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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 20 Apr 2000

Vol. 163 No. 3

Order of Business. - Containment of Nuclear Weapons Bill, 2000: Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

I am disappointed everyone is leaving as I thought they would stay to hear my speech. I welcome the Minister of State and I compliment him on his activities in relation to this legislation and with regard to Sellafield. This Bill brings Ireland up to speed with an international agreement to which we have already agreed and which applies to all countries. Its provisions are clear and the policing body in Ireland will be the Radiological Protection Institute, which is a significant body that is politically independent and is up to date on the reality of this issue.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a continuing shift in international political relationships. It is similar to the 1814 Congress of Vienna and the following age of Metternich, although historians present may correct me. At that time there was a change in the European and world order similar to the change we are experiencing now. It is good in that countries which were not democracies previously are now becoming democracies, but other countries, such as India and Pakistan frighten me, as do many others with the potential for nuclear weapons use in conflicts between them. It is important to have the steady hand of America on the world stage. We are concerned by issues in Chechnya as well as the instability in other states in that area, which seems corrupt in many ways. There seems to be increased stability in Russia of late and the main players in the field should agree to influence the smaller countries which have nuclear weapons.

The capacity of any nuclear weapon to fundamentally and utterly destroy life now and for future generations with radioactive fallout is very frightening and measures such as this need the support of all nations. We are playing our part with this Bill, although it is a small measure. We do not have a nuclear industry. There is some academic research in Cork which might theoretically fall under the sphere of influence of the Bill, but we are very much in agreement with the spirit of the Bill.

There are military activities in the Sellafield complex. Obviously we are all opposed to reprocessing at Sellafield but I am also concerned about its military activities. We rely on the policing of this treaty to ensure that what is taking place there is fully understood and declared. I am not convinced this is the case but I do not know enough about it other than to express my concern. Last year we visited the Los Alamos research centre in San Francisco. There is also concern about what is taking place there. However, the reality is that the military complexes in Britain and America are effectively a law unto themselves. I am concerned about their activities. It is important that the Minister continues to raise these issues abroad and that they are discussed by this Parliament.

The Minister not only referred to disarmament and to the proliferation of nuclear arms but also to our position on nuclear safety. While it is tangential to this Bill, I wish to raise Nirex and the proposed underground storage of nuclear waste near the Sellafield complex. This is a fundamental issue of nuclear safety involving Ireland and the protection of our environment. It is not an arms issue but it is a nuclear one. It is an issue of safety, not just for this generation or the next one but for those thousands of years in the future. Britain may have further proposals for the long-term storage of its nuclear waste. I am confident that the Minister, with the full support of the Opposition as well as the Government, will be up to date on this issue.

Some of the press leaks and documents which have come into the public domain on the operation of Sellafield demonstrate that what is said and done by the Minister of the day, whether it is Deputy Stagg, Senator Avril Doyle or Deputy Jacob, is important and has an impact. That is why it is important that we continue to discuss these issues and take the same approach.

This is important legislation. We are playing our part in the international arena. As I said, the Radiological Protection Institute will play an important role in this. Stable countries have access to nuclear weapons. However, I am concerned about countries such as Zimbabwe where, from what I can gather from media reports, Robert Mugabe seems to be starting a race war, having access to nuclear weapons. We do not know what nuclear weapons some of these countries have. We must be vigilant regarding the leaderships of countries on the periphery of the Middle East which are inherently unstable and have nuclear weapons. Ireland is clearly playing its part in the international arena, which I welcome. I welcome the Bill.

I also welcome the Bill and join in welcoming the Minister to the House. This day last week, some of us had the opportunity to welcome him to Newcastle in County Down where he discussed BNFL and the contamination of the Irish Sea. The Minister was commended on his interest and commitment in ensuring the voice of Ireland is heard on these issues, particularly the health of our population, which is paramount. I compliment the Minister in this regard.

I agree with Senator O'Dowd on the storage of waste and the cessation of reprocessing by BNFL. What happened at Sellafield was debated in this House and it is an absolute scandal. The Minister has rightly ensured that Ireland's view has been well articulated. This will hopefully encourage the British authorities to take a more enlightened approach and remove the risk to which we are all exposed.

I welcome the Bill which is in line with Ireland's policy on disarmament and arms control. This policy plays a central role in our foreign policy and is a key element in our contribution towards international security and the maintenance of peace. The excessive accumulation of arms is one of the major contributory causes to international tension and conflict. As anyone who remembers it or has watched programmes about it will know, the Cuban missile crisis is a good illustration of the trauma experienced when the world was on the brink of destruction. It highlighted the need to pursue policies which help us to avoid such crises in the future. As Senator O'Dowd said, the collapse of the eastern bloc has positively contributed to a better rapport between East and West and has significantly reduced the risk at which the world was placed on a number of occasions, particularly during the Cuban missile crisis when the world held its breath.

This is an opportunity to compliment the post Second World War visionaries, such as Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet, and the contribution they made to the new Europe. The history of Europe in the past century has been difficult and one shudders to think what might have hap pened if nuclear weapons had been available during the first half of the century. All one has to do is to look at the effects of the Chernobyl disaster on Belarus, the consequences of which will be with the current population as well as generations to come.

Ireland's approach to disarmament and arms control is closely related to other aspects of our foreign policy. The prohibition of inhumane weapons, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and control on arms exports are all issues with a strong human rights dimension. There are also close links with our policy for development in the Third World, where the diversion of scarce resources to arms procurement and the consequences of excessive accumulation of arms are important issues. The scarce funds available in the Third World are being misappropriated from the better cause of looking after its population. Greater disarmament and less investment in this area would result in considerable resources being released to reduce starvation in underdeveloped countries.

The acquisition and deployment of military power has never been an instrument of Irish foreign policy, other than in the context of essential security needs and involvement in UN peacekeeping. Our Defence Forces maintain weapons at the minimum level necessary to ensure the security of the State and carry out their peacekeeping responsibilities. Historically, this level has been lower than that of most other European states. We have no indigenous arms industry and thus no economic dependence on arms export. Ireland has focused its disarmament efforts at the political level in the major multilateral fora where we can be more effective in advancing our views and winning support for concerted international action.

The Minister of State pointed out that Ireland is well positioned to articulate this view. I compliment him on our being the initiator of the new agenda on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the conference in New York. It is a role Ireland is well equipped to play. We are well respected across the world by many of the states involved in the arms race and we are in a position to play a influential and positive role in that regard. The bodies primarily concerned are the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission, conferences relating to specific international agreements and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, whose security forum has responsibilities in this area and it participates in the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Our involvement in the work of bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency is closely linked to our disarmament objectives.

The end of the Cold War has had major implications for disarmament and arms control. The abandonment of the nuclear arms race, the end ing of superpower confrontation and the division of Europe have resulted in a far reaching reassessment of the need to maintain large arsenals. This has given a major impetus to multilateral disarmament in relation to weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. However, we should not be complacent. There are many unstable areas of the world where national rivalries and tensions could spill over into conflict. If nuclear arsenals come into play there is always the threat of mass destruction. The recent hostility between India and Pakistan are dramatic examples of the potential threat that can manifest itself in regional confrontation. It is the challenge of international diplomacy to diffuse these areas of unrest. Measures such as those provided for in the Bill are the international community's best chance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons because covert activities can be protected.

I welcome the Minister of State, Deputy Jacob, to the House and with Senators Walsh and O'Dowd I compliment him on the consistency of his approach and the good work he has done on the nuclear issue prior to and since becoming Minister of State. He was very much to the forefront on this issue and, as Minister of State, he has taken the opportunity to use his powers to progress this important matter.

This Bill is important. As a small non-nuclear island nation on the periphery of western Europe that is not aligned to others in terms of nuclear materials, one might think it is not essential for us to sign up to this international agreement, but it is important to do so. Having signed up to it, it is important that we take our place on the world stage and use our diplomatic skills to prick the conscience of countries that have misbehaved in the past and to ensure that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is fully adhered to. It is vital that happens.

It is important that the structures set up under the IAEA are complied with fully, that the countries involved are strictly monitored and the inspectorate has responsibility to ensure these conditions are complied with. The Minister of State might elaborate in greater detail on how the inspectorate will conduct its work, as it must be independent in doing so. Where major investment is involved, undoubtedly there will be vested interests and desires on behalf of certain members states, governments, companies and individuals that certain actions be taken. It is important that the inspectorate is seen to operate in a transparent and independent manner and that spot checks can be carried out unannounced by people other than those specified to do the work. That is central to the success of this measure. Its success will ensure the generation of confidence in the global community.

There is major concern with regard to the four countries that are not prepared to sign up to this treaty. I refer to India and Pakistan, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Cuba. The India-Pakistan conflict has a global dimension. That conflict has arisen twice in the past number of years and it has proven to be a source of international concern. Given that there have been good relations between Ireland and India, dating back to the time of Éamon de Valera and Frank Aiken, the Minister of State should use that tradition of good relations to try to coax the current Indian Government into adopting a more acceptable position on this issue and to encourage it to sign up to this treaty. That would enhance the reputation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and stabilise world security.

I appreciate the difficulty posed to India by Pakistan. Our foreign ministry appears to have good access to the authorities in countries such as India. We could do the world a favour by using our influence at every opportunity to encourage those countries to sign up to the agreement. I urge the Minister for Foreign Affairs to do that. There are difficulties regarding Israel. While it has domestic difficulties that are being resolved at present, given its location I am sure it could be easily coaxed into signing up to this agreement.

Some of us may have concerns about countries that signed up to the agreement but are applying the regulations in their own fashion. Those countries need to be closely monitored. The European Union needs to monitor the supply of nuclear weapons and arms by member states to other countries, particularly the sale of weapons by France and England to countries in South America and Africa. That needs to be monitored more closely.

The Minister of State has been to the forefront in addressing the Sellafield issue, although that is not the subject of this debate. Figures were misrepresented and false information was submitted in relation to that nuclear plant. How can we be sure there will not be a misrepresentation in relation to nuclear weapons and armaments and other related matters? We need further reassurances in that regard. We need to be constantly on the alert and focused and keep these countries under tight scrutiny.

It is important that the rights of states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are contained under the ambit of the IAEA. I welcome Ireland's strong support for the agency's nuclear safety and radiological protection activities and its encouragement of an enhanced nuclear safety culture worldwide. I compliment the Government on Ireland being to the forefront in this area in that it was the initiator of the coalition for the new agenda. The work done by the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Andrews, on that issue also deserves credit. I am delighted approval for it has come from the UN General Assembly, that further support is expected and that the Government is actively pursuing various other countries to fulfil their obligations under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ireland has been an active and consistent supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That matter has been discussed repeatedly in this House and in the Dáil. I am delighted that progress has been made on the banning of underground and undersea tests and that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty also includes tests carried out in the atmosphere and in outer space. Tests should be banned wherever they take place and I welcome that development.

I take this opportunity of complimenting the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland on the work it has done over the years, the manner in which it has monitored the position and the good work in which it continues to engage. The former chairman, the board and the staff of the institute have done extraordinary work. I also compliment the Minister of State who has the full support of this side of the House in the work he has been doing. We wish him every success, which I am sure he will achieve with his competence and his ability to be stern or charming when necessary. He will manage to convince even the great powers of the world as he continues to do this work on behalf of Ireland.

I welcome this legislation which is in keeping with Ireland's traditional position on nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ireland is a nuclear free country, not just in terms of weaponry but in terms of energy. It is important that we are to the forefront in articulating our concerns on this matter and promoting our position.

That said, I wonder why we are discussing the Bill this afternoon. Why has it suddenly appeared out of nowhere on a day when there were many rows because, having been notified that there would be two items on the Order of Business, we found ourselves with seven further items? We do not have an explanation of the reason the Bill is before us.

I note from the explanatory memorandum and the Minister's opening address that the protocol was signed by Ireland in September 1998 – 19 months ago. Why should we wait until the very last day of the sitting to complete Second Stage, leaving the other Stages to be taken at a future date? Why should we impose it on an already cluttered and overcrowded agenda for the last day of this sitting? Perhaps the Minister of State might address that issue when replying.

I raise that question because this is an important matter and we have great concerns about the whole nuclear issue. Last week the largest consignment yet of food, equipment and materials was sent to Chernobyl by Adi Roche and the organisation which supports the people affected by radiation as a result of the Chernobyl disaster. I understand that in excess of £2 million worth of goods was sent as a result of the generosity of the people of Ireland.

We are interested in this issue for other reasons because we have taken the initiative in many other areas. Deputy David Andrews, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, took the initiative of bringing a group together to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons in nuclear and non-nuclear countries. That was two years ago and perhaps the Minister of State will tell us what has been happening since then in that regard.

The Minister of State's initiative in relation to Sellafield shows the extent of our concerns and the implications of having Sellafield on our doorstep. Why should we have to deal with Second Stage in such a peremptory fashion today when we know we cannot process the legislation beyond today? There will be adequate time after the Easter recess. I hope the Minister of State will clarify that matter. I would hate to think it is because, as indicated in his contribution, Ireland is due to take its seat on the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the latter part of this year. Did somebody discover that we have not fulfilled our commitments to international conventions without legislation such as this and that it would look rather embarrassing if Ireland is to become a governor of the IAEA, which has responsibility for monitoring and inspecting nuclear weaponry and ensuring that countries are in line with the necessary requirements in relation to radioactive waste and nuclear safety? It is difficult to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Perhaps that is why we have suddenly decided there is an urgency this Holy Thursday afternoon to give an indication of our commitment in this area.

We should not be embarrassed about these matters. We should be to the forefront but our track record has not been good in recent times. My colleague, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, Deputy Howlin, instanced the large number of international conventions we have not ratified and it is about time we got our act together in that regard to ensure we are up to date in terms of our global responsibilities.

The Bill does not apply to Ireland in any meaningful fashion. As the Minister of State said, it does so only in respect of certain insignificant quantities of fissionable material held in University College Dublin and University College Cork. Why the urgency all of a sudden? That is the mystery I want resolved. Why has little Ireland to ensure its standing among the nations of the world now when the Bill is only relevant to Ireland in respect of this small matter of fissionable equipment or material in two colleges, which are already well inspected by the Radiological Protection Institute?

Sellafield is our major concern. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which is being facilitated under this legislation, has a responsi bility to report on information concerning goods and materials related to the nuclear industry. This is a long-running saga in terms of our position on international nuclear safety. We have a nuclear industry on our doorstep. We have expressed concerns repeatedly and we have been told constantly by the Government that there was nothing we could do, that we could not put together a legal case because it would not stand up in court. Now, however, we have discovered that Sellafield has been guilty of abuses and malpractice in its reprocessing activities. The Minister of State initiated a liaison with Norway to get matters moving and we saw some high profile publicity shots. I expect a follow-up on that because, for the first time ever, we are in a position to take meaningful action in relation to the greatest threat to the health of this nation.

I do not doubt the Minister of State's bona fides on this matter but some years ago, when my colleague, Deputy Stagg, was Minister of State at the Department of the Environment, with responsibility in this matter, he took it upon himself to attend the THORP inquiry and to state our position in the strongest terms. The Minister of State should make a high profile visit to the THORP reprocessing plant and make it clear that Ireland is seeking the closure of that facility, the operators of which have been completely negligent in relation to safety standards. It is unbelievable that those responsible for the plant's operation were prepared to allow it to operate, even in respect of the most dangerous material under its control, with only the minimum level of safety and inspection procedures in place. Now is the time to make a great deal of noise. The new information we have in our possession in respect of the abuse and malpractice to which I refer is what is required to close down Sellafield.

My party will table amendments to the Bill on Committee Stage. However, I have no difficulty with the Bill and I welcome its introduction. I would have preferred if it could have been introduced 18 months ago and I hope the Minister of State will indicate why it must be taken at this stage. However, I am sure his reasons are good.

I thank the Chair and Members for taking the Bill at this point. I also thank Senators O'Dowd, Walsh, Taylor-Quinn and Costello for their contributions.

I must inform Senator Costello that, as far as I am concerned, there have been no constraints imposed in respect of the timing of the introduction of the legislation. I am pleased that the Seanad saw fit to take the Bill today. The duration of the debate is a matter for the House but I am prepared to stay for however long it takes in order to discuss this important matter. It is vital that we deal with this protocol and I am grateful to the House for allowing me to initiate the debate on the Bill. There is a hardened edge to Ireland's activities on nuclear safety and it is vital that we are to the forefront in respect of ratifying this important protocolumn I am indebted to all concerned for allowing me to get this initiative off the ground.

The spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear arsenals is a highly emotive subject. There are many trouble spots throughout the world where, in the wrong hands, access to nuclear technology could be disastrous for mankind. Ireland is a small independent nation which has no pretensions to military might and which harbours no malice towards its neighbours. Anything we can do to make the world a safer place should be a high priority. Ireland's initiatives, which date back to the 1950s, have established a very proud tradition of encouraging the international community to take action to halt the threat of nuclear weapons.

The Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT Treaty which will take place between 24 April and 19 May will hopefully allow the international community to make progress in reversing some of the adverse developments in the recent parts, particularly those in Asia. I anticipate that the Irish delegation, with the representatives of other like-minded countries, will work towards bringing about greater understanding of what should be done to overcome these problems so that effective steps can be taken to prevent future deployment of nuclear weapons.

I welcome the recent decision by the Russian Duma to approve the START ll Treaty. When fully implemented, this treaty will lead to large reductions in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and US arsenals. We hope that all ratification procedures can be completed in the shortest possible period in order to permit rapid entry into force.

Members referred to Sellafield. Like other nuclear installations, Sellafield is subject to the new proliferation treaty. The UK is a key nuclear weapons state and is obliged to adhere to the provisions of that treaty.

Deputy Taylor-Quinn – I apologise, I should say Senator Taylor-Quinn but I often forget that I am in the Upper House.

The Senator does the same thing.

The Minister of State is not alone. Some of my colleagues resent my Lower House attitude.

Senator-Taylor Quinn stated that she would like to hear more about the way the inspectorate will go about its work. I can inform her that this protocol will strengthen the transparency of nuclear safeguards. However, perhaps I should provide details in respect of the components of those safeguards.

Safeguards are applied most intensively at facilities containing materials – mostly plu tonium and highly enriched uranium – that could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive. Inspection goals, which take into account potential diversion paths and other technical criteria, are formulated to give top priority to such facilities and to verify the whereabouts of these materials.

The IAEA uses nuclear material accountancy as its basic tool for safeguarding material declared by a state, pursuant to its safeguards agreement. This system establishes the quantities of nuclear material present in a nuclear facility and the changes in these quantities that take place over time and is comparable, in concept and procedure, to a financial accounting system. In addition, the IAEA receives and analyses reports on a regular basis from state authorities on the whereabouts of nuclear materials under their control. These reports cover stocks of nuclear fuel and the export/import of safeguarded materials and such equipment.

At many nuclear installations, the IAEA uses surveillance cameras and other electronic techniques to complement accountancy and inspector activities by continuously and automatically recording activities in key places. Also used are specially designed small metal seals which are fixed to camera housings and other IAEA equipment to prevent undetected tampering or used at nuclear material storage areas or on containers to safeguard their contents.

In some respects, the role of the IAEA inspectorate is analogous to that of an independent financial auditor. Both systems have the object of building confidence – the safeguards system builds confidence in the global community that states are complying with their non-proliferation commitments. The most visible components of the IAEA safeguards system are its inspectors. Under agreed rights of access, they regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records, check instruments and surveillance equipment and confirm physical inventories of nuclear materials. They later prepare detailed reports for the IAEA and the states concerned.

BNFL launched a huge public relations campaign on 18 April to offer its response to the reports that were published on 18 February. As far as we are concerned, an elaborate publicity campaign will not deflect us from our determination to see the cessation of activity at Sellafield. BNFL appears to be of the opinion that its response represents a comprehensive response to the major deficiencies at the Sellafield plant, including falsified documentation and unsafe management practices which were identified in the recent report of the UK's independent inspectorate. It is clear that BNFL is attempting to win back a measure of the public confidence it lost in the damning report of the NII.

Ireland will continue its campaign for the closure of Sellafield and I assure Senator Costello that every opportunity has been and will be used to continue that campaign. The Danes have already given us their support and I am confident of further support from the other Nordic countries. I will meet with their representatives in the near future, following my recent meeting with my Danish colleague. The recent events at Sellafield as revealed by the two NII reports, are most disturbing. This Government has a duty to take the appropriate actions to protect its citizens within the scope of international law. I will not hesitate to undertake appropriate litigation against BNFL if I believe its operations are not complying with the provisions of international law. I have asked the Attorney General to re-open the examination of evidence for legal action concerning Sellafield with particular attention to the NII reports.

This Bill is a technical measure to give effect in Irish law to the provisions of an international protocol which will, if adopted worldwide, make it more difficult for rogue regimes to build up nuclear arsenals. I appreciate the cross-party support for this measure. In particular, I am resolved to see the early ratification of the protocol which this Bill will facilitate.

Question put and agreed to.

When is it proposed to take Committee Stage?

On Wednesday, 10 May 2000.

Committee Stage ordered for Wednesday, 10 May 2000.
The Seanad adjourned at 4.55 p.m.sine die.
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