Making statements on the role of the Seanad enables us to take a cold, hard look at ourselves having regard to the Seanad's present day requirements as a legislative body. We must also take into account the public perception of the Seanad as expressed by some journalists through the media.
First, we must admit that there are difficulties with the way the Seanad performs. Inevitably, these statements will be viewed as a speculative investigation of the potential of the second Chamber. That is the idea behind this and I trust our statements will give an insight into how we perform, having regard to the restrictions we experience through no fault of our own and the limits we impose on ourselves, possibly through lack of change. The purpose of our statements should be to understand better the nature of impediments, delays, obstructions and obstacles that have penetrated the functions of the Seanad and which have had a harmful effect on its main purposes of scrutiny and control of legislation. It is important that Members of this House conscientiously use these powers and do not rubber stamp legislation. The Seanad could make its contribution more meaningful by having its own approach to procedures which highlight its constitutional intention. There is no reason a committee could not examine the constitutional parameters within which this House operates.
Second, we must clearly and openly state what the difficulties are, where they lie, how they arose and where the blame lies for the diminution of our purpose and role. It is incumbent on us to ensure that our collective statements show the public that we are conscious of the need for vast improvements and experimentation and that there is a sincere desire to pursue courses of action which will bring about an improved performance having regard to the present day requirements of any legislative body. We should also be seen to offer, in a willing and united manner, our view on the value we place on such a review of the working of the Seanad for the 54 years of its existence so as to facilitate considering the type of reform that might be most effective and which would allow the Seanad to function in accordance with its present day requirements. Obviously, to obtain the best results such a review should not be undertaken by parliamentarians. One of its main questions would be, has Seanad Éireann matched up to its constitutional parameters? The latter, in my view, cries out for attention.
Having stated the idea I would like to accentuate the concept of being true to ourselves. Of the statements so far delivered, some have expressed mixed feelings, some have been very direct and some have been on the defensive. Our purpose was not to go on the defensive but to own up to our deficiencies, because as far as I am concerned going on the defensive will not contribute to improving the role or function of the Seanad and certainly will not help to satisfy the public perception of the Seanad. Going on the defensive we will certainly not demonstrate that we are interested in showing political will, or showing that there is among Senators a serious thought about moving in the direction of pressing the Government to deal with the question of making the Seanad measure up to its present day requirements.
Dealing in the first instance with this question and without attempting in any way to avoid taking some responsibility for some of the circumstances we find ourselves in, I admit that Seanad Éireann is not functioning as an effective legislative body in accordance with what the Constitution intended and has not been doing so for some considerable time. I referred earlier to the need to be honest with ourselves. In an effort to do so, I submit that the following points constitute obstructions, impediments, delays and obstacles that have had an ongoing effect in making Seanad Éireann subject to the scorn of some of the media and public — and I emphasise the word "some". Obviously, the intention of the Constitution was not that Seanad Éireann would be compelled, as is the case, to approach legislation in the same dull, mechanical way as in the Dáil but that there would be additional expertise in Seanad Éireann with emphasis on parliamentary scrutiny and control.
I quote Article 18.7.1 of the Constitution in support of that point:
Before each general election of the members of Seanad Éireann to be elected from panels of candidates, five panels of candidates shall be formed in the manner provided by law containing respectively the names of persons having knowledge and practical experience of the following interests and services, namely:
(i) National Language and Culture, Literature, Art, Education and such professional interests as may be defined by law for the purpose of this panel;
(ii) Agriculture and allied interests, and Fisheries;
(iii) Labour, whether organised or unorganised;
(iv) Industry and Commerce, including banking, finance, accountancy, engineering and architecture;
(v) Public Administration and social services, including voluntary social activities.
That Article of the Constitution is clear in its intent to get expertise working in the Seanad. Obviously, the support is there for the argument I made: that the Constitution intended that the purpose of bringing people into the Seanad with expert knowledge and practical experience was to ensure that legislation brought before the House would be subject to the application of that expert knowledge and practical experience for the purpose of improving the legislation through greater scrutiny and control — in other words, greater scrutiny and control would be the end result in the Seanad by virtue of that special knowledge and practical experience. Obviously, it was also intended that the knowledge and experience would be applied to matters of an urgent, public nature. If not for those reasons, why does the Seanad exist?
It is clear from the Constitution what was intended, why the expertise was brought here and what its purpose was. The question we have to ask ourselves is this: has the question of scrutiny and control been applied in a proper way or have the impediments, obstructions, delays and obstacles that we have encountered diminished in some way the actual function and role of the Seanad or its overall general effectiveness? It was never intended in the law or the Constitution that the Seanad would be repetitive when a Bill comes before it, or that it would proceed in the same mechanical way as in the Dáil. For instance, why is it that we cannot or do not refer some Stage of some Bills to a special committee on a particular area where it could be processed in greater detail with the right of this committee to call in departmental officials, etc., and report back? The Constitution does not say we cannot do this. Perhaps the fault lies with our own lack of use of Standing Orders or our failure to change Standing Orders. Here I would like to quote Standing Order No. 84 (1):
When a Bill has been read a second time, it may be ordered to be considered in Committee of the whole Seanad on a day then named, or be referred to some other Committee.
The most relevant part is paragraph (2), which says:
The Seanad may on motion made without notice commit the Bill to a Committee of the whole Seanad in respect of some of its provisions and to a Special Committee in respect of other provisions. If such a motion be opposed the Cathaoirleach, after permitting an explanatory statement from the mover of the motion and from a Senator who opposes the motion, may, if he thinks fit, put the question thereon.
That does not exclude the idea at some stage when a Bill is brought into the Seanad, of some part of it being referred without debate to this select committee, or portion of some particular Stage of it. That is my reading of it; but I am open to argument on it. I believe that was the intention. If it was not, why then go to the bother of making sure there is this specialist knowledge and expertise available to the Seanad through the panel system? Yet we do not make use of this facility of referring legislation to a special committee to have a look at a certain aspect of a Bill that would require teasing out and would need to be looked at in detail.
The second point I would consider to be in the category of obstacles, delays, obstructions, etc, concerns the Seanad's right to reject Bills. The history of Bills rejected in the Seanad, and delayed even for a limited time of 90 days, is deplorable. In its 54 year history only about four Bills have been rejected. They were rejected only for a time; obviously they went to the Dáil and were passed. I could only find Bills being rejected twice, but I believe about four were rejected. The two I found were the Third Amendment to the Constitution Bill, 1958, and the Pawnbrokers Bill, 1963. This denies the intention of the Constitution on the matter of scrutiny and control.
The history of Private Members' Bills getting to the Statute Book is limited to about one in the lifetime of a Seanad. I do not know if there are any more. If there are, I would like somebody to tell me about them. That one Bill I discovered had to do with animals. I am not suggesting for a moment that animal legislation is not good legislation or that anything to do with the protection of animals is not good legislation. What I am suggesting is that the idea of a Private Members' Bill not getting on the Statute Book is not in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution as it was intended for the Seanad. The tabling of a Private Members' Bill is a very constructive process. The reason I would describe it as a constructive process is that it draws more attention to an issue than a general motion. A Private Members' Bill does not lend itself to inconsequential debate. On the other hand, general motions can become just a lot of talking for the sake of the record with no real decision resulting.
The third issue that falls into the category of impeding, obstructing or delaying is, for example, Seanad Standing Order 29 which deals with emergency motions. These are not encouraged because of the limitation in that order on what constitutes a matter of urgent national importance. The very limited way in which the Seanad can act with immediacy on matters of public interest requiring urgent consideration can therefore be included in this category of the Seanad being impeded, obstructed or delayed because of the inflexibility of Standing Orders. I am not referring in particular to the Government; we may all be guilty in some way, and I will deal with that later.
In regard to Standing Order 29, dealing with a matter of urgent national importance, the inflexibility extends to the Cathaoirleach, because he is bound by the Standing Order. No matter how sympathetic the Cathaoirleach would wish to be, he cannot do anything about it because the Standing Order has to be interpreted in a certain way. We must ask if we have looked at the Standing Order sufficiently. Is it not a fact that the Seanad is a more appropriate place, and has more time on its hands than the Dáil, to deal with a matter of urgent national importance? In regard to some of the rulings that have been made during the years on what was or was not a matter of urgent national importance, is it not true that matters subsequently came to this House, even though they did not originally get on to the floor for debate? Standing Order needs to be looked at. Its purpose is not being served if this House cannot utilise the expertise and special knowledge brought to it from vocational bodies.
I come now to the fourth point. In my view Seanad amendments to Government legislation have not stood up to the test of political substance down the years in either the volume of amendments accepted or the type of amendment. I was referring in particular to the quality of amendments accepted. More often than not, if an amendment is accepted it is of very minor importance in the overall legislation. I recall that we did see amendments accepted to the Stock Exchange (Completion of Bargains) Bill. I recall that the late Senator Alexis FitzGerald got ten amendments accepted to that Bill and then went on to be successful in having the Title of the Companies Bill, 1977, changed but these are the exceptions. The overall acceptance in respect of quality and volume of amendments does not stand up to the test of political substance.
Another difficulty I see, which in itself is an impediment and obstruction and draws fire on the Seanad as being a weak body, is weak Ministers. A weak Minister does not help because he does not comprehend what he is introducing and he does not have the strength to say no to the civil servants advising him. We all have seen this here from time to time and on such occasions one does not know whether one is addressing the Minister or the civil servant. On the other hand, we must give credit to the good Ministers. When somebody like the late Senator Alexis FitzGerald is able to get ten amendments through, it means the Minister concerned is a strong person. He knew what it was all about and what the final consequences for the Bill would be if he did not agree to the amendments.
I come now to the fifth point. There is some justification for the view held by the public and some Senators that the Seanad is a playground for political parties. Let us be honest with ourselves. The fact is it is used to enhance the chances of former budding TDs. We should not be afraid to admit this to ourselves and to the public at large. What we should not do is to play down these facts or go on the defensive. When all the debate is over and we are having an impartial examination, this may be one of the things we will have to look at and decide whether it has been a contributory factor to the impediments, obstructions, delays, or obstacles I have mentioned.
Nothing can be left out. It is all there for examination. It would be naïve to think that the architect of the system did not want it any other way. Who would? The architect of the system was not going to risk Bills being held up for 365 days when he could get away with 90 days and ensure that his Bills would get through anyway. This point merits some future scrutiny together with the other points made, and those about to be made. The reality is that the panels have been taken over by political parties. That does not make the whole case; there are many other points for examination. I have set out about five of them now and I go on to point six.
Party politics have entered the University panel by virtue of some University Senators taking the party whip. This, of course, has some bearing on the argument whether the Seanad should be strictly vocational. A point of interest here is that no Senator is elected on the basis of being an executive director, a general secretary or a branch secretary of a trade union; nor is he elected on the basis of being a University lecturer or the head of a faculty. I am suggesting that election takes place on a political basis. It will be argued that perhaps they are not political in the sense of not been completely synonymous with party politics, but the argument still holds that people are not elected because they are professors, lecturers, etc; they are elected because their constituents are convinced about them as people.
The constituents want people who can articulate their, the constituents', views. They want people capable of processing the issues that are peculiar to the University people. Also they look to the national appeal the candidate can generate. We must acknowledge and appreciate that the Univesities down the years have brought a high calibre of person into the Seanad. There is no doubt about that. We have had wonderful contributions from many of them, but the fact is that some of them come into the Seanad with a political bias. If they do not actually transfer into the political system, there is nevertheless some political bias in some of their expressions. There is political bias in the way they get elected in the sense that people want them to be able to express their constituency interest.
I make my observations on this point in the hope that this question will not be excluded from any review we undertake in the future. The fact that the party whip has been taken by Senators over the years cannot escape some scrutiny as to whether it is a contributory factor to the impediments, obstructions or delays that have helped to keep the Seanad role less than adequate for its present day requirements. In my view it is in the same category as the points we have gone through. Therefore, I think it should be open to examination, depending, of course, on the type of examination we finally agree.
Another area of our behavioural patterns that can be considered to come within the category of obstructions, etc. is the amount of tiresome technicality and trivia we experience in the House. We probably do not feel it is our fault that this happens, but it is noticed by the media and therefore must be considered as aggravating the weaknesses of the Seanad and its functions, particularly when we have regard to the other points raised. I would describe that as point number seven.
Making the eighth point, another difficulty experienced is that Standing Orders are so designed that we must follow the same dull mechanical procedure as the Dáil. I make this point because Standing Orders have had the effect of silencing very brilliant people. That is a problem. Obviously, Standing Orders need to be looked at, if not by us then by some detached or non-parliamentary body.
The ninth point is the difficulty we experience by reason of the insecurity of tenure. For example, when the Seanad adjourns sine die nobody is sure when it will be called back. This is largely because Governments have made it dependent on how they proceed, or what they decide is happening in the Dáil. If this was not the situation, it would facilitate the processing of more Bills through this House, or more Bills could be initiated here. In this way the Seanad would play a bigger part in the legislative process. What adds to the insecurity is that, by and large, we are confined to assembling just for Government business. That also is an impediment to our giving the best possible performance. The low proportion of non-Government business dealt with obviously follows on from that.
The tenth point that fits into the category for examination is this and in saying this I do not want the Senators on the Government benches to get the wrong slant on this. I am not going out for an attack or anything like that, but I am seriously concerned that there is a need for change, that we need to have a look at ourselves and openly admit to ourselves where we see the deficiencies. That does not necessarily say that everything is wrong, and I will be covering that point before I conclude.
Over the years I have seen many Senators on the Government Benches — and it did not matter which Government were in — who showed very substantial opposition to some of the legislation brought before the House. I have listened for hours on end to exchanges between people on the Government benches and Ministers going through the pros and cons of a Bill sometimes in a lighthearted manner and sometimes with heated exchanges. It is not a question of saying that some were sacked; at the end of the day they walked into the voting lobby. It is very important that Government Senators are not silenced because many of them have very good contributions to make in relation to legislation. There is possibly an underlying fear there that this is not the right thing to do but any strong Minister would understand that he or she was getting the best deal possible out of that type of exchange, provided they did not have the crippling experience of some walking through the wrong lobby. That is a legitimate way of contributing.
I mentioned the late Alexis FitzGerald earlier, and former Senator Eoin Ryan, Senior, was another example of people of high calibre. When he was Leader of the House he had no problem about telling a Minister where difficulties lay and having an exchange with him. The situation was the same when John Horgan was Leader of the Labour Party here and also Ken Whitaker, the late Senator Fintan Kennedy and, not least, President Mary Robinson when she was a Senator.
There were incidents where people lost the Whip but it was for different reasons. We had examples such as Michael Mullins and Christy Kirwan who were seriously opposed to many things. They lost the Whip but it was because they voted against legislation, not because they spoke against it. That is the difference. There are very able Senators in the Government party. They can make a substantial contribution and they should think seriously about this. We are open to criticism. We are having a good, hard look at ourselves in an honest and open way and we should not be afraid to face certain facts. The saddest thing of all is to see brilliant people silenced not by Ministers but by Standing Orders.
I have made ten points about why I feel the Seanad has lost some of its effectiveness. In doing so I do not think I have shirked the blame or let my colleagues do so. However, we cannot just accept the criticism and blame; we must move on and do more to show how effective Senators and the Seanad can be. We must examine the impediments, delays, obstructions and obstacles that hinder the Seanad.
We should recognise that we are no different to those in Government. It appears to a large proportion of the public that a few dominate the many. We have all heard the accusation: "You are all in it for yourselves". We are talking about the public perception of the function and role of the Seanad. We must not allow this to continue. It is well within our capacity to reform and it is incumbent on us to be honest and to recognise our difficulties.
It is one thing to say we should go ahead and take action to try to bring about substantial improvements in how we operate and in how we might change our attitude but it is another thing to implement what you think will work. For example, we do not know at this stage whether we can change Standing Orders in such a way as to make the Seanad more lively and relevant. Since all five Stages of a Bill have a definite purpose it is not possible to say whether the mechanisms we use to deal with Bills in this House and in the other House can be changed.
It is difficult to talk about reform. One must weigh up the concept of this House being very strongly vocational as against the political necessity to proceed in a certain way. It is not for us to suggest at this time that we are sure the best thing to do would be to reinforce the vocational element. As I said earlier, this debate is a kind of speculative investigation which needs deeper consideration. I do not believe that politicians collectively will be willing to change too much. Would it be possible at this stage of the debate to say that there is a collective agreement that after 54 years of operation of the Seanad there should be a review of our workings? We cannot say that with any authority at this stage. Can we say that a wide-ranging examination will be undertaken based on what has been stated? Can we say to any great effect that we will examine one House having regard to the fact that a relationship exists between the two Houses? We can say that with our approach to procedures we can make some improvements. Can we assess whether we have matched up to constitutional procedures? That may be a little more difficult to do. Can we allow the Seanad to contribute to contemporary Ireland by changing Standing Orders? Will that work? We want a greater opportunity to contribute to contemporary Ireland. It can and should be done.
I am satisfied that the Seanad can be reformed without endangering the Government's mandate to legislate but there must be the political will to do so. Senator Norris believes it is not there. I am not sure it is that simple. Substantial statements have been made and there is a lot of material to be digested. I reserve judgment on the question of political will. We can argue both ways; we can talk about the political will to do it the way we think or we can talk about the political will to make sufficient change to enable us to progress to the point where we measure up to the present day requirements of a legislative body.
Are Standing Orders the real culprit? Do we share the blame or are the Government at fault? No matter what way we look at it, we have obstacles to overcome. We must begin even if it is only on an experimental basis. The question of whether Seanad Éireann has lived up to the role envisaged for it in the Constitution cries out for consideration. I am not suggesting that, arising from this debate, that will happen but it is a serious point for consideration.
We all know that, in the minds of some people, Seanad Éireann is irrelevant to Irish life but that view also existed 54 years ago when the Seanad was established. The Seanad can and does make a very substantial contribution to legislation. I have criticised the workings of the Seanad as have other Senators, but as a result of this debate we have a very substantial pool of information and a lot of advice available to us.
I hope the Seanad will proceed with this debate and when it has concluded that the Committee on Procedure and Privileges will examine the points made. A lot of thought will have to go into how to bring about change having regard to the complexities of the two Houses and the difficulties of the political parties, the universities and the different panels blending together. There is no reason it should not be done because we have the ability to do it. Senators can make a substantial contribution to the nation, particularly by scrutinising legislation that comes before us, as was intended by the Constitution.