While carrying out his undertaking given to me last night to limit the operations of this Bill to a period of two years, still I would like to endeavour to get the Minister, if possible, to reconsider his decision now in regard to that period. I think it might be well, in discussing this amendment, which, of course, alters the whole character of the Bill, because it makes it a temporary one instead of a permanent one, to consider the real object of the Bill. There is some misunderstanding about its object. Under the law as it now stands, it is possible to substitute a temporary Circuit Court judge for one who is unable to perform his duties owing to illness. That is provided for by Section 45 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924. What this Bill proposes is, as I said yesterday, an entirely different thing. It is not to extend that principle, but it is introducing an entirely new one. It says that in future not only in a case of illness may a Circuit Court judge be replaced by a temporary Circuit judge, but also, that owing to other public duties or services temporarily imposed upon him or for any other sufficient reason such substitution may be made. I would like to impress upon the House the width and the scope of this measure, and the difference between what it proposes and what the existing law is. That is one of the principal reasons why I endeavoured to get the Minister to make the Bill as short as possible in duration.
The Minister said yesterday that he did not think there was any introduction of a new principle. He said it was merely extending the principle embodied in the existing law. But, as I pointed out to him, surely the fact of a judge being ill is not due to any act on the part of the State, but is what we, in legal parlance, call an act of God. The fact of a Circuit Court judge being taken from the position in which he is put by the State, and taken from the Bench, and put into another position by the State, is entirely a different state of affairs, and should be governed by entirely different regulations.
There were three alternatives open for the Minister. The first alternative was, as pointed out yesterday, that when occasions arose to appoint men of integrity and ability and legal acumen to certain positions, the Executive need not necessarily confine themselves to the rota of Circuit judges. There is a large body of lawyers amongst whom a good many would be found to answer the description I have just given. That would do away altogether with the necessity that has arisen in this case. But the Minister did not seem inclined to adopt that suggestion. To my mind that was the proper course for the State to pursue. Once a man is appointed to the position of Circuit Court judge, no matter how great his ability in that direction, and in other directions, he should not be disturbed from his post and he should be left to stick to his last. Others might be found to preside over commissions and do other public service equally as well.
The second alternative would be to create more permanent judges. Undoubtedly there is a necessity for more judges, more Circuit Court judges, as well as High Court judges. That would render it possible to have the areas of jurisdiction presided over by those judges curtailed, and it might give them, I do not say necessarily would give them, a certain time that they could devote to other public duties imposed upon them at the pleasure of the Executive Council. That course either has not been adopted yet. But the course adopted by this Bill as it now stands is, that at least for the period of two years, according to the Minister's amendment, the State is to have the power to appoint any number of temporary judges it pleases on the grounds that owing to other public duties or for any other sufficient reason a judge cannot fulfil his duties on the Bench. That I suggest is a very wide scope of discretion to give to the Executive Council. The principle of appointing temporary judges at all is I think a vicious one and one which should not be entertained; and all the more so if that principle was to be made permanent in this Bill, if it became law, as it originally stood enabling, at any future time, the then existing Government to appoint any number of temporary judges to take the place of existing Circuit Court judges who might be pursuing elsewhere public duties or for any other sufficient reason.
The Minister has carried out his undertaking to limit the operations of this Bill to two years and certainly so far so good. In doing that I admit that the whole character of the Bill has become altered because instead of being a permanent measure it has become more or less a temporary one. What I would have preferred would be that the Minister would have introduced a strictly ad hoc measure for the immediate necessities of this case which he said was a particularly urgent one but he preferred not to do so.
He has preferred the method that is now adopted. There is one gratification we must have, at any rate, and that is, that this measure is not to be taken as a precedent for the whole future policy of this country in regard to the appointment of judges. We have that crumb of satisfaction from the Minister's intention and amendment to limit the operation of this Bill to two years. I would have preferred, and I still prefer, that it should be limited still further. I do not see the necessity for the two years' limitation. I think it might have been six months or might possibly even yet be reduced to one year. I do not know whether he would consider splitting the difference between Deputy Little's proposal and his own in agreeing to limit the Bill to one year. Personally I abhor the Bill because I think it is against the principles of the Constitution and the principles of justice as it should be properly administered by impartial and independent judges.
I am not going to weary the House by going into any other argument on that score because I think there is no one in the House, including the Minister himself—in fact, he has himself admitted that he has not any love for the policy of creating temporary judges—in favour of it, and the only thing I would like to ask is if it would be possible for the Minister to consider now the reduction of the period from two years if not to six months at least to one year. Then it would be really more an ad hoc proposal to meet the immediate emergency and necessity of the case. If he does not choose to do so, of course, I am personally bound by my undertaking to support this Bill, because he has distinctly altered the character of it by conceding the period of two years as against making it a permanent measure which I would have strenuously opposed.
