The Third Directive on Non-Life Insurance comes into effect on 1 July 1994 throughout the European Union. This directive is part of the process, known generally as the Single Market, of opening up the markets of the member states of the EU to competition. We are obliged to enact legislation to introduce into Irish law the provisions of the directive which enable us to regulate the future market in health insurance in the interests of the common good while complying with the intent of the directive.
Within the competitive environment which the Single Market promotes we have to ensure that what is done is in the general good. There is an overriding requirement to protect that general good, to maintain social solidarity and, where health insurance is concerned, to strive to ensure that it will remain available and affordable for those who need it most, including the elderly, the chronically ill and those struck down by serious illness.
This is the first of two insurance Bills which I hope to have enacted this year. In the next term I intend to introduce legislation which will amend the 1957 Act and provide the framework for the Voluntary Health Insurance Board to compete effectively. In the development of these Bills, the report of the Joint Committee on Commercial State-sponsored Bodies, chaired by Deputy Liam Kavanagh, on the VHI has been of considerable assistance. I thank Deputy Kavanagh and the Members of the committee for the care and attention to detail which they showed in completing a very useful report. Senator Frank Fahey, Senator Michael Finneran, Senator Shane Ross and Senator Jack Wall were Members of the committee and I extend my gratitude to them also. In both content and timing the report was a very good example of the work of the committee system in the Houses of the Oireachtas.
In this country, health insurance has played a major role since 1957 in the development of the health services. Its success can be seen in the numbers covered, which now approximate to 1.3 million persons or over 35 per cent of the total population. Such a high level of coverage demonstrates that health insurance is accepted as offering value for money to consumers and its continuing strength, despite periods of adverse conditions for the economy generally, is a testament to the value that the insured population place on their membership of the various schemes. Despite consistent and sustained improvements in public health services and the broadening of eligibility criteria, health insurance continues to be an attractive product.
I will now outline some of the fundamental thinking which informs the provisions incorporated in the Bill.
Any regulatory system for health insurance in this country must be placed in the wider context of the general community. The Long Title for this Bill speaks of the legislation being necessary "in the interests of the common good" and it is this aspect of the new system which lies at the heart of the proposals. The common good requires that we be concerned with society as a whole. The strong should help the weak, the young should help the old. The principles of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime membership spring from this view of how we should behave as a society.
Competition and profit making must take place within this framework thereby encouraging innovation, efficiency and keen awareness of market opportunities. The alternative is to allow risk related insurance, attractive to the young and healthy, potentially unavailable to the old and sick. The inevitable result would be that many people would leave health insurance and, through no fault of their own, be put in a position where they had no choices about health care despite being contributors to health insurance for many years.
This Bill also implicitly recognises, as a second principle underlying these purposes, the significant role of insurance over the years within the broader public health services. Our hospital system is second to none in terms of quality of service and the public hospitals have benefited enormously from the presence of private care on their sites. In this year alone a total of over £60 million will be earned by public hospitals from private care and this is an invaluable support for the maintenance of high standards of care for all patients. The £60 million goes directly into the income of the public hospitals and their standards are enhanced by the availability of such income.
It is vital that public hospitals continue to have a mix of private and public practice on site. If this mix did not exist the result would be a fragmented hospital system where one group of hospitals treated private patients only and public hospitals treated exclusively public patients. Quite apart from the loss of £60 million income, there could also be a reduction in the quality of medical supervision and involvement at the highest level in patient care in public hospitals. I do not believe that the private hospitals would gain from the divided and divisive system I have described.
The competitive spirit which should be generated by the Single Market will have a major impact on the range and type of products available to consumers. Insurers must look at what they are offering now and see if those policies are truly matching the needs of the market and if there are any gaps in that market they can usefully fill. Responsiveness to customers' requirements will become ever more important and the development of niche marketing will more readily identify those critical gaps.
For example, companies which wish to specialise in non-hospital products will be able to sell plans which are related to the particular area of expertise of that company and will not have to become involved in the marketing of a hospital plan. An insurer who wishes to sell dental care benefits can do so without having to sell hospital policies. From experience elsewhere it is clear the availability of these ancillary products is critical in maintaining the attractiveness of health insurance. A healthy rivalry in the marketplace based on genuine consumer need will be of benefit to all.
I have circulated to Senators an information document on the main features of this Bill. That is not the usual practice but the Bill is quite complex. I felt it would be of assistance to Senators in preparing for this debate if an information document was circulated in advance. The proposals outlined in that document as to the fine points of the future regulation of health insurance will be the subject of detailed consultations with interested parties between now and the end of the year.
The principles involved are important, the first of them being community rating, which is the system of pricing by which members of an insurance plan are charged the same premium by a company for a range of benefits. No discrimination is made by the insurer in regard to the age, health status or sex of the individual member.
The rationale which underlies this concept is that high risk groups, mainly the elderly, should not have to pay more in premia at a stage in their lives when they may most need to use the benefits of an insurance policy. Furthermore, the low risk groups, such as the young, healthy, insured population will benefit from community rating when they age and come to need services.
The Bill as passed by the Dáil seeks to ensure that while a number of specific and appropriate exceptions are allowed, the principle of community rating will apply to all health insurance contracts, whether they cover adults or those under 18 years of age. I have, however, accepted that health insurance packages covering long term care are unlikely to be made available unless they can be sold at a risk rated basis. The Bill provides for this.
Community rating is not anti-competitive. It does not prevent companies from competing. There is ample scope for commercial rivalry to gain greater market share by concentrating on price, product and quality of service. It is a matter for each insurance undertaking to determine how it competes on price with its market rivals, provided it does not discriminate within its own plans against vulnerable groups within society.
There is nothing in community rating or in any of the proposed regulatory arrangements which will prevent the development of innovative products for the consumer. I am anxious to see new thinking on product lines in health insurance and I anticipate that should competition occur there will be a notable increase in marketing and related activities.
The second principle is open enrolment which, like community rating, is a concept of particular value to vulnerable people who can be assured they will have access to insurance when they choose to purchase it. Of course it is important that people take out health insurance at an early age if inter-generational solidarity is to continue and community rating to prosper. A decline in the number of young people with insurance would have serious consequencess for the system as there would be insufficient low risk members to balance out the high risk groups.
However, open entry cannot be absolute as no insurance company can be expected immediately to give full coverage to any individual who wished to join. Such an arrangement could have a significant adverse effect on the insurer in a short period. A waiting period for cover must be applied if the insurance system is not to be undermined.
The third principle enshrined in the ground rules for the operation of health insurance is that of lifetime cover, which is linked to open enrolment and community rating in its protection of the highly vulnerable. Continuing cover is critically important because health insurance would have little attraction if we were likely to be denied cover at the point in our lives when we are most likely to need it. I am therefore providing for the concept of lifetime cover to be an intergral part of the new regulatory arrangements but there will be some qualifications.
There are a number of important points arising from the interpretations which are set out in section 2 of the Bill to which I would now like to draw the attention of the House. The term "ancillary health services" is defined in the Bill. The term "ancillary" is used in the context of the Bill in a specific way to distinguish a range of services from those which are likely to be included in the schedule of minimum benefits to which I will refer to later. The term does not in any way denote that these are less important services. The intention is to distinguish these services so that, for example, they can be marketed either on a separate basis or as a top up in a package which includes minimum benefits.
The definition of "health insurance contract", which is a fundamental part of the Bill, defines health insurance as applying to payments which are made for or on behalf of insured persons for the specific reimbursement of fees or charges. In other words, there must be an element of indemnity before a policy can be described as health insurance. Policies which are merely cash payments and can be paid irrespective of the actual costs incurred in treatment are not, under this definition, health insurance. They do not constitute an indemnity policy as such and present no real threat to health insurance at present. However, my Department will be keeping the matter under review.
Section 7 of the Bill prohibits insurers from offering non-community rated policies. It also defines community rating. However, there are a number of aspects of community rating on which I would like to make further comments. It will be noted that section 7 (2) (a) uses the phrase "suffering or prospective suffering of a person from a chronic disease". My intention in using the word "prospective" is to prevent the application of current and anticipated diagnostic techniques, such as genetic testing, as a means of providing information on which a decision could be made to increase an individual's premium or to deny insurance cover to a client.
The House will also note from section 7 (3) of the Bill that, as I have already mentioned, I am not requiring health insurance policies covering long term care to be marketed on a community rated basis. I hope that insurers will develop products which can cover the costs of long term care. The demographics of this country and, indeed, other developed nations, would suggest that such products can be directed at a sizeable market which would justify their development.
I am making a number of exceptions in section 7 (4) (a) and (b) to the principle of community rating. These exceptions reflect current practice by insurers here, whether by the Voluntary Health Insurance or the friendly societies, and do not, therefore, dilute to any significant extent the principle of community rating. The concessions on group discounts are important and are necessary if insurers are to continue to attract the type of risk that can be set off against higher risks. Considerable care has been taken to give insurers flexibility in determining how they will charge for children. For example, in larger families it will be possible for insurers to waive charges for children in excess of a particular number. However, all policies must comply with the basic principles of community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover.
Section 8 of the Bill sets out, with certain qualifications, the requirement on insurers not to refuse a contract to a person under 65 years of age. An insurer is not obliged to accept for membership a person who is 65 years or more, except where that person's insurance company has ceased to trade. In this situation the insured person will be allowed to enrol with another undertaking and may not be prevented from doing so. Section 8 (4) (a) of the Bill provides for all those, irrespective of age, who have had a health insurance contract with an undertaking to transfer to another company. This provision is a reasonable one, given that a person over 65 years would probably have been paying into a scheme for many years and is, therefore, entitled to continue to receive benefit.
I will be prescribing in regulations waiting periods which are generally similar to those operated at present by the Voluntary Health Insurance Board. However, there are a number of areas which require further examination and to which I have referred in paragraph 3.1 of my information document. My aim is to ensure that the regulations will provide a balance between necessary controls by insurers on entry while at the same time adhering to the principle of open enrolment. I should add that restricted membership undertakings will be allowed to limit their membership to the relevant occupational group but may not refuse to accept a qualified person under 65 years.
Section 9 of the Bill explicitly prohibits a company from refusing to renew or terminating cover without the insured person's consent, except in circumstances to be prescribed in regulations. It is likely that these circumstances will allow for cover not to be renewed or to be terminated if it can be established that there was fraud on the part of the insured person or non-disclosure by him or her of significant relevant information to the company.
Section 10 of the Bill provides that an insurance contract which covers hospital services must provide for a minimum level of benefit to be offered to a potential subscriber. An insurance company which is offering benefits which do not include any element of hospital costs but relate only to ancillary services, such as dental care, will not be subject to this requirement.
The level of statutory minimum benefits will be clearly defined in regulations which will be publicised in the autumn after detailed consultations with interested parties. However, these benefits will only be paid in respect of what are regarded as medically necessary procedures. The main elements which would be included in minimum benefit are hospital in-patient treatment, including day care, hospital outpatient treatment, consultants fees, maternity benefits on a grant-in-aid basis, convalescence, psychiatric treatment, and substance abuse. The minimum level of accommodation which will require to be covered is semiprivate in a public hospital. My general approach is to ensure that the regulatory framework gives a guarantee of minimum benefit to consumers. If individuals want to top up and purchase more cover they will be able to do so.
The components to be included in the minimum benefits package will be kept under regular review. It would obviously be attractive to have all insured people covered for services such as general practitioner services and dental care. However, the reality is that this would tend to increase significantly the cost of the package and probably lead to a significant reduction in the number of people with health insurance. There is the further complication that general practitioner services are not an attractive or easy to manage proposition for an insurer's viewpoint.
It is important that all those purchasing health insurance should be given full information in a clear and comprehensive manner. It is also necessary to ensure that any advertising or promotion of health insurance is accurate and truthful and does not mislead the public. Section 13 gives the power to the Minister to make regulations for the control of advertising and promotion by insurers. It is a permissive provision and will not be invoked unless it is clear that it is necessary to protect the consumer. Developments in other countries clearly suggest that such a power is necessary, particularly in a competitive market, offering a wide range of marginally differentiated products.
One further issue which is of continuing concern to me is the problem of balance billing by consultants where patients may be billed at a level which is not reimbursed by the insurer. This is a particularly difficult issue which will require careful consideration. An excessive amount of balance billing must be avoided if health insurance is to maintain its standing as good value for money. However, any insurance company could be put under great strain if it were to meet the demands for increases in private fees, introduced from time to time by medical consultants independent of any statutory control or review process. My Department will be reviewing this matter further while the regulations on minimum benefit are being drafted.
Community rating can be undermined by some insurers deliberately selecting low risk groups or individuals. A number of marketing techniques can be employed by companies to make certain that their risk profiles are lower than the average. Those techniques could include having a direct mailing system to particular groups, or targeting occupational schemes with a relatively low average age, or designing policies in such a way that they appeal only to those who present the least risk. The inevitable result of selection of low risk members is considerable instability in the market as other insurance companies, with a higher than average risk profile, would find their financial position rapidly deteriorating.
There are different methods of risk equalisation. The method which I am considering is based primarily on profiling each company's membership by sex and age bands. I am opposed to any system which would pool all risks or costs in the insured population as this would be a disincentive to competition and would reimburse the inefficient insurance companies and service providers. The type of scheme I am considering for risk equalisation would cover costs up to semiprivate accommodation in most private hospitals. This and other aspects of risk equalisation will be examined in more detail by my Department over the coming months while the regulations are being drafted; there will be consultation with all relevant interest groups while the regulations are made. The EU Third Directive provides that member states may introduce risk equalisations schemes if considered appropriate. The proposals in the Bill are in accordance with the intent of the directive and are seen by the European Commission as a necessary part of the regulatory framework to maintain community rating, open enrolment and lifetime cover.
A health insurance authority has been provided for in Part IV of the Bill. It will not be necessary to establish the Authority immediately as the regulatory functions in regard to health insurance will, from July 1994, lie with the Minister for Enterprise and Employment, where prudential issues such as minimum solvency margins are concerned. These matters have been the responsibility of that Minister as part of his functions under the insurance sector generally. My regulatory responsibilities, as Minister for Health, will involve the maintenance of a register of health insurers as provided for in Part II of the Bill. My Department will also monitor policies to ensure they comply with community rating, open enrolment, lifetime cover and minimum benefits.
I will also make arrangements with an independent body under section 12 to advise me on whether equalisation should come into being, in line with a formula set out in regulations. The body appointed to undertake this task will not provide me with any commercially sensitive information on individual companies. The body will receive information from the first quarter of 1995 from health insurers, which will provide it with the data to assess whether or not a risk equalisation scheme should be introduced. I stress that such information would be entirely confidential to that body; its task would be to alert my Department to the possibility that the equalisation process, involving actual compensatory transfers between companies, may have to be introduced. My Department will inform insurers over the next few weeks of the proposed arrangement in regard to the detailed operation of risk equalisation, including the data to be supplied from the first quarter of next year.
The Health Insurance Authority will be established if risk equalisation is introduced or if in the interim period there are changes in the market which would justify it being established. If risk equalisation were to be introduced, it would require some body which is independent of the Department of Health to administer the system, particularly in a situation where financial transactions were being made. It would be inappropriate for a Government Department to involve itself in any such arrangement. It will on its establishment assume all the regulatory functions to be carried out from July by the Ministers for Enterprise and Employment and Health. I do not believe the arrangements to be put in place next month would of themselves justify the creation of another semi-State agency and I am satisfied that arrangements as outlined in the Bill will work satisfactorily.
I have described the main elements of the Bill and the remaining sections deal with standard provisions in regard to the maintenance of a register and the work of the authority, including matters relating to staffing. In addition, under sections 10 and 12 I will appoint an assessor who will advise me from time on the appropriate level of minimum benefit and the level of costs that should be subject to risk equalisation. It is likely that he or she will review annually minimum benefits to see whether they should be changed and, again perhaps on an annual basis, consider what changes might be made to those costs which must be risk equalised.
The regulatory system must be kept under review and should in any event be the subject of a comprehensive examination not later than five years after its introduction. Nobody can say with certainty how the market will respond to the new environment. It may be that there are areas which will need to be changed so the principles enshrined in the Bill will not be undermined. The advice to be tendered by the Authority, if established, and the evaluations conducted on an ongoing basis by my Department should together form a good foundation on which to conduct a full scale review.
All parties involved in health insurance and private care have an interest in understanding the wider arena in which they operate. No one interest can stand aside and demand that its needs be met, even if it means that others are adversely affected. Service providers who would insist that their demands be put at the top of the agenda, no matter what the impact may be on the affordability and the attractiveness of health insurance, would be behaving in a short sighted way. If the price of health insurance escalates because of excessive demands by service providers, the losers will not be confined to any one insurer or provider. We have seen elsewhere that increases over 30 per cent in one year can be applied by insurers and this has had a serious impact on members covered by insurance.
I do not wish to see an adversarial relationship develop between insurers, service providers and consumers. In order to create a better understanding between the different interests involved in private health insurance and private care, I proposed in the document Shaping a Healthier Future that a monitoring and consultative mechanism be established which would be representative of these interests. The forum to be established would include the Department of Health, the public health services and the institutional providers of private care.
As the strategy document made clear, as Minister for Health I do not have any function in relation to the regulation, coordination or assessment of the services provided by private hospitals; the exceptions are maternity and psychiatric services. My overall objective is to do what I can to ensure that the highest standards of care are delivered to the entire population. The consultative arrangements set out in Shaping a Healthier Future will give me the opportunity to assess what needs to be done to develop the correct relationship between private and public sectors.
The proposals incorporated in the Bill are designed to protect those features of our system which have worked so well and to allow the market place to operate and provide a wider range of choice to the consumer. The proposals have been structured in the interests of the common good and with no other objective whatsoever in mind. I believe this Bill and the related Bill which I will introduce later this year will set a solid foundation for health insurance for this decade and beyond. I hope it will be as successful as the VHI Act, 1957, in laying the basis for affordable and attractive health insurance. I commend this Bill to the House.