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Dáil Éireann debate -
Thursday, 28 Sep 1944

Vol. 94 No. 14

Transport (No. 2) Bill, 1944.—Committee. (Resumed).

Debate resumed on amendment No. 50

Speaking on the Second Reading of the Transport (No. 1) Bill, I think on the 1st May of this year, the Minister, I am glad to say, made it very clear to the House that he was not, at that time at any rate, definitely tied up with the kind of control that is provided for in this section of the Bill. If he looks at the Official Report, he will realise that he indicated his desire that suitable amendments might be drafted and that if such amendments were submitted they would be considered by him on their merits. This small group gave consideration to that promise made by the Minister, in connection with this and other matters, and it is for that reason that this amendment is submitted for the consideration of the House. This kind of control of a huge public undertaking with Government guarantees behind it is a novel one. In my opinion it is a most undemocratic one and is a very risky experiment. I am sure the Minister must realise that. I wonder if Mr. Reynolds, the present chairman, with his experience of the operation of limited control of this kind, is himself satisfied with the experience which he has had since he was appointed or came into office in February, 1942, and if he is satisfied with the nature of the valuable assistance given to him in his difficult task by the four colleagues who were put there as stockholders' directors with the power of office boys?

I suspect that Mr. Reynolds is not very satisfied and in fact I should like to know to what extent, if any, these stockholders' directors have been consulted by him on any matter of importance. In his evidence before the Judicial Tribunal he swore that he had not consulted his four colleagues prior to the meeting on the Thursday before this reorganisation scheme was published. Now the stockholders' directors are supposed to safeguard the financial interests of the existing stockholders and here we have the statement of the chairman on oath that he had not consulted them on the reorganisation proposals that are contained in this Bill. What other matter could he possibly have consulted them upon? If they are not worthy of consultation in a matter concerning the shareholders' interests, the interests they are supposed to represent, then I suggest that a considerable saving could be effected in this scheme when it comes into operation by wiping out these costly ornaments. The scheme in this Bill provides for the appointment of a chairman-dictator and, as far as I can gather, for the appointment of six stockholders' directors, these stockholder directors having as little power in future as they had up to the present time. It is an extraordinary thing that the stockholders' directors under this reorganisation, who will represent only 20 per cent. of the capital value of the new company, will have 85 per cent. of the representation on the board, whereas the chairman, who represents the interest of the taxpayers to the extent of £16,000,000, will be one out of seven. It is true, of course, that the chairman, under the powers conferred upon him in this section will be all-powerful.

If the Minister is still standing for the scheme contained in this section of the Bill—I hope he is not—what is the, necessity for having six stockholders' directors out of a total of seven directors? Apparently the chairman is very anxious to save money. We had an indication to that effect yesterday evening when the Minister suggested that it was for the purpose of saving money that the information contained in the accounts of the company was cut down and that the accounts have been published for the last year or two in the abridged form in which they have been published. If he wants to save money here is a clear case where he can do it. If he still stands for the system of giving the stockholders' directors a majority on the board they can have a majority by having two instead of six, in which case they will be two to one as against six to one. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Reynolds as chairman of this company, in February, 1942, as far as I can discover from the accounts published by the company, every director cost the shareholders of the company not less than £1,000 a year in fees and expenses and in some years they cost a good deal more than £1,000 a year. The chairman in office previous to the appointment of Mr. Reynolds certainly cost more than £1,000 a year, but the ordinary directors, in fees and expenses, cost at least £1,000 a year. If the Minister still stands for the scheme of control contained in this section of the Bill, he can save at least £4,000 per annum by reducing the number of stockholders' directors from six to two and there will still be a majority of two to one, representing stockholders' directors as against the chairman.

I want to know from the Minister, quite candidly, whether any bargain has been made with the directors of the Great Southern Railways Company and the Dublin United Transport Company to put the existing directors into the new scheme and, by doing so, to incur expense which otherwise would not be necessary. They are costly ornaments. They have the glorified title of directors with no more power than that of an office boy.

I referred last night to the fact that the Minister, repeatedly in this House, has made the case that it is the existing directors of the Great Southern Railways Company who are mainly responsible for the mismanagement and bankruptcy of that concern and, automatically, for forcing the Government to take the action which they are taking through this measure. I have listened on many occasions here to that kind of criticism of the old management and I am afraid that the working officials of the company are blamed, wrongly, by many people for whatever mismanagement there has been up to recent times. The working officials of the Great Southern Railways Company, in the same way as the working officials of the Dublin United Transport Company or any other public carrying company of that kind, carry out the orders of their directors. I know of cases where if certain suggestions that were made by the officials of the company had been adopted by the directors, a certain serious position would not have arisen between 1939 and the appointment of Mr. Reynolds. I have said here before, and I repeat, that I know that a certain highly-placed official of the Great Southern Railways Company suggested to the directors that they should purchase coal when there were millions of tons of coal available at a very low price, after the evacuation of Dunkirk, and that suggestion was turned down by the directors.

The Deputy is going into the alleged sins of commission and omission of years ago.

I do not want to stress that point. I only want to make it clear to the members of the House who are taking an active interest in making this Bill a better Bill that it is the directors and not the executive officials of the company who are responsible for the mismanagement in the past. I wonder has the Minister or his advisers given any consideration to the kind of control which has been so successfully and efficiently carried out in Great Britain. There was a fairly serious position in the railway world in Great Britain only a few years ago and a scheme of control in connection with some of the big companies was brought into operation which has worked very satisfactorily and most efficiently. The board of control, for instance, in the case of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway Company is a board consisting of full-time working officials with a chairman. The late Lord Stamp was chairman. Sir William Wood, an Irishman, is at present chairman. The chairman is a man with considerable financial experience and an expert in accountancy. As far as I know, Mr. Reynolds is a qualified, if not a certified, accountant. He has considerable experience in finance and, in the case of the Dublin United Transport Company, has, no doubt, proved that he was able to change the system of management to the advantage of the travelling public and of the workers. I give him all the credit that the Minister claims for him in that connection. I would prefer that the other active members of the board to whom the Minister may desire to give any power should be drawn from the sections of the officials who have an expert knowledge of the working of the transport industry in this country. I wonder is it too late for the Minister to give consideration to a scheme of that kind. The head of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway Company is, as I have said, a man of high standing in the financial world and an expert accountant and he has associated with him four or five assistants who are the heads of the revenue earning sections on both the road and rail sides and an expert engineer. These are full-time working officials in charge of the administration of a company that has 400,000 employees. I think we could afford to consider the adoption of a scheme of that kind, of having a board of control rather than one man as dictator who has had no previous knowledge of railway working and having associated with him six duds. I use the word "duds" because Deputy Dwyer, who knows the members of the board of the Great Southern Railways Company far better than I do, has described these gentlemen as duds.

Dummies.

I accept the correction. If they are dummies, they are worse than duds. At any rate, I should like to know from the Minister what are the matters of any importance upon which the present chairman, Mr. Reynolds, has consulted these duds. If they are not worthy of consultation, they are not worthy of being members of the board. Thousands of pounds can be saved by asking them to retire without compensation and to devote their attention to matters that they may know something more about. If the present stockholders' directors or those of them who will get seats on the board in the future are duds, there is no justification for their expense as directors. If these directors were satisfied, on the advice of Mr. Reynolds, or any other chairman of the company, that working members of the Great Southern Railways staff were duds or were not doing their work satisfactorily, they would have no qualms of conscience and very little consideration in giving the workers concerned a week's notice to leave their jobs. If that policy is an acceptable one so far as the working members or employees of the transport industry are concerned, then the same policy should be applied to these "dud" directors.

Now, one of the directors who will be reappointed, or who can be reappointed, under the terms of this section of the Bill, has been brought under the notice of the Judicial Tribunal. He has been found guilty of having made improper use of information which came to him in his privileged position, and he made a considerable amount of money at the expense of the shareholders, whose interests he is supposed to protect. Does the Minister agree that it is desirable to have such a person on the board of the new company? The reappointment of such a person is provided for under this new scheme of reorganisation. Not alone that, but under this scheme it is made possible for that man to secure two years' compensation on the basis of his existing fees, if he desires to retire. That is possible under the terms of this Bill.

As far as I can gather, no person is named in the Bill as a director.

Yes, Sir, but if you read page 52 of the report of the Judicial Tribunal, you will find clear proof of the statement I have made.

That the person concerned will be a director of the company?

All I am saying, Sir, is that under the terms of this Bill, it is possible for him to be retained as a director, and I am asking the Minister whether, in view of what has been proved before the Judicial Tribunal, such a man should be retained in the position of a director of the new company.

Yes, but if the character of every possible director of the new company is to be discussed here, it would lead to a long and ill-advised discussion.

All I want to do, Sir, is to draw your attention, and the attention of the Minister and the House, to pages 51 and 52 of that report, which I can, and, with your permission, will quote in its entirety, but I do not wish to do so.

It is not fair to discuss the character of prospective directors.

But is not the individual concerned holding office as a director at the moment?

My point is that the provisions in this section make it possible for him to be reappointed, and shall, unless he dies, resigns or becomes disqualified, hold office until the conclusion of the 1945 meeting, which would be the 1st January, 1945. Now, Sir, if I am stating the facts wrongly, I will apologise.

Under the First Schedule I think he will become a director. I think he must become a director.

Or "might" as I understand it.

No, the word "must" is not in it because, of course, if he dies in the meantime, or retires or becomes disqualified, he will not become a director.

But, on the establishment date, it would appear to me that he will automatically become a director.

This section, without doubt, is based on the Minister's belief that Mr. Reynolds is a heaven-sent superman. May I ask the Minister, without any disrespect to the Minister and, certainly, without any disrespect to Mr. Reynolds, what, if Mr. Reynolds should die or become ill or resign, will become of this organisation after such an event? After all, Mr. Reynolds is subject to a recall from this earthly world, just in the same way as any of us are subject to a recall—in the same way as the Minister himself. There is no lease of life for any man or superman, and for that reason I do not think that any man, and especially one without any experience of railway transport, should be given the powers that are proposed to be given to him under the terms of this Bill.

If I were in the position that Mr. Reynolds holds to-day—a very important position—I should prefer to have around me as advisers, three, four or five men with first-hand knowledge and many years of experience of railway undertakings. I should look for advice from these people, and I should consider anxiously any advice that I could get from men with 30 or 40 years' practical experience in the working of railway transport. I think that the Minister is a friend of Mr. Reynolds, and it is for that reason that I am putting this proposition to him, and asking him that he should regard the matter in that light. The Minister has told us that on the morning of the fateful occasion, when the division was taken in this House, Mr. Reynolds came down to him and pleaded with him to withdraw this Bill. Now, what was it that actuated Mr. Reynolds to come down to the Minister and ask him to withdraw the Bill on the morning of the fateful day of the division here? Did he get the "wind up"? What caused him to plead with the Minister to withdraw the Bill? Something must have occurred to make him come down and ask his friend, the Minister, to withdraw the Bill.

The Deputy is far away from the amendment. He is introducing extraneous matters. This Bill surely affords sufficient matter for discussion.

You may not have been here all the time, Sir, since the beginning of the debates on this Bill, but I think you will find that I have taken up very little time in this House during the six days that this matter has been under discussion. I do not wish to be irrelevant; I have no desire to be so. Certainly, I have not the same knowledge of what constitutes irrelevancy as you have, Sir, and I submit to your ruling. I do not wish to bring in any irrelevant matters, but it was suggested to the Minister during the Second Reading and during the discussion on the Committee Stage, that Mr. Reynolds was being criticised by Deputy Norton, myself, and other Deputies, because it appeared to the Minister—and I am certain that he is wrong—that there was some prejudice in our minds against that individual. I have no prejudice in the wide world against Mr. Reynolds. I was quite satisfied that the appointment of Mr. Reynolds was better—and I stated that here in the House—than to continue on with these "dud" directors and allow them still to carry on. Life, however, is too short for me to be bothered about being prejudiced against any individual.

Is that not also bringing in irrelevant matters?

Yes, Sir, but I was coming to the point where I want to make the positive statement that, if I am prejudiced in this case, it is only against the policy pursued by Mr. Reynolds, and not against the man himself or his ability.

How is it related to amendment No. 50, which the Deputy is purporting to discuss?

I am not as capable of discussing the question of irrelevancy as you are, Sir.

That, too, is irrelevant.

I am protesting against the dictatorial proposal contained in this section of the Bill.

We are not dealing with the section at the moment, but with amendment No. 50.

I am endeavouring to persuade the Minister to accept the amendment which stands in the names of members of this group.

I want to protest in the strongest way against the interpretation that the Minister put on some words of mine last week. He said that I had referred to "dummy" directors on the board in order to have a poke at a relative of mine. That is an absolute falsehood.

The word "falsehood" will be withdrawn.

I shall withdraw it, Sir, but I understood that it was allowed.

It has been allowed.

In any case, I withdraw it.

Perhaps it would not be out of place for the Chair to say that the Minister spoke jocosely?

No, Sir, it was not made jocosely. However, I withdraw the remark. The Bill states that the company shall be directed by a board of directors, and then this section goes on to show that the chairman alone shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of the board, although never before, in the history of public companies, has such a board been formed, where the articles of association state clearly that the directors have no power whatever to do anything without the permission of the chairman. It is an amazing thing that a company, which has now been in existence for 120 or 130 years, has never given an opportunity to any of its staff, so far as I know, to attain the position of directors of the company. A dictatorship is about to be established under the name of democracy. There are further possibilities of paying on turnover, which has never been done before, so far as I know. I never referred to these directors as "duds." I referred to them as "dummies," as having been made so by the Minister. I think it is a disgraceful thing that we should have a company here run by one man with a board of directors which has no power of direction. I was quite serious when I made that remark the other day. I think this is a most amazing provision, and I will support, as far as I can, the appointment of three directors as proposed by the amendment. I think that, in appointing these directors, it would be a good thing, in the interests of transport, to appoint directors, if possible, from the staff of the railway itself. They, surely, for 120 years have not been so completely dud as not to deserve some sort of recognition of their value to the company, and should have some say in it now. There has been a complete re-orientation in Britain as regards boards of directors. I think that after this war we will find that many representatives of Labour will go on the boards of big companies in England, and I think it is about time that we toed the line here.

May I intervence at this stage to try to get the discussion back to the amendment? I think that Deputy Davin had better make up his mind straight away that there is no half-way house between the proposals in the Bill and Government ownership and control. No doubt, he would prefer Government ownership and control. He made that fact clear. But this Bill does not provide for it, and the sections of the Bill which determine the form that this company will take have already been passed through Committee. We cannot go back on that. If the alternative, therefore, is not complete Government ownership and complete Government control, which Deputy Davin would prefer, does the suggestion in the amendment offer any improvement on the Bill, having regard to the general scheme of the Bill? I submit that it does not. It does not effect any such improvement. The suggestion, which is neither one thing nor the other, would confer not the benefits of either system but only the faults of both systems. It would give the Government full responsibility for the board of the company, while at the same time leaving in the power of others the influencing of its policy. We can have complete Government responsibility for transport direction, responsibility discharged through a board of directors nominated by it, if we want it. We think it would be a bad system in the circumstances of this country, and we are not proposing it. We are going to oppose it. The Dáil has taken a decision on that, and I submit that the people have taken a decision on that matter.

If we proceed on the basis of a commercial organisation, with the common stock held by private individuals who, as the owners of that stock, will select directors to represent them, is it desirable that we should limit the representation of these stockholders upon the board of this company to the extent proposed by Deputy Davin? I suggest that it is not. What is necessary here is to ensure that, if there is a conflict between the owners of the stock and the public interest, the public interest should predominate. It is necessary also to ensure that, so long as the taxpayer of the country is the ultimate guarantor of the interest obligations of this company, the Government, as the representative of the taxpayers, should have the power to intervene at any stage or time necessary to ensure that the financial affairs of the company are well managed.

It is true that I intimated to the Dáil during the course of the debate on the Second Reading of Transport Bill No. 1 that the proposals in this section were not necessarily regarded as unchangeable. I intimated that any amendment would be considered on its merits. Deputy Davin's was considered on its merits and, on its merits, I ask the Dáil to reject it. I think that it represents a worse proposal than that contained in the Bill. If we were to go as far as Deputy Davin suggests it would be better for us to go the whole distance, and get rid of the common stockholders altogether and have a board entirely nominated by the Government. I think Deputy Davin is under a complete misconception also in regard to the functions of the board when he refers to the stockholders' directors as having only the power of office boys. The members of the board of this company have many functions to perform, some of them placed on them by statute and others arising out of their day to day administration of the concern. Membership of the board involves a considerable amount of work. When the Great Southern Railways Company was constituted by the Act of 1924 it was considered desirable that the number on the board of the company should not be smaller than 12. The 1924 Act provided for a board which would not be less than 12 or more than 15. We considered that a smaller board would be equally effective, and legislated in 1933 to reduce it in size. But, on many occasions since, it has been represented that the amount of routine work falling to be discharged by the board is such that an increase in its size would not be unacceptable to the other members. We are not proposing to increase its size, but we think it is a complete misunderstanding of the functions of the board for Deputy Davin to suggest that the members will have nothing to do.

Why have six to one?

Because it is intended that the direction of the company will be largely in the hands of the representatives of the stockholders, subject only to the power of the chairman appointed by the Government to ensure that its policy conforms to the Government's intentions, and that its financial administration is such as not to prejudice the interests of the taxpayer.

Deputy Davin says that the directors of this company were not consulted concerning the proposals in the Bill. That is obviously wrong. It is quite clear that, during the stage of tentative consideration of these proposals before anything definite emerged, Mr. Reynolds, the chairman of the company, was acting as the Government's adviser and not as the representative of the board. At the stage when it became possible to consult the board, the board was consulted and the board took a decision to recommend these proposals to the people whom they represented—the shareholders of the company.

Were they not presented with an accomplished fact, with the proposals agreed to by you and Mr. Reynolds, with no alternative?

They were presented with proposals which had been provisionally agreed to by the chairman and myself.

Without previous consultation?

They were quite free to reject these proposals if they wished. There is, of course, no point whatever in the proposal that we should reduce the board to three directors. A board of three directors could not possibly discharge all the functions that will fall on this body.

I also want to say that the suggestion by Deputy Davin, that there was some bargain between the Government and the directors of the absorbed companies relating to their position in the new organisation, is completely without foundation. The Deputy is aware of the proposals in the Bill. We consider that these proposals represent the best method of effecting a transition from the present position into the contemplated position, but they were decided on on their merits, and not as a result of any agreement or arrangement.

If I am in order, I would like to make a brief reference to a director of the company who is referred to in the tribunal's report. I considered whether there were any grounds of public policy arising out of the tribunal's report why we should legis late in respect of Mr. Goodbody. Mr. Goodbody is a director of the company and, under the provisions of the Bill, will become a stockholders' director for a time—until his re-election arises—unless he decides in the meantime to retire. The report of the tribunal is as follows. I shall read two short paragraphs from it which summarise the whole position.

Read the whole lot.

No, but I think I will read sufficient. On page 52 the tribunal's report states:—

"Although Mr. Goodbody's action was in no way unlawful, we are of opinion that the mere giving of the order to purchase the stock before the issue of the circular was an improper use of information concerning the proposals for the reorganisation of the capital of the company within the meaning of our terms of reference. We are further of opinion that the purchase of the £500 stock was also an improper use of such information."

The other paragraph I shall read is from the findings of the tribunal on page 63—

"There has been no improper use-of information concerning the proposals for the capital reorganisation of the Great Southern Railways except the instances we have specifically mentioned, which we consider-unimportant and to which no other dealings can be attributed."

That was the report so far as Mr. Goodbody was concerned. I am of opinion that the report does not require us to take any specific action in relation to that gentleman. Whether he will regard himself as under any obligation to take action, I cannot say. Whether the shareholders of the company will have regard to that report when the question of his election arises, I cannot say. If, however, a view is strongly expressed here that the report does require the extraordinary step of legislating in relation to that gentleman, that view can be considered. However, I urge Deputies, if they are going to express that view, to express it with every desire to be fair, having regard to the terms of the tribunal's report and to the exceptional step that would be involved in the introduction of amending legislation naming that gentleman in relation to the board of this company. This is not a matter on which I am going to influence the Dáil one way or another. I have given the matter very careful consideration and my judgment, for what it is worth, is that the report does not call for any special action on the part of the Legislature, whatever action it may call for on the part of the individual himself or on the part of the shareholders of the company.

Immediately after the reference in the report to that gentleman, there are references to a civil servant.

And he was retired.

The civil servant was retired. What is the difference between the two parties?

A difference of function.

We are discussing the function of a director in relation to the shareholders.

His function is entirely different from that of the civil servant.

What is the difference——

I am not going to discuss the matter by way of interjection or cross-examination. I have expressed my view by speech and other members can express their view by speech. I strongly urge Deputies not to be led into advocacy of a course of action in relation to that individual or any other individual hastily or on the basis of prejudice. I am under no obligation to offer any words in his defence, nor am I doing so.

If a full-time railway official did the same thing, what would happen? The board would put him out.

I think it would be most unwise to provoke heat on this issue by means of interjections or cross-examination. If heat is provoked, there is a grave danger that the Dáil may be induced to do something which would be unfair. I urge the Dáil to reject this amendment as the worst of all the alternatives yet submitted to the House for constituting the board of this company.

Amendments Nos. 50, 53 and 57 hang together.

Amendments Nos. 50, 53, 54 and 55 are to be discussed together.

I want to endeavour to give to the Dáil a picture of the type of board we want constituted under this section. The plain fact is that this section—Section 35—is totalitarianism run riot. I defy a single member of the Fianna Fáil Party to defend the provisions of this section.

The Deputy should get a decision on the amendment before proceeding to discuss the section on which there will, probably, be a long discussion, as amendments Nos. 52 to 55 must be taken together.

I am asking any member of the Fianna Fáil Party to justify the constitution of the board in the manner provided by Section 35. Here we have a board consisting of a chairman and six folk described as "directors," who are without the slightest power in the world to direct. They are on a lead. They are permitted to do just what the chairman wishes them to do. If the chairman does not wish them to do anything, those six directors, whether as individuals or as a collective group, have no functions or powers whatever. Did anybody ever hear of a board constituted in this way? There are seven directors. Six of them are to provide a little ornamentation for the seventh, who is chairman, and who wields all the power. Although there is a board of seven, the chairman alone constitutes a quorum at a meeting of the board. The six may be there if they like but, if the chairman is not there, there is no quorum. Six out of the seven directors may be present but there is no quorum unless the chairman is present. Is not that a nice conception of democracy? That is provided for in sub-section (5) which states that no decision shall be arrived at at any meeting without the concurrence of the chairman. Six of the seven directors may hold a view which is desirable from the national standpoint and from the standpoint of the stockholders so far as railway policy is concerned. That does not matter. So long as the seventh man, the Minister's appointee, the nominee of the Minister——

He will be the Government's nominee and the representative of public policy.

The so-called representative of public policy.

The Minister appoints him.

So far as transport is concerned, we are to assume that this person is the only one whom the shareholders and stockholders can find to look after public policy.

He is not appointed by the shareholders. He is appointed as representative of public policy. Is that what the Deputy is objecting to?

I am not objecting to that. I am objecting because this is a case of dictatorship run riot. The Minister should not get annoyed simply because we are pointing out that he is constituting a board of seven, six of whom will be the most innocuous ornaments this country or any other country has ever seen. So far as this board is concerned, they will be qualified for Madame Tussaud's exhibition in London. People with self-respect and independence of character would not serve as satellites in this special constellation for which the Minister is providing. These six persons will have no functions once the chairman decides against their view.

The Deputy has tabled an amendment proposing to delete the section.

I want to give a picture of the type of board we want to set up. That is set out in amendment No. 50. It is of a different type from the so-called board provided for by the Minister, which is an absolute dictatorship.

The Chair presumes that the Deputy will not move the subsequent amendments.

We shall see what the Minister says in reply. I do not want unduly to prolong the discussion. But I want to tell the Minister and the Fianna Fáil Party that what they are doing here is instituting a complete autocracy. One member of the board —the chairman—constitutes a quorum. If the other six are present and he is not present, there is no quorum. If the chairman and the other six directors are present, they can do nothing except what he permits them to do. Has anybody ever heard of such a provision in legislation in this country or any other country?

It is the system in operation at present.

You are continuing your mad-dog policy.

The Deputy asked if such an arrangement was ever heard of before. It is in operation.

I asked if such an arrangement were ever heard of in legislation before. The Minister imposed such a system by Emergency Powers Order. This is part of the Minister's mad-dog policy in regard to control and direction of the railway company. This amendment seeks to establish a board which will consist of three stockholders' representatives, three directors appointed by the Minister and the chairman. The object is to ensure that there will be at least a democratic board, which will be able to fix its own quorum, will be able to arrive at decisions by democratic majority rule and, at the same time, provide adequate representation of the public interest on the board, in view of the fact that the taxpayers are going to be liable, in the event of default by the railway company, to pay interest, at least until 1960 on the £16,000,000 of debenture stock which will be issued by this company. I suggest to the Minister that he ought not to display such a want of faith in persons who may desire to serve on the board of an Irish transport undertaking. One would imagine that everybody in this country was a public enemy of transport except the person who is appointed chairman by the Minister. I suggest to the Minister that even though he has abandoned his intentions of yesteryear, to introduce a scheme of national ownership and national control of transport, there is no reason why his abandonment of that policy should be accompanied by the establishment of a dictatorship, such as it contemplated, so far as the directors are concerned, in Section 35.

I think the section is thoroughly undemocratic, because it gives absolute and despotic power to the chairman, all based on the fact that he has succeeded in mesmerising the Minister. What would happen if one day the chairman got into a huff with the Minister, or with the Government, or became ill? It is almost too horrible to contemplate that a transport undertaking with a capital of £20,000,000 cannot be run, according to the Minister, unless this particular person is chairman. I think this is an attempt to enthrone absolute dictatorship. I consider that there is no justification for it, and this amendment, together with complementary amendments, Nos. 53 and 57, provide for the establishment of a democratic board, consisting of competent persons capable of managing the transport undertakings, who will arrive at decisions by majority rule and, at the same time, constitute a national safeguard.

Would it be possible to discuss all the amendments on this point now?

If the House so desires. What does the Deputy suggest?

I cannot speak for other amendments.

Deputy Sheldon will be given a decision on amendment No. 56, which governs amendment No. 58.

I do not propose to speak again on the amendments when they are called separately.

There can be no decisions on amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55. Let us say that amendments Nos. 50 to 55 will be discussed together.

Is there to be a decision on amendment No. 50?

Yes, if desired.

I should like to have an opportunity of speaking on all the amendments if taken together. That will certainly save time and help to get a proper understanding of the points raised.

That is precisely what I want: Nos. 50 to 56 discussed together with decisions on three of them.

I want to have them taken together.

That is now agreed.

What about my amendment?

I have it in mind.

The scheme proposed by Section 35 is that of a board of directors, a chairman and a certain number of stockholders' shareholders. There is the amazing proposal that the board can act whether there is a vacancy or not in membership, that the chairman can hold a meeting any time he likes, because he constitutes a quorum, that no meeting can be held until the chairman is there and, finally, to put the matter beyond possibility of leakage, there is a provision that no decision can be taken by the board unless the chairman concurs. The Minister continued to say that there is some virtue in having subsidiary members, other than the chairman, and that there was some function for them. I should like to know what it is. There were "tags" about responsibility and power and why they had to be conjoint, but the members of the board have no power except maybe in the way of influencing the chairman, or bringing views to bear on him with a view to getting him to sway his decision in a manner other than he proposed. I hope the framework will be changed, and that at ordinary board meetings majority decisions will be binding. Deputy Dwyer, as a business man, says that he knows of no company in which similar proposals are to be found. The Minister accepts that view, because the only thing he could say of the proposal was that it was done in a time of emergency. I think he also said that it was done on the promise that he was not going to make any emergency provision for the post-war period. If we take it that the board is not going to be reconstituted other than as the Minister proposes, then we must accept the position that the chairman will be there, that he is going to take a decision without a board meeting being called, that he can prevent any meeting discussing anything by staying away, and can prevent any decision being taken by refusing to concur in it.

It is very hard to consider these people except as Deputy Norton described them, satellites. They may have a viewpoint and bring it to bear, but in the background the chairman must be the supreme arbiter and his decision must hold. Fitted into these circumstances, although I do not think there is much value in the point, it seems to me that it would be better to have a number of people to provide varying viewpoints for the chairman in an effort to get him to come to a proper conclusion. The Minister said that if there is a conflict between private owners and public interest, the public interest must prevail. Accepting that for the moment, who is to be the judge of the public interest? Why should we assume that this chairman alone will be the best judge of the public interest? Why should he not be provided with other people, at least as conscious of the public interest as he is, who could produce arguments as to what is the best thing to do on particular occasions? There are very few boards that I know, not even the present Government, in which there is not at least a semblance kept up that there is still some process of reasoning in regard to taking decisions. We return to this old matter of the clash of mind upon mind, and you try to provide for that by getting people with diverse interests, having before them the particular viewpoints of their Departments, and getting these to agree upon one common policy. It seems to me that there may be some value to be got by surrounding this man, who in the end is to be the mouthpiece of the public interest, by people who at least will have arguments to put forward founded on experience as to what the public interest in particular circumstances may be. It was for that reason that I approached this matter from the point of view of the amendment I tabled to the Fourth Schedule. I had before my mind a particular viewpoint, and I submit that it is not an unreasonable attitude.

That is amendment No. 213?

Yes, which will fall with this. In the case of that amendment, it was a matter of involved drafting and it could have been done better, but I drafted it in the circumstances of the measure before me. I had a particular viewpoint before me which Deputy Norton has dealt with to some extent. There is in the measure a proposal that something in the neighbourhood of £9,000 or £10,000 worth of debentures will be redeemed from time to time and the suggestion is that there is to be a redemption fund built up, that the savings of the company will be put into the fund and redemption secured over a period of years between now and 1960, possibly on some regular instalment basis.

It is a common view—I do not think there is any gainsaying the view—that if the money for the redemption of these debentures is not to be found in the taxpayers' pockets, it will have to come out of charges on transport users. There will be two sets of people who in the end—one or other, or possibly both by some sharing process—will provide the money required to redeem the debentures. These are the transport users and the taxpayers, and I have put down the suggestion that for each £2,000,000, or part of £2,000,000, which in any year is paid off, in so far as it is paid out of transport charges, transport users' directors should be appointed and in so far as it is paid out of State funds, say, by the Minister, out of moneys he raises from the public purse, what I call official directors should be appointed. It would mean in the end that, if all the money were paid off, there might be a possibility of six extra directors being appointed. Supposing it were done on a half and half basis, from the public purse and from transport charges, there should be three extra directors to represent certain interests and three others to represent other interests.

It is not a strictly logical division, but when the Minister, in consultation with the Minister for Finance, came to appoint directors, because of the fact that the public had to subscribe to the paying off of the debentures, he should try to get certain interests—industrial, commercial and transport—represented and in so far as transport charges paid it off, those who used the transport system, such as agriculture and traders of different types, should be brought in and given an interest in the concern. I think there ought to be some consideration either for the transport users or the taxpayer, if either of these two sources are tapped in order to supply what is required to pay off these debentures.

I have put forward the additional proposal that right from the start— and Deputy Dwyer has touched on this and I am thoroughly in agreement with him; in fact, I had already anticipated his view by putting down an amendment—there should be three people appointed to represent the employees, that is, employees from the meanest type of worker on the system up to the managerial side. I did all that in the light of the ideas expressed and also because, just about the time I was considering the matter, the report of the Commission on Vocational Organisation had appeared, and it seemed to me that my proposal was very definitely in line with the run of their suggestions, that is, that when founding any of these institutions, an attempt should be made to get all those directly interested, either on the basis of service in the case of employees or the basis of payment in the case of taxpayers and transport users, should be associated in the management of the concern.

There is no doubt, as Deputy Dwyer said, that this new viewpoint has been steadily accepted and put into practice during the war in all sorts of organisations which were brought into being in order to meet the exigencies of the war situation, and that it has been found a profitable use of men's energies and brains that all these diverse interests should be got around the individual who is to be chairman of a board and should be enabled to play their part. I suggest that this matter should be given further consideration, and that we should accept some proposal to have this chairman at least provided with better sources of information and with a variety of viewpoints all touching on transport. There may be some way of effecting that, even though we have to fit it into the framework of this tight, narrow scheme of the Minister. I object to this tight, narrow scheme. I do not think it is possible, no matter how much admiration one may have for individuals, or what may be said of the work of an individual in peculiar circumstances in a couple of years, safely to rely on the judgment of one person.

I do not think that one person is fairly put into a position of importance of this type in being told right from the start that it is he who is being relied on and nobody else, and it would aid that man to carry out his responsibilities if he were given this duty, that not merely had he to come to a conclusion about the public interest, but he had to persuade a board, or a majority of its members, whom he had immediately under his control and to whom he could talk privately and persuasively, that what he thought was the public interest was in fact the public interest and should prevail. So long as we accept the system of argument, of trying to get things done by a process of reasoning, I do not see why we should not still have argument as the decisive matter, even though it may be in the privacy of the boardroom. I am all for having that system adopted and I suggest it should be adopted here.

With regard to the matter raised by Deputy Davin, of the individual spoken of in the report of the tribunal, the Minister says he thinks it would be very drastic, on foot of such a report, to legislate against that one individual. It would, of course. We all accept that view, but the trouble is that the Minister, by administrative action, operated against another person. I do not propose to go through the details, but one can read the pages after page 50 and compare the cases of the two individuals and see what amount of stock each desired to buy. The gentleman referred to did not succeed in his full ambitions with regard to purchase, but we can take what the objective of each was in connection with purchases. We must take this into consideration also, that, so far as the civil servant to whom I have referred is concerned, all that the report says is that the tribunal cannot believe that he could entirely dissociate his purchases, and the mind behind his purchases, from the information he knew or might have come to know inside the Department. Remember the case of the other man—a clear confession that he sat at a board meeting and got information and that he was going to use that information. In the report it is stated that he put the viewpoint that he did not intend to purchase before the flag fell, so to speak, that is, before the publication of the proposals, but clearly in the report, it is indicated that he was going to be first off the mark on the Monday morning. Clearly, distinctly and confessedly from this report, that was the result of information he got as a member of the board, and, if the two cases are to be judged, the Minister cannot just halt and say it is a drastic thing to legislate against one man, without remembering that he has acted administratively to the very definite detriment of the other man. There should be some better equalisation of the positions.

If the Minister goes back into the history of the Railway Tribunal, I think he will find that there was one occasion—I am not absolutely certain of this—on which a case was found to be made in respect of what is called undue preference in the matter of rates—undue preference given to the firm of Ranks, with which this gentleman, of course, is connected—and that another case was pending in which the same complaint was made and that case was only prevented from coming off because the Minister passed an Order with regard to exceptional rates. I tag that on to this gentleman's history. There was, I think, one occasion in which it was alleged that preferential rates were given and, peculiarly enough, they were given in favour of a firm with which this man is connected.

It is quite true that one could not find in the articles of association of any company, so far as I know, any arrangement corresponding to that proposed in this Bill. I can say in relation to this arrangement, however, that it is working smoothly now, that it is working efficiently. Deputies must not assume that the situation in the board room of the Great Southern Railways will always be one in which definite antagonisms will arise between the chairman and the other directors and that these powers set out in Section 35 will have to be availed of. I am certain that, from the time the Emergency Order was made in 1942 until this date, no director of the Great Southern Railways, chairman or anyone else, adverted to the powers given to the chairman in that Order, much less contemplated availing of them. I imagine that that is how the situation will be in the future.

It may be that at some stage a conflict of interest will arise between the shareholders' directors and the chairman as the representative of public policy. If such a situation arises, we must make provision as to who is to come out on top. It is possible that in the whole history of the company that situation will never occur and these powers will never be exercised. In so far, however, as, in the framing of legislation, we must endeavour to provide against all contingencies, we must provide against a contingency in which there may be a definite, flat refusal on behalf of the shareholders' directors to co-operate in order to force either a change of policy on the Government or a change of legislation upon the Dáil.

While it is true that there is probably no company with articles of association similar to the corresponding section of this Bill, I should say that there are many companies which, despite their articles of association, function as if their constitution was as set out here. In fact, I should say, without being too definite, that the great majority of companies operate as indicated in the various sections of the Bill. Certainly in most of the companies in this country, where the chairman or managing director is also the predominant personality on the board and probably the largest shareholder as well, whatever may be in the articles of association, he alone constitutes the quorum and he alone can make decisions. Some of the Deputies who spoke here in this connection have probably experience of that type of company.

Frankly, I cannot understand what Deputy Norton means when he talks about a democratic system. This is not a board of guardians. This is a commercial organisation intended to discharge important commercial functions. We are not intending that it should be a democratic institution or that its functioning should be upon lines that are associated with Parliamentary democracy. We want to get the most efficient system which will produce the best results. I do not care whether Deputy Norton calls it democratic or dictatorial, the results are what will matter here. It is democratic if this democratic Legislature decides that it is the best system.

I am completely opposed to the idea of representative directors. By that I mean directors who will come on the board to represent some other interest than the company in the management of which they are participating. I speak, however, not merely upon the basis of theory but upon the basis of experience. I think that any commercial organisation will be successful if its directors are concerned solely with the interests of that organisation. If they are placed on the board of it as representatives of some other interest, their utility as directors is destroyed and frequently they become obstructions to the effective operation of the concern. I would oppose in any circumstances the appointment of persons to the board of this company in the acknowledged capacity of representatives of agriculture or industry or labour or finance or any such conception. I think that the persons appointed by the shareholders of this company to manage its business, or the person nominated by the Government to be chairman of the company, must be concerned solely with the successful operation of the concern and not under any obligation to justify their management in relation to any special interest.

I am not in any circumstances going to be put in the position of defending Mr. Goodbody. If Mr. Goodbody has a defence to offer, he himself will put it forward. I accept fully the observations of the tribunal and the censures —I think they did censure him—which are contained in the report. I am, however, going to say this: that there was, despite what Deputy McGilligan has said, a fundamental difference between the case of Mr. Goodbody and the officer in my Department who was compulsorily retired. He was a most efficient officer, one of the most useful officers available to me. It was a very considerable loss to the Department that his services had to be dispensed with. I do not believe that he took the action he did with any intention of doing anything wrong. But the action he did take led to the possibility of a leakage of information. There is no evidence that there was a leakage of information. But, in the interests of the public service as a whole, it was necessary to put it beyond doubt that, however innocently he may have acted, however harmless his action may have been, it was improper for an official of a Government Department, having information concerning any legislation of this character, to take any steps whatever which might have resulted in a leakage of information concerning it.

That, I think, justifies the action taken in relation to that officer of the Department. I took that action with considerable regret and solely because of the general principle involved. I think that the Department of Industry and Commerce was weakened considerably by the loss of that particular officer. But I do not want to draw any analogy between that case and any other case referred to by the tribunal. I do not think there is any analogy between it and the case of Mr. Goodbody. Whatever action is taken in relation to Mr. Goodbody should I think be taken by others. Whatever explanation or defence there is to be offered for him has to be offered by himself. It will not be offered by me.

I am glad, sir, that you have permitted the Minister to read the section of the report which I was prevented from reading last night by the Leas-Cheann Comhairle. I am glad the Minister said that he will not be put in the position of defending Mr. Goodbody in this matter. I did not mention any name. But there is another case and, if it were not for the Minister's speech on this matter, I would not mention it. It is a case where a man has suffered in advance of the findings of this tribunal. It is the case of an official of the Great Southern Railways who, before the tribunal was set up and long before the findings of the tribunal were announced or made available to Deputies, was prejudged. I was wondering if the Minister would not take an interest in seeing, in view of the findings of the tribunal, that that man's petition will be put right.

Is the case referred to in the tribunal's report?

It is the case of an official of the company who was removed from a fairly important position in the general manager's office and put in a minor position.

I certainly would not interfere in a case of that kind. I think it would be entirely wrong for me to do so. The maintenance of discipline within the company's organisation is solely a matter for the management and any attempt on my part to influence their decision would be improper.

The finding of the tribunal proves that there was no justification for what was done.

It is a matter of order.

It is hard to know where this discussion should be limited. I was discussing, and I think Deputy Davin was discussing, this section. We are objecting to these amazing powers being given to the chairman.

Retrospectively.

Deputy Davin, I understand, is asking that an action taken should be nullified or changed. It is with the future conduct we are concerned. I understood the Deputy to suggest that this man who was degraded should be reinstated.

We are not dealing with the past administration of the Great Southern Railways.

Nor have we the facts.

The Deputy is raising a matter, the facts of which are not in the possession of the House, and I really believe it is outside the scope of this section. I am sure the Deputy realises that, too.

I shall relate it, if you will allow me, to the statement made by the Minister. He said that the scheme outlined in this section has been working efficiently since the present chairman came into office.

That does not permit of an examination on this section of the working of the undertaking since Mr. Reynolds took office.

Is there not a positive danger? A man put into this amazingly strong position took certain action which has not been considered justified by a judicial body.

I do not think it came before a judicial body.

It certainly did.

It was the case of an official, put in an office of trust, talking too much. If anybody on my personal staff spoke about me in the same manner, while I might not de-grade him, I would make sure he was not in my personal office any more.

The Minister has a personal responsibility in this case. He listened to a member of this House telling a wrong story about an official of the Great Southern Railways and, instead of reporting that man to the tribunal, he reported him to the chairman of the company, who pre-judged the case by removing him from a highly-paid position to a junior post. That official was brought before the tribunal and found not guilty. I do not want to go into details concerning this matter, but the Minister, who was brought into this case, and who acted on information given to him by a Deputy, should, I suggest, now intervene to see that that man is restored to his former position or status.

Perhaps the Deputy will leave the matter there?

I shall, Sir. The Minister stated that the scheme is working efficiently since the present chairman came into office. I dispute that, though I do not want to go into any details to prove my argument. The Minister, I am sure, has not given any authority or encouragement to the present chairman to interfere with the constitutional rights of members of the staff of the Great Southern Railways as to what union or organisation they will become members of or remain in, or to interfere with the constitutional rights of the members of friendly societies who have been over a long period of years making arrangements for some compensation to be paid to themselves or their dependents in certain eventualities. The Minister has not given any such encouragement, but the chairman has been acting in that provocative way and, from the point of view of the employees of the company, he has caused a good deal of irritation.

I should like to mention the assurance which I was glad the Minister gave on the Second Reading concerning the policy activities of the future chairman, whoever he may be, in regard to matters of that kind. I rely on the Minister's assurance. I suggest the successful working of this huge scheme depends upon the goodwill that will prevail on the day it comes into operation. A friendly understanding, I hope, will be created and will continue to exist between the management and those who have helped to carry on the organisation from day to day and year to year. If the Minister's assurance in respect of the matters I mentioned is accepted and put into operation by the future chairman, I feel satisfied that, if the necessary amendments to this Bill are carried, there will be a better scheme of transport provided for the country than has been provided up to the present.

The Minister has not given any convincing arguments—and I do not accept his explanation—why there should be six stockholders' representatives on the board of this company in the future. I do not know why the Minister has arrived at that figure, unless it is to provide place and power and fees and expenses for directors of the Great Southern Railways and the Dublin Transport Company. I suggest some of these people have not the necessary time to devote to the problems they will be asked to solve, even in the coming year, and particularly from 1st January, 1945. One of the men who will be taken over under this scheme of control is a directors of no less than ten companies. He cannot have much time at his disposal to devote to the big problems the Minister talks about concerning the future working of this company.

Another member of the board who will come over under this scheme is nearly 80 years of age. I respect age as much as any person in this House, but I suggest that that man is beyond the age of usefulness. If that man and his colleagues, some of whom are between 75 and 80 years of age, decide that it is good policy to get rid of railway workers, I suggest that a similar policy should be applied to themselves, if we are to set up a successful transport undertaking. There should not be one law for directors and another for working men on the railways—one law for the rich and another for the poor. I submit that there is a good deal of that type of law contained in this and other sections of the Bill.

I submit that these directors who are between the ages of 75 and 80 have passed their period of usefulness. They are to get compensated under another section of the Bill without having to prove any case, without having to go before an arbitrator to argue that they are entitled to compensation, while the ordinary railway workers, who have carried on efficiently, from day to day in past years and who, I hope, will carry on in an equally successful way in the future, have to go, as it were, on their knees before the management in order to prove their claim for compensation; they will have to go before an arbitrator to show they are entitled to compensation. Why should not the same law with reference to compensation apply to the directors as well as to the workers?

We will probably hear about that from the Deputy when we reach the relevant section.

I am making the case that men of 75 and 80 years of age— one of them holds a directorship and receives an income of £10,000 a year, apart from perquisites—have passed their period of usefulness and I suggest that their places should be occupied by younger and better men, men who will be capable of establishing a sound and successful transport system.

The Deputy's emphasis does not get over the fact that he was dealing with compensation.

I have an amendment here and, while I agree with a good deal of what the Minister said concerning the company, I think that, although the system which has been in operation during the emergency has worked well, it would be unwise to draw conclusions of a permanent nature from that. It would be unwise to arrive at a decision that what has worked well for a short period under particular circumstances should be continued indefinitely. I agree that because it has worked well there might be a desire on the part of the Government to continue that policy, but the present chairman, whom I regard as very efficient and as one of the assets of the company, may not always be there and, in the future, when different directors and a different chairman are carrying on the functions of the board of Córas Iompair Éireann, the circumstances may be entirely changed.

It is my opinion that the desire should be to legislate rather for a system than for individuals; to legislate in order that an efficient system may be set up rather than from the point of view that, because certain individuals have worked efficiently, the system which they have operated should be continued. The amendment in Deputy Hughes's name and mine, providing that the quorum at a meeting of the board shall be three directors of whom the chairman shall be one, would ensure that the chairman would be present at all meetings. It would also ensure that the chairman alone could not hold a meeting. Under the section as it stands at the moment he could hold a meeting irrespective of the wishes or of the attendance of any other director. Deputy Dwyer mentioned the fact that he had never witnessed similar provisions in the articles of association of any company. In most cases companies are run or directed by one particular individual, who is usually the managing director, but in a large concern of this kind I certainly believe it would be desirable that the chairman should be guided and assisted by at least two other directors, and that no decision could be arrived at without their concurrence or without their attendance.

I think that any sensible person who is appointed chairman of this company will work on that basis. There are probably standing orders for the board of the Great Southern Railways Company prescribing what constitutes a quorum. What we are doing here, however, is laying down as law that certain things will operate if the occasion arises upon which they are to be availed of. I think it is extremely improbable that the circumstances will ever arise in which all the stockholders' directors of the company will refuse to attend a particular meeting, for the purpose of bringing the work of the company to a standstill. I think everybody will agree that that is extremely improbable, but must we not provide against that possible eventuality arising out of a dispute between the stockholders' directors and the Government? That is why the section is there. It is there so that, if that extremely improbable event should happen, there would nevertheless be a means of carrying on the company. I do not see that there is any alternative to providing what is in the Bill. Even if we accepted Deputy Cosgrave's suggestion and provided that two other directors should be there, there is still the possibility that no meeting could be held if all the stockholders' directors refused to attend.

Again, I repeat that the board probably does, of its own initiative, make arrangements, with which the chairman concurs, as to the minimum attendance necessary to constitute a quorum and to permit of business being conducted, but we have got to provide against extremely improbable events which would, if they came to pass, bring the company to a standstill and make it impossible for the business of the board to be discharged. We always have this problem in framing legislation—that we must provide in the legislation against every eventuality we can foresee that may defeat the purpose of that legislation. Here is one eventuality that we can foresee. Everyone can see that it is possible. We propose to provide against it in the manner suggested here. If there is any manner of providing against that eventuality other than the method suggested in the Bill it can be considered, but it is not a safeguard to substitute for what is in the Bill some other arrangement which can be equally nullified by the decision of individuals. We must in all circumstances provide that the business of the board can be carried out.

The amendment in the name of Deputy Donnellan is somewhat similar to that in the name of Deputy Cosgrave. It seeks to ensure that directors will have some power, some responsibility, and that absolute decisions cannot be taken by the chairman alone. As the fundamental object of this section is to set up a board of directors, I think we should seek to give them some authority. Practically every big company is controlled by a board of directors; each member of that board has power and responsibility, and, in practically every board of that nature, majority rules. If the Minister wanted to avoid the danger of all the six stockholders' directors combining to nullify the actions of the chairman, he might have met the difficulty much more effectively by ensuring that representatives of the public interests had a definite majority on the board, and appointing four directors instead of one. I think that would have been a much more reasonable and a much more workable method, and I think it would make for better representation of the public interests on this board. Here we are relying upon one individual and one individual alone to uphold the interests of the community on a board which is to consist of seven. He is vested with such absolute power that he could achieve that object, but it would be far better if the public interests were represented by a majority, because in this, as in every other matter, we must take the human element into consideration. It is possible that the one director may have a very strong personality; he may be a very clever man and he may be able to hold his own. There is a danger there that he may, perhaps, go too far. There is practically no control over his actions except that exercised by the Minister. On the other hand, it is possible that the one man representing the public interests may be a weak individual, and the representatives of the stockholders may be men of stronger character who would be able to dominate him. Given a majority of persons representing the public interests on the board, we would be in a much stronger position to ensure that the interests of the entire community would be safeguarded.

I do not see any point in the Minister's objection to having directors appointed who are representative of special interests. This is not a small hole-in-the-corner organisation that is being set up. It is a huge organisation which will control the life of the nation from one end of the State to the other. To a very large extent, it will control agricultural development, and for that reason it is desirable that at least one representative of agriculture should be on the board, even though that representative may be nominated by the Minister, and even though the Minister may, as he should, have the discretion of selecting a man who, apart from his knowledge of and interest in agriculture, has a good knowledge of transport administration and is suitable in every other respect. I am not suggesting that a representative of an interest such as agriculture or a representative of the interests of the employees should be appointed simply because he has an understanding of those particular interests, but at least directors should be appointed who have a knowledge of and an interest in the employees, and a knowledge of and interest in agriculture and the other vital concerns in this State.

It is, in my opinion, desirable that the Minister should consider these amendments. They may not all fit in together, but I think we should have the opportunity of picking what is best out of them. I would very strongly press the amendment in the name of Deputy McGilligan to the Fourth Schedule to the Bill, which provides for representative directors. There will be a very bad system of control if one man only is given absolute power. He will be surrounded by a group of people who have been described as dummies, with no power whatever but acting as a smoke screen behind which the director can act, if he is a remarkably clever man, or be dominated if he is a weak man. One may not always have the brilliant chairman there is at present and one may not always have a Minister like the present Minister to look after that chairman. It would be in the best interests of the State to give the public interest a majority on the board.

The fact that these amendments are being taken as a group allows of some contradiction between them. If the Minister insists on the board being formed in the way set out in the Bill, with only one representative of the public interest, I would be in favour of the amendment which gives the stockholders' directors power over the chairman. I do not see why this House should be anxious, in view of the various remarks that have been made about the stockholders' directors, to give them power over the chairman. I do not agree with the Minister that there should be only one representative of the public interest, but if he insists on that point, then I would agree with him that that representative should have more power than the stockholders' directors.

Speaking from the farmer's point of view, with regard to the needs of the farmers—having been 25 years in city life and 25 years farming—I would say that transport has been lacking very much since the evolution of the motor-car. I was greatly struck by the work of a well-known road-making company on the main road. It cost £960 a statute mile between two of the main cities. I was just an observer and perfectly powerless, but I heard remarks that the roads made by the farmers were stolen from them.

This amendment deals only with the directors.

I am speaking of the necessity for strong agricultural representation on the board, as suggested by Deputy Cogan. The needs of the agricultural community have been very sadly neglected. Their roads have been stolen and glaciers made of them. I would like that there should be strong agricultural representation. At present the roads are impassable, though they have cost £960 a statute mile. There is scarcely a yard of them on which there are not accidents. I have seen men thrown on those roads. The needs of the agricultural community should be considered very definitely by the Minister in this respect.

Since it has been suggested by Deputy McGilligan to take all these amendments together, the situation has become more clear and Deputies like myself have an opportunity to make their contribution. Coming from a constituency which is served by an undertaking other than the one in question, naturally I would not have the same interest in its composition as other Deputies, but, as a representative of the people, and in view of the fact that the State is guaranteeing the interest on this debenture stock, I might just say a few words on this particular section. The section, as it appears, seems somewhat illogical and I thought it was so, until I heard the Minister stating he could not visualise any meeting being held by the chairman alone. It was his opinion—and I am inclined to agree with him—that the directors will attend these meetings and that the chairman will take very few decisions without their consent. It cannot be denied but that is what usually happens. Deputy Davin will agree that the driving force in many trade union branches is the secretary or some one individual who is more lively than the others. No matter how big the membership of a union or a friendly society may be, the work is done mainly by one or two.

I am conscious of the fact that the main idea, the one thought in the Minister's mind, is to make this company pay and I am sure we all agree with that view. I think it is in order to ensure that, that the Minister has put in this section, giving this power to the chairman. I do not know the chairman personally but, by all accounts, he has proved himself a very efficient manager of the undertaking with which he has been associated for the past four or five years. That is what we want: we want success in undertakings, whether carried on democratically or otherwise.

I am also conscious of the fact that the Minister is in a very strong position. This Bill was greatly criticised prior to the last election and he has before his mind's eye the fact that the Fianna Fáil Party went to the country and got an over-all majority of 17. I can quite realise that those thoughts of the result of that election are behind the Minister's mind whenever he replies to Deputies here— Deputy Davin, Deputy McGilligan and the rest—who have put down amendments to this section. I should also like to remind the Minister that he if he were in opposition and Deputy McGilligan were in the Minister's place, would be putting down exactly the same amendments.

I agree that the chairman has made a success so far of the railways and I know perfectly well that some dynamic power was needed to make the railways pay; but I should like to impress on the Minister that we are living in very difficult times, in an emergency, and that people are putting up with inconveniences now and are giving of their best, from patriotic motives. That state of affairs will not obtain when this war ends—and we hope the war will end soon. Notwithstanding the chairman's great efficiency, there must be goodwill and co-operation on the part of the workers and employees. That is a thing I would always harp on. We have an unfortunate background of history in regard to that during the past 20 years, since the State was inaugurated. Whilst we are all out for the benefit of the State, we all seem to disagree absolutely on what is best for the State. It would be well for the Minister to bear that in mind and to try to meet the ideas expressed here by the Opposition Deputies through the various amendments set down on this Order Paper. I hope he will realise that, if the success of Córas Iompair Éireann is to be assured, it will require the goodwill and co-operation, not alone of the manager and directors, but of the employees. May I add this advice to the representatives of Labour as well, that it will be to their interest, in fact it will be their duty and the duty of the workers themselves, to see that it is made a success? After all, this company will be their own in the strict sense of the term. If it is not a success, they will be the sufferers.

That is why I think the Minister should adopt one of these several amendments. If he cannot adopt them in their entirety he should go at least some way to meet the wishes of the Opposition in this matter. Remember we represent a very important and influential section of the people. We are in a minority, of course, but I think the Minister will agree that much of his work will be made easy if he gets the co-operation of the Opposition, not alone in this House but outside it. I therefore deprecate in the strongest possible manner the flippant way in which the Minister seems to dismiss all these amendments. Let me express a further wish in another matter referred to by the Minister as affecting the report of the recent inquiry into the dealings in railway shares. The Minister expressed the hope, a hope with which I agree, that he will not be asked to introduce certain legislation dealing with a particular individual. May I suggest to the Minister without offence that I think he himself has been responsible for most of the references made to the report by what I might call the game-cock attitude he adopted last week? He flaunted that report in the face of Opposition Deputies on several occasions. I was present in the House and I thought he was most unwise in adopting that attitude and in trying to convince members that the report was 100 per cent. sacrosanct. I do not want to deal with that report now but may I say as a representative of plain John Citizen that I do not attach the same importance to that report as the Minister did because the members of the tribunal came to their decision in accordance with the law and in accordance with the facts as strictly proved. I think these are the exact words as used in the report. We all know that that is the law but we also know that there was many a prisoner tried at the bar who got free whom 99 per cent. of the people knew to be guilty. That is why I say we need not attach much importance to the report. We need not go any further into the matter.

I think the Minister ought in all fairness meet the Opposition in the reasoned amendments that have been put down to this section. I put forward that suggestion in the hope that it will secure co-operation and goodwill between the chairman, directors, the workers and the public in general, because I think that this is a big undertaking and one in which Deputies should take a special interest. It should not be left to the Minister, members of the Executive or members of the Fianna Fáil Party alone. We should all try to make it a success. For that reason, I trust that the Minister will, if at all possible, try to meet some of the amendments in regard to the powers of the chairman and the constitution of the directorate.

Question:—"That the words proposed to be deleted stand"—put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 61; Níl, 27.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Bennett, George C.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Brennan, Thomas.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Buckley, Seán
  • Burke, Patrick (Co. Dublin).
  • Butler, Bernard.
  • Carter, Thomas.
  • Colbert, Michael.
  • Colley, Harry.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Daly, Francis J.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Fogarty, Patrick J.
  • Friel, John.
  • Furlong, Walter.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Hilliard, Michael.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Kennedy, Michael J.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, James.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Loughman, Frank.
  • Lydon, Michael F.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McCann, John.
  • McCarthy, Seán.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, Ted.
  • Rice, Bridget M.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Traynor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Laurence.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.

Níl

  • Blowick, Joseph.
  • Browne, Patrick.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Cafferky, Dominick.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cogan, Patrick.
  • Coogan, Eamonn.
  • Corish Richard.
  • Davin, William.
  • Donnellan, Michael.
  • Dwyer, William.
  • Everett, James.
  • Halliden, Patrick J.
  • Keating, John.
  • Larkin, James.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Murphy, Timothy J.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Donnell, William F.
  • O'Leary, John.
  • O'Sullivan, Mártin.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Sheldon, William A. W.
  • Spring, Daniel.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Kissane and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies Corish and Larkin.
Amendment put and declared lost.
Question declared carried; amendment, accordingly, defeated.

I move amendment No. 51:—

After sub-section (1) (b) to add two new sub-paragraphs as follow:—

(c) such number of other directors (in this Chapter and in the Fourth Schedule to this Act referred to as official directors or transport users directors) as is provided by the said Fourth Schedule;

(d) such number of other directors (in this Chapter and in the Fourth Schedule to this Act referred to as employees directors) as is provided by the said Fourth Schedule.

I move amendment No. 52:—

To delete sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) and in lieu thereof to insert the following sub-section:—

The determination of any question before the board shall be according to the opinion of the majority of the members of the board voting upon the question.

Question—"That the sub-sections proposed to be deleted stand part of the Bill"—put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 57; Níl, 37.

  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Allen, Denis.
  • Beegan, Patrick.
  • Blaney, Neal.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Boland, Patrick.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Brady, Seán.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Brennan, Thomas.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Buckley, Seán.
  • Burke, Patrick (Co. Dublin).
  • Butler, Bernard.
  • Carter, Thomas.
  • Colbert, Michael.
  • Colley, Harry.
  • Daly, Francis J.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Fogarty, Andrew.
  • Fogarty, Patrick J.
  • Friel, John.
  • Furlong, Walter.
  • Gorry, Patrick J.
  • Hilliard, Michael.
  • Humphreys, Francis.
  • Kennedy, Michael J.
  • Killilea, Mark.
  • Kilroy, James.
  • Kissane, Eamon.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick J.
  • Loughman, Frank.
  • Lydon, Michael F.
  • Lynch, James B.
  • McCann, John.
  • McCarthy, Seán.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Morrissey, Michael.
  • Moylan, Seán.
  • O Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Loghlen, Peter J.
  • O'Rourke, Daniel.
  • O'Sullivan, Ted.
  • Rice, Bridget M.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick J.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Sheldon, William A. W.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Travnor, Oscar.
  • Walsh, Laurence.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Conn.

Níl

  • Bennett, George C.
  • Blowick, Joseph.
  • Browne, Patrick.
  • Byrne, Alfred.
  • Cafferky, Dominick.
  • Coburn, James.
  • Cogan, Patrick.
  • Coogan, Eamonn.
  • Corish, Richard.
  • Cosgrave, Liam.
  • Costello, John A.
  • Davin, William.
  • Dockrell, Henry M.
  • Dockrell, Maurice E.
  • Donnellan, Michael.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Dwyer, William.
  • Everett, James.
  • Halliden, Patrick J.
  • Hughes, James.
  • Keating, John.
  • Larkin, James.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGilligan, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Mongan, Joseph W.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Murphy, Timothy J.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Donnell, William F.
  • O'Driscoll, Patrick F.
  • O'Leary, John.
  • O'Sullivan, Martin.
  • Pattison, James P.
  • Redmond, Bridget M.
  • Spring, Daniel.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Kissane and Kennedy; Níl: Deputies P. S. Doyle and Cogan.
Question declared carried.

Amendments Nos. 53, 54, 55, 56(a). These amendments were all governed by the decision on the vote that has just been taken.

Amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55 not moved.

I move amendment No. 56:—

In sub-section (4), line 5, to delete the word "No" and to substitute the words: "Subject to sub-section (7) of this section, no."

I also have down amendment No. 58 which is the more important one.

The two go together.

I am hoping that these amendments will suffer a better fate than some of the recent ones which have been before the House because they do not cut across the Minister's ideas as to the constitution of the board, and accept the chairman's overruling power. All that I am seeking in these amendments is what the Minister himself has suggested we ought do, and that is to provide for all contingencies. The section, as it stands, provides for one set of contingencies, but I suggest there is another set on the other side. The Minister has provided that the stockholders' directors cannot sabotage the board. I suggest that, in all fairness, we ought to put in something to ensure that neither will the chairman run wild. The Minister, of course, will say that that would not be the chairman's intention, or his own intention, but good intentions do not always have a happy fate, and if there should grow up a generation which knew not Joseph there might grow up a generation which knew not the present Minister for Industry and Commerce and hence his intentions would not count for anything.

The worst thing, I think, that the Minister can say about these amendments is that they are unnecessary. Presumably, he will rest his case on the Companies Consolidation Act of 1845. I suggest to him that the relevant section of that Act does not quite provide for a board constituted as this board will be. The section in that Act which has the same implication as these amendments is, I take it, Section 92. It provides that the directors shall hold meetings "at such times as they shall appoint for the purpose of" so-and-so. What I am seeking to do in this amendment is to provide that at least four meetings of the board shall be held in the year. Presumably, a greater number would, normally, be held, but I am making that proposal to meet a possible contingency in the future, and because of the fact that this board is peculiarly constituted. The chairman is the only one who, in the final analysis, can say when the board shall meet. The other directors cannot outvote him. If they wish to hold a meeting, and the chairman does not concur, the meeting cannot be held. My suggestion is that provision should be made to meet a situation of that kind.

There is another section in the 1845 Act which provides that any two directors may require the secretary to call a meeting of the directors. I direct the attention of the House to the words in the section "to call". It is further provided in that Act that there shall be present at least the prescribed quorum. The 1845 Act only provides that a meeting shall be called. Of course, in the normal course of events, with an ordinary board, the calling of a meeting and the holding of a meeting are much the same because of majority rule. Those who turn up can go on with the meeting. Under this board, however, while the chairman might agree to call a meeting he could remain away himself. The meeting could not then be held. By doing so he would be acting against the spirit of the 1845 Act. There is not very much more to say about these amendments. I am not suggesting that they are vital, but I consider that if the Minister thinks he must provide for all future contingencies on one side, it is only fair to make similar provision on the other side.

Unless the Deputy assumes that the chairman, who will be appointed for the purpose of seeing that the business of the company is done and that the intentions of the board are discharged, is going to do the very reverse of what he has been appointed to do, no provisions other than those contained in the Companies Consolidation Act appear to be necessary. There is in that Act a provision that any two directors may require the secretary of the company to summon a meeting of the board. The dates upon which the board meetings are to be held, and the notice that must be given to members of the holding of a meeting of the board, are determined by the board. I think that to insert a special provision of this kind would be to imply that some special reason existed in the case of this company that does not apply in the case of other companies. Why should we assume that somebody is going to prevent the board from meeting or the business of the board from being done? In fact, the chairman is being appointed to ensure that meetings of the board are held, and that the business of the board is discharged. In the case of a company of this size, I should say that weekly board meetings would almost be not sufficient. Even in the case of the Great Southern Railways Company, although weekly board meetings are held, it has frequently been found necessary to delegate to committees of the board certain duties in order to permit of the full functions of the board being discharged within the week. There is, therefore, no reason to think that the board will not meet at least weekly. In so far as that is a matter which, under the Companies Acts, is left to the directors to decide, I think we should leave it to the directors of this company to decide how often they will meet, and, similarly, in so far as the summoning of meetings of the board is concerned, that is a matter, too, which the directors should themselves decide. The law requires that a board meeting shall be held if any two directors require the secretary to summon it.

"To call" is the phrase used in the 1845 Act, and it can only apply to ordinary companies.

Is the Deputy suggesting that the chairman himself will not be present? I think it would be undesirable that a board meeting should be held at which the chairman was not present. If, through temporary incapacity or for some other reason, he is not able to attend, then his deputy will be there. I think that normally the chairman should be present, having regard to the constitution of this company and the functions which the chairman has to discharge. I want to try to get the discussion away from the possibility that the chairman will be there to obstruct a meeting of the board. The chairman is being put in for the very opposite purpose: to see that, in fact, the business of the company is done, and that the board's functions are fully discharged.

The Minister is confusing his own intentions with what might very well happen.

In so far as the board has functions to discharge, it is only the board itself can discharge them. The chairman cannot discharge these functions on his own initiative. He must have the concurrence of the board.

But the Bill provides that the chairman alone shall constitute a meeting of the board.

There is not a meeting of the board unless every member of the board is summoned to be present.

Is it not possible for the chairman to summon a meeting of the board and then sabotage it by not being present himself?

If the suggestion be that that is going to happen, I will resist the amendment as being a preposterous one. The chairman is being put in for the purpose of ensuring that meetings of the board are held, and that the business of the board is discharged.

The Minister has already carried a section on the basis that the shareholders' directors all might boycott a meeting and prevent a quorum assembling. Why not equalise the suspicion?

Because the chairman is being put in for the express purpose of getting the business of the board done.

That is my point: that that is the present Minister's intention in appointing the chairman, but, after all, we are here to provide for all future contingencies, and, surely, we should provide for a Minister who would not have that intention.

I would say that if, at any time, a Minister for Industry and Commerce appointed a chairman of this company who acted in that manner, he would be in duty bound to exercise his power to remove that chairman forthwith, because the chairman would then be doing precisely the opposite of what he had been appointed to do.

That is why I want to have this amendment put in. If the chairman wished to do anything like that, and the Minister backed him up in his action, the Minister would then have to come before the Dáil and ask for new legislation.

That would mean that the business of the board could not be done.

It means only for that meeting. The Minister can easily contemplate circumstances in which the chairman, desiring to get rid of embarrassment on an occasion on which a meeting was called at the instance of shareholders, would say: "I will stay away from that meeting and from the whole business." Why should the chairman refuse to be bound by a regulation which says that he shall call and hold a meeting if a certain number of shareholders require him to do so?

It is the secretary who calls the meeting.

Without the chairman's concurrence, no decision can be taken but, at least, he ought to be forced to hear the views of the other directors.

The Deputy is proceeding on a completely false assumption. The chairman is being appointed for the opposite purpose. Meetings of the board at least once a week will be necessary.

What power has a member of the board? According to the Bill, directors seem to have no power whatever.

Progress reported. Committee to sit again at 7 o'clock.
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