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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 30 Jun 1936

Vol. 63 No. 5

In Committee on Finance. - Estimates for Public Services. Vote 26—Law Charges.

I move:—

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £43,150 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1937, chun Tuarastail agus Costaisí Oifig an Príomh-Atúrnae, etc., agus chun Costaisí Coir-Phróiseacht agus Dlí-Mhuirearacha eile, maraon le Deontas i gcabhair do Chostaisí áirithe is iníochta amach as Rátaí Aitiúla do réir Reachta.

That a sum not exceeding £43,150 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1937, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Office of the Attorney-General, etc., and for the Expenses of Criminal Prosecutions and other Law Charges, including a Grant in relief of certain Expenses payable by Statute out of Local Rates.

Is the Attorney-General not going to say anything at this stage?

We have come here to hear the Deputy.

This Vote includes the Attorney-General's salary and, consequently, I want to take advantage of it to press for further information about two matters of great importance for which the Attorney-General is primarily responsible. One is the decision to try the More O'Ferrall murder case before a jury instead of before the Military Tribunal.

The Attorney-General

A Chinn Comhairle, I do not want to say that I am not perfectly willing to discuss the More O'Ferrall case, but I think it proper to draw your attention, Sir, to this fact: Four men were arraigned and tried before a jury. The first jury before which they were brought disagreed. They were subsequently tried before a second jury and were acquitted by that jury, and the judge informed the jury that he agreed with their verdict. I do not know whether it is in order or proper to discuss that trial here in this House, or to suggest in any way that these men were not properly acquitted.

I do not propose to suggest that. I could say a very great deal on that subject, but I do not propose to do so. I just wish to confine myself to ascertaining the principle upon which the Attorney-General came to the conclusion that that particular case ought to be tried before a jury and not before the Military Tribunal.

The Attorney-General raised a point of order which Deputy MacDermot has answered in intimating that he did not propose to deal with the Edgeworthstown case except with regard to the venue of the trial. The question as to whether that case should have gone before the Military Tribunal or before the ordinary courts was debated on the Justice Vote.

With much respect, Sir, what I said just now was not that I did not propose to discuss the propriety of the venue, but that I did not propose to discuss the propriety of the verdict. I do want to ascertain whether or not it was a suitable case to be sent to the Military Tribunal.

Which is precisely what the Chair said.

With all respect, Sir, that matter was touched on in the Justice Vote. I myself touched on it, and, I said that it was primarily a matter for the Attorney-General, and he himself, intervening on that Vote, supported that view and said that it was entirely a matter for his decision.

The Attorney-General

I did not say any such thing. If I did, I said something which was not correct. At any rate, I have no recollection of stating any such thing. As a matter of fact, if the Deputy looks up the Act and the relevant Schedule—I think he has the Schedule of the Act in front of him——

The Attorney-General

——he will see that it is a matter for the Executive Minister and not for me at all. I could not send a case to the Military Tribunal unless the Executive Minister gave a certificate that it was a proper case to be brought there.

Surely, it is the function of the Attorney-General to advise as to the legal aspects of such matters?

The Attorney-General

Yes.

Well, at any rate, I remember very distinctly that, in the course of the debate on the Justice Vote, the Attorney-General said that he was surprised at the matter being raised at all on the Justice Vote and that it was a matter that could be raised with more appropriateness on his Vote. I submit, Sir, that I am in order in asking the Attorney-General whether or not he adopts the explanation given by the Acting-Minister for Justice on the Justice Vote—an explanation that had never been offered in this House before and that, if offered at all, ought surely to be offered by a legal expert and discussed and criticised by legal experts. The explanation given by the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, acting as Minister for Justice, was that the offence committed at Lissard was not one that could be regarded with certainty as having been committed with the object of impairing or impeding the machinery of government or the administration of justice.

I submit, Sir, that Deputy MacDermot ought to quote what I did say, because he certainly is not quoting what I said on that occasion at all. The Deputy should not misquote me.

I am not affecting to quote the Minister.

Well, I hope not.

I am referring to the fact that the Minister accused me of flippancy for suggesting that this case was one that could go before the Military Tribunal, and he said that I had evidently not considered the provision in the so-called Public Safety Act, to which I am referring now—the particular part of the Schedule to the Public Safety Act which covers offences that are committed with the object of impairing or impeding the machinery of government or the administration of justice. Now, what I want to suggest. Sir, is that a very large number of cases have, in fact, been tried before the Military Tribunal where there was much more difficulty in holding that there was an attempt to impede or impair the machinery of government or the administration of justice than in the More O'Ferrall case. In fact, I could hardly imagine a murder more directly connected with the impeding and impairing of the machinery of justice.

The position demands some clarification. The Deputy seems to be replying on this Vote to a speech made by the Acting-Minister for Justice on another Vote. The Attorney-General stated that he does not always decide what cases should be referred to the Military Tribunal. The responsibility did not rest upon him in the Longford case. Therefore that matter may not be discussed on this Estimate.

The Attorney-General

I qualified that, and made it clear that I referred all offences which are not mentioned in the Schedule, and which cannot go before the Tribunal, for the Minister's decision. With regard to other cases, I accept responsibility.

The Attorney-General does not accept any responsibility in regard to the More O'Ferrall case?

The Attorney-General

I accept responsibility for advising the Minister if he wants it.

The Attorney-General does not accept responsibility to any such extent as would enable it to be discussed on his Vote. Is that clear?

It is not so clear to me now where the ultimate responsibility lies.

The Attorney-General

I do not suppose I should accept responsibility where I have none. I would be quite glad to do so to enable the Deputy to discuss the matter, but I referred already to clause 7 of the Appendix to the Article which sets out the offences which may be sent to the Tribunal without any certificate. Then we have:

Any offence whatsoever... in respect of which an Executive Minister certifies in writing under his hand that to the best of his belief the act constituting such offence was done with the object of impairing or impeding the machinery of government or the administration of justice.

I may take a view with regard to certain offences, and I may apply for the Minister's certificate and I may not get it. He is master of the situation and must be satisfied. He must make up his own mind about certifying to the best of his belief, and the responsibility for that is surely on him.

The responsibility is apparently a Ministerial one and does not concern the Attorney-General. In any case, the question was discussed on the Vote for the office of the Minister for Justice.

Very well, I cannot proceed further, but I am bound to say that I feel somewhat aggrieved, possibly through my own misunderstanding. I do not think I was at all singular in that misunderstanding. I imagined the matter ought not to be fully gone into on the Vote for the Minister for Justice and I accordingly postponed remarks that I would otherwise have made then to this occasion. There is one other piece of legal advice about which I hope this evening to get some elucidation from the Attorney-General, and that is the advice which I presume comes from him, and must come from him, that the organisation known as the Irish Republican Army was so manifestly an illegal organisation that there was nothing to be gained by proclaiming it as such under the Public Safety Act. I want to ask the Attorney-General to tell us when he first tendered that advice to his colleagues. Did he tender it when he was in Opposition? Did he tender it before the general election in which they associated themselves as closely as they could with that body?

The Attorney-General

Again, that is not my responsibility. Surely that is the responsibility of the Executive Council. They alone can proclaim a body an unlawful association.

It was not when the Attorney-General was in Opposition.

No, and I do not propose to say anything more about that. But he was Attorney-General when they came into power, and I am entitled to inquire from him, as the person to whom the Executive Council must go for advice, when he first told them that the I.R.A. was so manifestly an unlawful organisation.

Let us be clear about this. There is no indication before us that the Attorney-General has any responsibility for tendering such advice. The Acting-Minister for Justice made a certain statement on his own responsibility and spoke on his own behalf. We have no information on what advice the Executive Council or the Acting-Minister for Justice acted.

With great respect, is it not the invariable rule that the Minister for Justice relies on the Attorney-General for advice with regard to certain points? What is the Attorney-General for if not to be consulted by his colleagues on legal points such as this?

Clearly we cannot canvass every statement made by every Minister with reference to every Act of Parliament, as to whether they sought for and obtained the advice of the Attorney-General upon particular points. If we did we would never get finished with the Attorney-General's Vote.

I do not propose to canvass every statement that Ministers make, but I propose to canvass a constitutional point of the utmost importance, about which the Minister for Justice would be grossly negligent in his duty if he had not consulted him.

That point should have been made on the Vote for the Minister for Justice.

I do not accuse the Minister of negligence, but, on the contrary, I am quite confident that he did consult the Attorney-General, and it is on the Attorney-General's advice that I am entitled to information. I submit that I am entitled to it, but if you rule otherwise I must submit.

The Deputy has no information as to whether the Acting-Minister for Justice or any other Minister sought the advice of the Attorney-General on a particular statement that was made, and to ask the Attorney-General if he had tendered advice, without knowing whether it was tendered or not, in my opinion, is a matter that cannot be discussed.

We are discussing the Attorney-General's salary, and if a discussion on that means anything surely I am at least entitled to ask if he tendered that advice. Am I entitled to ask if he did tender that advice? Let him say yes or no.

The Attorney-General

I will reply to anything said afterwards, but not now by way of cross-examination.

After we know that he did tender that advice—if he did—I presume we shall be able to ask him when he tendered it, and to discuss the issues that arise out of his answer.

I do not intend to make many remarks about this Estimate, but, at the outset, I wish to draw the Attorney-General's attention to one matter. I endeavoured to put a question about it in the House some time ago, but it was not allowed. Subsequently it was raised in a discussion as to the legality of the action of the Land Commission when dealing with certain lands in County Mayo. The Attorney-General then undertook to look into the matter, and I have reason to believe that he is in a position to answer. I will put the facts as concisely as possible. The Land Commission purchased a certain farm belonging to a man named Hession, on the Byrne estate in County Mayo, as we were told, for the relief of congestion. The Land Commission did not utilise that farm in its entirety for the purpose for which it was bought, but proceeded to give very substantial portions of it to a doctor and to two national teachers. The Parliamentary Secretary stated in the House subsequently that the land was given to the doctor and the two school teachers as building plots, but it transpired that the doctor received seven acres and the national school teachers five acres each. The land was sold to them for cash. The statement that it was given as building plots had to be retracted in this House, and then we got from the Parliamentary Secretary the statement that it was given to them as cow plots That is a description which is new to me.

The land which was purchased for the relief of congestion, was used as to 17 acres thereof—a very respectably-sized small holding in the County Mayo, a holding admirably suited for the relief of congestion—not for the purpose of relieving congestion, but was distributed amongst the three people whom I have named. I should say in passing, though I think it was practically abandoned in discussion, that the Parliamentary Secretary did at one time say that while this land was being used by the doctor and the national teachers for feeding cows, it would not be able to feed the cow, either by grass in summer or by hay in winter, of the person who had left a congested holding and that, therefore, this land was not suitable for the relief of congestion. However, as I say, it is pretty obvious that that absurd contention could not be persisted in for very long. Therefore, the position is that the Land Commission having purchased land for the relief of congestion have utilised that land for purposes other than those of the relief of congestion. It had been stated here, again and again, by the then Minister, Mr. Connolly, and by the Parliamentary Secretary to the then Minister and the present Minister, Deputy O'Grady, that the Land Commission are not under the control of the Parliamentary Secretary or of the Minister where reserved services are concerned, that this matter of the acquisition and distribution of land is a reserved service, and that the Land Commission acted completely in this matter without any control of the Minister, the Parliamentary Secretary or of this House.

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that if there is any check at all on the Land Commission if they act illegally, the only person who can keep the Land Commission in check and who can take proceedings to prevent their acting illegally and to set aside any undertaking they may have entered into, is the Attorney-General. Accordingly, the question I now put to the Attorney-General is this. This land having been acquired for the relief of congestion under a statute very recently passed by this very Dáil, it can only be used, in my opinion at any rate, for the relief of congestion. It has been utilised for other purposes by the Land Commission and their action, it seems to me at any rate, is clearly and obviously ultra vires. They had no power to enter into these sales. It was a violation of their statutory duty and, accordingly, I ask the Attorney-General, now that he has had a full opportunity of considering the matter, if it is his intention to take proceedings before the proper tribunal to have this question tested, if he considers it necessary that it should be tested or if it is plainly, void ab inito as it would appear to me at any rate, I would ask him whether it is his intention to take proceedings to have the sale of this bit of land, acquired for the relief of congestion, to two national teachers and to a doctor, set aside. I await with interest the reply of the Attorney-General. I hope the Attorney-General will give a favourable reply and, at any rate, that we shall have the views of a competent tribunal on this matter. This, of course, is not a Party matter. It is a matter of very grave interest and very grave importance to the whole country because if the Land Commission are not under the control of the Minister or under the control of this House in these matters, their proceedings must be very carefully watched and, if they exceed their statutory powers, steps must be taken to set the matter right by remedying that excess.

That is the only remark I have got to make on that matter. It is almost the only remark I have got to make upon the Estimate for Law Charges, but there is just one other matter that I should like to place before the Attorney-General in connection with proceedings that are being taken before the Military Tribunal, and in connection, to some extent, also, with the speech of the Acting-Minister for Justice, who is moving about at the present moment so much like the busy bee gathering honey wherever he can. No doubt I entirely agree with the speech made by the Acting-Minister for Justice that the I.R.A. in its constitution is entirely illegal, that there has never been any doubt, or could be any doubt, about the legality of that association. It is is plainly illegal under the terms of the Constitution Amendment Act No. 17. But for a long time, although it was plain and beyond doubt to the Acting-Minister for Justice and plain beyond doubt to the Attorney-General and to the people of the country as a whole, that there was this illegal association in existence, yet the law was held in abeyance as regards that association. Persons who joined that association, though they must have known that they were acting illegally, thought at the same time that they were joining an association whose members were not going to be proceeded against by the Government. Suddenly there was a change of attitude on the part of the Government. For my part I welcome that change of attitude and I welcome the determination, no matter how late in the day, of the Government to put the law into force. I welcome the determination of the Attorney-General to put the law in force against the I.R.A. as an unlawful association but I want to draw the attention of the Attorney-General to this one matter.

The I.R.A. for a very considerable time was not proceeded against, and persons had an idea that they could join the I.R.A. without running any risk of punishment or of imprisonment for joining that body. It had not been proclaimed. This is not a matter for the Attorney-General, of course, and I can only refer in passing to the advisability of following the procedure which the last Government followed in similar circumstances, a procedure which had very successful results, namely, that of giving every person who was a member of the I.R.A. an opportunity of leaving that illegal body and of knowing that if he signed a declaration that he had left that body—as so many of them did in 1931 when the Act became law—no proceedings would be taken against him. This is a matter for the Executive Council and I have only barely alluded to it. I wished I had an opportunity of making these few remarks on the Vote for the Minister for Justice but, of course, I could not have made them then, the proclamation not having been issued at that time. I want to impress on the Attorney-General that when anybody is indicted before the Military Tribunal, membership of the I.R.A. prior to the proclamation should not be a count in the indictment. It was only when the proclamation was issued that such men knew they were acting illegally or if they knew they were acting illegally heretofore they were not aware that the law would take any cognisance of it. They did not know that until this proclamation by the Executive Council was issued or until the speech was made by the Acting-Minister for Justice the day before. It does not seem to me quite fair, therefore, that anybody should be indicted for membership of that association prior to the date of the proclamation. It is very important in dealing with a body like the I.R.A. that there should be no sense of injustice or hard dealing on their part.

That body I know, and I had to deal with them. I hope the Attorney-General will adopt the method that I always adopted. Let them know that the law can be strong where strength is necessary. Let them know that the law can be severe where severity is necessary; but at the same time let them know that the law is scrupulous, just and fair, and that the law will not be put in force against a man except in circumstances of having committed, or been charged with committing, an offence for which he knew he would be proceeded against at the time the offence was committed. I fancy the Attorney-General will very much agree with the spirit of what I have just put forward and will see that no further counts will be contained in any indictment of membership of the I.R.A. when the membership dated from before the proclamation.

I should like to ask: would the Attorney-General give us information as to the number of persons arrested under the Constitution Amendment Act since it came into operation; the number charged before the Military Tribunal and found guilty; the number acquitted; the number still awaiting trial, and the longest period for which any person arrested is still awaiting trial?

The Attorney-General

I do not think that is a question for me at all. I am only responsible for charging them. I understand what the Deputy asks is the responsibility of the Minister for Defence, or the Minister for Justice. However, I could not give information like that off-hand.

All the observations I have to make upon this Estimate will, I am afraid, be extremely prosaic. I find I have only one grievance against the Attorney-General since last year; and a discussion of this kind is bound to be prosaic unless you can bring up some grievances against the head of the Department. When I have unburdened myself of the one grievance I have against the Attorney-General, I should then like to put one or two questions to him. First of all, I want to ask why it was, when a State Solicitor was appointed recently for Clare, a Mayo man was exported from Mayo and imported into the County Clare? The Leas-Cheann Comhairle will appreciate the point I am making, because there are in his constituency at least 14 competent solicitors. It struck me, looking at it purely as an outsider, and viewing the practice as it was when I was vested with that rather appalling necessity of making one of these appointments, that the policy then adopted was to give the appointment to a practitioner in the area in question. During the entire time that I had the appalling necessity of making such appointments—and I sympathise with the Attorney-General when faced with that job, because there is no more trying experience in one's duty as head of the Department than to have to select one from 14 people who are extremely active in pursuit of the job—I always appointed a local man.

While I sympathise with the Attorney-General, I still feel a considerable grievance that somebody from Mayo had to be brought in and placed over the heads of the 14 local practitioners in Clare. 99 per cent. of these men— indeed, I think the whole of them—are competent. Why it was necessary to bring in a complete outsider from Clare to fill the job passes my understanding. I should hurry to say that I understand that the gentleman in question has Clare connections. I think if he had not that equity, so to speak, he would not be able to put his nose inside Clare. Knowing Clare as I do, having practised there on many occasions at Quarter Sessions and Assizes, I think the Attorney-General did a rather bold act, if not a rash act, even though he satisfied himself of the fact that the person in question had Clare relations. But it does imply a vote of censure, on the part of the Attorney-General, on the 14 practitioners in Clare. I do press upon the Attorney-General, and I do so in all seriousness, that in all future appointments to be made the proper person to be appointed is a local practitioner. Bringing in an outsider is in itself some sort of censure upon local practitioners. I think local people are better able to deal with matters that they have to hand on to the Attorney-General from their own county. They have to practise in a variety of matters before the District Court in connection with summary proceedings. They are familiar with local conditions and with the local people and with all things which are of inestimable value to the Attorney-General when prosecutions are being considered, and when, subsequently, after a conviction is obtained through the District Court, in considering what attitude the Attorney-General would take up if the conviction be a question of punishment.

The question of prosecuting for indictable offences is a matter of considerable importance. On the Estimates for the Department of Justice I raised a question as to whether or not an abnormal number of cases had not been transferred in the last couple of years from the country to the City of Dublin. In that matter, in the connection as to whether or not a particular case should be transferred from the country to the City of Dublin, for trial, a question upon which the Attorney-General would want advice, he must rely mostly upon the advice of the local State solicitor. Speaking generally, the Gárda are most anxious to have these cases transferred. There is a natural reason for that, because the City and County Dublin jurors are more or less apart from local considerations, and have been doing their duty in a courageous and upright fashion in the last 12 or 14 years. The result is that the local Gárda authorities think that they are more certain of a conviction from jurors in the City or County of Dublin than locally, and consequently they press, in 90 per cent. of their cases, for a change of venue. The State solicitor is an interested individual, too. He discounts the chances of a prosecution, if conducted locally, and he wants it taken somewhere else. Accordingly, if a transfer takes place the responsibility is passed on to somebody else. At the same time, he knows the local conditions and is in a good position to take an impartial view of the question whether or not a case is fit to be transferred to the County or City of Dublin. When I raised this point on the Estimate for the Minister for Justice, the Attorney-General assured me that it was his intention to carry on the policy of the office before he was Attorney-General and, as far as possible, to have criminal cases tried locally. If the local jurors fail to do their duty, the proper policy, in my view—I think the Attorney-General largely concurs with me in this—would be to let loose the local criminals on the local people and let them take them to their bosoms if they want to do so. The Attorney-General assured me that there was no great increase in the number of transferred cases. I was not quite satisfied with the explanation of the Acting Minister for Justice as to the greatly increased number of trials in the Circuit Court in Dublin and in the Central Criminal Court. It appeared to me that there was either a very large increase in ordinary crime in Dublin or else that the whole crime of the Saorstát was being tried in the City and County of Dublin. On behalf of the hard pressed jurors of Dublin, I venture to enter a protest. Perhaps the Attorney-General will deal with the matter when replying.

There are a few routine matters which I want to mention. As regards the payment of State solicitors, I notice that the amount in the Estimate is reduced by almost £800. I should like to know the reasons for the reduction. It may seem strange that the Opposition should raise questions as to the reduction of an Estimate. Usually protests are directed against increases in the Estimates. I should, however, like to know what is the reason for the reduction in this item. There may be a genuine reason for it, but I want to calm any query in my mind that the remuneration of State solicitors is being decreased. I know that it is the policy of the Department of Justice, aided and abetted by the Department of Finance, to cut down the salaries and fees of professional men—solicitors, barristers, engineers and everybody else. That is their set policy.

It appears from the Estimate for the Attorney-General's Office to be so, because the salaries paid for assistant solicitors in what used to be known as the Treasury Solicitor's Office are really a disgrace. I notice a rather interesting point—that women solicitors are paid less than men solicitors. While £175 is supposed to be a good salary for an assistant man solicitor, £10 less is supposed to be sufficient for an assistant woman solicitor. So far as I know, there are no women solicitors in the Civil Service of this State, but provision is made in this Estimate for women solicitors. Why they should have a smaller salary than men solicitors I do not know. They are both solicitors. The point, however, is that they are both being paid at an extremely low rate. I want the Attorney-General to give me an assurance that, so far as he is concerned, he will not stand for reduction of the salaries of State solicitors. In my time the State solicitors were given an undertaking that their salaries would remain fixed. Already, during the period of the present Administration, their salaries have been cut. I want an assurance that they will not be further cut and that advantage will not be taken of new appointments by the Department of Finance, aided by the Department of Justice, further to reduce the remuneration of State solicitors.

Why not strike?

The jurors are going to strike, and perhaps the State solicitors will strike subsequently. Deputy Davin may then give us a few points on the conduct of a strike.

He will start a rival union.

The lawyers have a trade union already, which is supposed to be the strongest of the trade unions.

They keep their end up as well as any trade union.

I do not agree with the £175 salary.

I protested against it when I was Attorney-General, and I protest now when I am not. It is no answer to me to say that there were 30 or 40 applicants for the job at £175. When that point was made to me, I replied that I could get 100 applicants at 30/- a week, but they would be dear even at 1/- a week.

Why not apply that principle to Ministers?

I would apply it to Ministers. A certain friend of mine, who, I am glad to say, used to give me business, was accustomed to say that cheap law was bad law. That is my view in every department of life. If you want results you must pay for them. That goes for labour as well as everybody else, so far as I am concerned.

One of the activities of the Attorney-General's Department is to look after the statutes. An official in the Parliamentary Draftsman's section of the Department every year prepares an index for the annual bound volume of the statutes. In my time that was done with great expedition and complete accuracy. I am sure it is being done with the same accuracy and the same speed now, but while I was there I was never able to get the bound volumes of the statutes published in time. They are not published for six, eight or 12 months after the relevant year. I was never able to understand why that was so, and I was never able to track down the place where the delay occurred. Certainly it did not take place in the Attorney-General's office. Everybody repudiated liability for the delay, but the net result was that the statutes were late in making their appearance and still continue to be late. Sometimes they are not published until nearly 12 months after the lapse of the year to which they relate. I want the Attorney-General to carry on that fight on behalf of the ordinary practitioners who have to look to the bound volumes of the statutes in their daily task. In reply to a question I put down during the year, the Minister for Finance said that he was not aware that any great public inconvenience was caused by delay in publication of the bound volumes of the statutes. The Attorney-General will appreciate the difficulty of a practitioner when these various statutes come out at irregularly intermittent intervals. They do not come out in sequence. Sometimes the unbound copy of No. 5 comes out before No. 1, and No. 10 may come out before No. 3. It is sufficiently difficult for the ordinary practitioner to keep abreast of the flood of legislation without having to search in the rags and tatters of the unbound volumes of the statutes. I ask the Attorney-General to direct his attention to that matter.

The last point to which I want to allude has been touched upon by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney. On the Estimate for the Department of Justice I raised the question of the statements of witnesses taken by the Guards. Now the one thing on which we must be all united in endeavouring to secure is that the ordinary people will have respect for the administration of the law whether conducted by the judiciary or conducted by police witnesses. That is an absolute necessity if the State machinery is not to break down. In connection with that matter the Attorney-General has very considerable responsibility, and I think I am right in saying that the Attorney-General realises that and performs that duty to the best of his skill and ability.

The Attorney-General has to be convinced at some stage, either before a prosecution is directed or after the proceedings are instituted in the District Court or carried on after their institution, and the party has been returned for trial to the Circuit Court or Criminal Court. The Attorney-General ought to scrutinise scrupulously those so-called statements by people charged with offences, and if he has any doubt as to whether those statements have been made voluntarily or not he should not offer them in evidence. There are cases of this kind in court from time to time, and the number is growing. Again I appreciate the position of the Attorney-General in this respect. In these cases he is placed in a position of delicacy, having regard to the zeal of the Guards in extracting confessions from prisoners. After having considered them he is in a delicate position in deciding whether these confessions are to be nullified. I say that that position is growing in the country. In a large number of these cases if the evidence were left without the statement made by the prisoner there would be no case against the prisoner. That class of case now is growing. Very often we have the position that suddenly, when there is no case at all against the prisoner, there is produced a complete confession on the part of the prisoner.

I am sure that the vast majority of the Guards, superintendents and ordinary Guards, do not take an unfair advantage of the prisoner. At the same time the feeling is undoubtedly growing that those so-called voluntary statements taken by the Guards as voluntary statements are not being got as voluntarily as some people say they are being got. If that feeling grows, it will tend to minimise greatly the value of State prosecutions and ultimately it will bring the administration of the law into disrepute. We must put up to the community the importance of having the law vindicated and of educating public opinion in this country in respect for the law and for its administration. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney appealed to the Attorney-General in the matter of initiating certain prosecutions. I would add my voice to what Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney said. I would say even in prosecutions before the Military Tribunal—perhaps I should say particularly before the Military Tribunal—the utmost scrupulousness should be, and I am sure will be, observed by the Attorney-General in the conduct of cases. I would appeal to him to say that only such evidence as would be held to be legal in an ordinary criminal court will be put forward by him at trials before the Military Tribunal. If the Military Tribunal gets the reputation in the matter of these trials of convicting on evidence 90 per cent. of which is alleged to be made up of voluntary statements, then any respect for the law through that particular channel will undoubtedly be undermined and a great public danger will have to be faced. I commend these few observations to the Attorney-General for his serious consideration.

I strongly support the suggestion put forward by Deputy Costello regarding the filling of vacancies for the position of State solicitor. I thoroughly agree that if the Attorney-General wants good service from State solicitors in connection with work which these gentlemen have to perform, he should make a selection from the men making application from the local circuit in which the vacancy occurs. If it is to get abroad that the position of State solicitor in a particular circuit is open to every solicitor in the country, I pity the Deputies in regard to the canvassing that is sure to go on. The ordinary solicitor has a very glib tongue, and he has many means of approaching Deputies and other politicians. Apart altogether from the fact that it is very undesirable, from the point of view of getting the best results, that selections should be made from outside the circuit in which the vacancy occurs, the Attorney-General should make it clear that these positions in future will be filled from applications in the area where the vacancy takes place. I support the other suggestion made by Deputy Costello and I am sure he is making the suggestion from his experience of the work of the Attorney-General's office—that is, that the assistant solicitors should have a higher commencing salary. The Estimate before us shows that there are four assistant solicitors in the Attorney-General's Department. I notice that the commencing salary for a qualified solicitor with large experience, possibly, is the miserable sum of £175.

Plus bonus.

Plus what you like; every officer in the Department has plus with the exception of the Attorney-General himself. There are four legal clerks who have no qualifications as solicitors with a commencing salary of £200. I assume that the legal clerks with a commencing salary of £200 are not qualified solicitors. A qualified solicitor has to spend a good deal of money and a good deal of time in qualifying for his profession. Though I have been a quill driver myself for over 30 years, I am of opinion that professional men are entitled to more consideration in regard to salaries than the ordinary law clerk. I submit this as a serious matter for the Attorney-General's consideration. I hope he will give some thought to it. The lords in the Department of Finance believe they are the last word in regard to everything. Some of us know that the Minister for Finance is very much inclined, if not altogether inclined, to swallow whatever advice is tendered to him by the lords of his Department. I would like to hear the Minister for Finance, if he has the inclination or the courage to do so, to defend a commencing salary of £175 for qualified solicitors as against a salary of £200 for legal clerks. The Minister preaches the gospel about Christian social policy; let us have some of it in this matter and let some of it permeate his advisers.

Perhaps the Deputy would read the final salary in both cases.

Yes, after reaching his maximum.

The commencing salary is the matter under consideration. I do notice that two of the assistant solicitors have salaries at a fairly high figure. I suppose they were in the position before this or the late Government came into office and their salaries could not be reduced. This is a matter that should be looked into. I think the Attorney-General as a lawyer will agree that a solicitor has to spend money and considerable time in securing his qualifications and he is entitled to a better commencing salary than the figure given here.

The Deputy ought not to be content with putting a half truth before the House. Let him give the whole salary in both cases.

The commencing salary is £175 rising to £400 for the solicitors and for the clerks the commencing salary is £200 rising to £300. Is that what the Minister wants me to read out?

Yes, it is.

The point I want to make is with regard to the commencing salary.

The Attorney-General to conclude.

Is it necessary to call upon the Attorney-General to conclude? The House is in Committee. Although it has become customary to call on the Minister to conclude, I submit that custom ought not to apply in cases where the Minister made no statement.

The Chair must make some attempt to bring the discussion to a conclusion, and if no Deputy offers himself, the Chair, in order to put an end to the discussion, is free to call upon the Minister to conclude.

In the Committee Stage of a Bill the Chair does not feel under any such necessity—the Chair does not feel compelled to call on the Minister to conclude.

The Chair puts the section or the amendment on the Committee Stage of a Bill.

In any case, the Minister for Justice is responsible for this Vote, not the Attorney-General.

It is the Attorney-General who is responsible.

On a point of order. May I point out that it has repeatedly been the practice here, even in some cases where the Minister made an adequate statement on the opening of an Estimate, for the debate to be continued on special points after he had intervened.

I have no desire to abridge the discussion, but the position is that the Chair must make some effort to bring the discussion to a conclusion. If no Deputy offers himself to the Chair, the Chair must either put the Vote or call on the responsible Minister to conclude. If nobody offers himself, I shall put the Vote.

I do not question that, if the Attorney-General does not deign to reply, and if nobody else rises, the Chair has no option but to put the question.

It would be a help to the House if the Attorney-General would be kind enough to intervene.

The Attorney-General

I have no objection whatever to anybody following me if he wishes. It is a matter for you, Sir.

The Attorney-General can intervene if he likes in the debate. That is the point I want to make clear.

The Attorney-General

If it is helpful to the House, I have no objection. There have been several points made, of varying degrees of importance, and I shall try and take them in the order of their importance as they strike me. The first point of importance was the point raised by Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney, which I think Deputy MacDermot also mentioned, in regard to my attitude towards men charged with being members of the I.R.A. First of all, I should like to make it clear to Deputy MacDermot that prosecutions have been brought against a number of men for being members of an unlawful association, namely, the I.R.A., long before the recent proclamation. There was a full-dress argument on the question before the Tribunal many months ago. By reason of documents found on certain individuals, the case was made that the documents established that the individuals charged were members of an unlawful association promoting or encouraging the use of firearms and convictions were secured. In fact, as the acting Minister for Justice mentioned in the debate on his Vote, about 275 members of the I.R.A. have been tried and convicted before the Tribunal—not all of membership of an unlawful association.

To pass on to what Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney asks. I appreciate the spirit of the suggestion which he makes and I am sure he will at once understand that it is not my prerogative to adopt the attitude he suggests. That is a matter on which I could not act on my own responsibility. He suggests that I should not charge anyone with being a member of the I.R.A. prior to the date of the recent proclamation. I mentioned the matter, as the Deputy raised it, to the acting Minister for Justice and he tells me that I may say this much to the Deputy: that if any individual severs his connection with the I.R.A. and signs an undertaking that he will have nothing further to do with it, no proceedings will be instituted against him. I will go further and say that if any of the individuals who have been recently charged before the Tribunal with that offence, combined perhaps with the offence of refusal to answer questions, give a similar undertaking, the Minister tells me that he is prepared to recommend that they be released.

I think that goes the whole way to meet Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney's suggestion on that head. I do not think that I would give, although I will bear in mind the suggestion, any undertaking that, if asked to prosecute for membership of the I.R.A., I will not lay a charge of membership at a date prior to the recent proclamation, for the reason that, as I have just stated, persons have already been charged. It will be within the recollection of the Deputy that about six or eight months ago a number of men were charged with being members of the I.R.A. and were convicted. While the proclamation, as the President stated, makes the position clear to anybody beyond any doubt, there was an indication given in several cases which have come before the Tribunal to the effect that if documents were found on individuals, on which membership of the I.R.A. could be brought home to them, that if it could be shown from documents in their possession that they were members of a body which came within the list of associations which were unlawful under Article 2A, they ran the risk of being charged, and a number have been charged and convicted.

Deputy MacDermot asked me a question as to when I advised the Minister or the Executive Council as to the I.R.A. being an unlawful association. I do not really think that it is proper to ask me to state in the House what advice I gave to the Executive Council in regard to any particular matter. That is a matter for the Ministers responsible. If they wish to reveal that I have given certain advice, it is quite open to them to do so, but I do not think I am entitled to tell the House what advice I have given. I do not suppose it is necessary or that the Deputy will press for any further clarification of the position than what I have just stated—that I have had no hesitation, where persons arrested have had on them evidence of the fact that they were members of an organisation which promoted or encouraged the use of firearms, in prosecuting them for being members of an unlawful association, and have, in cases where the evidence was available, put in as evidence against them the document which calls itself the Governmental Constitution of the I.R.A.

I feel that Deputy MacDermot labours under a sense of grievance against me. He suggests that he was induced to leave over the discussion of the More O'Ferrall case until my Vote came on because of something I said here. I would dislike very much to have been responsible for inducing the Deputy to abandon raising something on the Minister for Justice's Estimate in the expectation that he could raise it here. I have searched through the debates to see if I did make such a suggestion to the Deputy. If he has the column in the debates before him in which he says that that appears I shall accept contradiction of my statement that the Official Reports bear no report of any such promise or suggestion by me. I did, undoubtedly, make it in connection with another matter raised on that Estimate, but I think I did not make it on this matter. I do not want to be absolutely too certain of it, but I do not think I did make it. I find it very hard to believe that I would, for the reason I gave when I raised the point against the Deputy. I have already given the reason, that I think it is not proper to discuss the More O'Ferrall case here in the way it has been discussed. It seems to me that there is a limit to the discussion of a case which has come before the courts.

I did not really want to lure the Attorney-General into a discussion on the More O'Ferrall case, but I did hope, if it was in order, to get him to clarify the principle which I quoted the Acting-Minister for Justice as having laid down in the course of the debate on the Estimate for the Department of Justice. I have since turned up the passage in the speech of the Acting-Minister for Justice, and I think it confirms what I said. I did not misquote him or misrepresent him in any way.

The Attorney-General

I observe the Deputy has not turned up the other passage. I was going on to meet the Deputy to this extent, that had I been asked my view upon the facts in that case I would have taken the view that it was a case in which it was extremely difficult to give a certificate. I think the Minister would have to hesitate very much before he could give the required certificate in that particular case. As the Minister himself pointed out, he has had no hesitation in giving a certificate in other cases, even though the charge was murder. A certificate was given, in connection with the McGrory case and in other cases, perhaps not of murder, but where it was clear that the act constituting the offence was done for a particular purpose I would have no difficulty in obtaining a certificate. There are border-line cases, and the Deputy must believe that in any case that comes to me for advice the Minister responsible must endeavour to discharge his duty conscientiously and make up his mind definitely as to whether it can be said that, in his belief, the particular act constituting the offence was done for one or other, or both, of the two purposes mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. I merely go that far lest the Deputy might think that I was trying to evade discussion on the matter when he raised it earlier.

Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney has asked me a question in connection with certain lands in Mayo. When the Deputy raised the matter here on a previous occasion I promised him that I would read the debate that took place to try and discover the particulars of the case. I have done so. I have gone to a lot of trouble to consider my position with regard to the Land Commission in a matter of this kind. I daresay that, if a case is made out that the Land Commission have clearly been guilty of a breach of their statutory duty, some means of challenging that can be found. I, however, have examined this case carefully myself. I have had the opinion of senior counsel on it, and I have come to the conclusion that I cannot find any statutory restriction upon the Land Commission which would disable them from disposing of the particular lands in the way they did in this case. I think the Deputy cannot have had all the facts before him. I am not now going into the question of policy which was really at the back of the Deputy's attack upon what was done in this case. I am merely discussing the question as to whether the Land Commission, where they have a certain area of lands in their hands and cannot find for it suitable persons of the class which the Land Acts mainly aimed to give it to, can dispose of it to other persons.

That is not the fact here. This land obviously could be given for the relief of congestion.

The Attorney-General

I cannot assume that. Surely, the Deputy is well aware of the answer which the Land Commission have made, and I am in the awkward position of having to ask the Land Commission for particulars to enable me to say whether or not action should be taken against them.

I quite understand, but surely nobody on earth can hold that a doctor's cow can get hay and grass off a field and that this field will not give the same grass and same hay to the cow of a migrant.

The Attorney-General

From the practical point of view the answer of the Land Commission seems to me to be very complete. They point out that they resumed a holding; that they cut it up into a number of economic holdings; that they found on their hands a certain area of land, about 29 acres, but that in that neighbourhood there was no suitable migrant whom they could conveniently migrate to it. There were no suitable persons in that congested area with a sufficient quantity of land to enable them, economically, to apportion land as an addition to their holdings. Consequently, they were left with this parcel of land on their hands, and they did in this case what, I am sure the Deputy knows as well as I do, they have been doing for a number of years— that is where they have a parcel of land in their hands which they cannot dispose of in the ordinary way they divide it up into plots. As far as I can see, they have ample powers to do that. Once that appears to be so, I do not think the Deputy is serious in suggesting that I should come forward with proceedings to challenge the action of the Land Commission and set aside all these sales on the ground that the persons to whom the land was given were not persons entitled to receive land under the Act.

Deputy Davin asked a question as to the number of persons arrested and charged and dealt with before the Constitution (Special Powers) Tribunal. I understand that particulars in connection with this matter were given to the Deputy by way of reply to a Parliamentary question in the House some time ago. If the Deputy puts down a further question I have no doubt the particulars can be brought up to date. I have no material at my disposal now to give him the particulars he asks for.

Deputy Costello asked me about the appointment of a State solicitor in the County Clare. While the Deputy was right in saying that the solicitor appointed was practising in the County Mayo, he must be aware of the fact, because he referred to it in the course of his remarks, that the man appointed is, in fact, a Clare man, and was only temporarily out of his own county. He has gone back there now, and I am satisfied, from what evidence I have of his abilities, that he will make a very efficient, and, I am sure, popular State solicitor.

I did not say anything about his efficiency or his popularity, but I did say that he was permanently out of the County Clare. Would the Attorney-General say how long he was out of the County Clare?

The Attorney-General

As regards the transferred cases, the Deputy raised this matter on the Vote for the Minister for Justice. The acting Minister, in his reply at Column 2645 of the Dáil Debates, gave figures as to the number of cases tried in the Central Criminal Court and in the Circuit Criminal Court from the year 1925. They are not segregated and this table does not say how many of them were transferred cases. I do not gather whether the Deputy was repeating the point he made there or whether he was relating his statement to the State solicitorship appointment. The State solicitor is undoubtedly a person upon whose advice I must rely when a question as to whether a case should be transferred or not comes before me. I am quite certain that the recent appointee in County Clare will quickly familiarise himself with the conditions sufficiently to enable him to give correct advice in regard to such cases.

What did his colleague say about his appointment for County Clare?

The Attorney-General

I do not think that is quite relevant. As regards the reductions in the State Solicitor's office, which Deputy Davin discovered, the Minister for Finance is here and he is the person responsible for that. Deputy Costello stated that he thought the salaries were too small. I naturally take an interest in the salaries paid to solicitors in the Chief State Solicitor's office and to State solicitors. I suppose it is not a breach of confidence to mention that occasionally there may be conflict with the Department of Finance and that our views clash. In this instance the Minister for Finance is fortunately in a position to be able to put forward the argument that when he advises a post at that figure the number of efficient and highly-qualified solicitors who apply is surprising.

I told him that they could get them at 30/- a week or less if they wanted them and that they would be dear even at that price.

We could get a Minister at £100 a year for the same reason.

The Attorney-General

We have it stated that a surprising number of highly-qualified solicitors make application. They apparently consider the figure offered a sufficient inducement, together with chances of promotion in the service. These, it would seem, are sufficient to induce them to come forward and offer themselves for the post. The reduction in the figures is due to the fact that there has been a reorganisation of the staff. There was recently a man appointed and I am quite satisfied, from the little experience we have had of him, that he is most excellently qualified for the post. Perhaps we may be able to induce the Minister for Finance later to increase his salary. I must say, in justice to the Minister for Finance, that I have got him to agree to increase the salaries in the Departments under me wherever a case has been made out. Although, generally speaking, the Department of Finance are very hard, they are sometimes surprisingly generous when a good case is made out.

That undoubtedly is surprising.

Amazing.

The Attorney-General

They have treated a number of officers with whom I have some connection quite fairly and I do not think it fair to the Minister for Finance to claim that he always refuses to do anything but reduce salaries. Deputy Costello asked me about the printing of the Statutes. Although we are responsible in my office for the preparation of the Statutes, I think I can say that no responsibility for delay can rest with me. I understand one of the reasons for delay is having the Statutes translated into Irish.

As regards the question of using statements made by prisoners, I do not think the Deputy is right in suggesting that there has been a growing tendency to rely upon what he terms so-called voluntary statements solely in criminal cases. I was not aware of that until he mentioned it and it did not strike me that there has been any increase in the number of cases where we had to rely on the statements of prisoners. I appreciate what Deputy Costello says about the responsibility which rests upon the prosecution of giving a fair trial. If there is a reasonable doubt that a prisoner has not made the statement voluntarily, or that he or she has been induced to make it for some reason which would make it unacceptable in evidence, I would not hesitate to refuse to proceed with such a case.

On the other hand, I do not know that I share quite fully the Deputy's view about statements. I cannot see any better evidence of guilt than a voluntary confession made by a person charged with an offence. I think some people are inclined to go a little bit too far the other way with regard to the admissability of statements. The law leans very strongly in favour of the prisoner in ordinary cases in the ordinary courts. Unless it can be shown that the prisoner was duly cautioned and informed that he need not make a statement and, if he chooses to make one, that it may be used in evidence against him, or if it can be shown that any inducement, threat or promise was held out to him, any statement he makes cannot be used in evidence against him. A prisoner who is undefended and quite ignorant of his rights is given every protection. If any of these elements creep into the taking of a statement, he has the opportunity of challenging the statement in court before the judge. The trial judge is the arbiter as to whether or not the statement is to be admitted.

With all that in favour of the prisoner, it is very doubtful indeed if there has been any case in which a person has had a conviction based upon a statement which was improperly obtained. I assure the Deputy that I realise there are exceptional cases in which over-zealous Guards may obtain statements under circumstances which are not proper. If such cases come to my notice, I will have no hesitation in declining to use the statements; but even if I do put forward the statements, accepting the explanation as to how they were obtained, there is the further safeguard to the prisoner in the protection which the law affords him and the assurance that he will obtain that protection from a skilled and experienced judge. I do not think there is any other point upon which I need comment.

There is one point that I overlooked mentioning. During the course of the last year a decision has been come to by the courts as to the right of a private individual or a private prosecutor to conduct prosecutions. It is quite clear that the Attorney-General's function is to conduct prosecutions on indictments, and that no private person can do that. There has been in existence practically since the District Court started a perfectly ridiculous form, and I want the Attorney-General to use his influence to put an end to it. In the District Court prosecutions for indictable offences are at the suit of a particular member of the Gárda Síochána. The way that appears in the form is this—"the Attorney-General (at the suit of Guard 101Q)". That is taken from the old form where the prosecutions were in the name of the Crown—the King at the prosecution of Police Constable Cox. I want the Attorney-General to use his influence to put an end to that entirely misleading form which is in general use throughout the country. For the first time since the Criminal Justice (Administration) Act, 1924, the position has been clarified by the decision of the court that in all ordinary prosecutions before a District Court it is the right of a private individual to prosecute. A police constable who prosecutes in those courts in his own name is what is known as "a common informer". I do not want that particular capacity in which he prosecutes the same as every other private individual to be mixed up in this adaptation of an old form—the Attorney-General at the prosecution of Guard So-and-So. It is an entirely ridiculous formula, which in my view should be put an end to as soon as possible.

The Attorney-General

It is a survival from your own time.

May I say to the Attorney-General that I always had the idea of stopping it if I could. The only reason why it could not be stopped was that an interpretation of the Criminal Justice (Administration) Act, 1924, had never been authoritatively declared. I myself had the privilege of having it authoritatively declared last year and now at the first opportunity I am making a plea to my successor that what I wanted done will be done.

I cannot help expressing some disappointment at the information which the Attorney-General has given the House. On the question which I raised in connection with the Land Commission acting ultra vires, I should like to point out certain things to the Attorney-General. In the first place proceedings to acquire land for relieving congestion, for which purpose great powers are given to the Land Commission, were taken for the first time under the Act of 1923. I should like to point out that it is only since 1933 that the Land Commission has been freed from Parliamentary control. I should also like to point out that while even prior to that the Land Commission may have had land attached to mansion houses and things of that kind which they gave to persons who were not directly migrants, yet the land which those persons surrendered could be utilised for the purpose of enlarging holdings. While of course I do recognise that the Attorney-General is handicapped by the fact that he had to get his facts largely from the party against whom he was proceeding, that is, the prisoner pleading not guilty as it were, still I think it is a matter of very considerable gravity that land should have been improperly distributed in this fashion. It is absolutely absurd to say that the land could not be utilised; that the land which would be barren and sterile in the hands of a small holder is fertile in the hands of a doctor, or fertile in the hands of a school teacher. That is the case which the Land Commission has made, and that is the case which the Attorney-General has gravely advised upon.

The Attorney-General

I think it is only fair to make clear that I did not say I was handicapped.

You did not. I myself said that the Attorney-General is handicapped by the fact that he got his facts from the prisoner in the dock if you like.

I want to ask the Attorney-General a question. I take it he is charged with giving the prisoner at the bar as good a chance as the law entitles him to, and is charged with the general good conduct of any prosecution carried on in this country. A case came before the Central Criminal Court in Dublin recently, in which a man was being prosecuted for introducing explosive substances into the household fuel of a neighbour. It was alleged that this crime was perpetrated in an area which is within the Fior Ghaeltacht, and in that area the Civic Guards very properly do their business through the medium of the Irish language. When the man was brought before the court of first instance the Guards who were giving evidence for the prosecution gave their evidence in English, although the court of first instance was situated within the Fior Ghaeltacht and the district justice could understand Irish. The prisoner was returned for trial to the Central Criminal Court, Green Street, and was there arraigned before a jury, not a single member of which understood a word of Irish. The trial judge did not understand a word of Irish. Certainly some of the counsel for the defence understood no Irish. I do not think any of the counsel for the prosecution understood Irish.

The Attorney-General

They did.

They may have; I am not sure about that. Certain it is that counsel were engaged in the case, on one side or the other, who did not know Irish. The Attorney-General had no reason to believe that any single member of the jury understood Irish. The Attorney-General had every reason to believe that the trial judge did not understand Irish. The case proceeded to a certain point, and then the Guards who were in charge of the prosecution were produced. They entered the box and announced that they were going to give their evidence in Irish, whereupon an interpreter was sent for. The farce was then gone through that a man who spoke English, and, I believe, had English as his vernacular—the Department of Justice says that Irish was the language into which he was born, but he certainly spoke English more fluently than he spoke Irish—was in the witness-box giving evidence, and he solemnly gave evidence in an acquired language to an interpreter who translated it to the jury and the trial judge. That was in itself ludicrous enough, but then as I understand it counsel asked that Guard a question in a language which he well understood. The Guard sat with his mouth open until the question was translated into Irish by the interpreter, whereupon he proceeded to absorb it and to reply to it in Irish, when it was retranslated.

I want to submit that that kind of conduct brings justice into disrepute. I fully see that that is the aspect of the question which should primarily concern the Attorney-General, but I think I am entitled to add—although I cannot make the Attorney-General directly responsible for this—that that kind of "codology" brings the Irish language movement into disrepute. I do not think any rational believer in the revival of the Irish language in this country wants Irish to be made a public show-off in the Central Criminal Court, or wants Irish to be made a medium for obstructing the course of justice where the question is one of clearing the character of the man in the dock, on the one hand, or of bringing a criminal to justice effectively if the accused person is really guilty. It does seem to me that if vital evidence is going to be tendered to the courts it should be done in the language which is best known to the witness, to the members of the jury and to the judge upon the bench. If that is not done, an obstacle is put in the way of the effective administration of justice. Nobody wants the Irish language to appear in the public life of this country as an effective obstacle to the administration of justice, but that is what all this "codology" amounts to. Now, if the Guards want to use the Irish language in the Gaeltacht and make it their daily vehicle of communication in the Gaeltacht and in the course of their work in the Gaeltacht, in my opinion, they will do very valuable work, but they should not be asked to make exhibitions of themselves in the way I have referred to. I should be glad to hear from the Attorney-General what his view is on the propriety of the proceedings that took place in Green Street in connection with the case I have mentioned.

I should like to apologise to the Attorney-General for attributing to him a remark of the Acting-Minister for Justice—that the Attorney-General decides whether prosecutions are taken before the Military Tribunal or the civil courts—I think those were the words of the Acting-Minister for Justice.

The Attorney-General

That is true, with the qualification I have explained to the Deputy. The Minister was right, with that exception.

Yes. I want the Attorney-General to understand what was in my mind. I do not want to elaborate this. It is not for a layman to pit his opinion against the Attorney-General on a point of law, but I have difficulty in understanding how a raid on the house of an officer of the court, for the purpose of intimidating, and any crime committed in the course of that raid, can not be properly described as being with the object of impairing or impeding the administration of justice. With regard to the other point I raised, the Attorney-General has told us rather triumphantly that he was successfully prosecuting members of the I.R.A. for membership of that body long before the illegality of that body was proclaimed. I am quite conscious of that and always have been, but it seems to me to be treating the members of that body rather unfairly. After all, I suppose prevention is better than cure, and the position has been left extremely ambiguous in their eyes. They saw that, in spite of continuous pressure, their organisation had not, in fact, been declared illegal. They saw that its parades and ceremonies were allowed to take place without interference all over the country and that it was only when somebody for some specific reason got into the bad books of the Attorney-General that he was actually prosecuted by the Attorney-General for membership of that body. My question to the Attorney-General was prompted by some natural curiosity, and, I think, by some natural regard for the public interest. It was designed to ascertain at what period the Attorney-General first realised that the organisation in question was, by its very aims and constitution, illegal, and when he tendered that advice to his colleagues; because I feel that something is needed to explain that tremendous transition through which they have passed.

I am not out to make Party capital out of this. I have not any Party for which to make capital, but I do think that any member of this House has a right, if not a duty, to be informed as to when it was that the Attorney-General brought his colleagues from the frame of mind in which the prosecution of a member of the I.R.A. seemed to be an act of intolerable tyranny or a steam-rolling of one's opponents or, in the words of Deputy Hugo Flinn, "a damnable creation of a low and mean intelligence."

I never used that expression.

I do not know, Sir, if I would be in order in reading it. This is in reference to the use of the Public Safety Act against members of the I.R.A. The passage reads:

"It was a damnable creation of low and mean intelligence. It was created for the purpose, if possible, of steam-rolling out of existence the political opponents of Cumann na nGaedheal. I do not know anything low enough or mean enough on whom to use it except on those who created it. They made the lash."

What have the opinions of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance got to do with the Attorney-General?

Well, Sir, my hand was forced. Deputy Flinn seemed to expect that it should be read. I do not think it is unreasonable that one should display a little curiosity as to the point in time when the Attorney-General led himself and his colleagues out of the frame of mind in which they used to be, into the much more desirable frame of mind in which they now are.

Before the Attorney-General concludes, I should like to draw his attention to the relatively high charges made by county high sheriffs in the execution of writs.

The Attorney-General

Sir, I have no responsibility for sheriffs or their charges.

Sheriffs' charges do not come into the Vote.

The other charges do, I submit, Sir.

All the items in the Vote are relevant, but nothing else. The Deputy can see the items in the Estimate.

Well, I should like to ask the Attorney-General who fixes those fees?

The Attorney-General

I suppose they are fixed in consultation with the Minister for Justice.

Well, the Acting-Minister for Justice is sitting beside the Attorney-General, and he ought to know.

The Attorney-General

There is an Order, and they are fixed under that.

Well, we have these various items here under the head of law charges and I submit, with all respect, Sir, that that is a law charge.

The Attorney-General has informed the Chair that he has no responsibility for the item concerned, and the Chair must be guided by the Attorney-General in that matter.

And the Acting-Minister for Justice has no responsibility for this at all.

The Acting-Minister for Justice has responsibility for law charges.

If the Attorney-General cannot give us any information as to why such an enormously high charge has been fixed. I am asking the Acting-Minister for Justice to inform me on that matter. I should like to have some information on the point because these charges cause a lot of hardship.

May we ask the Acting-Minister for Justice who is responsible for this?

Mr. Boland

Not on this Vote.

The Attorney-General

I understand that they are fixed under an Order, but the Minister for Justice is the responsible person.

Is the Attorney-General aware that a couple of sheriffs are known to have taken £300 from unfortunate persons who cannot pay their land annuities?

Mr. Boland

That matter cannot be raised on this Vote.

Why not? If sheriffs are able to have an occasional income like that, why should the Attorney-General be providing, under sub-head B, for fees and expenses of sub-sheriffs—£2,500 for persons who are able to pick up these enormous sums in present circumstances.?

It is known as pin money.

Mr. Boland

That was one matter that I expected would have been raised on the Vote for the Department of Justice but it was not raised.

The Attorney-General to conclude.

Are we not to have any explanation about these Law Charges? Will the Attorney-General define what is meant by "Law Charges?" It has a rather peculiar meaning.

On a point of order, is it not in order to raise this matter under sub-head B of this Vote?

It is not in order as the Attorney-General has no responsibility for fixing sheriffs' fees.

Have sheriffs authority to fix their own fees?

The Chair is informed that the Attorney-General is not responsible. Sheriffs' fees come under the Vote for the Department of Justice, which has been passed.

The Attorney-General

Sheriffs' fees are fixed by an Order made by the Minister for Justice under the Enforcement of Court Orders Act. I would be astonished to discover that I had any responsibility for them. I never heard anything about them, and had no dealings with them, and consequently could not answer the question.

Will the Attorney-General say whether the fees collected by under-sheriffs are for themselves or are paid into the Exchequer?

The Attorney-General

I am afraid I could not say off-hand. I know that certain under-sheriffs still retain the fees and that others, who are employed on salary, pay them into the Exchequer. Off-hand, that is my recollection of the position. One or two other points were raised. I was going to object to one matter raised by Deputy Dillon as being out of order, as I had no responsibility in connection with it, but afterwards I saw that if I raised a point it would take longer to discuss than if I allowed the Deputy to proceed.

You have got a little bit of experience.

The Attorney-General

For, I think, the second time the Deputy attacked the Guards, and he thought to bring me in by suggesting that a case in which a Guard gave evidence was not conducted properly in the interests of justice, or that it was not in the interests of justice to allow Guards who understood English to give evidence in Irish. The Deputy must understand the legal position and the constitutional position, and that any individual, be he Guard or ordinary citizen, is entitled to insist on giving evidence in Irish if he so wishes.

Hear, hear!

The Attorney-General

I cannot understand why the Deputy says "Hear, hear!" The Minister in reply to the Deputy said that the Guard, in speaking in Irish, spoke in the vernacular.

He spoke in Irish because he was ordered to do so by the Minister for Justice.

The Attorney-General

I am not responsible for orders issued by the Minister for Justice or by the Commissioner of the Gárda Síochána. If the Minister or the Commissioner directs. Gárdaí to give evidence in Irish, I cannot make any objection whatever to that. They are perfectly within their rights in doing that.

But the Attorney-General could state, when the entire jury does not understand Irish, whether it is in the interests of justice that such an order should be issued.

The Attorney-General

I do not think my opinion is in the slightest degree relevant. I could not insist on a Guard giving evidence in English, even if I wished to do so, and I think it is absurd that I should be asked by the Deputy to give a personal opinion on the matter when what is under discussion is my conduct in my official position. I could not insist on a Guard doing otherwise than he wished in the matter. I do not think the judge who tried the case would agree that he did not understand Irish. Certainly counsel prosecuting in the case and representing me not alone understood Irish but examined in Irish in that case. The Deputy referred to the fact that this case was some time pending before it came to trial in Dublin. The case was tried in Galway. I am not sure if all the evidence was given then, but there was a disagreement of the jury and I transferred the case to Dublin. That is merely incidental, and if the Guards in the case chose to give evidence in Irish, they were quite entitled to do so. If evidence was given in Irish, and a proper translation was before the court, even though the jury did not understand Irish, I do not see why they were not capable of deciding whether the accused was guilty of putting a bomb in a sod of turf, and seeing it reached the house of a certain man with the intention, when inserted in the fire, that the place would blow up. That was the issue in the case. I do not think evidence given in Irish would prevent a jury coming to a conclusion on the facts. I know that they acquitted the man, and when the Deputy talks about justice certainly the prisoner has not suffered any injustice.

Hear, hear! Doubtless justice was done in this particular case.

The Attorney-General

I suppose Deputy MacDermot understands clearly that what the Minister for Justice stated in connection with certain cases before the Tribunal is quite correct. The responsibility rests upon me in certain definite cases and in other cases, which are substantially described in the Schedule to Article 2A, the responsibility rests upon the Executive Minister who chooses to send a case there.

Question put and agreed to.
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