I thank Senator Neville for raising this important Adjournment Matter. In recent times the pay agreements which have governed the public service have formed part of the national programmes. This applied in relation to the Programme for National Recovery, which covered the period 1988 to 1990, and the Programme for Economic and Social Progress, which covered the period 1991 to 1993. It also applies in the case of the current programme, the Programme for Competitiveness and Work, which, in respect of the public service, covers the period 1994 to the middle of 1997.
The pay policy to apply over the period to be covered has been an integral part of each of these programmes. It has been a vital part of them in that it has a bearing on such fundamental issues as competitiveness, employment and the scale of public expenditure. The negotiating arrangements for these programmes are now very well established. They have been well tested over the time span of the various programmes. As is well known, the arrangements involve negotiations between the social partners.
Generally speaking, in the programme negotiations the discussion on pay centres on the overall regime to apply nationally and, side by side with that, and indeed as an integral part of it, the arrangements to apply to the public service. Members will be aware of the significance of the public service in terms of numbers and cost — it comprises some 185,000 people and in 1996 the public service pay and pensions bill is estimated to be £4.8 billion. The public service pay regime to emerge from the negotiations is, therefore, vitally important. In many respects it is the most important element of these agreements.
Where pay generally is concerned, the main players in the negotiations are IBEC, the ICTU and the Government representatives. These same players would also be involved where public service pay is concerned but in relation to the ICTU an important role would be played by its public services committee, which is representative of public service unions which are members of the ICTU.
The situation I have outlined gives rise to the issue which is the subject of the Adjournment Matter. The associations representing members of the Defence Forces and the Garda are not members of the ICTU and as such are not associated with the negotiation of national programmes and the related pay agreements. I would like to say something about the nature of the Defence Forces and the Garda Síochána associations. The establishment of associations for the purpose of representing members of those forces, in relation to their remuneration and other matters, is governed by special legislation in each case. For obvious reasons, related to the special nature of these forces, this legislation contains certain prohibitions and restrictions.
The Garda Síochána Act, 1924, as amended by the Act of 1977, provides that it shall not be lawful for a member of the Garda Síochána to be, or become, a member of a trade union or of any association which seeks to control or influence pay, pensions or conditions of service of the Garda Síochána, other than an association established under the Act. The Act also makes it an offence for a person to cause disaffection or to induce any member of the Garda Síochána to withhold his or her services. I need hardly say that this prohibition is essential to the operation of the Garda.
Section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) Act, 1990, similarly prohibits members of the Defence Forces from becoming members of a trade union or any other body seeking to influence or otherwise be concerned with the remuneration or other conditions of service, other than an association established under the Act.
In the case of both the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces, the legislation would enable the Minister concerned to agree that a representative association might be associated with an outside body. Having regard to the legal restrictions which apply in relation to trade union membership and the withdrawal of services, which necessarily apply in the case of the security forces, these provisions have not been utilised to permit association with the ICTU.
There are valid reasons why the restrictions I have referred to should be in place in these cases. For example, members of the Defence Forces may be required to come to the aid of the civil power, or to render aid to civil communities during trade disputes. Great care must be taken to ensure that the arrangements applying to the associations representing security forces personnel, including the affiliations they might enter into, maintain the integrity of their representative structures and do not put in jeopardy the unique nature of these forces in the community.
However, the overall situation does give rise to an obvious difficulty for the associations in so far as discussions on national pay agreements are concerned. The members are part of the public service but the associations are not members of the ICTU. Consequently, they are not associated with the negotiation of the pay provisions of the national programmes, even though, inevitably, the terms of those provisions apply to their members.
It is true that the Garda and Defence associations are able to participate in conciliation and arbitration schemes. The schemes, which are similar to those operating elsewhere in the public service, provide arrangements for dealing exclusively with pay and other specified conditions of service of most members of the Garda and Defence Forces. It is open to the representative associations to raise issues of concern to them at the conciliation councils under those schemes and this can then become part of the process of public service pay discussions. It has to be and is accepted, however, that the experience has been that these possible arrangements have not operated on any regular or structured basis.
Looking at the situation from all sides, it is acknowledged that there is an issue to be addressed in relation to the remoteness of the associations from the determination of public service pay policy in the context of the national programmes. It is accepted also that it is appropriate at this stage to consider whether some mechanism could be put in place to deal with this matter. What such a mechanism might be would, in the first place, be a matter for discussion between the associations and the two Departments directly concerned — the Department of Defence and the Department of Justice. Obviously, any mechanism would have to have regard to the unique nature of the security forces, which has necessitated legislation to deal with their representational position separately from the general trade union and industrial relations legislation.
My understanding is that this issue has been raised on a number of occasions. The response has been that the best way to proceed would be to have the matter discussed between the representative associations and the Departments concerned. This remains the best approach.
It is obvious that the issue is not a simple one and that it has to be treated with great care. I would not like to speculate at this stage as to where a solution might lie. That is best left to the two Departments concerned in the first place. I would, however, agree that it is important that consideration be pressed forward in the hope that an acceptable solution be found in good time for the negotiations which it is expected will take place later in the year on the pay arrangements to follow the Programme for Competitiveness and Work public service pay agreement.
