signs of these attempts. It will require not merely good faith, which I believe exists on both sides, but good judgment and good luck to withstand the pressures to which this process will be subjected. I can understand that some people including Senator Robinson have doubts about this difficult enterprise and where these doubts — clearly true in her case — are genuinely felt they must be respected by us all. But so much hangs on the joint ability of the two Governments to resolve these issues that, with God's help, we must, I believe surmount all these obstacles.
Before I conclude, I would like to say something about the roots of the problem this agreement has set out to treat. In somewhat different ways, members of both communities in Northern Ireland, whose memories go back beyond the beginning of the present cycle of violence, have suffered over many decades from the situation in which they found themselves following the events of 65 years ago.
Northern Nationalists from 1920 onwards found themselves part of a State with which they could not identify and the institutions of which were alien to them and appeared in many ways to be designed to make them strangers in their own land — in the island in which their ancestors had lived for several millenia. Nationalists suffered from a sense of second-class citizenship, and were discriminated against in housing and employment, in ways that drove many of them to withold their allegiance from the system of government and others to emigrate, who might, in different and more equitable circumstances, have been able to remain in their own land.
But Unionists suffered also albeit in a different way. Of course, for half a century they controlled the levers of power, and those levers were moved so as to ensure for that community a dominant position in the society of Northern Ireland. That this happened reflected however — and we must have sufficient insight to understand this — a sense of fear leading to a siege mentality, arising from finding themselves in a corner of an island in the greater part of which the Nationalist population, after centuries of subordination to external rule, were at last accorded the power to which their numbers were entitled. In a sense, unlike many people in this part of Ireland, the Unionist population of Northern Ireland never really accepted psychologically the division of this island; they never felt secure about this division, or accepted in their heart of hearts that it afforded them the protection which they felt they needed against an ethos which to them was alien, and appeared threatening.
These fears diminished them; it led them into ways of thinking and of acting, that did less than justice to the fundamental generosity of spirit which they share with those on this island who belong to the other, Nationalist, tradition.
These are the facts. It is our task, and we now have an opportunity to undertake it, to attempt to heal these divisions, to remove the alienation of one community, and to still the fears of the other. This is an opportunity we should grasp. Towards that end I believe that we must tackle aspects of our constitutional laws which represent an impediment to the establishment here of a pluralist society upon which basis alone we can credibly propose to Northern Unionists in time a coming together in peace and by agreement and free consent of the two parts of Ireland. I shall have occasion to return to this matter again. It is one on which I have already in October 1981 presented my views to this House. It is in this spirit that I commend the Hillsborough Agreement to the Seanad.
