I move:
That Dáil Éireann approve the accession of the Government to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the terms of the Protocol for the Accession of Ireland.
The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have invited the Government to accede to the General Agreement, and the Government propose to accept the invitation. The approval of Dáil Éireann is required under Article 29 of the Constitution, as accession will involve a charge on public funds in the form of a contribution to the expenses of the GATT. The amount involved is small—an initial non-recurring payment of £650 to the GATT Working Capital Fund and an annual contribution towards administrative expenses which, on the basis of the estimated expenses for 1968, would be of the order of £5,600.
Deputies will have before them copies of the White Paper on accession to the GATT, which was circulated recently. This outlines the origin and development of the General Agreement, summarises its main provisions, and traces the negotiations, including Ireland's participation in the Kennedy Round, leading up to the invitation to accede. In the circumstances, there is no need for me to go over the same ground in detail. I shall confine myself to outlining the considerations which led the Government to seek accession, and the principal obligations and benefits involved.
The GATT is an international agreement embracing countries at all stages of economic development, state-trading countries as well as market-economy countries, and the contracting parties account, in all, for over 80 per cent of total world trade. It is now just a little over 20 years since the General Agreement was concluded and in that time the number of contracting parties, initially twenty-three, has increased to the present seventy-four.
The delay in our seeking to accede to the GATT was due to a number of causes. It was felt that accession might involve our making significant tariff concessions and this was regarded as a difficulty before the re-orientation of our economic policy towards free trade. Moreover, membership of the GATT was incompatible with the fulfilment of our obligation to Britain, under the Anglo-Irish trade agreements, in regard to the maintenance of existing proportionate margins of tariff preference and the grant of preferences in any new tariffs we might introduce. The disappearance of this latter obstacle was an incidental result of the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement.
In deciding to seek accession, the Government were influenced by a number of factors. All the countries of importance in our external trade had already acceded to the General Agreement. Also, there was evidence that more energetic action was being taken within the framework of the GATT to find solutions to the problems affecting international trade. There was the further consideration that, although we had been given the benefit of tariff reductions previously negotiated in the GATT, there was no certainty that we would be afforded similar treatment in the future if we did not accede to the General Agreement.
The fundamental principle of the GATT is that international trade should be conducted on the basis of non-discrimination and this is reflected in the basic rule that each contracting party is obliged to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to all other contracting parties in regard to customs duties and all charges with equivalent effect. In our case the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause is modified in two important respects. First, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement has been drafted in accorfie dance with Article XXIV of the GATT, and accordingly we are not obliged to give other contracting parties the same tariff treatment as we give Britain. Second, the Protocol for the Accession of Ireland provides that we may continue to grant tariff preferences to countries of the Commonwealth Preference Area on condition that we do not increase the margin of preference above that in operation on 30th June, 1967. This latter condition is acceptable to the countries concerned.
Tariff negotiating conferences are an important means used by the members of the GATT to achieve the objective of reducing barriers to world trade. Countries acceding to the GATT receive a contractual right to benefit from the tariff concessions previously negotiated in such conferences, and are expected to make reciprocal tariff concessions. This involves their participation in "pre-entry" tariff negotiations, which can most conveniently take place as part of a general round of tariff negotiations. It was on this basis that we participated in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations which commenced in 1964 and concluded on 30th June, 1967.
The details of the concessions we made in the Kennedy Round are set out in the Schedule annexed to the Protocol for the Accession of Ireland and are reproduced in Appendix IV to the White Paper and the timetable for their implementation is given in paragraph 89 of the White Paper. For administrative reasons it may be found convenient to adjust the timing of those reductions which are to take place over the period ending January, 1972.
The concessions relate to 773 tariff positions out of a total of approximately 3,000 in our Customs Tariff; 684 represent undertakings not to increase the present rate of duty or not to impose duties on goods at present duty free, 63 represent reductions, most of which do not exceed 10 per cent, in present rates of duty and 26 are undertakings to eliminate minor duties. The rates of duty on British goods to which the Free Trade Area Agreement relates will not be affected. Our concessions will, it is estimated, result in an annual loss of customs receipts of no more than £65,000. These tariff commitments are unlikely to create any problems for Irish industry or agriculture but, if difficulties affecting particular products do arise, there is provision in the GATT for withdrawal or modification of any concessions relating to those products subject to the grant of compensatory concessions elsewhere.
As a contracting party to the GATT, we would probably be expected to participate in future rounds of trade negotiations, although we would not be under any obligation to do so. In any event we would not be expected to yield concessions greater than the benefits gained in such negotiations.
The General Agreement prohibits the application of quantitative restrictions for protective purposes, but it has not been possible to achieve the full implementation of this requirement by contracting parties, particularly in regard to restrictions on agricultural products, and it has proved necessary to establish procedures for the periodic examination of restrictions maintained inconsistently with the General Agreement. It is expected that our import restrictions will fall to be examined under these procedures.
The General Agreement envisages that contracting parties who find it necessary to limit imports for balance-of-payments purposes will do so by the application of quantitative restrictions. In recent years this has proved administratively difficult for industrialised countries which have eliminated most of their quantitative import restrictions on industrial products and have dismantled their licensing machinery. Both Britain and Canada found it necessary, therefore, to apply import charges rather than quantitative restrictions when they encountered balance-of-payments difficulties. In these cases the Contracting Parties did not take a decision as to the compatibility of the import charges with the General Agreement but set up Working Parties to consult with the countries concerned with a view to keeping the application of the charges under review, and ensuring that they were applied in a non-discriminatory manner and that they would be removed as soon as circumstances permitted. It would seem, therefore, that if, as a contracting party, we encountered balance-of-payments difficulties, the possibility of our applying temporary import levies or charges might not be ruled out on account of the tariff bindings undertaken on our accession.
These then are the principal obligations which the Government will assume as a contracting party to the GATT. There are a number of others which are less important and which I need not refer to here as I do not think that it is necessary to elaborate on the information given in the White Paper. I may perhaps make one general comment however. It is that the success which the GATT has achieved has been due in large measure to the fact that it has not been applied in a legalistic manner. The Contracting Parties work on the basis of consultation and confrontation and seek to find acceptable solutions to problems rather than decide that one or other party to a dispute is in breach of the Agreement. This is, in fact, the only manner in which various problems could be settled.
The GATT's principal success has been in its efforts to bring about a reduction of tariffs and other obstacles to trade in industrial products. As a result of successive rounds of negotiations, culminating in the recently concluded Kennedy Round, the principal industrialised countries have made very substantial cuts in their import duties and have undertaken commitments binding nearly the whole of their duties on industrial products against increase. This affords a high degree of stability in the level of tariffs throughout the world which facilitates the planning and development of export trade.
The achievements on the industrial front have not been matched by progress in the agricultural sector, where the measures applied by the highly industrialised countries in the interests of their domestic producers limit severely the possibilities of obtaining satisfactory outlets for exports of agricultural products. This is not to say that no efforts have been made in the GATT to achieve a breakthrough in this sector. A particular principle adopted for the Kennedy Round was that, in view of the importance of agriculture in world trade, the negotiations should provide for acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products. The results achieved fell considerably short of this objective, but the negotiations have helped to focus attention on the problems of trade in agricultural products and their significance in the overall picture of international trade.
Turning to our own position, the principal advantage of acceding to the GATT is that, instead of relying on bilateral arrangements, we will obtain a multilateral right to most-favoured-nation treatment in our trade with the other contracting parties. The importance of this trade is evident from statistics. I have already mentioned that the contracting parties to the GATT account for over 80 per cent of total world trade. If we do not accede to the GATT, there is no guarantee that we will continue to get the benefit of multilateral tariff concessions and, indeed, a number of contracting parties are now considering withholding most-favoured-nation treatment from non-member countries by means of a two-tier tariff system.
Our accession to the GATT is advisable in connection with our efforts to export manufactured goods, which account for an increasingly important proportion of our total export business. Our participation, as a contracting party, in future GATT negotiations will afford an opportunity of securing further tariff concessions, which would facilitate the continued expansion of our export trade and further diversification of export markets.
The history of the GATT in the agricultural sphere is not encouraging but it is hoped that the Kennedy Round will not mark the end of the efforts to achieve some progress on trade in temperate foodstuffs. At its present session, the Contracting Parties are considering a proposal by the Director-General of the GATT that the possibility should be examined of reopening discussions on trade in cereals, meat and dairy products. It is important that Ireland should have the right to participate in any discussions that might affect trade in agricultural products of importance in our economy.
I think Deputies will agree that, on balance, accession to the GATT would be in the interests of this country. Approval of the motion now before the House, which I recommend, will permit the completion of the accession procedure before the end of this year.
Before finishing, I should perhaps give some explanatory comments on the Protocol for the Accession of Ireland, which is reproduced in Appendix III to the White Paper.
Paragraph 1 provides that the Government shall apply the General Agreement provisionally. The effect of this is to require them to apply Parts I, III and IV fully, and Part II to the fullest extent not inconsistent with legislation existing on 30 June, 1967. This follows the lines of the Protocol of Provisional Application under which the original signatories apply the General Agreement. As explained in paragraph 18 of the White Paper, the requirement in respect of Part II is interpreted as permitting the application of measures which are contrary to the provisions of Part II provided the legislation from which they derive was in force on 30 June, 1967 and is of a mandatory character.
Paragraph 2 defines the text of the General Agreement to be applied by the Government. This is the text applied by the present contracting parties subject to some changes of date to take account of the timing of our accession.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 relate to the schedule of tariff concessions which we made during the course of the Kennedy Round and which are reproduced in Appendix IV to the White Paper. Upon the entry into force of our Protocol of Accession, the schedule will become a Schedule to the General Agreement and we will thereby become committed to implement the concessions.
The Final Provisions in paragraphs 5 to 10 are mainly procedural. The Protocol will remain open for signature until 1st July, 1968, and will enter into force 30 days after it has been signed on behalf of the Government.
It is the Government's intention to arrange for signature as soon as possible, subject, of course, to the approval of the present motion by Dáil Éireann. The Protocol may also be signed by other contracting parties and by the EEC but the only signature required in order that the Protocol may enter into force is signature on behalf of the Government of Ireland.
Our signature of the Protocol will mean that we will become a party to the instruments listed in paragraph 7 of the Protocol of Accession. All of these require unanimity for entry into force and acceptance is outstanding from one, two or four contracting parties. The first instrument — the Protocol amending Part 1 and Articles XXIX and XXX—would not effect any change of substance in the General Agreement. The other instruments referred to are protocols rectifying or modifying tariff concessions made by individual contracting parties at various dates in the past.
The provision in paragraph 8 of the Protocol of Accession arises from the fact that, as I have indicated earlier, the General Agreement is applied on a provisional basis. The purpose of paragraph 8 is to enable Ireland to accede formally to the General Agreement in the event that it enters into force on a definitive basis.
I recommend the motion to the House.