In America, looking at the Irish question from the outside, he saw that the time was come when the English Government would make every effort possible to break the morale of the people. They were only human, and when excessive force was being used it would be only human nature to break under it. That was why he was particularly anxious to come back. He felt it was his duty to be there. It was a contest between might and right. The enemy had got superior forces and equipment, and all Ireland had was the power of moral resistance. The question was how far could they keep their people up to this resistance. Looking at it from the outside, his opinion was that the policy demanded now was a delaying policy. Time was on their side, and they ought to make up their minds to hold out. They should not seek a decision. A strong aggressive policy to bring a decision would be right if they were strong enough, but seeing they were not strong enough, the delaying policy was the right one. Their policy should be to stick on, to show no change on the outside as far as possible, and at the same time to make the burden on the people as light as they could. This policy might necessitate a lightening off of their attacks on the enemy. The change was so slight it could best be initiated by the machinery of administration rather than by public proclamations or acts. Any external change would be disastrous; the country would be broken up. They all saw how Lloyd George's attitude immediately changed with regard to Truce negotiations when he got Father O'Flanagan's telegram and the bogus resolution of the Galway County Council.