I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. This is a Bill to amend the Local Authorities (Combined Purchasing) Act. It is introduced to replace the Act that has been carried through from year to year under the Expiring Laws Act, since 1925. The system of combined purchasing originated at the session of Dáil Eireann in 1920, and practical steps were taken in December, 1921, to carry out the decision that was, at that time, arrived at. In 1925 the Local Authorities (Combined Purchasing) Act, 1925, was enacted for a period of three years, but since 1928 it has been continued from year to year under the Expiring Laws Acts. The system has, therefore, been in operation for a period of 17 years. In the present Bill the main features of the Act of 1925 are retained. In some respects extended powers are sought. The prime necessity for the successful administration of a system of combined purchasing is complete co-operation by all local bodies. Although it is generally recognised that the system has been advantageous to local bodies, there is still not a little distrust of it on the ground that it involves the removal of control from the local to a central body.
This view of the position is not warranted. The present Act is administered in co-operation with representatives of the local bodies and representatives of industry and commerce. It is the local advisory committee that examines the tenders for supplies that are obtained at fixed intervals on written specifications, and makes recommendations to the Minister for the appointment of official contractors. There is, therefore, a large element of local control in the administration of the system. It has also been advanced by some opponents of the system that it tends to a concentration of contracts for supplies in the more populous areas. This impression is also not well-founded. Contractors in the smaller towns can and do compete successfully with those in the larger centres of population. The existing contracts are distributed throughout the country. Besides the four county boroughs there are official contractors for supplies in at least 26 other areas.
The current list contains 2,164 items, and the names of 230 contractors. Tenders are not invited for perishable commodities or for commodities which can generally be obtained with greater or equal advantage locally, e.g., cement, coal, and many items of building material. Further, commodities of a highly specialised and technical character, as also those which do not form part of the regular requirements of local authorities, do not come within the ambiz of the scheme. The system of combined purchasing has been helpful in some instances to the establishment of native industries, and in most cases to their development and expansion. It is expected that the changes which are proposed in the Bill with the object of fixing definite quantities to be supplied over a specified period will lead to an advancement of this policy.
The main differences between the present Bill and the Act of 1925 are in respect of the provisions of Section 6 under which an official contractor may be appointed for the supply of commodities to a particular class of local authorities or to particular local authorities; Section 10 which deals with the revocation of the appointment of an official contractor; Section 12 which regulates the procedure to be followed in regard to substitute commodities; Section 13 which requires the submission by local authorities of estimates of their requirements; and Section 14 which contains provisions prohibiting the ordering of supplies by any member or officer of a local authority from any person other than the official contractor.
As regards the provision in Section 6 dealing with the appointment of official contractors it is thought advisable to have wider powers in connection with the supply of commodities to a particular class of local authority or to particular local authorities, and the provision in sub-section (5) of the section is designed to meet the position. The provision would permit of the formation of special economic areas if it is found that the adoption of this course would enable the smaller industries that could not meet the needs of all local bodies under a general contract to tender for the supply of commodities for such special areas on competitive terms. The existing Act does not enable the Minister for Local Government to cancel the contract of an official contractor even if he proves to be unsatisfactory as regards quality and delivery of supplies. Section 10 of the Bill has in view only an official contractor whose retention of the contract would entail serious inconvenience for local authorities if being unable to obtain delivery of supplies at contract prices, they had to purchase commodities at higher prices without any prospect of being able to recover the additional cost from the official contractor.
As regards Section 12 of the Bill there have been instances of local bodies when inviting tenders for supplies having made variations in specifications for commodities or alterations in conditions of supply so that their requirements not being specifically provided for in the combined purchasing list could be obtained from non-official contractors. In reality the requirements of these bodies would be adequately met by commodities obtainable from an official contractor, and to prevent the continuance of such a practice the Bill empowers the Minister to declare that another specified commodity be deemed a substitute for the original commodity, and, therefore, subject to the same regulations as the original commodity.
Provision is made in Section 13 to enable estimates of the commodities required during the contract period to be obtained, so that intending contractors may be given an estimate of the quantities of the commodity or commodities for which they tender. When such contractors know that such quantities will be definitely taken off their hands, and when the contract is thus a firm order, they will be in a position to cover their risks, and, in the case of textile manufacturers, contract at a fixed price for their raw materials. On the other hand, they will not be called upon to supply at the contract price more than the estimated amount of the commodity or commodities—a great advantage to the contractor in the event of rising prices. At present an institution may during the last week of a contract period give the official contractor an order—when the market prices have considerably risen—for a quantity of commodities which he would order normally during the next contract period. Against the liability of such orders the contractor has in the long-run to protect himself by a higher contract price at the beginning of a contract period.
Estimates will only be required for commodities of a stable character and which are in regular and recurrent demand. It is not contemplated to apply this section to miscellaneous articles and those for which the demand is not of a recurrent character. It will apply to such commodities as blankets, tweeds, suits, shoes, tea and tobacco. Even if a local authority exceeds its estimate it incurs no undue hardship as the articles can be used in the next contract period.
Perhaps the most important section in the new Bill is Section 14, which prohibits dealings with persons who are not official contractors. As I have already indicated the prime necessity for the successful administration of a system of combined purchasing is complete co-operation by all local bodies. In fact, Section 12, which I have explained is not possible without the prohibition of dealings with non-official contractors. I shall endeavour to explain as fully as possible the reasons for Section 14. Should the market price of a commodity rise during the contract period, orders for such commodity may be substantially in excess of the quantity estimated for by contractors with consequent diminution or loss of anticipated profits unless contractors have discounted this possibility and covered the risk in prices tendered. Should there, on the other hand, be a falling market, quantities of stocks may be left on the hands of contractors with consequential unexpected loss unless they have discounted such a possibility in prices tendered. Hence, if contractors were in a position to know the quantities of materials for which they would be likely to receive orders prices would be lower and ratepayers would benefit. Further, manufacturers by having the articles manufactured by them for local authorities fully disposed of during the contract period, would be able to manufacture these articles during their dull periods and thereby help to even out their employment of labour throughout the year.
If local authorities were to have the option of purchasing materials locally, the Department would not be in a position to give prospective contractors any idea of the quantity of material likely to be ordered from them and consequently the best possible prices would not be generally obtained. Instances can be cited of unsuccessful applicants for official contracts having subsequently canvassed local authorities that require large quantities of materials, and quoted lower prices than those submitted in applications for appointment as official contractors. This under-cutting is facilitated by the fact that the applicants hope to get firm orders for large quantities, and have not to include in their prices the extra cost and expense entailed by the supplying of small orders to small institutions, at irregular intervals, and at remote places which involve higher transportation cost per unit.
The official contractors in such cases lose the more valuable orders, whereas they have to supply the less valuable. Naturally, successful contractors have to cover themselves against this emergency by tendering higher prices than they would tender if they were assured that the valuable as well as the less valuable orders would accrue to them. The official contractors who deliver to the less profitable areas must be protected against piracy or "creaming the traffic". The creaming of such traffic is liable to result in higher prices for all areas and in depriving the local government institutions, as a whole and in the long run, of lower weighted average prices.
The provisions dealing with tests of commodities supplied contained in Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act of 1925 have been amplified so as to make the results of the tests evidence and also so as to require payment by local authorities applying for tests. In the proposed Bill the Local Supplies Advisory Committee has the same constitution as that laid down by Section 9 of the Act of 1925, save that one representative of employees (paragraph (d)) is added.