Before I proceed to deal with the two questions I asked to-day and the reason that I found the replies unsatisfactory, I should like to know if the Minister for Justice requires any long time to reply to any observations I may have to offer or is he going to confine himself to the abbreviated answer he gave to-day? It may be necessary to divide the time somewhat between us. Does the Minister say that he will require a long time?
Adjournment Debate. - Exercise of the Prerogative.
Of course a question put in that form really is not deserving of an answer at all.
Very good, I shall go on, sir.
When the Deputy is calculatedly offensive.
I offered to divide the time with him but he does not want to. I raised two questions which were replied to together by the Minister for Justice. I asked if he would state:
"(a) the offence with which Charles Dullea was charged at the Cork Circuit Court Criminal Sittings last March; (b) the result of this trial and the sentence imposed; (c) the term actually served by Charles Dullea; (d) whether the trial judge recommended for or against the remission of sentence; (e) whether the Minister for Justice recommended the remission and (f) the general grounds on which sentence was remitted."
I asked very much the same question and the same particulars in regard to Doctor Levison except that in the second question I put in "if any appeal on the matter came before the Court of Criminal Appeal and, if so, what was the result." The replies were given together and I want to say that I am entirely satisfied with what was given to me in regard to the particulars asked for under (a), (b) and (c) in the first case and (a), (b), (c) and (d) in the second case. These satisfactory points were as follows:—
Charles Dullea was convicted on two charges of rape (against the same person on two separate occasions) at Cork Circuit Court on 21st March, 1932 and was sentenced to three years' penal servitude on each charge, the sentence to run concurrently.
He was committed to prison on that date, 21st March, 1932, and was released on 17th June following.
This gentleman was convicted of two charges of rape, committed to prison on 21st March, and released on 17th June. So the Minister states.
Human Levison was convicted at Dublin Circuit Court on 16th December, 1931, of being a principal in the second degree to using an instrument to procure miscarriage and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose. He was sentenced to three years' penal servitude for the first offence and to 12 months' imprisonment for the second offence, the sentences to run concurrently. He was committed to prison on that date, 16th December, 1931. An application to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal was refused. He was released on 7th July, 1932.
So this gentleman who was convicted in the second degree of using an instrument to procure miscarriage—a slightly different offence from the other, but equally disgusting—and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose, and who got a sentence of three years' penal servitude and was committed to prison on 16th December last year, was released on 7th July of this year.
As far as the remaining items were concerned, I got what I consider a most unsatisfactory reply. I asked did the trial judge recommend for or against the remission of sentence. I was told:—
It is not the practice to disclose the reasons for the exercise of the prerogative in such cases, or the nature of the recommendation made by the trial judge.
I did not ask for the nature of the recommendation. I asked a simple question—did he recommend for or against the remission of sentence? I was fobbed off with the answer that "it is not the practice to disclose the reasons for the exercise of the prerogative or the nature of the recommendation." I was told in each case "The release was on my recommendation." Therefore, the Minister has recommended, in the case of a gentleman convicted of two charges of rape against the same person on two separate occasions, sentenced to three years' penal servitude, and committed to prison on 21st March, that he should be released on 17th June following. The Minister has also accepted the responsibility to this House for having recommended—and for getting the Executive Council to accept the recommendation—the release of a man convicted of procuring miscarriage and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose, who was sentenced to three years' penal servitude last December and was released on 7th July of this year. The Minister simply states that his recommendation for release was issued in the exercise of the prerogative, and then he hides himself behind the statement that it is not the practice to disclose the reasons for the exercise of the prerogative.
It must be very apparent to anybody who knows the atmosphere of this country with regard to sexual crimes, and to anybody who knows the Catholic mind that runs through this country generally and the peculiar view—the strict, rigid view— which is taken with regard to all such offences, that the public mind is apt to be gravely disquieted by the fact that a man convicted of rape against the same person on two separate occasions and sentenced to three years' penal servitude for the offence, was released after three months, and that a man convicted of being a principal in the second degree to using an instrument to procure miscarriage and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose, and sentenced to three years' penal servitude, was also released after a few months. One would have thought that a person appreciative of that point of view would have taken the opportunity of explaining, at least to this House, that the Trial Judge had recommended the releases. If that answer had been given, the public mind, which has been gravely disquieted over the cases of these two people, convicted of two outrageous offences, would have been to some extent, satisfied. The Minister, however, says that it is not the practice to disclose the nature of the recommendation made.
I am not going to go into the sordid details of either of these cases, but I do want to say with regard to the case of Charles Dullea, convicted by a jury and sentenced to three years' penal servitude and released after a few months, that, after his release, he was sued civilly in Cork for an alleged indecent assault committed on the 16th November last—the same occasion and the same act which got him the three years on the criminal charge previously. When the case came into court, it was then made known to the Judge that this gentleman had been released. His lordship then stated that if he was released it was against his lordship's advice. In the Judge's own words: "I stated that there was no ground on which he should be released." The Minister says that that is a very improper observation.
A very improper observation.
It is not more improper than the Minister's conduct in releasing the man and failing to give a reason for his release, and if it be put to the test of the public conscience it will be found, I think, that the Judge will stand higher than the Minister.
However, the case went on. The girl was produced and gave evidence; so did the doctor and the girl's father. Was there a plea entered by the prisoner—remember that this was after the Minister had been moved in some way to release this man, and presumably, on this man's behalf, some plea was made which moved the Minister to get him released, and now he appears in Court charged civilly with the same offence—does he put forward any plea on his own behalf? No. A solicitor examines him on the point only of means as to what damages he can pay. The defendant in his evidence stated that: "the greater portion of his farm of about 60 acres was mountainy land. He had a wife and six young children, and was obliged to pay his father and mother £6 per year, in addition to meeting all the obligations on the farm. It was urged on his behalf that he was poor and could not bear heavy damages. His lordship said he had to give the girl damages which he thought her entitled to; it would be a big sum, but having regard to the position of the defendant he would fix the amount at £250. He allowed costs, and ordered £50 to be paid within fourteen days and the balance within six months." The foregoing is from the newspaper report of the trial.
Let us get that in perspective. A man is tried criminally on two charges of rape, as the Minister has put it himself, against the same person on two separate occasions; is convicted and sentenced to three years' penal servitude on each charge to run concurrently. He is put into prison on 21st March and is released on the following 17th June. He is released for some reason unknown to this House, and certainly for some reason, as it appears, unknown to the Judge. He comes before a civil court for the same offence, only this time he is being sued civilly.
The same Judge?
And the same Judge. It was a jury which found him guilty the first time and if the Minister thinks that the judge was wrong in making that remark——
His name was improperly introduced by you.
I am quoting from the newspaper, and his name would not have been introduced at all if the Judge had recommended the release, but the Minister thought to hide himself behind a principle which he raised for the occasion. This man this time was sued civilly before the Judge who gave him sentence after a jury had found him guilty and the man did not put in any evidence on his own behalf. He merely pleaded inability to pay heavy damages. The Minister shelters behind the prerogative; it is not desirable to have the prerogative discussed. I agree there are limits within which the prerogative should be discussed or might be discussed in this House, but when the public conscience is excited by a person convicted of rape and sentenced to three years being let out after three months, is the public conscience not to be allayed by having it stated that the Judge at the trial did recommend against the remission or that he recommended for it? The Minister will not state that. What is undesirable in having it stated?
If the mere statement that the Judge recommended that the sentence should be remitted had been made, as it could have been made, to the House to-day, it would probably have satisfied most people. The thing to be noted is that there was no appeal made by Charles Dullea against the sentence on a criminal charge and an appeal was open on a variety of grounds. No appeal was taken. The appeal was to the Minister who had not seen the trial, who had not seen the witnesses and who had no capacity to judge from the demeanour of the people where right lay and where wrong was. Then, as to the aftermath, when that same individual was sued civilly on the same charge he did not enter any defence for himself.
I now come to the case of Dr. Levison. According to the Minister, he was convicted, on the count of being principal in the second degree, of using an instrument with a view to procuring miscarriage and of conspiracy to use an instrument for that purpose. He also got three years and he served from mid December until July of this year. Then he too was released, but his case went through a different procedure. He was tried here in Dublin. There was a certain point in the trial. Counsel defending him asked for a direction, submitting that there was no legal evidence of conspiracy against him. The Judge refused the application and the trial proceeded. The newspaper report of the winding-up of that case states that the Judge charged the jury at length and said that the offence of performing an illegal operation, with a view to miscarriage was a very serious one— second only to the capital offence. The Minister who released this man probably knows that himself. The jury retired and, returning after a certain time, they found Levison guilty on the count of being principal in the second degree. Applications for certificates for leave to appeal were made and the Judge said he would decide the matter in the morning.
Eventually the case came before the Court of Criminal Appeal. It was there argued for a couple of days. According to the newspaper reports, in the application of Levison there were fourteen grounds in which it was submitted that the verdicts were unreasonable, perverse, unsupported by evidence, and against the evidence; that the evidence of the girl was inadmissible on the count of conspiracy; that the trial was unsatisfactory and that there had been a miscarriage of justice. The judgment of the Court was read by one of the Judges who said that the Court saw no reason for holding that the trial was unsatisfactory and were of opinion that there was no reasonable ground to interfere with the verdict of the jury.
Again, let us get this into proper perspective. A man stands his trial before a jury and the jury convict him. He is sentenced to three years. He takes an appeal and the appeal introduces all these things I have referred to. At the end the Court of Criminal Appeal say that they saw no reason for holding that the trial was unsatisfactory and were of opinion that there was no reasonable ground to interfere with the verdict of the jury. A further application was thereupon made for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the decision involved a point of law of exceptional public importance. The answer of the Court was that the Court considered that no point of law of exceptional public importance was involved in their decision and they refused the application.
The Minister recommends the release and the Executive Council accept that. When I seek to get some information on this point—and I want the phraseology I used in the question attended to—I am really refused an answer. I asked in each case whether the trial judge recommended for or against the remission of sentence, whether the Minister for Justice recommended the remission and the general grounds on which sentence was remitted. Why may we not be told in a case of this type that the trial judge recommended the remission of sentence or that he did not? May I suggest that the present Government, which has not shown itself very anxious to keep confidential information confidential, would not have failed to say that the trial judge had recommended a remission if, in fact, the trial judge had recommended it? Why this peculiar delicacy about stating matters of this kind?
I would like the Minister to be more specific. Is the Minister suggesting that I have revealed——
The Deputy.
I would like the Deputy to be specific. Is the Deputy suggesting that in any other connection I revealed confidential information?
No, I do not.
I wanted that made clear. It will shorten my reply.
But the Minister's colleagues did.
Not at all.
It will save time afterwards—that is, if I get time to reply.
I asked the Minister what time he required and he would not answer me civilly.
The Minister must be given a reasonable time in which to reply.
I have been often, as a Minister, refused even ten minutes in which to reply. I asked the Minister did he want the time divided and he would not make a civil answer to me.
The question was put in an offensive form.
The Deputy will not get away with it this time either.
I say that if we had been told the trial judge had recommended a remission, if, in fact, the trial judge had done so, we would have been satisfied. I can see nothing undesirable in that simple statement being made. I could see quite a lot of undesirable remarks flowing from the reasons that were given, if they were to be gone into in detail. I can see no reason whatever for refusing to state that the trial judge did or did not recommend remission. I have asked for the general grounds upon which the sentences were remitted. If I had asked the Minister to go into a long, detailed explanation, he could have refused. On the other hand, he could have stated that fresh evidence had been brought before him; he could have stated various things.
What about the ten minutes which the Minister should have in order to reply?
The Minister could have said various things, but he did not state any of those things. He hides himself behind this idea, that it is undesirable to have the reasons disclosed—that it is not the practice to disclose the reasons for the exercise of the prerogative in such cases or the nature of the recommendation made by the trial judge. Does the Minister not consider, in such bad cases as these, involving very bad sexual offences, one of which must undoubtedly excite the public conscience —that is, the growth of such offences as the procuring of miscarriage—that it would have been far more desirable even to give the detailed grounds—no matter what they might have led to— upon which the Executive Council accepted his recommendation to release these two people? The Minister has not decided to do so and he can stand before the public hereafter as the man who released, after three months, a person who had been convicted of rape and sentenced to three years.
You know the men on your own back benches can deny that.
I did not understand what the Minister said.
You can take it to yourself.
If the Minister wants me to take it to myself he should let me know what it is. In the case of a man who was given three years for using an instrument for a certain purpose, the Minister thought fit to release him after seven months. He hides in each case behind the prerogative and he will not say whether the trial judge recommended it or did not recommend and what are the general grounds on which the Executive Council acted.
Ask some of your own back benchers.
It has been suggested that this man, Charles Dullea, and, I suppose, this man Levison, had such a grip over the Party to which I belong that, without rhyme or reason, or without any pretence of right, they have been released from terms of penal servitude. Charles Dullea was so anxious to enlist the services of the Fianna Fáil Party to influence me to do something corrupt that, instead of presenting his petition, as hundreds of prisoners present petitions (practically all of them unsuccessfully), by sending it to me directly or by sending it to me through some intermediary, he is such a pal of the Fianna Fáil Party that he adopts the course of sending his petition direct to the Governor-General, and the Governor-General on 12th May graciously sends it to my secretary. A very subtle way of reaching the heart of the Fianna Fáil Party; a very unusual way, I may say, of presenting a petition. The Deputy put certain questions to me to-day and I answered that I felt that it is in the highest degree undesirable that the grounds on which the prerogative of mercy is exercised should be stated; that it is undesirable to drag the name of the judge into this matter by saying that he made a recommendation for or against, that he made a recommendation at all, or that he was consulted. The responsibility is upon me. The responsibility on me is a much wider responsibility than that thrown on either judge or jury. They are restricted by well-known, well-defined, inflexible rules of evidence. It is part of my duty to try to ascertain the truth, to ascertain it even by hearsay, provided it is reliable hearsay, to take every circumstance into account. If I had a little longer time to do it, I would put that to the House in language more eloquent than I have at my command. I refer to the report of the Committee that inquired nearly thirty years ago into the Adolph Beck case. Let me quote a little of it. That Committee said:
"The Committee complain that the failure to release Beck was due to the failure of the Home Office officials in the Petition Section to grasp the legal points in the petition which, if grasped, must have resulted in his release."
Further they say:
"The Home Office has already power to redress miscarriages arising out of findings of fact. Even where partial guilt only is clear, the wide jurisdiction under the prerogative of mercy admits of a large discretion in re-adjusting sentences. The Secretary of State is not invariably guided by the Judge's opinion; in some cases he has acted contrary to the Judge's opinion."
It is a long time since that report was issued and we are supposed to have progressed a good deal since in point of time. Some people think that we have progressed, if I might say so, in a geographical sense too; that possibly we might take an even more liberal view in this country than was taken in England, at all events the England away back in the early part of this century. As is pointed out in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Levison case, the Court of Criminal Appeal or the Judge of First Instance has no power to interfere in a question of fact. That was pointed out in the Court. The Deputy might have taken the precaution of reading that judgment before he launched this attack. If the Deputy had taken the trouble to read the charge of the learned Circuit Court Judge of Dublin to the jury in the Levison case, not merely would the Deputy have refrained from introducing the matter in the House, but he would have marvelled how any jury, in the teeth of that charge, could have convicted Levison. At all events, the Minister for Justice, as the repository, in effect, of the prerogative of mercy, is the only person who can redress such a wrong, if it is done. There is no other machinery in the country. I would be wanting in my duty if I did not do it.
Mr. G. O'Sullivan rose.
Deputies
Sit down!
I am sure the House has been impressed already, when Deputy McGilligan and Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney got up here to throw stones at the man taken in sin, and I am sure they will be delighted if Deputy Geróid O'Sullivan will join them and throw a stone. The stones thrown at the woman taken in sin will be forgotten after this performance.
I am sure the Minister will not refuse to answer a question.
The Minister got only eight minutes for his reply.
He has not replied.
Sit down.
Is the Minister setting himself up as Judge and jury over the Judges and juries who already tried the case?
I have only now a few seconds to conclude and there are a few more observations I should like to have made. Let me say this, however. If any Deputy is genuinely interested in the principles upon which the prerogative of mercy is exercised, these principles could have been discussed here without the introduction of the name of any person. Some Deputies would have thought it was not a courageous thing to drag in the name of Levison and Charles Dullea, men who are not here to answer back; men for whom it is not part of my duty to answer.
It is.
My function is an entirely different one. My function is to see that any man against whom guilt has not been proved is not kept in jail. It is not enough for me to be told that the Catholic mind is excited or that Charles Dullea may have committed a sin. What I must see to is, whether there has been guilt duly proven against him and, if there has not, I have a duty, and it is a duty I will not shirk and I will not be intimidated even by questions like this. If a case arises to-morrow or the next day, in which I am satisfied, as fully as I was satisfied in this, I will again exercise the prerogative of mercy without the slightest fear of an illjudged and unfair question being placed on the Order Paper.
The Dáil adjourned at 11 p.m. until Friday, 28th October, at 10.30 a.m.