We have had a wide ranging debate on this motion and it would be quite impossible for me to say all I wish to say on the matter within the compass of some 30 minutes. Accordingly I think, as the Leader of one of the groups in the Seanad, speaking at the half way point in this debate which is being scheduled to stretch up to 25 hours if necessary, I should in my contribution meet the more serious arguments that have been made against the motion and for the amendment which is before the House.
In a thoughtful contribution at the close of the first day's discussion, Senator Smith suggested that those who wish to criticise the amendment should read it carefully. I want to assure Senator Smith that I have read the amendment very carefully and I have read it so carefully that it is quite clear to me there is a superfluous three letter word in this amendment which makes it gramatically incorrect. But we are not concerned with niceties of grammar. We are concerned with what this amendment means, and when Senator Smith went on to talk about what the amendment meant, he did not refer at all to the first line of the amendment. The first line of the amendment is equally important, if not more important, than what follows, because the first line says delete all words after "Seanad Éireann".' What are the words that occur in the motion after "Seanad Éireann"? "That Seanad Éireann welcomes the Agreement." The amendment says delete "welcome". The amendment says refuse a welcome to this agreement, and that is what anybody who votes for the amendment is voting for. The motion goes on to call on all persons of goodwill to work for the success of this initiative. Though Senator Smith went on to suggest to wish the agreement well and to hope that good would come of it, anyone who votes for this amendment is voting to refuse to join in the call to persons of goodwill to work for the success of this initiative.
We should be clear exactly what is the net point in this debate. To vote for the amendment — and perhaps to go even further and, the amendment having been lost, to vote against the substantive motion — is to clearly refuse — if Senator Stanford were here he would now correct me on that split infinitive — I should say clearly to refuse a welcome to the Hillsborouigh Agreement and to refuse to join in a call to all persons of goodwill, North and South, to work for its success. That was the issue that was faced courageously in this House yesterday by Senator Eoin Ryan, who over a period of almost 30 years has contributed so much to this House. That is the issue that must be faced by every Senator when we come to vote this evening.
I want to deal with some of the points that have arisen during this debate. I have chosen three points and I want to concentrate on these. The first is a point made by several speakers from the Opposition benches, notably made at some length by Senator Martin O'Toole, that this agreement is a substantial departure from what was in the Forum report. I want to argue that it is a culmination of the Forum process and its language is very close to that of the Forum report. Senator Lanigan and other Senators argued that this agreement is inconsistent with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution and I propose to argue and to quote authority to the effect that it is nothing of the sort. The third point that I would like to deal with is the point which was raised by Senator Mary Robinson from the Opposition benches that in looking at this agreement we must accept the reality and the dangers of a substantial Unionist alienation. First, I want to emphasise that this agreement is the culmination of one process and the start of another and a more formal process. The recovery from the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement has been slow; but in the past few years, even though there has been a wavering from time to time, the progress has been sure. There were between 1974 and 1983 initiatives of a minor nature both in Northern Ireland and here in our own State, but none of these gathered momentum. In 1983 we had the establishment of the Forum and in 1984 we had the Forum report. It has been said — and was said in this House when we debated the Forum report in September 1984 — that the response of the United Kingdom to that report was entirely a negative one. I argued in that debate of September 1984 that this was not so — that notably the response of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Jim Prior, in the debate in the House of Commons was one that showed a possibility of progress. I want to re-emphasise that point today. In that response, which was the first response of the United Kingdom to the Forum report, in the debate of the House of Commons on 2 July 1984, Jim Prior made a number of important points. The first point he made is one that is just as relevant today when we judge the Hillsborough Agreement as it was at that time. I would like to quote from what he said. In column 25 of the Hansard report of the House of Commons of 2 July 1984, Jim Prior stated in his speech:
The dangers for the people of Northern Ireland of sitting back and doing nothing are greater than the obvious risk of seeking to make some political advance.
That was the immediate response of the members of the British Cabinet responsible for Northern Ireland. It was not a response that said there is no risk in going ahead. It was a response that said the risk must be taken, and what as happened since then is that that conviction of Jim Prior's in July 1984 has since been shared by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
I was a member of the Forum delegation that visited London in order to talk to the members of the various British political parties and I came back from those discussions rather despondent because there was not among any group of any of those parties a sense of urgency in regard to Northern Ireland. There was not among these people at Westminister — the small number who took an interest in the problem of Northern Ireland — any appreciation of what might happen if things just went bumbling on. This has changed. This has changed over the past two years, and it changed as a result of the Forum process that was initiated by the Nationalist parties.
It is always a nice thing in a debate on Irish political issues of great magnitude which have constitutional implications to find a suitable quotation from Edmund Burke. Edmund Burke has something to say to us on this issue. It is something we should remember. Burke said that "nobody made a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could only do a little". That is what the Hillsborough Agreement is saying to the people of this State, to the people of the United Kingdom and to the people of Northern Ireland. It is better to do a little than to do nothing at all. There are risks in what is being done. This was emphasised by Senator McGonagle yesterday. That has been clearly recognised by our Government and clearly recognised by the Government of the United Kingdom.
There are risks. There is no notion in the minds of either the Irish or the United Kingdom Government that the peace and stability which is aimed at in this agreement is something that is going to come tomorrow, is something that is going to come in the short term. Again, I would like to quote what Jim Prior said in that July 1984 speech; I am quoting from column 23 of the same Hansard report. He said
At one time, I felt that a major, strong and effective political response would in itself prevent terror. Now I am of the belief that in the short run political progress may increase terrorism, for a short time before things improve.
That is one of the risks that has been consciously taken by the United Kingdom Government and by our own Government. Both Governments and the people in both countries must face realities on this issue.
I now want to come to my second point which is that this agreement is not a departure from the Forum process. It is the culmination of the Forum process. It is easy to look through the Forum report; it is easy to look for the passages that suit a particular purpose but in particular for those people on the ground in Northern Ireland, Unionists and Protestants who looked at the Forum report, they above all were able to appreciate that the heart of the Forum report was in Chapter 5 entitled "Framework For a New Ireland. Present Realities and Future Requirements". That is what the Hillsborough Agreement is all about, facing present realities and attempting to meet future requirements. Paragraph 5.1 of the Forum report deals with the major realities that were identified by the four Nationalist parties sitting in the Forum. Paragraph 5.2 deals with the necessary elements of a framework within which a new Ireland could emerge. Jim Prior also acknowledged these realities in his speech to which I have alluded and he produced a list of realities of his own, of five realities in regard to Northern Ireland.
What we have seen now in the Hillsborough Agreement is the synthesis of the realities listed in the Forum report and the realities in that initial response on behalf of the United Kingdom Government. The seven major necessary elements for the emergence of a new Ireland listed in paragraph 5.2 of the Forum report and the five major realities listed by Jim Prior in July 1984 are clearly and unambiguously reflected in the preamble and in Articles 1 and 4 of the Hillsborough Agreement.
Because of the limitation of time it is not possible for me to point out in detail the extent to which the language of the Hillsborough Agreement reflects the language on reality of the Forum report. For the benefit of anyone who has difficulty tracing it, I will list the concordance between the two. Paragraph 1 of the Preamble of the Hillsborough Agreement is strikingly similar in language to paragraph 5.1 (7) of the Forum report. Paragraph 2 of the Hillsborough Agreement parallels 5.2 (1) of the Forum report; paragraph 3 of the Hillsborough Agreement parallels 5.2 (4) of the Forum report; paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Hillsborough Agreement is close in language to paragraph 5.2 (2) of the Forum report and is also one of the five principles which Jim Prior mentioned. Paragraph 5 of the Preamble reflects wording which is part of paragraph 5.2 (4) of the Forum report and paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Hillsborough Agreement reflects language from that same paragraph. Paragraph 7 of the Hillsborough Agreement is extremely close to paragraphs 5.2 (5), 5.2 (6) and 5.2 (7) of the Forum report. If I had time I could point out how close these similarities are. When we go on further through the Hillsborough Agreement we find the working out of these realities and requirements.
I come now to the argument that the constitutional position of this country has been changed or will be changed in some sense by this agreement. Again I ask people to look at what is in the agreement and perhaps even to look at what is in the Constitution. Because of the time limit I can only make a few points. I am asking people to look at the contents of the Constitution listed on page V of the official edition. In this list there is a grouping under headings. Articles 1, 2 and 3 are grouped under the heading of "the Nation", Articles 4 to 11 are grouped under the heading of "the State". Our Constitution distinguishes between the Nation and the State. That distinction is part of this basic fundamental law; it is in the constitution itself. Is is not merely a semantic idea — we have judgments of our Supreme Court which stress the distinction. I will refer only to one judgment of 6 May 1976 in relation to the reference to the Supreme Court of the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Bill. The unanimous judgment states on page 14:
It is true that the Constitution is a legal document but it is a fundamental one which establishes the State and it expresses not only legal norms but basic doctrines of political and social theory.
Page 15 states in regard to Article 2 of the Constitution:
This national claim to unity exists not in the legal but in the political order and is one of the rights which are envisaged in Art. 2 and is expressly saved by Art. 3.
Finally on this point I would like to quote from one of our most eminent constitutional lawyers, Mr. Justice Donal Barrington, at one time a candidate for Seanad Éireann and in that instance not aligned with my particular political persuasion. In a de Brún Memorial Lecture at University College, Galway in 1981, Justice Barrington dealt with the question of whether there was any semblance of truth in the argument that the provisional IRA could derive a mandate from Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. In that respect I will quote directly from this lecture. The quotation is most easily accessible in the Forum report, on page 19 "The Legal Systems, North and South". This lecture was given in 1981 after the Supreme Court judgment. I quote from Mr. Justice Barrington:
Whatever political doctrine is stated in Article 2 the State established by the Constitution is pledged to respect for international obligations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Article 3 accordingly prohibits it from attempting to legislate for Northern Ireland.
I continue to quote his exact words:
The implication is that the State, with whatever political reservations, accepts the Border between North and South in law and in fact until such time as a peaceful solution can be found to the problem.
There is one of our more eminent constitutional lawyers saying that the question of the Border is not a question to be copperfastened in the Hillsborough Agreement; it is something accepted in law and in fact since 1937. Let us be quite clear. If we want to talk about constitutional matters, let us talk about them in terms that are real. Let us listen to those who have studied them, those who are the experts on this point. That is why Senator Eoin Ryan was able to come in yesterday evening and say there is nothing against the Constitution in this agreement.
I ask you, on this point, to look at what was the great lost opportunity of 1967 when an all-party informal committee was able to come together, and when we had unanimous agreement and I would like to quote from the December 1967 Report of the Committee on the Constitution:
We have given careful consideration to the wording of this provision. We feel that it would now be appropriate to adopt a new provision to replace Article 3. The wording which we would suggest is as follows:
The Irish Nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be reunited in harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen.
That was not an abandonment of the national tradition. That committee sat under the late George Colley whose credentials as a Nationalist were never doubted. A member of that committee was Seán Lemass whose credentials as a Nationalist were never doubted but who indeed was one of the great realists of Irish politics. That was assented to by Deputy Denis Jones, no longer in public life but still, happily, alive, and anyone who knew him knew his devotion to our Irish heritage. That was assented to by the late Deputy Seán Dunne who managed to acquire a most excellent knowledge of language because he was imprisoned in the Curragh Camp as an extreme Republican during the war years.
This was not an abandonment of Irish nationality. It was an attempt to make it absolutely clear beyond any doubt that Articles 2 and 3 were not a claim but only an aspiration. Of course we can say it is only an aspiration but the Unionists in Ireland do not believe us. The problem is that the Unionists of Ireland do not believe it. We would have had a far greater chance of convincing them if there had been action on that 1967 report.
The final point I want to touch on is the very real problem of Unionist alienation. Senator Robinson posed the question at the end of her contribution yesterday: are we to attempt to alleviate the very real alienation of the minority in Northern Ireland at the cost of a similar alienation of the Unionists? This is a problem that must be faced and is faced in the motion before you. If you look at the wording of the motion you will see that it calls on all persons of goodwill to work for the success of this initiative. That word "work" is not accidental. We are being called on to work. At the moment we are just being called on to talk here and talk is necessary as an initial response, but what is necessary over the very long haul that is coming is work, hard work, self discipline and a continual sensitivity to the problem.
I have not got much time to develop this point but I want to say that I think it is one of the more serious points that we have to consider. We have seen in the newspapers statements from Unionists saying that this is worse than Sunningdale, that they supported Sunningdale, but they cannot support this agreement. Can they not read the Hillsborough Agreement and see that the road to Sunningdale is now open under Article 4 of this agreement? Devolution on the Sunningdale basis is possible under the Hillsborough Agreement. If these people are not merely talking, if they really were prepared to accept Sunningdale then let them accept this agreement; let them work under Article 4 for devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis acceptable to both communities.
We need a real commitment to work for the success of this initiative. What have we got to do? We have got to read the Hillsborough Agreement. We have got to read our own Constitution and settle our doubts about that particular problem. We have to try to understand. I said it is hard work. Here is some homework that I think we should do. Here in my hand are the three reports from the Devolution Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly. How many members of the Oireachtas have read these three reports? How many have read anything other than the newspaper account of the Catherwood report which is an annex to the third report.
There is indeed hard and unwelcome work to be done. Senator Michael D. Higgins referred to an article in the Financial Times of 20 November by Kevin Boyle and Tom Hefferan, two lawyers, one from University College Galway and one from the Queen's University of Belfast. They have a good deal to say about acceptability. What we have to do in this State is not to talk about conciliation but to practice it. Words are cheap.
I suppose it is inevitable that when talking about Northern Ireland all sorts of religious connotations come into mind. When I say we should practice conciliation and not talk about it, I am reminded of the words of a devotional work of some centuries ago the "Imitation of Christ", which is usually attributed to Thomas á Kempis. There is a phase in that that always stuck in mind: "I would rather feel compunction than know its definition". This is what we must concentrate on. We must concentrate on these issues by practice rather than preaching.
While I am in the quotation frame of mind I want to quote again from Joseph Addison. He may be an unusual author to quote from on such a matter. I want to quote from him in order to emphasise that the success of this initiative is not inevitable, that success will not be easy and certainly far from automatic. In his play on Cato, Addison included the lines:
"Tis not in mortals to command success but we'll do more, Sempronius, we'll deserve it."
That is the challenge to the people of this State. If we act so that we deserve success with the Hillsborough Agreement, then there is a chance of success but not otherwise. I have attempted to show by what I have said that there is no real substance in the objection to this agreement on Constitutional grounds, and that there is no substance in the argument that it is a departure from the Forum process. If I had more time I would have liked to develop the argument that there is no prospect of success in seeking to advance along the line suggested in the final paragraph of the amendment.
I want to stress what the motion says. It asks that the agreement be welcomed. It asks everyone of goodwill to work for it. I want to stress once again that anyone who votes against this motion votes against welcoming the agreement and votes against calling on people of goodwill to work for its success. I hope that the majority of the Members of this House will vote overwhelmingly to reject the amendment and the amendment, having been rejected, I sincerely hope that nobody, not even one Senator, would then vote against the substantive motion.