I presume that the motion, listed No. 17 on Private Deputy's Business, will be discussed in connection with this Bill.
Committee on Finance. - Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1947.—Second Stage.
Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
Yes.
And the reasoned amendment as well?
I take it that, after the Bill and the amendment have been disposed of, the motion will be formally moved and decided.
I put it to the Deputy—perhaps it is going into the merits of the Bill—that part of the motion deals with the question of affording an opportunity of discussing this matter.
Will the motion be put?
I do not know if it can be put after the Bill has been debated. If the Deputy will look at it, it calls on the Minister to make a statement.
I do not want to create any difficulties. If the material contained in the motion is open for discussion on the Bill, I shall be satisfied.
That will be decided on the reasoned amendment.
I presume that we will discuss the Bill and the motion together?
Yes. The matter of the motion will be discussed on the Bill.
Might I ask the Minister to divide his statement into two parts, one relating to the Bill and the other to the subject-matter of the motion?
I will divide it into three parts. The main purposes of the Bill are to continue Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts in force for another year, that is, up to 31st March, 1948, and to amend the Acts in a number of respects as a result of the recent decision to retain the Marine Service, which was organised during the emergency, and to rename it the Naval Service. The amendments in relation to the Naval Service are largely a matter of terminology. The Acts, as they stand, are of a purely military nature and it has been necessary up to the present to deal with members of the Marine Service and Naval Service on a military basis. Now, however, that a permanent naval component of the Defence Forces is to be maintained, it would be anomalous that its members should continue to be described as soldiers; that their service should be Army service; and that all the remaining terminology affecting them should continue to be that which by tradition and usage has always attached to land forces.
The changes proposed are administratively desirable and should have a psychological value in regard to serving personnel and to the recruiting prospects of the Naval Service. The amendments will not, however, affect the fundamental legal status of members of the service under the Acts and the service itself will not be a new force or a separate entity but will be a component of the Defence Forces.
Under Section 3 and 5 the hitherto prescribed marine ranks and ratings will become naval ranks and ratings. Otherwise these sections generally follow with the exception of an alteration in the military commissioned ranks to which I shall refer later Sections 17 and 18 of the No. 2 Act of 1940 and Sections 9 and 10 of the Act of 1942, which they replace. Section 6 is in substitution for Section 3 of the 1942 Act. It is similar in wording except for the substitution of the word "naval" for "marine". Section 8 provides for the adaptation of terminology which I have already mentioned. The Act of 1923 and the Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924, refer to military defence forces and this necessitates the amendment shown in the Schedule and the provision contained in Section 9 of the Bill.
Deputies will notice that in the table of commissioned ranks——
Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted, and 20 Deputies being present——
I was saying that Deputies will notice that, in the table of commissioned ranks at the end of Section 3, provision is made for the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The present senior ranks of commandant and major in the Defence Forces are the equivalents of major and lieutenant-colonel, respectively, in other armies. There have often been misconceptions of the status of our commandants and majors in their contacts with officers of foreign forces and it would be desirable that these should be removed as far as possible. It has been decided, in this connection, to substitute the rank of lieutenant-colonel for that of major. The rank of commandant, however, has historical associations, and while its substitution by the rank of major was contemplated, it was felt that, on the whole, sentiment would generally favour its retention as a senior rank.
Section 4 makes the necessary provisions in relation to officers who, at present, hold the rank of major. The only other matter to be mentioned in connection with the Bill is that in the Schedule of Repeals, provision is made for the repeal of Section 7 of the Act of 1942 which suspended the right of a soldier to be discharged during a period of emergency.
Before entering upon a detailed statement regarding the matters which have given rise to the motion, I feel bound to say that, while I have no objection to the matters in question being discussed by the Dáil, I see no reason why either the Government or I should have been expected to consult the Dáil about them beforehand, seeing that they are, in the main, matters of administration which are my responsibility and the responsibility of my advisers and that they are covered by the Acts and by the regulations made under the Acts. The Dáil might equally well expect to be consulted, for instance, about groups of promotions arising out of an emergency as about groups of reversions arising from the termination of an emergency. Subject to that, however, I feel no particular objection to making a statement. Even if this motion had not been put down, I would have thought it well to make a statement, if only to remove any public misconception of the position caused by badly-considered comments and criticism.
The matters at issue are the proposed reversion of a number of officers and non-commissioned officers to their substantive ranks; the proposed retirement of certain officers in the interests of the service; the proposed discharge of a number of non-commissioned officers and the reorganisation of the reserve. All these matters have been the subject of a good deal of mistaken comment and speculation, an instance of which is the reference in the motion to the disbandment of the reserve. It is, of course, ridiculous and untrue to suggest that the reserve is being disbanded. All that has been done is what was foreshadowed in paragraph 16 of the White Paper of May, 1945, on the Demobilisation and Resettlement of the Defence Forces in which it was stated that it was proposed to amalgamate, as far as possible, the various existing classes of the reserve of officers and reserve of men into a post-emergency first line reserve. The necessity for this simplification of the reserve organisation had become apparent during the emergency. All eligible and suitable personnel of the existing classes were given an opportunity of accepting appointment in the new First Line Reserve. The remaining personnel were, if officers, afforded an opportunity of resigning their commissions. Where they did not choose to do so, I had no option but to request the Government to advise the President to direct the relinquishment of their commissions. Non-commissioned officers and men who were not eligible or suitable were discharged.
The Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923, provides that the reserve shall consist of the reserve of officers and the reserve of men. The reserve of officers and the reserve of men are still in existence. They are composed of the personnel of the first line and of the personnel of An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil, which is the second line component of the reserve. In the near future, a second line naval component will be added in replacement of the Maritime Inscription.
I have dealt with the reserve reorganisation first, with a view to comparing the actual facts with the type of misrepresentation which has occurred, even in the wording of the motion itself. I now propose to address myself factually to the other matters. In confining myself to the facts, I am making no specific reference to the various charges which have been levelled at the administration such as that of a "purge". I feel confident that the facts themselves, once they have been made known, will, for all fair-minded persons, prove a sufficient answer to the charges.
As regards reversions, I may commence by reminding the House that, during the emergency, the Defence Forces expanded enormously. This necessitated the promotion of many officers, non-commissioned officers and privates to higher rank. It was realised, however, that when the emergency came to an end, with the accompanying return to a peace-time establishment, many of the promoted personnel could not possibly be retained in their higher ranks and, accordingly, the vast majority of promotions during the emergency were made on an acting or temporary basis. I think I may say that the fact that the promotions were designated as "acting" should have made it clear to all so promoted that they held out no guarantee of permanency.
The peace establishment has now been promulgated and has been fixed at a figure of 12,860 officers and other ranks, excluding Construction Corps personnel. It is not, however, capable of absorbing all the promoted personnel in their acting higher ranks. Amongst other things, the emergency divisional organisation has disappeared and the number of brigades has been reduced. Changes such as these entail the reversion of a number of senior officers to their substantive ranks. The task of selecting the officers for reversion was an invidious one but it had to be faced. In making these selections, all the relevant factors were carefully considered. Actually the number of officers selected for reversion is small in comparison with the large number of promotions made during the emergency. It consists of four acting colonels reverted to the substantive rank of major, ten acting majors reverted to the substantive rank of commandant, ten acting commandants reverted to the substantive rank of captain and two acting captains reverted to the substantive rank of lieutenant, or a total of 26. In the non-commissioned ranks, the total number of reductions to lower rank because of the lack of suitable vacancies in the establishment is 37.
As against these reversions, 16 acting colonels, 41 acting majors, 155 acting commandants and 144 acting captains, or a total of 356 officers have been or are being confirmed in their acting ranks to which they attained during the emergency. The number of non-commissioned officers who will retain their temporary ranks is 1,170.
Five of the officers selected for reversion are over the retiring ages applicable to their substantive ranks. These officers are availing of the option given to them of retiring voluntarily in their higher acting ranks and will be eligible for retired pay based on such ranks. Seven of the remaining affected officers have also applied for, and have been given, permission to retire in their higher acting ranks. These officers will likewise receive retired pay based on the higher ranks.
In the cases of those who, on reversion, are remaining in service, every effort has been made to mitigate the financial difficulties arising from their reversion by permitting them to retain the pay of their higher rank for one-sixth of the period of their service in the higher rank, i.e., for two months in respect of each year of such service. After that, they will be paid at the maximum rate applicable to their substantive rank. The non-commissioned officers who are being reduced because of the lack of suitable vacancies will, like the officers, retain the pay of their higher rank for one-sixth of their period of service in the higher rank.
That reversions have to be effected is, of course, regrettable but it is also inevitable. It occurs in every army at the end of a period of war or emergency. The feeling in the Army would, I imagine, be one of satisfaction that a larger number of reversions was not found necessary. Before passing on from the question of reversions, however, I feel it incumbent on me to say that, as the reversions arise from the lack of suitable vacancies in the establishments, they are in no sense whatever a reflection on the ability of the officers concerned. Some of them, indeed, are very promising young officers who have been selected for reversion only because they were junior in their acting ranks. It is my hope that, with the passage of time, it will be possible to reinstate many of the officers in their higher ranks.
The reports as to the officers recommended for retirement in the interests of the service have been somewhat exaggerated as regards the number, ranks, ages and length of service. Actually, the number involved was 13, made up of two majors, one acting major, one commandant, three captains, one acting captain, four lieutenants and one second lieutenant. Of these, however, the acting major has requested and been given permission to retire voluntarily.
It is unusual and, as Deputies will appreciate, almost invariably undesirable, to make any statement with regard to the retirement of officers in the interests of the service. In saying that, I am influenced by the fact that in this particular case, in my opinion, a discussion is not in the best interests of the officers themselves, all of whom I would say should make good in other walks of life. Briefly, some of the younger officers have shown themselves to be unsuited to Army life. Of the remainder some have failed to retain their interest in the service, whilst others have not kept up with the advances which have taken place in their profession.
These are some of the considerations involved in the cases under review. If I am reluctant to discuss the matter, it is because I am not prepared to disclose here, with regard to any individual officer, which of the considerations or what combination of them, applies to his particular case.
Would the Minister have available the length of service of the officers?
Yes, I can supply that. I can say this, however, that, on consideration of the reports made to me by the appropriate military authorities, I was satisfied that there was no alternative to the termination of the service of the officers concerned and that retirement in the interests of the service was justified.
Here, I may say that retirement in the interests of the service of the officers concerned enables them to be given more favourable treatment than could be provided if they were retired for any other reason. The officers who are being so retired are all below the normal retiring ages for their ranks. Under an amendment of the Defence Forces (Pensions) Scheme which will be placed before the Dáil soon, they will, if they have 20 or more years' pensionable service, be credited, for retired pay purposes, with a further five years' service or such lesser period as they would have had to serve to reach normal retiring age. They will all receive six months' pre-retirement leave with full pay and allowances. Under the proposed amendment of the pensions scheme already referred to, non-commissioned service will count in full as pensionable service instead of half as heretofore. This will affect a number of the officers.
As I mentioned, two of the officers involved held acting rank—one the acting rank of major and the other the acting rank of captain. The acting major, as I have indicated, has expressed the desire to retire voluntarily. As he is taking this course, he will receive retired pay on the basis of his acting higher rank, but he cannot be given the added years' pensionable service; a provision of this nature could not be related to voluntary retirement. Neither can he be given pre-retirement leave, which is not a privilege accorded in the case of voluntary retirement. The other officer, who has not elected to retire voluntarily under the conditions governing such retirement, is being required to revert to substantive rank before being retired. He will, however, under the existing pensions scheme, be credited with five years' added service for retired pay purposes.
It may be argued that retirement in the interests of the service is inconsistent with the fact that the officers received promotion during the emergency. While that may be so, it may also be true to say that an officer's capabilities cannot always be accurately gauged until he has been promoted and all officers do not live up to the promise shown by them before being selected for promotion.
There are 142 non-commissioned officers who, on their records and on the reports of their superior officers, are regarded as unsuitable for retention in their ranks, even if suitable vacancies for them existed in the peace establishments. Here again, there has been considerable exaggeration as to the number and scope of the reductions. In some cases, there will be reductions of more than one rank. For instance, a sergeant-major cannot, generally speaking, be reduced to the next lowest rank of battalion quartermaster sergeant. His training does not render him suitable for that rank and he must be reduced to the rank from which he was in all probability promoted, i.e., the second-next lowest rank of company sergeant. Similarly, a battalion quartermaster sergeant cannot ordinarily fill the next lowest rank of company sergeant but must be reduced to the rank of company quartermaster sergeant. Apart from cases such as these, the number of reductions by what can properly be described as more than one rank is small. It consists of one sergeant major to sergeant; one battalion quartermaster sergeant to sergeant; four company quartermaster sergeants to corporal and three sergeants to private or a total of nine.
In addition 199 non-commissioned officers are being discharged. They are men who have rendered long service; they have all, in fact, at least 21 years' service and are being discharged on pension. There is no connection, such as has been suggested, between their discharge and the recruiting position. Their discharge was decided upon a considerable time ago on grounds such as those of age and medical grading.
That is a factual statement with regard to the various matters involved in the motion. I think I can claim to have shown fairly that the relatively small number of reversions from acting rank is unavoidable in the light of the return to a peace-time establishment after the maintenance of the Defence Forces for several years at emergency strength. I hope I have shown, too, that the decision to retire a small number of officers in the interests of the service—13 out of a total officer strength of more than 1,100—was not taken lightly.
In case the decision may still be felt to have been unduly severe, I should like to place a few considerations before the House and I am sure that nobody will disagree with them. It is most important that the officer corps should be highly efficient. The efficiency of the Defence Forces, in fact, largely depends on the efficiency of the officers and our soldiers have the right to be led by only the most capable officers. It was necessary, therefore, that on the reorganisation of the Defence Forces on a more permanent basis than that which has existed for some years past, action should be taken to ensure as far as possible that all officers are fit for their appointments and possess initiative, energy and ability as well as balance and a sense of responsibility appropriate to their ranks and appointments. That is the standard which is being set and, even if it is high, nobody will, I think, quarrel with it on that account.
I note that it is desired that a statement should be made on the Government's defence policy and on the organisation, recruitment, training, equipment and cost of the Defence Forces in relation thereto. Actually, I made statements on defence policy last year in the course of the debates on the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill and the Army Estimates, and the question was very fully discussed on each occasion. I can now do no more than repeat generally what I then said.
The desirable—and, in fact, the only possible—defence policy for this country is clear. It may be summarised by saying that the country must possess a defence force capable of operating in defence of the national territory and that the strength, composition, organisation, training and equipment of the force must be such as to enable the Government to assume complete responsibility for the defence of the country.
The questions of strength, composition, organisation, training and equipment have been under examination for some time past but obviously so many considerations are involved that decisions cannot be taken hurriedly. These considerations include the experiences of the emergency which has just ended; war developments in organisation, training and equipment and the general world-situation. A good deal of progress has been made, however, and in particular the Government have been able to decide upon a strength for the permanent force of 12,860 all ranks, excluding Construction Corps personnel.
The basis of the pre-emergency permanent force was the maintenance of a small force of specialists—a hard core of highly trained personnel around which, in an emergency, a large army could be built. It was envisaged that every member of the permanent force would be trained in duties and responsibilities above his rank and would be capable of playing his part in the speedy organisation and training of the expanded Army. This result was not fully achieved. The permanent force was altogether too small; the garrison and other routine duties inseparable from Army organisation left insufficient time for specialist training and the force proved unable to deal as quickly as was desirable with the large influx of recruits in 1940. The Government have, therefore, decided upon a permanent force which will be sufficiently large to enable routine duties to be carried out otherwise than at the expense of training; which will assist in the training and development of the reserve and which will fit into the scheme of defence.
The new territorial organisation consists of three commands with, in addition, the Curragh Training Camp. The permanent force is provisionally organised, under the peace establishment, into the cadres of three brigades, together with the various staff establishments, depôts, schools and a number of other miscellaneous formations. The brigade cadres, with their reserves, would ensure that, on mobilisation, three brigades, or the equivalent of a division, would be immediately available. Each brigade would, in addition, be capable of forming the nucleus of a division, if necessary. The permanent force also includes the Naval Service and the Air Corps.
The Dáil is already aware of the steps which have been taken to increase the officer strength of the permanent force. The strength on the 31st December last was 1,115 officers as against an establishment figure of 1,356. The recruiting campaign which has been in operation since September last and is still continuing has already produced 1,900 recruits which, I may say, represents a greater influx than for any comparable period during the last 20 years, the latter portion of 1940 excepted. The strength of other ranks on the 31st December, 1946, was 7,574 as against an establishment figure of 11,504.
The considerations which I have already mentioned render it unlikely that a war establishment will be prepared for some time to come. A simplification of reserve organisation has, however, been effected, the details of which I have indicated earlier in my statement.
Training, again, is a matter which needs careful consideration. A number of officers have already undergone, and are undergoing, courses in Great Britain, and it is contemplated that additional officers will be sent on such courses in the immediate future. Some of the officers concerned are filling senior appointments and others are intended for the Military College and for the various corps schools. It is proposed that the training of officers will commence at the corps schools as soon as possible, and it is also hoped that the command and staff school will open before the end of the present year.
Annual training will be resumed this year for the first line reserve. The training of An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil will also proceed and it may be mentioned that the peace establishments provide for, approximately, 100 officers, 200 non-commissioned officers and 50 privates, who will be occupied exclusively or mainly on duties connected with An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil. It is intended to organise courses of instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers of the force itself, who will then be in a position to take over responsibility for a good deal of the local training of the units.
The question of equipment presents certain difficulties. It would be pointless, at present, to incur heavy expenditure on the purchase of equipment which might in a very short time be found to be obsolete. It is reasonable to assume that post-war developments with regard to equipment will soon be apparent and it is only on consideration of these developments that our requirements can be decided. There appears to be no doubt but that considerable expenditure may have to be faced.
The Army Vote for 1946/47 is £4,576,310 and I propose to introduce shortly a Supplementary Estimate of approximately £630,000. For 1947/48 I am asking for £4,600,000. I cannot at this stage give any firm indication of what the cost of the Defence Forces is likely to be over a long period. It, obviously, depends on a number of factors. I may say, however, that while every precaution will be taken against unnecessary inflation of the cost, there is a point below which it cannot be kept if the defence policy is to be seriously implemented.
I move the amendment standing in my name and that of Deputy O'Higgins as follows:—
To delete all words after the word "That" and substitute therefor the words:—
"the Dáil declines to give a Second Reading to the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 1947, until it shall have heard and shall have an opportunity of discussing a statement on behalf of the Government on its general defence policy and on the organisation, recruitment, training, equipment and the cost of the Defence Forces in relation thereto."
When the Minister gets £4,600,000 next year, he will be running the most expensive ostrich farm there ever was. I had hoped, when I heard that the Minister was to make a statement on defence policy, it would not be necessary to move the amendment. I find it necessary to do so. The Minister says that he explained the Government's defence policy last year and that he has nothing to add to that statement. He told us last year that the Government had decided to have a permanent army of 12,500 men and that the reason he wanted a force of that kind was that there was an enormous amount of routine work to be done in looking after barracks and stores and in doing sentry work and that he was determined that that type of work would not interfere with the work of training for the real military purposes for which the Army is kept.
The purpose of putting down the amendment to the Minister's motion is that the Government will tell us for what purpose the Army is being kept, and in the light of that purpose what its strength and its equipment ought to be. I think the least the country is entitled to know is what the Army is there for. If it is there for a particular object the people ought to be given an opportunity of realising what sum is worth spending on its size, equipment, and training. They ought to be given an opportunity of understanding that they have the money to spend on it, and that for the purpose for which the Army is required in relation to the country—its social, national and economic life—it is worth spending that money on it. I say that the Minister is going to be in charge of the most expensive ostrich farm in the world, because both he and those who are advising him with regard to his present general proposals, must have their heads in the sand, at any rate in relation to their responsibilities to our people and to the Parliament.
The Minister says that the Army was not strong enough in 1939 to do its work. Surely to goodness, as events transpired, we built up too big an Army in the end for the work that it had to do.
We knew that at the end of the period.
Yes.
We were very wise then.
I think some people were wise even before.
Oh, very wise.
At any rate we knew that at the end of the period. The Minister says that he is basing his proposals now on our experience in the emergency. What were our experiences and what did we observe during the emergency and during the last war that dictates to the Minister now that he should ask the country to bear, in 1947, 1948 and 1949, the cost of an Army of 12,500 men? My point is that we are here to discuss that matter, and to try to find that out. As I said when we were discussing this last year, it would be a most undesirable thing for this country and for the Army if the Army should become the subject of mere Party politics, and it is not in any way necessary, any more than it is desirable, that it would.
We ought to face frankly what are the conditions in the world, and what are our home conditions that dictate to us that we should spend as much as £4,500,000 or £5,000,000 a year on the maintenance and equipment of the Army. I submit to the Minister that, while he may appear to throw his statement to us rather summarily, he is not carrying out his responsibilities as Minister set up to look after the Defence Forces simply by coming here and saying: "We have decided that we are to have an army of 12,500; we have consulted our military advisers on the one hand and the Government have agreed to it on the other, and we are not going to say anything more about it." I ask him: "If you were starting again in 1939 to build up this country and prepare it for its defence, would you do exactly what you did then?" I have said before that after the Government were given all the emergency powers that they could reasonably want, every power in the world except the power of taxation and conscription without the permission of the Dáil, the Army was mobilised without any reference to any of the other Parties in the Dáil. Following that we approached the Government. We told the Taoiseach that in our opinion the economic position would be more serious for us at that particular time than the military position, and that mobilising the reserve even at that time meant taking men away from their normal avocations and income, that it disturbed the family economy of quite a large number of people as well as disturbed industry and commerce when it was not clear that we were going to be directly affected in a military way at all: that there was time enough to face up to that, but that it was perfectly clear that our agricultural industry was starting off when it was caught on the wrong foot as a result of the difficulties under which it had laboured during the economic war, that, instead of putting another £2,000,000 into defence at that particular time and in mobilising the reserve, everything possible should be done to spend as much money as possible on strengthening our agricultural economy at that time.
If we were facing that position again to-day would we not commence by collecting money and materials, fertilisers, the commodities that we require for housing and for the clothing and feeding of our people and secure them in that way? Would we not have done that before we had moved to mobilise the reserve? I ask the Minister to throw his mind back to the time when France fell in 1940. What were we looking for then? Simply for another 10,000 men for the Army and for a local security force. The Government did not even then want a Local Defence Force. It took some weeks on the part of the Government to listen to logic because it was simply logic we put before them: that if the Army wanted 10,000 men and if the emergency was such that the Army wanted 10,000 men full-time, that then at least the young men throughout the country who could not give full-time service in the Army should be given a certain amount of opportunity to get military training so that they might be of assistance to an Army of X plus 10,000, and if called upon would be ready for duty. Even away back in 1940 the Government's mind on the situation at that time was that it had to be perfectly convinced of what we require to do now—to strengthen our economy, to harmonise our social conditions, to build up and strengthen our education so that we will know that there is something to be fought for if our country is attacked in any way, and that we will not be led simply blind-folded into the defence of the country because we have an Army and have spent money in building it up: that having done that we must stand for our rights and the Army must fight.
The Minister spoke about the recruits that we are getting into the Army. I questioned him in October on the recruits that were going into the Army. I asked him for the number of men who had been turned down for reasons of health and lack of education. I was told that out of the total of 1,917 men who presented themselves to join the Army only 811 were accepted; and 1,106 were rejected—583 of these were rejected because they were below the physical standard for the Army and 240 were rejected because they were below the educational standard. In the Dublin area, one-third of those who came forward were below the physical standard; in the Curragh area one-fourth were below that standard; in the southern area one-fourth were below that standard and in the western area one-fifth were below the physical standard. In the Dublin area one-tenth were below the educational standard; in the Curragh area one-fifth; in the southern area one-tenth, and in the western area one-fifth.
There is no country in the world facing its security future that is not deciding to-day that until it strengthens its economy it does not know whether it will be able to do the work necessary for defence and we should realise, from our experience, that we need to strengthen our economy if our people are to exist in a world at war. We should surely learn the lessons that were plain to be learned as a result of war developments during the past six years. The Minister says that our defence organisation must be such as to enable the Government to assume complete responsibility for the defence of the country. I wonder does the Minister know what were the developments in arms during and at the end of the last war, and I wonder what comfort it will be to us, having spent £4,500,000 a year on the empty occupation of training-in armies, if the circumstances of the next war will be for us much as the circumstances of the last war were for Japan.
A prominent United States general said, within the past few days, that the opening 24 hours of the next war could easily mean that 24,000,000 or 25,000,000 citizens of the United States would be wiped out by atomic bombs. Other United States generals, commenting on the development of armaments, have indicated during the past 12 months that the atomic bomb is not necessarily the most violent or dangerous weapon in war. They suggest that developments in rockets and the advances with a certain type of aeroplane can easily be much more effective in death-dealing than even the developments with the atomic bomb. Has the Minister watched the discussions proceeding in the world between the great Powers that feel they are particularly interested in war because they have the responsibility for getting into it and for bearing the brunt in men and arms and equipment? Has he been examining what they have been saying with regard to developments?
One of the most obvious things with regard to the development of military thought in the world is that there must be regional conceptions of defence policy and you have the Canadians, South Africans and Australians declining to be participants in any broad defence policy for the Commonwealth of which they are members because they consider that in defence matters there will have to be regional arrangements and even these regional arrangements have, if possible, to be linked with an outlook on defence matters organised by a body such as the United Nations Organisation. He will see that comparatively recently in relation to their own defence matters, and even before President Roosevelt died, legislation has been introduced into Congress for the purpose of enabling the United States to rearm and re-equip all the States in Southern America and that definite defence arrangements have been entered into between the United States and Canada on the ground that it is only by mutual understanding they will be in a position to defend their countries. In the same way you have Australia and New Zealand in the position that they have to co-operate and take a major part in looking after regional defence in the South Pacific.
You have other military thinkers who say that the whole centre of gravity of any defence plan, even for the defence of Great Britain, Australia or Canada, must be based on South Africa, because of the nature of the equipment and the nature of the warfare that the next war, if it comes, will bring. There are people who think that Great Britain would be completely out of court as a place from which to wage or sustain any kind of effective military operation, and the idea is held that South Africa will provide the ground for manoeuvres in any serious world organisation for defence or for any organisation that will enable the British Commonwealth of Nations to defend itself.
There is no Government in the world that is looking at its defence problems to-day in the same astounding way as our Government is looking at them; that is, that our arrangements, as we are told, must be such as to enable us to assume complete responsibility for the defence of the country. The idea of spending £4,500,000 a year and taking the abilities and the intelligence of the 12,500 of our men from productive occupations in order to train them in arms to wrap themselves up in that delusion and in that kind of pride is a fantastic and a mad business, even if war was going to appear in five years' time. Surely, everything in the world situation dictates to us that we should forget war for the moment and concentrate our efforts on building up our social and economic life and improving our education. Even if we had to meet war in the future, we should realise that it is only by bringing our resources to bear on strengthening our economy that we would be able to fit ourselves to meet it.
The Minister stated last year as reported in column 2127 of the Official Debates of the 7th March, 1946:-
"I want to tell the House, whatever they may feel regarding the purchase of warlike stores in the future, that the Army is at present underequipped. If we are to have an Army and a Local Defence Force, we shall have to equip them. The alternative is for this House to tell the Government that it does not want an Army or that it wants the Army to be greatly reduced."
There are different things for which we may want an army, big or small. You may want it just as a symbol of the State's sovereignty, as a kind of State sword, or as an auxiliary to the police force in internal matters. You may want it as a major weapon of defence in serious war work. If we want the Army as a major weapon of defence in serious military work, then it is too soon for us to be able to make up our minds what kind of war is going to arrive, if and when it is to arrive, what kind of weapons are going to be used against us, and what kind of weapons we are going to use in defence. If we are going to be involved in a major war our circumstances are going to be what they were in relation to Great Britain at any rate in the last war, that is, that it is Great Britain's power of defence, both by air and by its navy, that will protect us. These were the forces which kept us in the security which we enjoyed during the last war.
Doubts have been expressed as to whether either the British Navy or Air Force would give us the security they did in the last war. If they cannot, then we are not sufficiently trained imaginatively to decide what is going to protect or defend this country in the next war. Whatever the situation will be, we cannot dissociate our defence here from the defence of Britain but it is much too early for us to say what kind of co-operation is necessary in actual arming or training. Even the Prime Minister of Great Britain said early last year that there were too many unknown factors in the situation to enable the British to say what kind of plans or organisation or what kind of equipment they wanted in any war that might come upon them, so that everything in the situation dictates to us that the Army can very well be maintained as a maintenance party here, as a study group, in which we would have the best men we could possibly get at the head of our Army and in charge of our various services, to study intensely both political and military developments in the world. They would be in close touch with the study carried out by those people most closely associated with us and without whose assistance we cannot defend ourselves—that is the people of Great Britain on this side of the Atlantic and the people of the United States on the other.
Instead of spending £4,500,000 on a rather elaborate police force of 12,500 men, that can be nothing but a police force, we should see to it that we had a small army in which we would provide the best training and the best study we could get on the top. I urged last year that instead of trying to build up an Army by looking for an additional 600 officers and another 6,000 men to replace the men who are being demobilised, the Minister should content himself with carrying out the demobilisation of whatever number of officers and men were going out and then maintain the Army services on whatever number was left. The men that were left were good enough in the situation that arose in 1939 to recruit, train and keep in good morale and discipline over the long period of six years, a very difficult thing in an army, the additional 35,000 men recruited at that time.
The men who were good enough for that would be good enough to stand by in this waiting period while we were watching what was going on in the world and making preparations to organise our Army on whatever lines and with whatever kind of outlook the future might show to be necessary. I said last year, as reported in col. 2158 of the Debates of the 7th March:
"Surely we ought to regard this as a period of pause when we can sit down and examine our defence problem without committing ourselves to any military organisation save the Army at present in being and the equipment we have. We could examine the problems of a defensive nature that are likely to come our way in future and see what kind of organisation we require to meet them."
I should like to ask the Minister what kind of consultations or what exchanges of opinion have taken place between our military authorities here and the authorities in Great Britain with regard to the future say of equipment and organisation and whether any similar exchanges have taken place between ourselves and the military authorities in the United States because it is simply sinning against the light and sinning against ordinary intelligence to tell us that we must go on spending £4,500,000 a year to keep an Army of the kind we have? We have a very serious and difficult economic situation to deal with. We cannot afford this money and we particularly cannot afford to develop a military spirit here in a world that is trying to banish it. Whether we are going to have a war in five years' time or 15 years' time, whether the United Nations Organisation is going to succeed in bringing about a situation in which war can be avoided, we are extravagantly foolish and childish to spend £4,500,000 per year on an Army. We are being badly served politically in an important matter like this when we have the Minister coming in to the Dáil and telling us simply: "We are going to have an Army of 12,500. We said last year that we are going to have it and we are going to have it."
I feel the Dáil should pass the motion in the names of myself and Deputy Dr. O'Higgins because without a more satisfactory statement of what is in the Government's mind or some more information as to how they arrived at their present conclusions, it would be criminal on the part of any public man at the present time to vote money to maintain an Army of the size and the kind indicated here.
I second the amendment, and I do so in very much the same spirit as that in which we have appealed to the Minister for Defence year after year. The amendment can come as no surprise to the Minister or to his advisers. Year after year for a very considerable number of years back, we have pressed on the Minister the advisability and the necessity of being frank with the Dáil and the country, if he intended to come to the Dáil to take more money from the country for the purpose of paying and maintaining soldiers. We impressed on him year after year that every Minister for Defence, every Minister for War, in any normal Parliament throughout the world, when asking for increased moneys for the provision of more soldiers and a greater army, was always prepared to come before Parliament and to lay down simply and clearly what the defence policy of the country was and why a greater army strength was required. I should venture to that Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Abyssinia, makes a more intelligent and intelligible statement to the Abyssinian Parliament with regard to the Abyssinian Army and its defence requirements than ever we have elicited from the Minister or his predecessor.
The Minister comes in and asks for three times as much money as was required pre-war to pay the Army annually in the post-war years of peace. He just ambles to his feet and says: "I want three times as much money for the coming year's peace as ever I required for previous years of peace. I am going to keep an Army two-and-ahalf times as great in numbers as ever we had in the previous years of peace". He is asked the reason why and he appears to resent any Deputy asking the reason why, when they are asked to mulct the taxpayers in an extra £3,500,000 per year. He does not feel called upon to give the reason. It is sufficient merely to say: "There are guard and sentry duties and other routine duties to be done and I do not want these duties to interfere with training, and, consequently, the Government, the General Staff and I have decided that we want more". It is not the Government, the General Staff and he who provide the millions and the people who provide the extra millions asked for are at least entitled to know why and for what purpose the extra millions are required.
An army has a number of functions and some of these functions are similar in every country throughout the world. An army in every country is there as an armed supporting force for the police in case such a situation gets too dangerous, too difficult or too big to be handled by the police. In other words, armies are maintained for the purpose of keeping the peace internally, for dealing with rioting and similar classes of activity.
Armies are also kept to act, as it were, as the ceremonial sword of State, to supply the trappings and trimmings, the pomp and ceremony, which is a more or less essential part of a free and independent State and armies, in addition, are kept for purposes of war. When armies are kept for purposes of war, they are designed to be at least as great, or as nearly as can be as great, as whatever force is most likely to attack it, or as whatever force they are most likely to find themselves in conflict with.
So far as external dangers go, armies which cannot build up their strength so as to be equal, or as nearly as possible equal, to any threat which might confront their people meet the deficiency so far as possible by entering into alliances, offensive or defensive, so that their own force, plus the allied force, will be sufficient to give their people a sense of safety and a degree of confidence in their capacity to defend their people. We here are an island people, a people living on a tiny island with a dwindling population, with no internal production sources of the materials of war—we do not make a bullet; we do not make a gun; and it would be true to say that we scarcely make the wheel of a carriage or vehicle used in war— and our policy is and has been to keep out of all wars. In that set of circumstances and in that atmosphere, the Minister asks for three times as much money for the Army as ever was asked for previously in times of peace and he makes that demand for three or four million pounds without giving any statement, any reason or any explanation.
I do not care to what Party Deputies belong, unless they fancy themselves as a lot of bosses of the people, an organised set of thieves, there is a responsibility on them to search, to press and to inquire when a sum of this immense amount is demanded from the people and there is a responsibility on them to satisfy themselves that in fact it is required and that nothing less would meet the situation. If that responsibility is on Deputies, there is certainly a far clearer responsibility on the Minister to be vocal, to be at least sufficiently vocal to let us know why three times as much money is required in coming years. If he is not prepared to make that statement, if he is not prepared to make that clear, we must only assume that the same old game is to go on, but in a bigger way— the game of playing around with soldiers, of merely shifting them, changing their titles, altering their uniforms, passing the time with new schemes of reorganisation and shifting them around like a little boy on the drawing-room carpet at Christmas. We must assume that the appetite is developing, that they are tired of the old soldiers, that there were not enough of them, that they are weary of some of their faces and weary of the old type of uniform, that a new toy is wanted and that the new toy, keeping abreast of the fashion of the times, has to be far more expensive than the old toy.
Is it that we require more soldiers —three times as many—in order to fulfil the ceremonial functions in association with the State? Is that one of the reasons? Is it because there is far more internal unrest? Is it that there is far more internal danger, far more danger of riot, of rebellion, than there used to be? Is it because that second purpose of the Army requires greater expenditure? Is that why the increased demands are made? Or is it because the world war that was boiling up for a number of years past has come to an end and the world is militarily exhausted and thoroughly and generally disgusted with war and the very thought of war that we want three times as many soldiers and mulct the taxpayers for three times as much money?
Is the whole model, the whole plan of this Army, that is to be three times as expensive as the pre-war Army, to be designed on the old lines at a time when the greatest military experts in the world will admit that they do not know from day to day whether or not armies will be entirely worthless in a year or two? The latter months of the war in Europe were proving very conclusively that unmechanised land forces were figures of history, that their day had been and gone and that they were a thing of the past. The last couple of weeks of the war in the Far East made it appear that armies were matters of history and, had that war continued for another couple of months, it might have been made clear to all military men, here and elsewhere, that the greatest folly a nation could commit was to concentrate its manhood in any type of formation, armies or otherwise.
Statements have been made and published from time to time by people elsewhere who could claim to be military experts, not only in theory but in practical experience of two great world wars. Read their statements. Read their prognostications. There is not one of them who could say that the future of armies is that they have to be three times as numerous, three times as costly but designed on the old lines of infantry soldiers. When the whole world, including the greatest military experts, are guessing, Minister Oscar Traynor can walk in here and tell us exactly what the requirements are, not to the nearest 1,000 but down to the very last figure, down to the very last orderly, and down to the very last half-penny.
It is not here he should be. He should be directing the world because he is the only Minister for War or Minister for Defence under God's sun that can talk in that simple way. It is because we are not serious about defence and never have faced up seriously to the matter of defence that we can bring in Bills to change the rank of our officers from major to lieutenant-colonel. That is our defence work. That is our defence policy. We start playing around with uniforms, with ranks, with paper organisation, because we are not doing the serious heavy solid work of thinking in terms of defence.
Seventeen years ago the Minister for Defence that was over there came to this Dáil year after year asking for authority to maintain a very tiny army, costing comparatively little, and year after year he asked for less and less from the taxpayers of this country. Very clearly it was stated that, as the internal position of this country quietened down and internal disorder and organised lawlessness internally became less and less, the demand on the taxpayer would be less and less. The policy directing the Army and the reason for asking for the money was clearly and fearlessly stated year after year. It was stated: "We want the smallest possible Army to preserve internal order, to maintain peace within our shores, but we want a highly trained, efficient Army of the very smallest type that can be rapidly expanded and that can build a greater Army around itself."
The recent war and the previous war have shown us that soldiers can be turned out when they are wanted as quickly as sausages can be turned out through a sausages machine. A man behind the counter to-day may be fighting in the ranks of an army in two months' time. Does anybody think that France, Britain or any of these greater countries that are called on to play a major part in any war that comes along would ever presume to say to Parliament, in between times: "We have to keep an immense standing army because some day, somewhere, somehow, there may be another war"? Every one of them knows that armies are built when armies are wanted and sound policy in any of these countries is to keep the smallest, the cheapest but the most expert army in between times that will be capable of expanding rapidly and officering a much greater force.
That was the policy in this country when another Minister was over there but that did not satisfy Deputy Traynor or Deputy Aiken or Deputy de Valera when they were over here. According to them, £1,000,000 was a shocking amount to be taking from the people, even with armed thugs around the streets outside, with armed bands moving around the mountains. It was shocking extortion to be taking £1,000,000 a year for a tiny army of 5,000 men, and if we had any sense at all we would have a militia, a volunteer force, and we would have a standing army merely big enough to maintain barracks. We were told that that policy was put up by them after very close study and full consideration and that it was honestly advanced. Now you have not the armed thug outside your gate nor the organised bands moving around the hillsides; you have no leading politicians encouraging all that kind of cod; but still you want three times as many soldiers, costing three times as much. That is so at a time when the one thing necessary is that we rebuild ourselves after the seven years we have gone through.
If these extra millions of pounds are wanted, it should be possible for someone over there to show the reason why. If the particular Minister is incapable of doing it, some other member of the Government should come along and tell us what there is in the situation, present or future, to require a much larger Army for the peace ahead and the peace behind and to require much more money from the people. That is not asking a whole lot.
The Minister divided his statement into three portions—the Bill, the recent events in the Army, and what he called the defence policy. The three portions, taken together, contain a considerable amount of figure—figures which might be of importance in the course of the debate. I would suggest that, when a Minister comes in here to read slavishly a carefully worded document, prepared by his Department, then as a matter of courtesy, where it contains figures, it should be made available.
As a White Paper.
It is difficult for a Deputy to retain all the figures in his memory. However, with the Bill I am not concerned. In the main, it merely repeats the Defence Forces Bill, which is an annual one. There are some new things in it, such as changing the rank of major to that of lieutenant-colonel and rating naval men as naval men. If it gives any pleasure to the Minister or to the people in the Department to play around with further alterations in the rankings, well, it does no harm.
On this question of reductions in rank and compulsory retirals, the Minister seems to think that, if injustices are done and done only to a small number of people, then the injustice itself is of minor importance. If an injustice is being done by Ministerial action, it is the injustice that is important and not the number of people affected. If 13 officers are being treated unjustly, deprived of their livelihood and their career through any Ministerial evasion or quibble that rides round the Acts there to defend their position, then the number affected does not matter one whit. Acts of Parliament give discretionary powers to Ministers. That is usual: it is done on the assumption that the Minister will never do an unjust act.
The most rigid society in any country, where the rules are hardest, is a military service, where the rules of discipline apply. There are very many ways within the military code where an officer who misconducts himself, commits any offence, can be dealt with and there is a certain simple machinery laid down to protect that officer. If an officer commits an offence, even of such a nature as might not be regarded as an offence at all in civilian life, there is a method of dealing with him— charge him, try him, punish him. If an officer is negligent in his duties—and. remember, there is an expensive inspectorial staff working all the time, day in and day out—or if an officer is inefficient in his work, an adverse report against him at any time can have him dealt with. The only protection for the officer is that the adverse report must be passed to him to sign stating that he has seen it. Then he can be dealt with. Even on grounds of misconduct, of indiscipline or inefficiency, an officer can be punished—dis missed, retired or called on to resign, or put out on half-pay. But in any of these sets of circumstances, there is responsibility on the Minister to point out the reason.
There is another way in which an officer can be got rid of, all his rights trampled on and all the protective machinery removed—that is, by the phrase stating that the President has no further use for his services. That is a direct flow of the stream from the king of this country that now calls itself a Republic—a phrase that was never heard and never used, in law or outside of law, except in countries that inherited it from a king. Now, apparently, we mean to anticipate a further change in the title of the gentleman in the Park. He was elected to an office: he has assumed another office, that of President of the Irish Republic, and if we are to follow and read into the future from the action taken in the Army to get rid of officers without charge or trial, kingship is going to be the next claim.
I put it to Deputies that, whatever their profession or business, it is their career, their livelihood, and it is through that profession or business they hope to maintain themselves and their wives, to rear a family and launch a family on life. The most terrible misfortune that could happen to any living man with any sense of responsibility to wife and children is to find himself suddenly deprived of his livelihood, suddenly robbed of his career, thrown, in the fifties, out into the world, untrained for anything but the profession he had adopted. Whether the number is one, 13, or 17, it is a brutal thing to do and should not be done by any man with any Christian feelings.
Does not every one of us know that, in every civil service department in the world and in every army in the world, there is a small percentage of inefficient officers and that there are any amount of dull, monotonous, routine jobs in every service and every army which do not require ability, initiative, or alertness and that, in those old side alleys, both civil servants and army officers and other ranks are allowed to finish out their time until retiring age, their livelihood protected? It is a very serious thing for Parliament to sanction the dismissal of any officer except for reasons stated. The person who has the right to hear the reasons is not a member of Dáil Éireann but the individual officer himself. If a crime is being committed or if an injustice is being done, do not try to bury it by giving extended benefits by way of pension. If the man is a bad officer, then there is no reason why he should get a better pension than a good officer. If the man is a rotten servant of the State, there is no defence for giving him better retiring conditions than a man who is an excellent and efficient servant of the State. If no charge can be brought against an officer, if there are no adverse reports on which he can be judged, then I say that the action of the Minister is entirely unworthy, unjust and unfair.
Army reorganisation and get rid of men just because you cannot fit them in! On what does the Minister base his opinion that the individual is inefficient or unworthy and should not be carried any longer in our Army? These individuals obtained acting ranks, meaning that, after years of service, the Army should know the quality of the individuals, their character, calibre and efficiency, in face of what the Minister regarded as an appalling military emergency. Some of these individuals were given acting promotion, with greater responsibilities, so that the people and the Army would be relying on them more than they previously relied upon them. There cannot be two heads on the coin the Minister tosses. Either they were efficient officers and deserving officers when they were promoted to acting rank recently and have since "dirtied their bibs" or they are still efficient officers. If an officer "dirties his bib", the Minister and his staff have a code of regulations and these regulations must apply if discipline is to be maintained in the Army and if there is to be any respect for Army regulations. A man must be charged and tried. He must be given an opportunity of defending himself and then take the consequences. There is no middle course. This business of going to the Phoenix Park and looking for a person miles removed from the Army so as to hang your coat on that peg and make that individual the scapegoat is not the way to handle an army. It is unfair to the individual in question and it is unfair to the people being dismissed.
The Minister has explained the position with regard to the Army reserve. He says that, as already stated, there is to be a different type of reserve and that, so far as possible, officers and other ranks of the old reserve will be fitted into the new reserve. May I ask the Minister if any of them are not being fitted in?
Those who are not efficient will not be fitted in.
Words and phrases. Suppose we applied that rule over there, how many of the nigger-boys would be left to-morrow morning?
As many as would be left over there.
Suppose we started with the Minister and suppose I was the judge of his efficiency——
Heaven help me, if you were.
Remember, the Minister is the judge of the efficiency of some of these poor fellows.
That is right.
Do you never find an inefficient man who digs with the right foot? There was no inefficiency amongst the administrative officers who were political playboys before they got the appointments and are now going to get ten years' added service. When it comes to efficiency, who is to be the judge? Is it reasonable that, unheard, people, who do not get an opportunity to defend themselves, should be graded at a desk in Parkgate Street as inefficient? I believe that some sanctity still attaches to the law of contract, that there should still be left some respect for the honour of a contract and that that implies an honourable obligation on both sides to keep the contract.
How did your Army reserve first arise? It arose at a time when it was necessary, in the public interest, to reduce taxation as rapidly as possible, at a time when the Minister's colleagues were over here clamouring for a reduction of Army expenditure and of the strength of the Army. A pledge had been given by the then President of the Executive Council that no further demobilisations or retirals from the Army would take place except for reasons specifically stated—misconduct or disciplinary offences. At the same time, it was necessary to reduce the Army in order to reduce the cost and a reserve was built up. The inducement given to officers and other ranks to leave the Army, in the public interest, was that they would get so much a year as reservists and one month's full pay every year when they reported for duty. The officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier weighed up his position as any other man would. He said: "If I remain in the Army, my pay will be so much; I have a life job; I have been guaranteed security as long as I conduct myself. If I meet the requirements of Parliament and the Government and resign my job, I will get so much a day as a reservist and a month's pay every year I report for duty. I will carry that annuity until I reach the age laid down in the regulations." Numbers of them decided to retire from the Army on those conditions. By a stroke of his pen, the Minister decides that he will break his side of the bargain, that he will deprive them of their position in the reserve, that he will strike a financial blow against them at the peak point of their expenditure, when they are in the fifties— touching up to the sixties—and when they can least afford to meet so serious a blow.
Did he ever read the way these things are done elsewhere, in countries where there is a sense of decency and of fair play towards individuals? Has he not often read of forces being amalgamated, one with another, or disestablished, but that as regards individuals already there of their being allowed to finish out their period of service and to draw whatever little annuity was coming to them? The Minister says inefficiency. Is there not a rule or regulation in the Army that, when an individual is adversely reported upon as a result of inspection, he will get a copy of that adverse report, and will be asked to initial it before it will be put on record and used against him? Is the Minister prepared to state in how many cases, where he has dispensed with men as being inefficient, such reports have been made and the regulations complied with by the reports being submitted to the individuals concerned? In how many cases in which he has compulsorily retired individuals, has that procedure been followed?
The Minister, in his opening statement, said quite bluntly that the Dáil has no right to the information we are seeking, and no right to the information sought in this Private Member's motion. The Minister, like a number of his colleagues, seems to forget the fact that he is a servant of the Dáil, and that we are all servants of the people, and that whatever the State service is, whether it be the Army, the Civil Service or anything else, Parliament is entitled to know the reasons why any particular action is taken other than a purely administrative one.
The third point is the matter of acting ranks. Leaving out the present situation for the moment, there is no Army precedent that has been more abused in this Army than the precedent of acting ranks. An acting rank, generally, is a rank given to an individual either while he is temporarily holding the position of a higher officer or while he is undergoing a period of probation. Acting rank was never intended as a kind of military cat and mouse Act where, instead of doing the right thing in the right way, you add the word "acting" to the new rank and in ten, 15 or 20 years later you deprive an individual of it on the ground that it was only an acting rank: that you would have the right to deprive him of that higher rank without stating any reason. Not only recently, but for years back, the most abused thing in our Army was the abuse of the position of acting rank. Surely, when a man has been for four, five, six or ten years in a rank there should be enough competence in the Department of Defence to decide that he is fit to hold it. If he holds it for five, seven or ten years and is then deprived of it, surely that puts the brand of incompetence on the Department of Defence for having allowed him to hold it for so long, if he was unfit to hold it. If he was a fit person to hold it, well then he should have been confirmed in the rank long ago.
He should be confirmed after a couple of years.
Men have held acting rank for a great number of years. The Minister gave figures to show the numbers in higher acting ranks who are being reduced to their substantive rank. He merely explained that on the ground that in a peace-time army organisation, compared with war-time, it would not be possible to fit all these officers into positions carrying the actting rank. Well, in the first place they were considered fit to carry the acting rank right through the emergency and in the critical years through which we have passed. The Army, the Minister and the people had to have sufficient confidence in them to carry that higher rank with ability and efficiency during that period. Now they are being reverted, and the Minister's case is that in the peace establishment there is not room to fit them in. That might be a fair case, but I would ask the Minister how many temporary officers recruited only during the emergency as temporary officers have been fitted into this new establishment as permanent officers? How many of those temporary officers have been confirmed in a higher acting rank? Does he consider that he can have anything except seething unrest, criticism, discontent, disappointment and disillusionment when temporary men are taken in and jumped over the heads of regular officers with long service and of the greatest efficiency: that when the emergency is over men with long service and with no mark or record against them are reduced from the rank which they held for years, while temporary men are not only altered in their conditions of service so as to become permanent men but are made permanent officers at a higher rank than some of the unfortunates who have been forced to evacuate? On analysis, I think that broad justice is not the rule to-day in the Army.
I think there is enough evidence of cliques controlling Army life, of favourites getting advancement and of people who are not favourites going down, some because of their political affiliations and others because of their social affiliations. But there is the feeling right through the Army that fair play is not being administered all round, and that there is not the same Army law for all irrespective of affiliations and irrespective of associations.
As everybody knows, I speak on this matter purely as a civilian. I am not sure that in matters of this kind a civilian is not in a better position to take a somewhat detached view. I confess that when I read first of the decision of the Government to invite a number of officers to retire, with notice that if they did not accept the invitation they would be compulsorily retired, my mind went back to an experience I had shortly after I went to America to learn my business. I was first apprenticed to a large department store which had recently hired a very expensive new manager. The atmosphere still obtained in that establishment when I got there which had been created by his first executive act. He summoned the very large staff together and he invited those who had been more than 20 years in the service of the firm to declare themselves, which they did in the confident anticipation that some special mark of appreciation was about to be conferred upon them. But the new broom informed them that they were all sacked; there was no room in this go-ahead organisation for old men or old women. I think most decent people on hearing that story were disgusted. They felt that someone who was brutal, short-sighted and vain was giving an admirable example of the reaction on swine when pearls are cast before them. In a vain search for efficiency he was throwing away loyalty and devotion, intangible assets which he simply was not competent to appreciate at their true worth. I think that man did a great wrong; he made a great mistake.
I do not know who is responsible for this departure in our Army, but I am told that about 20 senior officers who have had service of over 20 years are being compulsorily retired. When I heard that I asked myself two questions. I first asked myself, what is going to become of these men? Opportunity in this country is pretty limited. Most of us have experience of one walk of life or another. I put it to any Deputy that, suppose he found himself confronted with a man of about 50 years of age with pretty considerable family responsibilities and a pension quite inadequate to provide any reasonable abundance for that family, and he was asked to find employment for that man, where and to whom would he turn to get a berth into which that man would fit? Remember that in Great Britain, a country with vast Colonial services and great industrial enterprises and 101 walks of life in which character and reputation for responsibility and solidity are material assets, it is comparatively easy for a man with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, colonel or major to walk out of the army after 21 years' service and find a position where the very qualities which his long service in the army have conferred upon him will help him to secure a post that a younger and possibly more energetic man would not suit so well. But what posts of that character are to be found in this country? I ask Deputies, if they were confronted with the problem of placing such men in the kind of employment that these men could reasonably be expected to undertake at their time of life and in their position, what would they do? The total number we have to deal with is about 20. Deputy Davin seems to treat this matter as a joke. I do not think it is a matter to joke about.
I was not joking about it.
Deputy Brady and Deputy Davin are inclined to treat it as a joke. I do not think it is a joke. It is a horrible business, because I feel most deeply for men in that position. I do not accept the proposition that the Army of this country will be utterly disorganised if we have to carry 20 men who are not in the full sense of modern army organisation highly efficient. If those men cannot be deemed to be the most highly efficient officers is it not right that we should carry them by finding occupations with the organisation which could have been attended to by men of lesser rank, but which, in the special circumstances, it was determined should be attended to by men of rank out of all proportion to the nature of the work which we had available for them?
Remember the kind of men these are. Many of them are men who were with the Army since its institution. It is very probably true that the training they got is not the kind of training which would fit men to be the most highly efficient type of officer in a modern mechanised army. But that was not the kind of training we wanted when they came to us. When they entered the service of this State they had the qualities we wanted and they had qualities which this House would have been glad to pay any price they cared to name, because without these qualities this State would have perished. Now they are to be told, not only within the discreet privacy of their own professional circle, but coram populo, that they are worn out and are no good and that they had better get out. And that is because the executive authority of the Army tells us that 20 officers must be disposed of.
I am looking at this thing from the point of view of a layman, not a professional man at all. Nothing but the probability of serious and irreparable injury to the Army would, in my mind, justify the heartless indifference to the welfare of these men that this course of action unquestionably is. I am not sure that anything that we do here now will repair the damage that has been done. I cannot help feeling that these men have been offered an affront which they should never have been offered. I want to remind the House that it is just as my American friend in a very different sphere discovered, that he had thrown away something infinitely precious in a vain search for an illusory efficiency.
So, in our Army if we treat men who have a long and honourable service in that way, I think we are throwing away something which I have good authority for saying is the most precious asset that an army can have. Certain Deputies may have recently read studies by Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, an Irishman, and I think generally admitted to be one of the most successful and resourceful commanders in the recent world war. When he became an instructor on the staff college at Quetta, those who listened to the first course of lectures which he there delivered, said that they could be boiled down to this: The most essential thing, the most fundamental thing and the most precious thing that an army can have is morale, morale, morale. He said that morale derived from, and was built upon, the confidence of men in their commanders, and that that went for privates, sergeants, sergeant-majors, lieutenants, captains, majors, all the way up.
What are the officers and men of our Army going to feel if they see before them the example of 20 of their colleagues, who have given the best part of their lives to the service of the Army, thrown out because that is what it is supposed to be, albeit with additions to their pensions and concessions, but none the less thrown out, because we think they are out of date? I put it to this House, are these the foundations upon which to build morale? Is this the way to persuade men in that Army to believe that those who are responsible for them will defend their legitimate interests before all-comers, that they can give their commanders and superiors that unquestioned loyalty and full confidence which is in fact the foundation of what Field Marshal Lord Montgomery has described as the only thing that really matters when building up an army, morale?
There are members of the Minister's Party who are out of date. There are members of the Minister's Party, who, I am sure, are a considerable embarrassment to the leaders of the Party from time to time. How long would the Party last, if those who had spent most of their lives in its service, grown old in its service, made very substantial sacrifices in its service were told: "Because you have got old, you are out of it. Get out, we will give you a small job or a sinecure that will keep you from starvation, but you are no good any more. Get out"? I think honourable men would reply: "We do not want your sinecure; all we wanted and believed we were entitled to, was to be allowed to judge for ourselves what was the appropriate time to get out and not to accept from those with whom we soldiered the public affront of being told that we were worn out and no good any more." Is there any Party in this House which would say to its oldest veterans: "Get out, you are no good any more"?
I do not think they dare do it. Why then should we do it to men who have served in the very special circumstances in which these men have served? It is so silly to do it. We are throwing away something fundamentally precious—morale—in a futile attempt to make a gesture of efficiency when, in fact, efficiency might have been secured and morale preserved intact by a more human approach to this problem and by the employment of these men, for the comparatively short time that remained of their ordinary service, in routine duties about which there need never have been any special inquiry. Should there happen to be a special inquiry, their long and valued service would have provided ample explanation. For what might have appeared to be an incongruous arrangement a full explanation would be forthcoming. Is there anything wrong or impracticable or anything silly in advocating that we should deal with the servants of our people as human beings, not as ciphers, to be pushed about and affronted at our sweet will? I do not think there is. I think we make a great mistake if we fall into the error of believing that those who served the people should be treated in an entirely different spirit from that in which any of us would dream of treating those who serve ourselves or the organisations for which we are responsible.
If, however, this most regrettable course has to be pursued I think those officers—I speak now of the men with long service—are entitled to expect of the Army that if they retire now, or are retired, they will be treated as men who have served their full term, and who will receive pensions on that basis and that, in so far as in our power lies, they will be put in a position in which they can carry on, even though they fail to find suitable employment with which to supplement the pension to which they become entitled under the existing regulations. In that connection, it is relevant to observe that these pensions are based on many of the assumptions that held good in 1922 and 1923, but in the post-war world in which we find ourselves we must recognise that such pensions to-day are a far less generous provision for these men than they would have been when they were first worked out 20 or 25 years ago.
I think it is a mistake to overstate this case, because I believe that every responsible man and officer in the Army recognises that, after the emergency expansion which took place, the post-war contraction was inevitable, and that did mean inevitably the surrender of certain acting ranks and did mean, I think, inevitably, that certain non-commissioned ranks would inevitably have to step down one or two grades.
Why?
Because it does not seem possible to me to have the same number of officers and non-commissioned officers in an army of 6,000 or 7,000 men which you had in an army of 40,000 men. Is that not a reasonable assumption? So it seems to me, and I think most reasonable men would take that view. All these men are in this position, that the fact that they step down a grade involves no reflection whatever on their efficiency or their usefulness to the Army. It is merely the inevitable consequence of the ordinary and expected contraction of the Army's size.
Their case is far different from the non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers who are being pushed out as being worn out and of no use. The affront we offer to these men humiliates me. I should be dreadfully ashamed to meet them. When I think of the flowery language we employed, when I think of the generous promises we made and when I think of us going around the country protesting our unalterable resolution that those who manned the Army, who organised it and built it up, would be forever our creditors and that nothing would be too good for them when the crisis had passed, I declare that, if I had to meet these officers, I would be ashamed to look them in the eye. Hurt as many of them may be, it should be some consolation to them to know that if there are people who should feel humiliated, if there are any people who should hang their heads in connection with this business, it is those who have offered them this gratuitous insult and not they who have to accept it, because, whatever may be said about them—that they are inefficient or worn out or no good—they know that all of us in this House know, whether we admit it or not, that there was a time when they were the best this country could hope to get, the best this country could hope to have, and that there were few people who are not grateful to the Providence of God Who provided them for our protection and for the protection of the nation as well.
My reaction to this situation is to attempt the impossible, that is, to communicate to these men the deep sense of humiliation which many of us in this House feel that we have ever lived to witness the offering of such an affront in public to them, and, to attempt the impossible again, to seek to communicate to them that this treatment is in no sense a reflection of what this House feels and that those who truly understand the nature of the work they have done, and still could do, would be ashamed to face them at this time, and only hope that faithful servants may forgive those who make so poor a return for duty honourably done.
Now, I turn to the bland announcement that we are to have a standing Army of 12,000 men which is to cost us £4,500,000 per annum in order to provide that hereafter, alone, we are capable of undertaking the defence of the national territory. Is that not manifestly hot air and ballyhoo—hot air and ballyhoo which is to cost us £4,500,000 per annum at a time when we cannot provide the kind of social services which the majority of the members of the House think ought to be provided on the ground that we have not enough money to provide them? Is there any Deputy who believes that an Army of 12,000 men will maintain the defence of the national territory unaided against all comers in the years that lie ahead?
Impossible.
Is there a man in this House who seriously believes that an Army of 12,000 men, furnished with the equipment we are in a position to give them, can meet every threat which may confront the national territory in the years that lie ahead? Suppose this territory is attacked—very possibly, it never will be attacked but let us suppose it is—and three atomic bombs such as fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are dropped on this territory. What will the 12,000 men do? March from Cork to the Curragh, and from the Curragh to Galway? Suppose that three more atomic bombs are dropped on our national territory. What will they do then? March from Galway to Cork and from Cork to Dublin?
Mr. Corish
They could only do as much as 12,000,000 men.
Exactly, unless they are furnished with the armament, the equipment and everything else that goes with an army of 12,000,000 men and the resources of a nation which is in a position to mobilise 12,000,000 men, equip 12,000,000 men and put 12,000,000 men in the field.
What equipment had they from 1916 to 1921?
Ask the Chair.
I do not mind Deputy McCarthy going down and thumping his tub in North-East Cork or East Cork——
You are wrong again.
I can never place the Deputy. He is from some part of Cork in any case, and I do not blame the poor man for thumping his tub down there, waving his hand and asking: "Where were you in 1916?" and: "What did one want then but a tenfoot pike to stand by Cathleen Ní Houlihan in her hour of need?" That is grand, and more power to the Deputy who does it, and gets his £480 a year for it. That is not too expensive. But, when it comes to £4,500,000, then I think it is time the hot air was turned off. £480 a year is plenty for hot air but £4,500,000 is a little too expensive, and it is to no useful end. But, suppose we succeed in gathering these 12,000 able-bodied men to engage exclusively in army activity. Do Deputies realise the situation in which we find ourselves at the present time? There is in Great Britain at the present time an acute shortage of man-power. At this present moment thousands, and tens of thousands, of the best young men and women in this country are being swept out of the country into Great Britain. You cannot get men to work on the land or to do any work. They are not to be had.
And you want to send the men that are in the Army after them.
No. I want to employ the men of this country in reproductive work that will help to build up the country, to make the country a better place to live in, to increase the resources and the reserves and the strength of the country.
And have an Army to defend it.
If we take 12,000 men out of an already seriously attenuated labour force and anticipate the occupation of such a number in the Army for years, instead of being a contributing factor to the national wealth, constituting themselves into an annual charge of £4,500,000 on the public purse, I say that that is doing something which is a material contribution to the destruction of the country, that it is going to cripple the country. At least half of those 12,000 ought to be employed at work which would increase the national wealth and build up the country instead of being engaged for 22 years in the regular Army on manoeuvres and army work of a character which, should the impact of war ever come upon us, will have no value whatever. What we are obviously going to do with an army of that character is that we will start preparing to the best of our ability to fight the last war, carefully averting our eyes from the prospect of the next war because we know perfectly well that we have neither the equipment nor the resources nor the means of taking any active part in any kind of war that is likely to be fought in the generations that lie ahead.
In that, like everything else, the Deputy will find very few to agree with him.
There have been very many famous occasions in history when the one who was right found himself in that situation. It is admitted now that there are virtually only two countries in the world who are able to produce effective armies. One is Russia and the other is the United States of America. That is the plain fact.
What about the United Nations Organisation, in future, if we are in it?
I am talking about the fact that the only two nations in the world who have the resources which make it conceivable that they will produce effective military instruments of war are admittedly these two countries. It is now virtually admitted that Great Britain is not in a position to do it and that the only justification for her maintaining an army on the scale on which she maintains it is her colonial responsibilities, and these she is trying to limit.
It is not for war we need an Army, but for defence.
United Nations Organisation will defend you.
I ask Deputies to envisage, for the defence of this country, what good are 12,000 men, whose sole reaction to the only kind of attack that ever was made on the territory of Japan, an island, in the last war, will be to march from Cork to Galway, from Galway to Dublin, Dublin to Cork and back to Galway.
Was there a landing in Norway by somebody?
There was never a landing in Japan. The war began and ended, so far as Japan was concerned, with two bombs, one in Nagasaki and the other in Hiroshima.
And the foot-sloggers had to walk in to take it over.
Surely we are not going to walk in and take anybody over.
Your argument is——
My argument is that for defence—for defence—the maintenance of large permanent armies by small countries is the purest nonsense. That is not to say that we should not have any army at all but it is a very strong argument, in my submission, for making up our minds as to what kind of army we are going to have and what its dimensions should be. I have no hesitation in going further than the Minister for Defence would seem prepared to go. He said: "I have declared the Government's policy twice before and I am not going to repeat it."
I put it again to the Minister that our object should be to have a small body of highly trained men, a guards battalion or a guards division—to speak in terms of British army usage—that is to say, a body of soldiers with the highest standard of training, discipline and morale, that we can evolve and, side by side with that, an air force trained in the latest types of fighter aircraft, albeit we know we cannot maintain the quantity of aircraft which an effective air force would have to use in time of war, but assuming that, if there is a war, we will not find ourselves alone confronting one of the great powers of the world but will find ourselves allied to some group of powers resisting some attempt at aggression which in our judgment is unjustified and that, in that situation, the highly trained personnel of our air force would have placed at its disposal by one of the powers allied to us the aircraft with which to use their acquired skill in the defence of this country and such other things as common cause might call upon them to defend.
That is practical politics. I know perfectly well that there is no Deputy in the Fianna Fáil Party who does not know in his heart and soul that in any future war if we are allied to Great Britain and the United States of America we will come out of the war virtually unscathed and that, if we are not, we will be blown clean out of the ocean. That is the plain fact. Of course, nobody will admit it. It would be political madness, in this country, to admit that.
How did we get out of the last war?
Deputy Dillon fought for us. He saved us.
The Taoiseach said we got out of it by the goodwill of two men—the late President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. I will not go beyond him for that and, if Deputy McCarthy wishes to do so, he can slip out now behind the Speaker's chair and ask him if he said that, and I am sure the Taoiseach will spend an hour and three-quarters explaining to him that, although he did say it, it had a subtle meaning and only a true child of Cathleen Ní Houlihan could understand its true meaning. But if Roosevelt's and Churchill's grandchildren do not come up to scratch in the next war, we will be blown out of the Atlantic Ocean. I have not the slightest doubt they will come up to scratch. America is our friend, and although at the moment they are telling us to eat yellow meal, I believe they will come round in the end. The old friend is the best friend and temporary misunderstandings will be overcome, and when the time comes we may look to her confidently for alliance and help. I believe that in any cause in which she is concerned we will find ourselves concerned as well.
I know it is unpopular and politically imprudent to say that, in the future, it is highly likely that any cause on behalf of which the people of England are embattled will be a cause that commends itself to us. Now, I know the people of England sentenced my grandfather to death, I know the people of England put my father in jail and I know the people of England did a lot of things in this country which it would be a great deal better if they had not done. I know the British people are capable of doing very savage things and I know our own people are capable of doing very savage things: but I am not talking of the centuries gone past. I am talking of the years that lie ahead.
And the centuries.
And the centuries, too. I am thinking of the fate that awaits our children and our children's children, and I envisage that, in any case hereafter where these two great nations are embattled, this country will find itself more in sympathy with them than with whatever antagonism confronts them. If that is so, then, if this nation conceives it to be its duty to take an active part and help Great Britain and the United States of America, it is from Great Britain and America we will get the equipment wherewith our people will repel that attack—because we cannot get it from our own resources, and we never will.
The object, then, in the event of such a situation arising where it became our duty to take our part in preventing an attack being made directly upon our territory, should be to have men here competent to use the weapons necessary effectively to resist that attack— and the only such weapons, as I can see it, would be aircraft of a character designed to keep bombers at bay.
Would 12,000 men be able to do that?
If Deputies would refrain from interrupting, we might make more progress.
I believe that, by the time that war comes, Deputy McCarthy and myself will be both sitting above in Heaven with a pair of wings on us— I hope that we will and that we may deserve it. It is for those who come after us that I believe our present sense of citizenry must be principally exercised. I think it is reasonable to take the limited precaution which I have indicated, but to go beyond that is to waste our manpower at a very important stage, to undertake financial burdens which are going very seriously to embarrass this country in the years that lie ahead.
I beg of this House to remember that, unless we can make this country a fairly attractive one, the vacuum for labour developing in Great Britain will draw two-thirds of our population away, at higher wages, better conditions and greater opportunities. If we are further going to embarrass our ability to build this country up and offer those who stay in it material attractions not measurably comparable with what will be pressed upon them from Great Britain, we will see this country denuded of population and in much the same position as a State like Australia finds herself to-day, clamouring for people, for foreigners to come in and inhabit it, and quite unable to find anyone willing to accept the invitation. Mind you, it would be a queer fate for Ireland if her people turned their backs on this country and moved over en masse to Great Britain—and something like that has been happening for the last three or four years.
Would the Deputy deal with the Defence Bill now?
Yes, Sir. If you are going to place upon this country a burden of £4,500,000 a year, an obligation to maintain 12,000 of the best men in the country in wholly unproductive work, I think you are going to place the whole future of the country in very serious peril. When we recognise that that is all done for no other purpose than to promote the kind of hot air Deputy MacCarthy is shooting off his mouth, I want to suggest to this House that it is too dear at £4,500,000 a year, that £480 is quite enough for that. It is a grave injury to the country and a grave disservice to a young Army, with a high reputation, that they should be manceuvred into the position of becoming a burden on the community, when heretofore they had been its protector and its creditor, albeit the debt we owe them is being paid to some of their members in very strange coin to-day.
I move the adjournment of the debate.
Debate adjourned.