This meeting has been convened in order that the select committee might consider two motions which have been referred to it. These motions relate to: (i) Ireland's accession to the memorandum of understanding concerning the principles for the establishment and operation of a battlegroup to be made available to the European Union in the second half of 2012, and (ii) the terms of the agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United States of America on enhancing co-operation in preventing and combating serious crime, which was signed in Dublin on 21 July 2011 and a copy of which was laid before Dáil Éireann on 10 January 2012. I propose that we deal with the defence motion first and that we then proceed to the justice motion. I welcome the Minister for Justice and Equality and Defence, Deputy Alan Shatter, and his officials and invite him to make his opening statement.
International Agreements: Motions
Vice Chairman (Deputy Anne Ferris
The following motion has been placed on the Order Paper of Dáil Éireann:
That Dáil Éireann approves Ireland's accession to the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the principles for the establishment and operation of a battlegroup to be made available to the European Union in the second half of 2012.
In commending the motion I wish to briefly outline the background to the Ireland's participation in the Austro-German battle group. The ambition of the European Union is to be able to respond rapidly to emerging crises. This is a key objective in the continued development of the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. In the headline goal 2010 the Union set itself the objective of being able "to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union". A key element of the headline goal is the capability to deploy forces at high readiness, broadly based on the battle groups concept. The purpose of the EU battlegroups is to undertake operations as outlined in the Amsterdam treaty - the Treaty on European Union. These operations, known as the Petersberg Tasks, include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In the Lisbon treaty these tasks were expanded to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks in supporting the reform and restructuring of security services and legal institutions in fragile states, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation.
A central tenet of Irish foreign policy is support for the multilateral system of collective security represented by the United Nations. In this regard, Ireland has worked to uphold the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. This commitment has found expression in Ireland's long-standing tradition of participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Participation in EU battlegroups represents another means for Ireland to express its commitment to the United Nations and its principles. The Petersberg Tasks are the sort of tasks already undertaken on UN-mandated crisis management operations, combining the efforts of both civilian and military personnel. They recognise the need for a comprehensive response to crises in order to prevent conflicts before they start and ensure co-ordinated action in post-conflict situations to rebuild state institutions so as to ensure stability.
At its meeting on 19 July 2010 the then Government formally approved the arrangements for Ireland's participation in the Austro-German battle group 2012, agreeing to provide a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force to participate in the battlegroup. The Defence Forces' contribution to this battle group will involve a Recce-ISTAR company, together with staff posts at both the operational and force headquarters. Recce is an abbreviation of reconnaissance, while ISTAR is an acronym for intelligence, surveillance, target, acquisition and reconnaissance.
The total number of personnel involved in the battle group will be approximately 175. This will incorporate the Recce-ISTAR core of the battle group, a command and control function, a combat service support capability and a force protection capability. It is important to note that this level of resource commitment will only arise should the battle group be called on to undertake an operation and should Ireland agree to participate in it. The commitment in terms of personnel leading up to and during the stand-by period, where the battle group has not been mobilised to undertake an operation, will be one officer.
The Austro-German battlegroup memorandum of understanding is an agreement between the participants comprising the battle group, namely, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which sets out principles in relation to the operation, deployment and management of the battle group. Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, deal with the definitions and reference documents applicable to the memorandum of understanding. They define Germany as the framework nation and Austria as the logistic lead nation and broadly outline the purpose of the memorandum of understanding.
Sections 5 to 8, inclusive, deal with the consultation process, exercise, training, certification and the operation of the battle group. Most battle group training will take place in the contributing member states, that is, Irish troops will mainly be trained in Ireland. That said, some level of joint training with other battle group elements may be required. One important issue to note is that each participant retains the right to deploy or not to deploy its forces, irrespective of an EU decision to launch a battle group operation. Equally, each participant retains the sovereign right to withdraw its contingent at any time. The command of each contingent remains under national control, with operational control delegated to the operational commander. As such, any deployment of the Irish contribution as part of the Austro-German battle group will still be subject to the triple lock, namely, UN mandate and Government and Dáil approval, and this will remain unaffected by Ireland signing the memorandum of understanding.
Sections 9 to 13, inclusive, outline the arrangements in terms of financing, logistics, classified information, the status of forces and the issue of claims and liabilities. When a battle group participant is within the territory of another participant, the issues of jurisdiction and discipline and claims and liabilities of forces will be dealt with in accordance with the NATO Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, PfP SOFA. A status of forces agreement, SOFA, is one which relates to the status of personnel engaged on overseas training and operations, whereby the host country agrees to extend certain rights and privileges to such personnel. These include arrangements regarding jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes, powers of military police, enforcement of discipline by the superiors of the relevant personnel and determination of liability for damage to the property of third parties.
While all the other Austro-German battle group participants have signed the NATO PfP SOFA, Ireland has not done so. We have previously acceded to the relevant provisions of the SOFA generally, through an exchange of letters with the European Union, NATO or lead framework nation for any operation in which we have participated. It is intended to engage in a similar exchange of letters regarding these matters in respect of our participation in the Austro-German battle group. It should be noted that the immunities and privileges provided for in the SOFA, including those to which Ireland will accede through an exchange of letters, will not apply within Ireland.
Sections 14 to 16, inclusive, deal with the matter of additional participation, the timelines for coming into effect and termination of the memorandum of understanding and the process for dispute resolution. Ireland has previously acceded to a battle group memorandum of understanding in respect of the Nordic battlegroup. In 2007 the then Minister for Defence, following the approval of Dáil Éireann, signed a memorandum of understanding for Ireland's participation in the Nordic battle group 2008. This memorandum of understanding remained in effect and was used again for the Nordic battle group in 2011.
While no battle group has deployed to date, the EU battle group concept has yielded many benefits to developing improved interoperability between the Defence Forces and the forces of other EU member states. The battlegroup has also enabled the European Union to develop its decision-making processes for rapid deployment on crisis management operations. The purpose of battlegroups is very simple, namely, to enable the Union to be more effective in contributing to international peace and security in support of the United Nations by putting in place a rapid response capability. In this regard, I again recall the strong support of the United Nations for the European Union's efforts in this direction. During his visit to Ireland in 2009 the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged positively the Union's efforts in the development of capabilities for crisis management and, in particular, those designed "to develop the capacity for rapid deployment in support of the UN." Ireland's active engagement in EU battle groups enhances our capacity to influence the ongoing development and evolution of the rapid response capacity of the EU, in particular the role battle groups can play in reinforcing and acting as a strategic reserve for UN blue-hat operations. Active engagement by Ireland across the range of activity under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy means we can help shape this policy in a manner which is consistent with our values and our support of multi-lateralism and for the United Nations.
In this regard, my Department last year submitted a paper on EU-UN co-operation in peacekeeping which is now being progressed by the European External Action Service of the EU in consultation with the UN. The paper identifies a range of options as to how the EU, as part of its ongoing capability development process, could identify capabilities which could be made available and fully integrated into UN blue-hat operations. I look forward to the progress report on this at the next Defence Ministers' meeting in March.
In summary, Ireland's participation in battle groups supports the development of rapid deployment skills and capabilities within the Defence Forces, together with improved interoperability with like-minded states. It also enhances Ireland's credibility as a provider of professional and effective military forces for crisis management operations. Finally, it reinforces our standing and capacity to influence the ongoing development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy in support of international peace and security and the UN.
I welcome the Minister to the meeting and I commend our Defence Forces for the work they do internationally, particularly in peacekeeping operations. I have major concerns about battle groups and Ireland's participation in the Austro-German battle group in particular. Is it part of the process that we are dumping our independent foreign policy position, which historically was highly regarded internationally, of being an independent neutral country trying to prevent conflicts and working peacefully to resolve international issues? The Minister raised the issue of crisis management. To me this always meant peacekeeping, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Are we moving away from this policy?
Have the Minister and officials at the Department received advice on whether this motion is in breach of Article 29 of our Constitution which states, "Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality"? I have major concerns about this.
I will answer the questions in reverse order. The motion fully accords with Article 29 in that it seeks to provide an additional mechanism which reflects mechanisms previously used to facilitate our contributing to either the prevention or peaceful resolution of conflict. It is all extremely simple and straightforward. As detailed previously, we participated on two previous occasions in battle groups. It is about recognising the reality that in providing and engaging in peacekeeping missions we always do so in co-operation with other countries; prior to there being a common European approach in these areas we did so pursuant to UN resolution. This particular arrangement maintains the current position, as detailed by me, if the Deputy was listening, whereby we participate in any particular mission only on foot of a resolution of the United Nations, the agreement of the Government and the agreement of Dáil Éireann. This is the triple lock provision which we apply to all of our peacekeeping missions. Historically it has always been applied and it continues to be maintained.
The Deputy seems to be of the belief that our Defence Forces unilaterally strive out on their own into far-flung regions of the globe to bring peace and engage on their own to resolve conflict. The reality is that all of our engagements at UN level have been part and parcel of an engagement involving troops contributed by other nations with whom we act in co-operation.
In the context of the question the Deputy raised with regard to his major concerns about our independent foreign policy position, we are, and correctly so, in a position where we do on occasion make decisions about foreign policy matters that may not reflect decisions made by other countries, but we are part and parcel of the European Union and the common European defence policy approach to issues - and it is very much in our interest that we are - and this is a very important example of us acting in partnership with other European Union member states.
I believe a name other than "battle group" might have been a good way of describing it when it was originated. If the Deputy has not thought past the name of what we are speaking about I can well understand the comments he makes, because speaking about battle groups suggests we might all be off to invade somewhere, when in fact what we are speaking about is a peacekeeping, conflict avoiding and conflict resolution group-----
Why not say that?
-----which is what the battle groups are about.
It is very simple; change the name.
I set out very clearly in my statement what the purpose and objectives of battle groups are. They are to assist in conflict resolution and in peacekeeping. The benefit of having a battle group is that should an unexpected crisis arise to which we could make a contribution to resolving, we would be geared up in conjunction with other European Union states to put in place troops who can act in an appropriate manner. Through the training and co-operative period which precedes any crisis there is the capacity for efficient interoperability, command structures and decision-making which maximises the potential of any group that is deployed. It is no more mysterious than this and I hope the Deputy accepts that what I have set out fully and comprehensively responds. He has no great reason for any particular concerns.
The terminology is important and the Minister has recognised that perhaps it should be called something other than a "battle group". If this is the case, perhaps it is something that as Minister for Defence he could look into and see whether it is possible to change.
Hear, hear.
This leads into the debate on where Europe is going in terms of its military. I have no doubt some in the EU would like to see the formation of a European army. Even Angela Merkel has stated previously that it would be a desire of hers to see an EU-wide army. When we hear terminology such as "battle groups" people suspect it may be a slow step towards this end goal. I take on board what the Minister said about the triple lock. We have discussed it before and it must be maintained.
It is stated that personnel will be based in Ireland but there may be some occasions when joint training will take place. In the previous battle groups in which we participated did much joint training take place? Were there any occasions on which the troops had to take part in joint training? How intensive is it and where does it take place?
With regard to the standby costs of €380,000 it is stated the current estimated additional cost for a maximum 120 day battle group deployment is €10.7 million. Is this a total of €10.7 million or a cost to Ireland of €10.7 million? That is not stated in the Bill. The €380,000 will come from the Defence Vote but where will the €10.7 million come from if it had to deploy and we were part of it? Can any of that money be recouped?
To take the questions in reverse order, the €10 million the Deputy makes reference to would be the cost of the deployment of our troops for that length of time. It would be partially paid for through the European Union, with some funding coming from this State. It would be part and parcel of the decision-making process as to whether it is appropriate we deploy, as clearly financial issues arise.
Having viewed this myself, some of the training that takes place and the interoperability is through computerised peacekeeping processes in the context of the different states whose armies are deployed setting up operational stations, deploying in a theoretical theatre and co-ordinating what they are doing across the web on secure lines to practise different possible deployments dealing with various exigencies over a number of days. That is part and parcel of the training that takes place, apart from the practical training of using the vehicles available and the normal training in which our Defence Forces would engage. The previous battle group involved some members of the Defence Forces going to Sweden and engaging in a joint exercise. What happens under the current battle group is a matter to be finalised.
In the context of the query the Deputy raised about the formation of a European army, our engagement is of the nature I described. The purpose of the battle groups is as I described it. In technical terms, "battle group" is a standard technical military term and it is used for its brevity in describing the coming together of a number of countries with their military. Essentially, it is a battalion size force with its various required support elements, including transport and logistics, and the overall size of a battle group is in the region of approximately 1,500 personnel. EU battle groups have what is described as a readiness to deploy, within five to ten days, to a range of possible missions which are sustainable for between 30 to 120 days.
I come back to what I said. The grouping could have been better named than being referred to as a battle group. That has become the terminology throughout since its establishment and it has been used by different groups that have come together. I am sure, in the context of the European Union, that if we change the name it would create all sorts of temporary excitement about translations and 27 different EU member states debating the appropriate name to use and the name that might be more or less controversial or open to misunderstanding within their own states. Whereas I would have preferred if it had been differently named from day one, there are so many other issues Europe is currently engaged on of greater seriousness and urgency I do not intend at a future meeting of European Council Ministers to present a paper on the satiric, semantical issue of whether we continue to call them battle groups or we consult the Oxford English Dictionary, think of a dozen other possible terminologies and then engage with the other 26 member states on all the terminologies they prefer. In military terms I will surrender to the name "battle group" for the time being.
I will keep reminding the Minister about it.
It is not worth me revisiting it but when Europe is not under as much pressure as it is under at present in addressing some of the enormously serious economic issues and we have the luxury of being able to rename concepts that have worked well so far - it is only the name that causes the odd upset as opposed to the substance of what we are doing - it might be possible to revisit it at some time in the future.
Not at the moment.
I think mañana-----
Yes. That is the position. We bear the costs, essentially, of our contribution.
And if we did, is there a set percentage in terms of what comes back? I am aware that in terms of UN peacekeeping we get around 80%. Is that negotiated before the group deploys or is it agreed now?
I think it is agreed based on the nature of the mission and the numbers. Our costing depends on the numbers we deploy. We may not deploy the maximum 1,500. I referred to the numbers we have set aside in the context of "battle group". There is a mechanism of common cost, the Athena mechanism, which applies in this context but special circumstances may produce different arrangements. I do not want to mislead members about that issue.
I accept that the motion complies with the triple lock principle and with the Constitution. I share the misgivings people have expressed about the term "battle group" and hope that label could be changed some time in the future.
Regarding the other countries we are grouped with in the battle group, how many of those are members of NATO and how many are neutral countries like Ireland?
Austria and Ireland are not part of NATO in the context of the group.
And the other countries are-----
The others are part of NATO.
I thank the Minister. I agree with my colleagues about the term "battle group". It is like something from an Action Man comic and perhaps when matters are not so serious economically it could be examined. Is the motion agreed?
I oppose it.
We are not voting on it. The Deputy can record his opposition when it is dealt with in the Dáil.
I want my opposition recorded in the minutes.
We can record our opposition when it is dealt with in the Dáil.
Yes but it is only before the committee for discussion.
Message to Dáil
In accordance with Standing Order 87, the following message will be sent to the Dáil:
The Select Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality has completed its consideration of the following motion:
Proposal that Dáil Éireann approves Ireland's accession to the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the principles for the establishment and operation of a Battlegroup to be made available to the European Union in the second half of the year 2012.
We will now take the justice motion.
The motion is as follows:
That Dáil Éireann, pursuant to Article 29.5 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, approves the terms of the Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United States of America On Enhancing Cooperation in Preventing and Combating Serious Crime laid before the Dáil on 10 January 2012.
As committee members will be aware, our citizens currently benefit from Ireland's eligibility to participate in the US visa waiver programme.
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the USA has set standards which it requires participating states to meet if they wish to ensure continuing eligibility for the visa waiver programme. The conclusion of an agreement on enhancing co-operation in preventing and combating serious crime such as this one is among the requirements prescribed by the USA and agreements of this kind have been, or are in the course of being, finalised between the US and 19 other European Union member states.
Deputies may wish to note that the agreement draws inspiration from, and mirrors very much, the EU Council decision of 2008, known as the Prüm Treaty, on stepping up cross-border co-operation particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, the aim of which is to improve police co-operation through the exchange of fingerprint and DNA data.
The agreement provides that fingerprint and DNA reference data from each country's national databases should be shared in specific defined circumstances, that is, for the prevention, detection and investigation of serious crime. The agreement therefore permits a national contact point, designated by each party, to access and search the fingerprint reference data and DNA reference data of the other party. The purpose of the search is to establish if there is a match with data held by the requesting state. The process does not involve the exchange of data at this stage. It merely establishes if identical data exist in the other state's database, that is to say a "hit" or "no hit" search facility. Should the search procedure show a match between DNA profiles or fingerprint data, the supply of any available further personal data and other data relating to the reference data is governed by the national law, including the legal assistance rules. Therefore, any transmission of additional data will be governed by Irish law in the case of data held by An Garda Síochána.
In addition, the provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Ireland and the USA will also apply. The treaty provides that mutual legal assistance shall be afforded for the purpose of investigation with a view to a criminal prosecution. Assistance will not be available for matters in which the US anticipates that no prosecution, or referral for prosecution, will take place. Provision for the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Ireland and the USA is already made in our domestic legislation by virtue of the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008. The threshold for criminal activity under Irish law for the purposes of this agreement is criminal activity which attracts a prison sentence of 12 months or more.
Turning to the agreement, Article 1 sets out the type of data which is in question, namely, DNA and fingerprint reference data. Article 2defines the scope of the agreement and specifies that it will only be used for the prevention, detection and investigation of serious crime. Articles 3 to 6 deal with the querying of fingerprint data, including a provision that following a match, any further personal data shall be provided in compliance with national law and the terms of the mutual assistance treaty with the US. Article 7addresses the points of contact in both countries.Articles 8, 9 and 10deal with provisions in regard to the querying of DNA data and are similar in nature to those applying to fingerprint data. Article 11deals with the transmission of data in particular circumstances where there is a belief that an individual will or has committed a serious offence, in particular terrorist-related or organised criminal offences. The agreement contains specific provisions - Articles 12 to 17 - related to privacy, data processing, data security and data protection. In addition to requiring the parties to provide high standards of data protection and security, the agreement also provides for the amendment of incorrect data and the deletion of data once it is no longer required. Individuals are entitled to information and redress in accordance with national law.
The Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) Bill will facilitate the establishment and operation of a DNA database for criminal investigation purposes, a commitment contained in the programme for Government. Work is progressing on the preparation of the legislation. The Bill will enable Ireland to meet its obligations arising from the agreement in respect of DNA data.
The Garda Síochána's criminal automated fingerprint identification system, AFIS, is currently operational. However, it requires further development to allow it to accept remote searching of its records as required by the Prüm Treaty. This work is currently being carried out and it will also facilitate the operation of the Ireland - US agreement.
International co-operation between states is an essential component in combating the ever increasing global nature of criminal activity. Since the events of 11 September the world has become aware that no country is safe from the threat of international terrorism and despite the extensive progress made in the context of our own peace process, we must remain mindful of the threat posed by dissident activities on this island.
We must also recognise that there are other elements in society who also have a contemptuous disregard for the rule of law and who are prepared to take any measures to subvert it. I refer in particular to organised criminal gangs who have shown themselves capable of activities in furtherance of their interests not just solely within the confines of this State but beyond its borders. I am of the view that this agreement will provide the United States and Ireland with a valuable resource in seeking to combat these threats, in particular in addressing the threats posed by criminal gangs and terrorism.
I, therefore, commend the motion to members.
I thank the Minister for attending. I welcome the agreement. The visa waiver programme is a fantastic asset. Anyone who uses it and walks by queues outside embassies realises how important it is.
If a person's conviction has been spent, and some data match up, is information given that the person concerned has served his or her time or done his or her service? Is there any limit on how long this information is kept? When does the Minister intend to bring this measure to the main Chamber? The briefing we have been given dates back to last November. A review of the agreement between the two countries was carried out and it seems to have gone well, but it strikes me that this is an issue that is probably outstanding.
The final text was made available to members and it is available. In the context of the issue of spent convictions, the legislation on that has yet to be enacted. That is an issue that has yet to be addressed in the House. That Bill is in preparation and it was in preparation during the term of my predecessor. I hope it will be published and enacted during the course of this year. It is contained in the programme for Government and is detailed on the B list of the legislative programme.
Will that legislation take account of this agreement?
In so far as any issue arises out of this agreement, we will examine that, but the Bill is only in preparation at present.
This motion should have been discussed in the Dáil rather than in committee. There are only four members discussing it. This agreement will have consequences. When it comes before the Dail and if a vote is called on it, many of the Members will probably not know on what they will vote. That is unfortunate. I would have preferred if it had been debated in the Dáil.
Article 6 relates to the supply of further personal or other data. It states that the supply of any available further personal data or other data relating to the reference data shall be governed by the national law, including the legal assistance rules. Is the Minister satisfied that the current legislation will cover this or will we need additional legislation?
Article 10 deals with the contact points. Who will be the contact points? Will it be the Garda Síochána? The second point covered in article 11 seems very broad and I would appreciate if the Minister would comment on that. Article 13(1)(c) relates to preventing a serious threat to public security and the Minister might clarify the definition of that.
I will take those questions back to front. That question would have to be judged on a case by case basis.
That question is in regard to the threat to public security.
The threat to public security would depend on the nature of the issue involved. None of us can predict or prescribe with accuracy all possible threats.
With regard to the Deputy's question about Article 6, there is no need for additional legislation to be enacted. The provisions are already in place. In the context of his comment that this issue should have been discussed in the Dáil, in so far as there is a concern that Deputies might form a view without having information available to them, the information is available and has been published. It is available for any Deputy who wishes to consult the content of the agreement. There is no reason a Deputy could not do so.
On the contact point issue, as I mentioned, the Garda Síochána is the contact point. Article 11 makes provision for the supply of personal and other data to prevent serious criminal and terrorist offences. When the system is up and running and if there is a hit, if I might use that phrase, where there is a fingerprint or DNA record in the State of someone with a similar record in the United States and it is trying to establish this, the nature of the other information that may be sought can only be sought in accordance with Irish law on information that can be made available. Again, it would be particular to the circumstances and background nature of what had occurred and the information being sought. However, we cannot do anything that is not lawful under domestic law. In other words, the United States could not demand of us that we provide it with some data which we were not allowed to provide under domestic law. Equally, we cannot demand of the United States that it do this for us.
It is very important that this arrangement is perceived. It is relevant to the visa waiver provisions in place, but it goes a good deal further than this in the sense that it is something that could be of particular assistance to the Garda Síochána in circumstances where, for example, somebody now based in the United States is sought for a crime that took place in Ireland. Without saying something inappropriate as Minister for Justice and Equality, there might be individuals in the United States who may be the subject of investigations by the Garda for a variety of reasons, be it today or in the future, for alleged criminal activities conducted in the State and, just as it is of value to the United States that we provide crucial information to assist in investigations where it is appropriate that information be released, it is very important to the State that we receive similar assistance from the US authorities. This is setting out a structure for that end in the context of the exchange of DNA and fingerprint information which might lead to identifying circumstances in which there would be a mutual interest in the exchange of crucial information.
Article 11 refers to non-personal data. Will the Minister define "non-personal data"? Under Article 15, it is kept for two years and then destroyed. How is it destroyed? Who oversees this?
My final point relates to legislation that might be required. Obviously, there will be legislation on a DNA database. Is that the only legislation that will be required to implement the agreement?
The DNA database legislation is crucial. I wish I had it up and running by now, but one of our difficulties was that the infrastructure had not been put in place by my predecessor. I do not wish to blame my predecessor for everything because we have been in government for 11 months, but the previous Government envisaged putting the DNA database legislation in place. It was part of its programme. However, when we took office, I discovered that no funding had been made available for the necessary infrastructure. It was to be part of the new forensic science laboratory, for which, equally, there was a lack of funding. We have now identified an alternative way of establishing the DNA database and work in that regard is ongoing. It is very urgent as I am anxious that we have a DNA database as early as possible.
The legislation relating to it, on which my predecessor did a substantial amount of work, required further work. However, the advice from the Attorney General's office was that there were gaps in it. The office has been doing some work on it and I hope we will be in a position to publish the DNA database legislation in the period after Easter and before the summer recess. Owing to the pressures exerted by the drafting of legislation relevant to the EU-IMF-ECB agreement the personnel engaged in the preparation of legislation have had to give priority to that legislation and in the absence of the infrastructure required I had to make decisions about which legislation we should prioritise. However, I hope the DNA legislation will be published before the summer vacation, that it will be enacted before the end of the year and that by sometime next year we will have the infrastructure in place. At that point we will be able to trigger implementation of this provision.
The Deputy raised a question about what it would mean initially. It means that one simply checks either DNA or fingerprint data to see if there is a match. It does not initially reveal anybody's identity. That is what it means. It may well be that we are making inquiries about a crime we are investigating here and we might make an inquiry of the United States as to the identity of an individual or seek other relevant information, and it might do the same with us. It is about establishing if there is a commonality of DNA or fingerprint records and then moving forward. Again, however, it only means providing information that one can lawfully and properly provide under domestic law.
I asked about the deletion of records.
Article 15, subparagraph (3), provides that the recorded data shall be protected with suitable measures against inappropriate use and other forms of improper use and shall be kept for two years. After the conservation period, the recorded data shall be deleted immediately unless this is inconsistent with national law. In other words, the fact that there has been a match ceases to be a matter of record and the record is essentially scrubbed.
Is there a process for deleting the information? I am not familiar with the process. How does one delete records?
I presume there will be a computerised system and that there will be mechanisms in place to ensure this happens.
Who oversees the deletion?
I operate on the basis that we will comply with our treaty obligations and that the United States will do likewise. However, the state that supplied information is entitled to ask for oversight or to check that information is being deleted. That is something that might arise at some point, but it is not envisaged that there will be somebody from the State permanently in the United States to check these issues or vice versa. There will be a need for a degree of trust. There is a treaty obligation and just as we comply with our treaty obligations, we expect the United States to do likewise.
However, we have the option-----
There is the option to have a form of checking or oversight if we wish to trigger this, and the United States can do the same with us.
I broadly welcome the co-operation. I would love to see more emphasis on preventing and tackling serious crime, and I would like to know the Minister's view on this. Internationally and nationally, there is less emphasis by police on crime prevention. The community garda who stops a young kid from joining a gang or getting involved in drugs does not get the same respect as others within the police force. We should always focus on community gardaí because they make a massive contribution to the crime debate.
Organised crime is a huge problem internationally and nationally. Does the Minister feel it has gone out of control in the past 12 months? I have seen it devastating families and communities. In the current economic climate and with cuts to Garda stations and the Garda, does the Minister have adequate resources to deal with organised crime?
The Minister mentioned white collar crime. Is he satisfied that there are professional and efficient standards and resources to catch the people involved in white collar crime? Our people are extremely angry at these people and they feel they are getting away with it.
Deputy McGrath, you strayed a little from the motion in speaking about community gardaí and other matters.
The Minister mentioned them in his contribution.
Yes, but they do not, strictly, relate to the motion. However, I am sure the Minister will answer you.
All the issues I touched on were mentioned in the Minister's contribution.
I do not think I mentioned community gardaí.
The Minister referred to the importance of crime prevention.
Preventing and tackling serious crime is particularly important. There is even more emphasis on tackling serious crime now than in past years. There is far greater co-operation at European Union level in this area. At European Council of Ministers meetings, which I attend, there is ongoing discussion and focus on how we maximise co-operation at European Union level in tackling serious crime. A range of measures is currently under consideration and discussion. There is increased co-operation between police forces across Europe. What we are doing now is relevant to one small piece in the jigsaw of co-operation between this State and the United States of America in tackling organised and serious crime. This is ongoing work. I am engaged in various initiatives. I will not delay the committee by going into them. We have discussed them on other occasions. There is a great deal of support.
Co-operation between the PSNI and the Garda Síochána is at a very high level. There has been substantial success in crime prevention and tackling serious crime. The co-operation has extended across Europe and within this island. There have been seizure of drugs and smuggled cigarettes. There have been co-ordinated events which have involved the PSNI, the Garda Síochána and other European Union police forces, and there is engagement with Interpol. There has been substantial co-operation at a range of levels which has focused on organised crime and white collar crime. Unfortunately, no matter how efficient a police force is and no matter how well it is resourced there will always be dishonest, bad and very dangerous people who take the view that they are smarter than everyone else, have no respect for anyone else's safety or human rights and will engage in criminality. There is no magic bullet that brings to an end all criminality here, across the European Union or in the United States.
The Garda Síochána, under the leadership of the current Commissioner, is doing a superb job. There has been a fine-tuning of its operational capability. The focus, within the context of the difficulties of the State, is to use our resources to the maximum extent. Throwing money at solving problems, as opposed to employing greater efficiency, does not succeed. Greater efficiency, targeted operations, focusing on how we reform the structure within the Garda and even the provision and location of Garda stations to take account of the fact that we are now in the 21st century and not the 19th, are of huge importance.
The issue has no particular relevance to the motion, but the Deputy raised the closure of Garda stations. Garda stations opened across the whole of Ireland over many decades, not based on any oversight of where they were needed but on a fragmented basis. The location of the majority of Garda stations was probably determined prior to 1922 and we continued with them in those locations. If they were moved they were moved only a few hundred yards down the road.
We are now modernising the structure and the Garda Commissioner is engaged in that process. We have a very efficient Garda force and it has had many successes. Every week, arrests and interventions occur and bravery is displayed by members of the force. We must always remember that we have an unarmed force that is frequently confronted by violent people carrying arms who have no respect for human life. Even in the political hurly-burly and accepting the importance of opposition Deputies holding Ministers to account, it is a good thing to recognise the extraordinary work done by the Garda, its successes, its bravery and the extent to which it serves the community. It is too easy, from the opposition side, to be sceptical and cynical of the work being done and to undervalue it. It is important that we do not do that.
The Minister mentioned the Garda resources needed. Could he outline to the committee the resources to which he referred?
There is a very simple and basic question. What funding do I have available to me as Minister for Justice and Equality to provide to the Garda Síochána to facilitate it fulfilling all of its objectives? In the current financial climate and to meet the objectives of reducing our public expenditure and narrowing the deficit, my Department has available to it €100 million less this year than last year. That is a consequence of the profligacy and insane spending of the previous Government and the failure to ensure that the huge economic tsunami with which we have been hit would not occur. Very soon after my appointment as Minister I met the Garda Commissioner and asked him to look at what efficiency he could introduce.
I do not want to talk about the Garda as a lean mean force, because the Garda is not mean in the sense that could be understood. The Commissioner has introduced various strategies and efficiency which have proved very successful. We have a police plan for 2012. The Commissioner has set out his priorities in that plan and we are providing to him the resources necessary to facilitate his implementing it. Announcements will be made with regard to the funding available and addressing some issues we could not address in 2011 because funding had not been targeted in the budget of December 2010. We will make announcements within the coming days and weeks which will illustrate how, even in circumstances of financial stringency, important assets can be acquired to the benefit of the Garda Síochána.
I take this opportunity to thank the Minister and his officials for coming to the meeting.
I thank members for their assistance and co-operation in agreeing to take both important motions this afternoon. I welcome the fact that both motions had the broad support of members from all sides.