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Dáil Éireann debate -
Friday, 7 Nov 1952

Vol. 134 No. 9

Private Deputies' Business. - Report of the Central Bank, 1951—Motion.

I move:—

That Dáil Éireann hereby rejects the Report of the Central Bank dated 25th September, 1951, purporting to have been made and presented to Dáil Éireann in pursuance of the provisions of Section 36 (1) of the Currency Act, 1927 (No. 32 of 1927), on all, or any, of the following grounds:—

1. That the said report is not a report of the "proceedings" of the Central Bank and gives no, or no adequate, information concerning the "proceedings" of the Central Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 (1) of the Currency Act, 1927.

2. That the Governor and Directors of the Central Bank exceeded the functions assigned to them by Section 36 (1) of the Currency Act, 1927 (No. 32 of 1927), by embodying political and other views in the said report.

3. That the said report failed to disclose information which it ought to have disclosed.

4. That in so far as the said report directs or urges:—

(a) the banks to restrict credit, or

(b) a reduction in investments in Ireland, or

(c) a reduction in capital development projects and public works approved by Dáil Éireann, or

(d) the accumulation of sterling assets, or

(e) a reduction in real wages and earnings, or

(f) the abolition of subsidies of essential foods and fertilisers, or

(g) the imposition of additional taxation, or

(h) measures to offset what it terms "the unusually favourable state of employment", or

(i) the "sterilisation" or the investment of the E.C.A. Grant or loan Counterpart Funds in Britain or elsewhere, or

(j) measures to prevent or retard the development of our land and industrial resources, or

(k) measures to prevent or retard the provision of houses and hospitals for the Irish people, or

(l) measures that will produce unemployment, promote emigration or reduce the economic conditions of the Irish people,

Dáil Éireann considers that this advice is contrary to the interest of the Irish Nation.

Might I point out that there is not a single Minister in the House?

That is not surprising. It is very unlikely they will attend. They are afraid to attend and I do not blame them.

Do not, if they are afraid to come in here. On a point of order. Might I inquire whether the presence of Deputy Major de Valera on the front bench indicates that the Minister for Finance is too busy taking precautions against President Eisenhower's intention to plunge the country into war, as mentioned by the Minister in Manor Street, to attend here?

Major de Valera

The Minister has been sent for. I merely came in here as a matter of courtesy.

Is he away taking precautions to protect this country from the consequences of President Eisenhower's election about which his anxiety was so great in Manor Street the other night?

The Deputy should get in touch with his old friend, Mr. Churchill.

Perhaps Deputy MacBride will be allowed to continue.

As the Minister for Finance is now present, I should like to ask if he has taken the necessary precautions to protect us from President Eisenhower.

You were pleading for protection in this House a little while ago. You had better be silent.

The Minister has his eye on President Eisenhower.

I drafted this motion immediately after the proposals of the Central Bank had been published and submitted to this House. I drafted it in the hope that the Government would have found it possible to accept the motion, if not as a whole at least in part. That is why the resolution is presented in a number of separate parts, so as to make it possible for the Government to indicate that it would accept some parts of it. At the time that the Central Bank Report was published and submitted to this House, the attitude of the Government seemed to be somewhat undecided. As I understood the attitude of the Minister for Finance, he accepted the views contained in the report and the recommendations contained in the report. On the other hand, as I understood the attitude of the Tánaiste, he rejected the report and said that it was not going to be hung around his neck. Many months have now passed by since the report was published and since the House discussed this report. We are now in a position to judge the extent to which the report has been accepted and acted upon by the Government. It is quite clear, on retrospective examination of the Central Bank Report, that its main recommendations have been acted upon by the Government and have been accepted.

In my view, this report and this resolution raise matters of grave constitutional importance. It appears to me that the Central Bank, in that report, usurped or attempted to usurp the functions of the Government appointed by this House, and sought to dictate policy to the country. They are not authorised by the Currency Act, under which they are entitled to make this report, to enter into the political field. The report contains proposals which are clearly of a political nature. It contains proposals which, in my view, are contrary to the national interest. We are entitled to know by what authority this conclave of bankers and civil servants is entitled to attempt to dictate policy to the Government, to this House and to the nation.

The House will remember the broad outline of the report. I think it is well I should underline certain aspects of it. The report sought in the first instance to depict the economy of this State as being in a dangerous condition. It repeatedly dealt with the question of what was termed inflation, which seems to be one of the favourite expressions of a particular school of economists who, apparently, are in a position to influence the policy of the Government. It then went on to advocate the reduction or the removal of food subsidies. That advice has been at least in part accepted by the Government and implemented by the Government, because the food subsidies were removed at least in part. It advocated the restriction of bank credits. That advice has already been acted upon by the banking system with either the direct or indirect connivance of the Government. It advocated the imposition of additional taxation if possible on consumer goods, so that additional taxation would have the effect of reducing the consumption of consumer goods by the people. That advice has been acted upon.

It also advocated what, to my mind, is one of the most dastardly and sinister lines of policy that any responsible economist could advocate in this country. It advocated the curtailment of public works on account of what it called "the unusually favourable state of employment" in the country. In other words, the report advocated the creation of a pool of unemployment, advocated the creation of conditions that must inevitably lead to increased emigration. It is seldom that those views are put in black and white by any responsible person. Probably the nakedness with which those who framed that report, those who submitted a report of that kind to the Government, to the House and to the people, expressed those views, is in itself sufficient condemnation of their ineptitude.

In dealing with public works, the Central Bank in its report said, and I quote:

"In view of the unusually favourable state of employment for a considerable time past, there is the less need at present for the artificial stimuli provided by such a programme, especially as prevailing high costs cause it to encroach rapidly on resources which may be badly needed at a later time when conditions afford more justification for this expedient."

The report then went on to point out that public works imposed a strain on the balance of payments, and then: "They have, for example, entailed the immediate import of materials and equipment." Of course, the building of houses, the building of factories, any public works programme, any capital investment programme, will involve the import of raw materials. Then they go on, and I would like the House to pay particular attention to the next sentence: "They have (that is, the public works) through their labour content created a demand for imported as well as other consumer goods." Because housing, because public works have a labour content, they are to be stopped. That is the advice which is given to the Government by this conclave of bankers, advice which the Government possibly did not accept openly, but advice which the Government has certainly helped to implement. The result is, of course, that unemployment has risen. The result is, of course, that emigration has increased.

I have not seen the report which the Central Bank propose to issue this year. Presumably it will be made available in the near future. I do not know to what extent they expressed satisfaction with the results which they have been able to achieve so far in regard to unemployment; whether they were in a position to congratulate themselves that they have been able to create a pool of unemployment in the country, that they have been able to increase the rate of emigration, that they have been able to reduce the purchasing power of the people and the standard of living of the people.

It is no longer a technical report by economists or by civil servants. This is an entrance by these people into the political arena. If they want to come into the political arena, let them come out in the open; let them stand for election and come into this House; let them tell the people what their policy is. The only authority given to them by Statute is to present an annual report of their proceedings to this House. I need not seek to define what the word "proceedings" means. This House has knowledge of it in its own procedure. The House keeps a journal of its proceedings in which it records main decisions, what it does, and so on. It would be a strange thing if, under cover of publishing a report of its proceedings to this House, the Clerk of this House were to start expressing views on the various political issues that came before the House or that faced the country.

While these gentlemen are not slow, apparently, to enlarge upon their functions by publishing documents of this nature, they are reluctant, apparently, to give more factual information concerning their proceedings. We do not know from this report how often they meet, what they do at their meetings. We know very little about the business they actually transact. True, they publish an annual statement of account, which they are bound to publish.

The last one was made available to this House two days ago. Although it is dated 8th April, 1952, it was only laid on the Table of this House on the 5th November of this year. There is no explanation as to the long delay that took place. It was submitted to the Auditor General and was signed by him on the 6th June, 1952. What happened this statement of account since 6th June, 1952, I do not know. But it is an interesting document, little publicised; we have not seen any note of it in the papers yet. It does not contain very much information but the information which it does contain is well worthy of notice. We learn from it that the expenses of this institution have more than doubled.

I beg the Deputy's pardon. What is the Deputy quoting from?

I am quoting from the statement of account of the Central Bank for the year ending 31st March, 1952, which was laid on the Table of this House on the 5th of this month, although the document itself is dated 8th April, 1952.

I wish to call your attention to the fact that there is nothing in this motion about the accounts of the Central Bank for the year ending 31st March, 1952. The purpose of the motion is to discuss the Report of the Central Bank dated 25th September, 1951. I would suggest, therefore, that the Deputy's reference to this statement of accounts is out of order.

Do I take it the Minister does not like it?

The motion deals with the Report of the Central Bank dated 25th September, 1951.

I appreciate that but it is very difficult to limit one's remarks to this actual report without making comparisons with other reports of the Central Bank. I merely want to draw the attention of this House to the fact that the Central Bank in its report is very shy to give information which the public might like to have. As an instance of that, I think the public might well like to know why the expenses of the Central Bank have more than doubled in the course of a few years. One of the directors of the Central Bank, who is also secretary to the Department of Finance, I think, the other day, speaking publicly, made a speech about whirlwind inflation. It seems to me that it is whirlwind inflation for the expenses of the Central Bank to be more than doubled.

On a point of order. Is the Deputy in order, in the debate on this motion, to refer to proceedings which took place before the arbitration board or may we discuss all these proceedings in this House? I suggest to you, Sir, that, as the matter is sub judice, the Deputy is not in order in referring to anything that was said before the arbitration board or to the proceedings of that board.

I would suggest to Deputy MacBride that he keep to the motion on the Order Paper.

I will certainly keep to the motion on the Order Paper, but I am not going to accept any suggestion that a civil servant who makes a speech which is reproduced in the newspapers is to be dealt with as a privileged person.

It is not usual to discuss civil servants in this House.

It is a Central Bank director that he is talking about.

If civil servants enter the political arena, they must expect to be discussed in this House.

On a point of order —Deputy MacBride resents the excellent advice which was given to other Ministers when he was a member of a Government.

Is this a point of order?

No, Sir, it is merely a comment.

If it is not, I shall not give way.

I wish to put a point of order.

It is the one which I have made already, that it is not in order to refer to what took place before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal, and that, accordingly, as the matter is sub judice, Deputy MacBride is not in order in making any reference to any person who appeared there either on my instructions or on the instructions of the staff side of the Civil Service.

The newspapers have written articles about it. People have been making speeches, including the Minister, in Cabra.

The speeches were made on my behalf.

The Minister made speeches in Cabra last night.

That is another of Deputy MacBride's misrepresentations. I referred in my speech at Cabra to the proceedings of the arbitration board which was set up and which reported in 1951.

I would point out to the Deputy that it is not usual in this House to refer to matters that are sub judice.

With great respect, I am not going to accept the position where a civil servant can make a public statement, which is printed in the papers and commented on in the papers, and in respect of which we are not allowed to comment in this House. It would be intolerable.

He was appearing there on my instructions, to place my arguments before the tribunal.

I do not care. The Minister could appear there himself if he had political views to express. I do not propose to deal with it. I merely refer to the fact that references were made to "whirlwind inflation" by one of the directors of the Central Bank and I linked that with the fact that the expenses of the Central Bank had more than doubled in the course of a few years. That was one of the matters which the public might have expected would be dealt with in the Report of the Central Bank dealing with the proceedings of the Central Bank.

I suggest to you, Sir——

The Minister is afraid of this.

I suggest to you, Sir, that we are dealing with the report of 1951.

Would the Minister allow me to continue?

No, I am merely going to suggest to the Chair that this is just as irrelevant as your advocacy of a British alliance in 1948.

That is untrue and the Minister will kindly withdraw it.

It has nothing to do with the motion.

I have stated that that statement is not true and I would ask you to ask the Minister to withdraw it.

I have here a letter written by Deputy MacBride to the Irish Times in 1948 in which he said that cultural and economic bonds, coupled with mutual interest, would inevitably drive a free, united Ireland into a close alliance with Britain.

That is twisting the facts, but it is typical of the Minister, who is one of the most contemptible persons in public life in this country.

Another thing one might expect to learn from the Report of the Central Bank is why it does not invest one penny of its money in Ireland. In the year under review, the year ending 31st March, 1951, the Central Bank, according to its balance sheet, held £50,552,000 invested in British public securities.

Notice taken that 20 Deputies were not present; House counted and, 20 Deputies being present,

The Minister did not succeed in counting the House out, though he thought he could.

You ought to listen to this.

You had not much pluck.

The Minister's colleague thought it would be well if some more of their members were present to hear this. The Central Bank, in its balance sheet for the year under review, ending 31st March, 1951, held £50,552,000 in British Government securities as part of the Legal Tender Note Fund. The dividends which it received on its investments in British Government securities amounted to £536,000—somewhere around 1? per cent. on this vast sum of money.

This House and the public might have been interested to know why the rate of interest at which the Central Bank lent its money to the British Government was so low. The people might be interested to know why the Central Bank did not invest any single portion of its money in Ireland. Perhaps this year the Central Bank will, in its report, give some explanation of these matters. It might possibly explain, in its report this year, why the total amount of British Government securities held by the Central Bank in respect of the Legal Tender Note Fund increased from £50,000,000 to £55,345,000.

I understand that Deputy MacBride is quoting from the Central Bank accounts for 31st March, 1952. You have already ruled that reference to this report is out of order.

The Minister does not like it.

That does not matter. I am trying to teach the Deputy parliamentary procedure.

The Minister does not want public attention to be drawn to it. The Minister has been interrupting every minute since I got up to speak, just because he is afraid of these things. He is trying to keep——

As the Chair has already pointed out to Deputy MacBride, we are discussing a motion dealing with the Central Bank Report for the 31st March, 1951. The report for 31st March, 1952, is not before the House.

But I am entitled to indicate the type of information which this House and the public are entitled to have from the Central Bank. One of the matters which the public are entitled to know is why there is an additional £5,000,000 invested in British Government securities in the course of the year.

That is not relevant to the motion.

Go to blazes.

The Minister can go to Cabra and make election speeches about General Eisenhower and so on, but he is afraid that these things would be discussed in the country.

I am putting it to you, Sir, that there is a perfectly relevant statement of accounts issued by the Central Bank to which the Deputy could refer if he had taken the trouble to prepare himself for this debate.

This is impudent nonsense. Pretty Fanny is going quite daft.

The country is entitled to know why the rate of interest on the money lent by the Central Bank to the British Government is as low as one and one-eighth per cent. this year, while at the same time this Government has to pay 5 per cent. on a loan it obtains here.

These are some of the matters which the people are entitled to know. I have already dealt with the type of political advice given by this conclave of bankers and civil servants in their report.

There is another aspect to which I would like to refer. The Report of the Central Bank which is under discussion took great pains to decry the economic and financial position of the country. At page nine it referred to "The long continuance of the deficit position and the progressive weakening of the economy by loss of external reserves and the incurring of foreign debt—the United States dollar loan under the European Recovery Programme..." The whole report is couched in terms that are bound to be damaging to the credit of this State.

The report, if we were correctly informed, was published without alteration by the Government. I can conceive of no document and of no statement that would be more likely to damage the credit of this country than a report of this nature published by the Central Bank with the authority of the Government. It is interesting to note that within a short time of the publication of this report the value of Government stocks began to decline on the Stock Exchange. I think we may well infer that one of the reasons why the Minister for Finance had to offer 5 per cent. in order to raise £20,000,000 was the adverse reports that had been published by the Central Bank. That was undoubtedly one of the reasons which damaged the credit of this nation.

I would have thought that the Minister himself would realise the dangerous precedent which is being allowed to go on where this organisation, under the guise of publishing a report of its proceedings, is permitted to damage the standing of this country in the economic and financial world. If it suits the Central Bank at any time to create a panic among investors because they dislike a particular Government or the views of a particular political Party, it is open to them to publish a report of this kind, scare people and damage the position of the country.

I think the Minister should try to approach this question with reason and without seeking to make Party capital out of it.

Like the Deputy.

I have approached this whole question with reason and logic. I think it is highly dangerous to vest powers in a body of this kind which has no real responsibility, powers which can do a considerable amount of damage to the country as a whole. The Central Bank Report is clearly a political document. I do not think it was ever intended that the Central Bank should enter into the political arena. It is a dangerous precedent and one which the Minister should resist.

I do not know what the Report of the Central Bank will be like in the coming year. They will hardly be likely to congratulate themselves on having achieved complete success. They may well congratulate themselves that they have succeeded in creating more conditions of unemployment and reducing the standard of living of the people. They may well congratulate themselves on influencing the policy of the Government. As far as I know there is no statutory function given to the Central Bank to entitle them to do these things.

No doubt the Central Bank will probably say that the Government did not go far enough, that there are not sufficient unemployed in the country, that there is still too much being consumed in the country and that there is still too much capital development going on. No doubt they will express these views but I think they may well feel a certain degree of satisfaction at the success of their handiwork. I would ask the House to reject this report and make known in no uncertain terms that they will not allow this conclave of bankers, financiers and high civil servants to dictate policy to this House or to the country.

Major de Valera

This is the type of subject which should be approached in an objective way, but Deputy MacBride is one of those Deputies who has his eye on the political expediency of the moment and has sidetracked an important consideration to vote catch. It is difficult not to follow him in that. However, in spite of that my duty is to look at the matter in its proper perspective.

I am sure Deputy de Valera does not wish to be unfair. The Deputy will agree that this motion was tabled over a year ago.

And carefully kept in cold storage ever since.

Major de Valera

The Deputy is always one whose immediate objective sometimes defeats itself.

The Deputy kept it in cold storage.

That is typical of the Minister. This motion came up on the Order Paper in the order of precedence with the other motions.

Not at all.

That is typical of the Minister.

Major de Valera

We had a lot of this discussion from Deputy MacBride before he got into a Government, and we have had it since, although for three years Deputy MacBride might have been able to do something. In the circumstances, a lot of what he says becomes a matter of mere talking. The subject raised is something of importance. If we are to relate it to the actual situation here now or a year ago we must take into account the background before we deal with the subject matter of the motion at all.

What is the background financially? No matter how one looks at it, one has to admit that this country is subject, as are other countries, to the general repercussions of the economic situation in the world at large, that these repercussions were not altogether favourable from about 1949 onwards, and that there is a background to the financial problem of the country at the moment. Deputy MacBride was talking about credit, the restriction of credit, the credit of the country. He made the statement that damage had been done to the credit of the country, and, if I heard him aright, also made the statement in connection with the loan which was floated.

What are the facts? The facts and the background are that, during three years of Coalition Government drift here, the finances of the country were so managed that the total expenditure of the State was allowed to grow and grow out of proportion to the revenue of the State, and that a progressive gap was allowed to develop between revenue and expenditure. Compare that with an ordinary private firm in business. Looking at the country from the point of view of its being an economic unit, here was a concern whose expenditure was not being balanced by its income, a concern which, to use ordinary language, was getting more and more into the red.

This was allowed to continue and to become aggravated by the Government of which Deputy MacBride was a member. While the country got more and more into the red, no action was taken by the Government to correct the trend. The trend was allowed to continue. It was a case not so much of mishandling as of non-handling, of doing nothing, and that is the most dangerous thing of all. People in business know that, when looking at the credit of a firm, the most damning thing they can find is to find that the firm is drifting, that nothing is being done. Most businessmen would have more confidence in a firm that was doing something positively wrong than in a firm in which things were allowed to drift.

That is what was happening to the country regarded as an economic concern. Deputy MacBride talked about credit. That was the first big damaging thing to the credit of this country and anybody looking at it could not fail to have his confidence damaged by such a picture. The people asked where this was going to end. We were asking people to invest in their confidence in the future of the country, but any hard-headed businessman in these circumstances would have asked how he could have confidence in such a situation, because, if it were allowed to continue, there was inevitably going to be a crash. The phrase "putting the country in pawn" was used and used with great justification in that regard.

The Deputy stands over the advertisement then?

Major de Valera

That is what was happening, because, in allowing the country to get into debt, in allowing its expenditure to exceed by far its revenue, they were ultimately putting the country in the power of somebody outside.

The Deputy stands over the posters showing the three balls?

Major de Valera

Then, we had a world situation which aggravated that trend, but, before coming to that, we must look at another factor. When talking about loans, let us not forget the history of the three loans the Coalition Government floated.

We did not have to pay 5 per cent. for them.

Major de Valera

They floated a loan at the normal price of 3 per cent. and it was not fully subscribed. They raised it to 3½ per cent. and the result was not completely satisfactory, either. Again, not only was there damage to the country's credit by letting expenditure far exceed revenue but there was the damaging situation that we were borrowing more and more—going to the well too often for water—and naturally people were asking where it would all end and what would happen next. That was what was happening internally, owing to the incompetence of a Government that did not know its own mind and had not the courage to face up to facts or to get things adjusted.

Externally, there was another situation developing which aggravated that position. Externally, there was a situation in which the trend was towards dearer borrowing. If anybody studies the exchanges of the past 18 months or more, he will see that the tendency is obvious—that the price at which one could borrow was going up. That was related to a number of factors. In the beginning, it was perhaps related to the rather high return from industrials at one period. It was related to a number of things, but it was undoubtedly related also to the fact that here and elsewhere, in the sterling area anyway, there was a feeling that gilt-edge was not so much gilt-edge as it used to be and that many of the considerations that weighed to secure money at a relatively low rate of interest in respect of such solid securities were not as weighty as they were heretofore. In other words, we were back to the matter of confidence again, and I am not talking so much of confidence in ourselves locally as of confidence in the whole economic set-up of the sterling area.

The result was that, culminating in the rise in the bank rate, there was a situation in which, if we were to borrow money, the terms would have to be more attractive than theretofore. I suggest to Deputy MacBride that a little down to earth study of the lists of returns over the past year might help towards a more sober contribution to a debate of this sort. One will find that the average yields were such as to preclude the possibility of borrowing at the old rates, the rates varying between 4 per cent. and 6 per cent. as being more or less the possible limits. That was the situation the Minister for Finance found himself faced with when he took over. He first had the difficult task of correcting an unbalanced situation. He had to restore the confidence of the people and of the country.

Having shaken it himself.

Major de Valera

It was not he did it; it was you did it.

It was the Central Bank that did it.

Major de Valera

It was you did it. The ordinary common-sense investor did not need any reports, statements or anything else to see that there was a Government in power which was going to spend more than it earned and to leave nothing but liabilities behind it, a Government which was not managing the affairs of the country in a business-like manner, and it required nothing more than that fact to bring about the situation of which I am talking. There was the other factor which would have to be faced—I am certainly not blaming the Coalition Government for this one, but it was a factor in the situation— that the rates at which one could borrow were rising. In other words, the cost of borrowing was becoming greater, to borrow was a dearer process than it had been heretofore.

Many business people will tell you that it was an achievement to get that loan at 5 per cent., and the biggest and the most important factor in getting it is that it illustrates that the Minister has been able to restore confidence. This loan was subscribed. The argument the Opposition have is only a very small portion of a per cent. That is all they argue about. The fact is the confidence was there to subscribe the money and that confidence obtained because it was obvious that the country was going to balance its affairs and get itself on to a sound financial basis. Deputy MacBride has in the past talked a lot about sterling assets, link with sterling and many other things about which we heard very little from him from a practical point of view when he was in government because, when in government, there were certain hard facts that could not be got over.

In relation to the basic argument— this is a fact we have to face—most of us in our arguments with Deputy MacBride over a number of years on this subject have always conceded this point: it may very well be that, if one looks at the over-all situation and the difficulties that beset sterling, and so on and so forth, in principle it would be a very good thing for us to be completely separate without any formal association of any kind with sterling. The snag arises, however, when one faces the practical problem.

We have to face the fact, first of all, that at any particular moment—and when I say any particular moment I mean at any point of time from the first occasion on which Deputy MacBride started discussing this in, let us say, 1947 until the present day —when one comes to consider that problem one is faced with the fact that we are already part of the set-up and there are certain balances, the adjustment of which is a matter of some complexity. So far nobody has proposed a practical method of making the disconnection that some people advocate. It is being talked round; it is being talked "about it and about," to use Fitzgerald's phrase in Omar Khayyám, but we get no nearer an answer to our problem than he did to the problem he was considering. When we try to get down to a practical solution or approach to the problem— a problem which everyone admits is worth considering—nobody has been able to say how we can overcome the difficulties with which we find ourselves faced. There are so many millions in sterling assets there already.

I was prevented from discussing anything other than the Central Bank Report. I would welcome a discussion on the whole question of our relationship with sterling. I think we should take that separately, however, and have a full discussion on it some day.

May I draw the Chair's attention to the fact that Deputy MacBride seems to have forgotten the terms of his own motion? Paragraph 4 (d) bears the heading "the accumulation of sterling assets".

That is not a question of the relationship generally. I am quite prepared to discuss the whole question of our relationship with sterling provided that it is understood that we can do so.

The Deputy has shot his bolt now.

As far as I can see, the accumulation of sterling assets, the disposal, distribution or repatriation of sterling assets arises quite relevantly on this motion.

In your absence the Leas-Cheann Comhairle tried to limit it to the actual Report of the Central Bank. I am quite prepared to have a general discussion if that is clearly understood.

The motion states "in so far as the said report directs." I am sure the Leas-Cheann Comhairle had that in mind.

I do not want to limit the discussion provided that it is understood that no one will be limited.

Deputy de Valera wants to keep it going until 2 o'clock. That is his function at the moment.

Major de Valera

The fact is one cannot consider these issues unless one gets down to fundamentals. The net point I am making in relation to this question of external assets, because it has a bearing on this matter, is that one must take into account the situation as it is. The accumulation of these assets has resulted from a certain trading and financial set-up. It is impossible to do anything radical in the situation as it is, and the Deputy knows that from his own examination. Short of the importation of equivalent goods or services, I wonder can we actually, by monetary transaction alone, effect any repatriation of assets.

Of course not.

The Deputy should allow Deputy de Valera to make his speech.

Perhaps I could help Deputy de Valera by asking one question.

Major de Valera

No, you will not.

Not even one question?

Major de Valera

No.

The Deputy knows it will be an awkward one.

Major de Valera

I will not be cross-examined. I have a little experience of that game myself. Our relation with sterling is fundamental in all this connection. It is fundamental to the extent that you cannot consider our case as completely isolated while the relationship is there. In so far as Deputy MacBride has stated that, I accept his statement. We must accept the position as we find it. It is no harm to say that trying to overcome the disadvantages of the connection is not so easy. Indeed the question of breaking away is so difficult that so far nobody has been able to suggest a practical method of doing it leaving aside completely the question of whether or not it is desirable. Nobody has ever been able to say specifically: "We will do it this way." Nobody has ever been able to set down the concrete steps that must be taken.

I will give the Deputy one concrete example immediately. Invest part of the currency fund in Ireland.

Major de Valera

There, the Deputy is going back to the point that I am putting and that, frankly, I am not going to go into to-day because the more I look at it the more complex it becomes. I doubt that, on the last analysis—at least I have never seen it convincingly for myself—credit balances built up in the way that ours have been, as the result of trade transactions, transactions in goods, can be repatriated in the sense that Deputy MacBride likes to make propaganda, by a monetary transaction.

It is easy to squander them.

Major de Valera

I can only see them being usefully repatriated by the importation of equivalent goods and services. It is easy enough to squander them, as Deputy Carter says, or blow them on goods that we do not really want or that are not of primary importance—particularly consumable luxuries.

That is all nonsense.

Major de Valera

The difficulty is in being able to spend them on capital goods and matters of that nature. I am not going into the details of that except to suggest that it might be a very interesting thing for a committee of this House to consider at some stage——

Hear, hear!

Major de Valera

——whether it is possible, by any monetary measure, to do what people in the Opposition are talking about, and which I greatly doubt.

Will we do that? Will you agree to that?

Major de Valera

Coming from that, there are the transitional problems of isolating yourself from the repercussions in the sterling area. One particular repercussion from the sterling area was the one I mentioned already. You can take it as typical. It was the change in the price of money, the rise in the bank rate and the trend of investments. These were things that, whether we like it or not, while you have that set-up, are going to have their repercussions here and you must take account of it. Take one instance alone. If the bank rate were not adjusted here, I invite Deputies to work out the consequences. A lot of the other adjustments were simply automatic. One of the contributory factors in forcing up the price at which a Government loan must be floated now, even if the disadvantages of the sabotage of credit——

By the Deputy's friends.

Major de Valera

——by the Coalition Government's inefficiency were not there, is that the problem would still have necessitated a higher rate of interest.

The Coalition Government were in office for three and a half years. You had the power then.

We never let the Central Bank dictate to the country like that.

Major de Valera

This type of motion is completely misleading unless it takes into account the whole background that is there, and that is the one I am talking about. Even though the answer may be that that background would not be there if we were not part of the sterling area, my answer is that nobody has been able to put up a workable plan consistent with our economy for changing that situation. Even if there were a concrete proposition for the change, one is immediately faced with transition problems, as I tried to point out to the Deputy years ago—and I think we came back to it in this House. Through the hospitality of the columns of the Irish Times I invited Deputy MacBride to deal with a certain number of specific questions at a time when he was ranting round the country about breaking the link with sterling. My questions were as follows. How are you going to provide for certain transition problems? For instance, if you break, you will still, because of our direct trade relationships with the sterling area, have the problem of what the relation of your own unit and your own currency is to be. There were three possibilities, as I pointed out to the Deputy. You either had your £ unit par with sterling, in which case you made no change, or you had it at a premium or at a discount compared with sterling—and in either of those two cases you were faced with certain problems. You would have been faced with a problem that tended completely to depress your exports and you were faced with a different type of problem. But in any case you were faced with two very serious economic and social sets of consequences. The simple question for Deputy MacBride in so many facts and figures, was: how do you get out of these dilemmas? Deputy MacBride, who will get the ready answer if he can get it, with all the advocate's astuteness for the immediate political point, would have had the answer as quick as pat if it were there, but we never to this day got that answer. We are still, on this particular day, talking in the air.

That is not so. I will give the Deputy concrete proposals immediately if he likes to hear them.

He says he will give concrete proposals immediately.

Why did Deputy MacBride not give them to the Coalition Government when they were in office?

He has a record for them.

Major de Valera

We should like to see them, especially after three years of Coalition Government during which time the matter could have been done. In this motion we have a nicelybalanced legal set of innuendoes, nicely legally drafted——

The Deputy has missed his vocation.

Major de Valera

The Deputy? Perhaps.

If he could have seen himself from this side of the House when he was engaged in that balancing trick he would know exactly what I mean.

Major de Valera

If it is a question of balancing, nice little innuendoes, legal formalising and dealing in words I should have to bow to the master.

There is no dealing in words with 10,000 people unemployed.

There were to be no unemployed under the Coalition Government.

The figure was greatly reduced.

Major de Valera

We are paying to-day and for the past 18 months for the consequences of three years of Coalition Government.

There are 10,000 unemployed to-day.

Major de Valera

Unemployment, monetary difficulty and everything else——

No policy.

Major de Valera

The country has to pay to-day for the luxury of having you and the rest of you as Ministers for three years.

The country has to pay for the damage done to its credit by this conclave of bankers and your colleagues.

Let us come back to the motion which is before the House.

Major de Valera

I am. The background to all this is very important. You cannot have financial motions like this debated academically as in a debating society. We have to relate them to the background of the facts as they exist in the country to-day.

Debate adjourned.
The Dáil adjourned at 2 p.m., until Wednesday, 12th November, at 3 p.m.
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