I would like to refer to agriculture. I propose to demonstrate that in general, as a result of this budget, farmers of all sizes who are in the tax net—over £40 valuation—will this year be paying more than their fair share of tax. In other words, they will be paying more tax on a given income than a PAYE worker with the same income, and that is not fair. Secondly, I will demonstrate that smaller farmers, those between £40 and £60 valuation, will this year face a far bigger increase in their tax load, notwithstanding the resource tax, than will larger farmers. Thirdly, I will demonstrate that the small intensive farmer—a 50-acre farmer with a valuation of £40 producing about 50 per cent above the average level of intensity of production—will be especially hard hit. In 1980 his taxation will be increased six times over the amount of taxation he would have paid in 1979.
Given that farmers who are in the tax net are paying much more than their fair share of taxation, I will demonstrate that there is no justification whatever for the introduction of a resource tax in the interests of equity, which had already been achieved and over-achieved without such a tax. To introduce a resource tax was to pile injustice on top of injustice.
I wish to illustrate a point about my first allegation regarding the national debt. In 1977 the national debt represented 79 per cent of our gross national product; in 1979 it jumped to 88 per cent and at that rate our national debt within a year or two will be equal to our gross national product. The Government owe about £6,500 million, or more than £2,000 for every man, woman and child in the country and an increasing share of that money is owed abroad. Regarding public borrowing by the Government financed externally, in 1977 37 per cent was borrowed abroad while in 1979 that figure had increased to 51 per cent. In other words, more than half of every £ borrowed by the Government is borrowed abroad. This year the Government must pay £150 million in interest payments alone on money borrowed abroad and this amount is equivalent to 5p in the £ on the basic rate of income tax. If that money did not have to be paid abroad we could reduce income tax by 5p in the £.
Last year the Government and the Central Bank imposed an 18 per cent limit on private sector borrowing. They said to businessmen, farmers and people directly involved in productive activity generating wealth and jobs that they would not be allowed to increase their borrowing by more than 18 per cent. What happened to Government borrowing? It increased by 24 per cent and Government activity is not nearly as productive by any measure as private sector activity, yet the Government insist that the private sector should be limited to 18 per cent while they themselves will not submit to any such limits.
External reserves have fallen drastically, that is, the money which must be used to pay for imports in foreign currency. At the beginning of 1979 our external reserves were enough to cover the value of 3¾ months imports. By the end of 1979 and at the beginning of 1980 this had fallen to 2½ months cover. External reserves at the beginning of 1979 were £12,000 million and they are now down to around £9,000 million. There has been a drastic fall of almost one-quarter in one year. Everybody on the money markets of the world is aware of this and is watching. If this trend continues we simply will not be able to pay for imports to this country. The balance of payments deficit, that is the amount we are paying out of this country for imports as against the amount we are getting in for exports, has worsened and that is one of the main reasons for the fall in our external reserves. The balance of payments deficit in 1979 was £800 million as against £165 million in 1978. In other words, the balance of payments deficit has increased by about five or six times in one year.
According to the Central Bank Report it seems unlikely that this deficit will be significantly reduced, if at all, this year unless corrective measures are taken. The Government document on the economic background to the budget is in marked contrast to the actual budget and suggests that the advice which the Minister for Finance was getting from his officials was very different from the contents of the Budget. This document stated that on certain reasonable assumptions about the behaviour of savings and stock building the balance of payments deficit should be higher in 1980 than in 1979. We already have a situation where external reserves have fallen dramatically and the balance of payments deficit is several times larger than last year. The Department of Finance say that the situation will be even worse in 1980, yet no corrective action was taken by the Government to improve the situation.
The position of our currency has not improved during the past year. Since March 1979 the trend line for the IR£ within the EMS has been consistently downwards. This is inevitable in a country with a massive balance of payments deficit, falling external reserves and a rate of inflation which is in some cases three times as high as that of other countries with which our currency is supposed to be linked. It is impossible for our currency to maintain its value indefinitely within the EMS. What is the likely consequence of this sort of development?
The Government claim in the budget to have reduced the borrowing requirement. I believe this is basically a fraudulent claim for five basic reasons. First, this year's revenue is artificially boosted by £100 million which is brought forward as a result of the postal strike of last year, money properly attributable to 1979 which will be collected in 1980. The effect of this money on the revenue side is, artificially, to make things look better. Secondly, £33 million is being brought in this year by making the self-employed pay earlier but in a full year, in 1981, that money will not be an addition to the overall revenue situation. Thirdly, the money in taxation on spirits has been brought forward and that adds a further £9 million in artificial revenue. It is not long-run revenue. Fourthly, the Government have reduced their own contribution to the capital budget but maintained the level of the capital budget by telling public bodies, semi-State bodies and local authorities that they will not borrow for them. The Government can apparently reduce the amount of their borrowing but the overall amount will remain the same because semi-State bodies who are guaranteed by the State will be borrowing to make up the difference.
All this means that the reduction in Government borrowing is unreal because it does not include local authorities and semi-State companies. Another point is that the full cost of social welfare improvements will not be borne this year whereas a large proportion of the revenue from increased contributions will be received. Therefore the situation this year is only artificially better than it is in reality. An example is the children's allowances. The increases will not be given until July but the reduction in the tax allowance will occur in April, making the financial situation in this respect better from the revenue point of view.
I have said that the credit squeeze will be worsened. That will be so for two reasons. The first is that the Central Bank will realise that if they are to protect the value of the punt they will have to restrict the money flow to the private sector. I have explained that the Government borrowing picture is not real. In fact the Government are increasing their spending and if the overall level of spending is to be reduced in order to keep imports down and regularise the balance of payments situation, the Central Bank must ensure that spending in the private sector will be cut. Therefore, there must be a serious credit squeeze.
The second way in which the credit situation will be worsened in regard to private business and agriculture is that when the Central Bank are setting credit guidelines for private borrowing, local authorities and semi-State bodies will be included in the 15 per cent limit. Therefore, if the Government tell those bodies to increase their borrowing, those bodies will be squeezing out people in the private sector because they will be borrowing out of the restricted credit available for private sector borrowing.
Another matter that will affect our financial situation is that the Government are not spending productively. For the first time in many years half of every £1 spent out of the current budget will be spent on paying salaries, not on productive investment to assist agriculture and industry, or on the purchase of land to enlarge smallholdings, but to maintain staff levels in the public service. The Government are giving a very bad example by increasing their manpower by five extra Ministers of State.
What are the likely results of all this? At present the Government seem to be able to borrow abroad with relative ease. But even one international banker could begin to analyse the picture underlying our situation and if the Government apply for a loan next year that one banker could scratch his head and say he wants a study done of the Irish ecenomy, of the balance of payments situation, our external reserves, our comparative rate of inflation, just to make sure we would be able to repay the money. The bank would send out its man to do the job and if he goes back with the information that our balance of payments is appreciably worse than in countries competing with us on the international money market the bank will say that because of the danger of not getting its money back it would have to increase its rate of interest to compensate for the risk. However, that is the least ominous possibility.
A worse possibility is that the bank might start to circulate information to the effect that it does not think Ireland would be able to pay back the money at all under our present system and the bank might report us to the IMF who would then say, "They should not be given any money at all". Or the IMF might say, "We will give you the money but in return we will send a man into your Department of Finance and he will operate as Minister for Finance to see that you will run the country exactly as we tell you. If we say that you must cut down in the public service you will have to do it".
That is something we thought could not happen in holy Ireland. But it has happened elsewhere—in Britain, in Denmark and in Italy. If our external reserves are run down from 3¾ months cover to 2½ months cover in a single year and if our balance of payments deficit is quintupling in one year we cannot avoid a situation which would force the IMF to send a receiver to the Department of Finance to tell the Minister, Deputy O'Kennedy, what he must do, and no amount of sweet talk will dissuade the international receiver from doing his job.
Another possibility, which none wishes to contemplate, is that if our external reserves continue to be run down at the present rate we will not be able to maintain the value of the punt vis-à-vis the other EMS currencies. If our reserves able to maintain the value of the punt within the EMS, whether we like it or not. We must remember that no longer are we linked with sterling, no longer will we be able to hide behind the British £. Our creditors will be ruthless and there will have to be a devaluation of our punt. That would have many serious effects. First of all, it would cause immense hardship to businesses and to the Government trying to borrow abroad.
In a situation in which the Government are increasing their level of borrowing abroad from 37 per cent of their total borrowing in 1977 to 51 per cent this year and at the same time running spendthrift economic policies which are undermining the value of the punt, they are cutting their throats. If our punt is devalued we will have to repay the debts we borrowed abroad on the double because our punt will no longer be worth as much in repayment of those debts as it was prior to devaluation taking place.
The same will obtain for private industry. Our banks and private industry at the moment, in order to evade the credit squeeze, are being encouraged to borrow abroad. If the punt is devalued they also will suffer those massive exchange risks. The primary objective of the Government's economic policy at the moment should be to maintain the value of our punt because the consequences of not doing so will be very grave indeed for our economy. As well as the immediate effects I have illustrated on Government finances and on private business finances, it will start us on the slippery slope. We will slide slowly down into relative poverty in Europe. We will be seen internationally as the poor man of Europe, as a country in which is not worth investing. They will likely be able to say, "You cannot be sure they will even be able to maintain the value of their own currency". If we once devalue within the EMS we will no longer have the same creditworthiness as we have had in the past. I believe that the devaluation of our punt is something we must avoid at all costs.
I find it amazing that the Government, particularly after the Taoiseach's address to the nation in January, came in with a budget which relied so much on borrowing. I predict that the amount the Government will borrow this year will be even larger than the amount they borrowed last year. In 1979 the Government had all the good intentions about their budget as they had this year. In 1979 the then Minister for Finance said he would reduce borrowing requirements and that the current budget deficit would be kept at £288 million. What happened? At the end of 1979 the current budget was not £288 million but £520 million. This year the Minister for Finance tells us that the current budget deficit will be £355 million, a lot more than the £288 million which his predecessor predicted in 1979. It is likely that the actual deficit will be just as much in excess of the £335 million set this year as the £520 million, which actually occurred last year, was in excess of the £288 million which was predicted by the former Minister for Finance. There is no reason to believe that the situation will be any better.
It is worth noting that for salary increases in the public service the provision is nearly £100 million to cover special increases which may occur—we all know there are a lot of them in the pipeline—and the cost in 1980 of a new national understanding, which is to cover four months of the year. One-third of the year is to be covered by a new national understanding. If that is all to come out of £100 million it will have to be a very restricted national understanding that will be negotiated to start in September of this year. The Government by increasing the cost of living so dramatically in the budget and increasing indirect taxes are almost ensuring that the national understanding which will be negotiated this year will be an inflationary one, will be far larger than it would otherwise have been if we had not this budget. The situation in which only £100 million is provided to cover special increases in the public service and the new national understanding will simply not be maintained. The situation in 1980 will be the same as it was in 1979 when the Government predicted a deficit of £288 million and ended up with a deficit of almost twice that amount.
I would now like to refer to the position of agriculture in our economy. It seems very unusual that the Government chose 1980 as the year in which they would dramatically increase the tax load of the farming community, particularly that of smaller farmers. This year the farmers face a very difficult situation. Their incomes have fallen. The Minister for Agriculture estimated that the income increases would fall by about 3 per cent. The situation is far worse than the Minister's figure disclosed because his figures do not take account of the interest cost being borne by farmers. It is estimated that 20 per cent of a farmer's income at the moment is actually absorbed in the repayment of debts which he has incurred. We can subtract 20 per cent of any figure for income which is given. The Minister's figures took no account of the fact that farmers have interest payments to meet, which are exceptionally large this year because of the high interest payments.
I believe the reduction in farmers' incomes in actual cash terms in 1979 was as much as 20 per cent. Farmers this year are caught in the price net of the EEC. They are getting price increases set in Brussels based on the German rate of inflation which is about 5 or 6 per cent. They are getting the same increases as the German farmers but the Irish farmers have to pay increases in costs of 16 per cent, 17 per cent and 20 per cent. We are losing out because our rate of inflation is far higher than the rate of inflation on the Continent of Europe. We are getting far less from any price increases granted in Brussels, which are set on an overall European basis, than are the people in the economies of Europe.
This is also the year in which the super levy was proposed and this is the year the Government chose to introduce this dramatic increase in the taxation of the farming community. What are the reasons for this? Our only source of information in relation to this is what the Minister for Finance said in the budget. He said that taxpayers generally have felt that the amount of tax paid by farmers was less than was justified by reference to farm incomes. The Minister did not say whether he believed that farmers were not paying their fair share of tax. He did not say that, because he could be contradicted. He had to rely on the "gut" feeling of the man in the street, which the Minister accepted, whether it was right or wrong. The people in the street felt that the farmers were not paying enough and that the Minister would get it from them. The Minister decided he would get the money from farmers not because they were not paying their fair share but because people felt they were not paying their fair share. He went on later to say that it is in the interest of the farming community that farmers pay and be seen to pay their fair share of tax from the incomes which they have.
In that budget he proceeded to introduce a tax which bears no relation whatever to the incomes of farmers, namely a resource tax and an increase in rates for smaller farmers. If a farmer is losing money he will still pay the resource tax. If a farmer with between £40 and £60 valuation is losing money he will still pay the doubling of his rates brought about by the budget.
If a farmer with a valuation of between £40 and £50 is losing money he will still pay the doubling of his rates brought about by this budget. Yet the Minister justified this introduction of taxes, which bears no relation to income, by saying that it was in the interests of the farmers that they be seen to be paying their fair share of taxes on the income they have. The Minister at no stage told us that he thought they were not paying their fair share because he had not the courage to do it and he is not a man noted for his courage.
I would like to illustrate the points I have made about why the farmer is paying far more than his fair share of tax. First I will take the example of a farmer with a valuation of £40. Such a farmer, taking farm income statistics, would have an average income of £4,000. Out of that £4,000 that farmer, who is married with two children, would pay the following taxes in 1980: £484 in rates and about £10 in incomes tax. His total tax load will be £494. That will be an increase of 149 per cent on what he paid last year; last year he would only have paid a total of £198 in rates. How does the PAYE person with £4,000 compare? The farmer with £4,000 will be paying £494 mostly in rates; the PAYE person with a similar income will be paying £245. In other words the farmer will be paying more than twice as much as the PAYE person with the same income and that is a farmer who is paying hardly any income tax and no resource tax. On rates alone he is paying more than twice as much as the equivalent PAYE person. I intend to give these statistics to the Minister at the end of the debate if he wants them to use in discussions with his colleagues, because evidently he did not have them up to now.
Let us take the example of a farmer with a valuation of £50. He would be earning on average £5,000 a year, taking income statistics. He will pay £605 in rates and £271 in income tax, bringing him to a total tax load of £876, which will be an increase of £555 or 73 per cent on what he paid last year. How does the PAYE person compare? The PAYE person with an income of £5,000 will pay £495 as against £876 for the farmer. The farmer will pay 77 per cent more than the equivalent PAYE person.
Let us take the example of a larger farmer with a valuation of £100 who would be earning about £10,000 a year. He will pay £1,210 in rates, £350 in resource tax and £1,108 in income tax, giving him a total tax load of £2,668. The PAYE person with the same income of £10,000 will pay £2,243. In other words, the farmer will be paying £425 more or 19 per cent more.
The surprising thing to emerge from these statistics—and the PAYE person at all levels of income is paying less—is that the gap between what the smaller farmer pays on his small income and what the PAYE person pays on his small income is far greater than that between the larger farmer and an equivalent PAYE person. So, relatively speaking, the small farmer is losing far more than the large farmer vis-à-vis the PAYE sector. But all farmers, including larger farmers, will pay more tax this year as a result of this budget than equivalent PAYE people in a year in which farm incomes have fallen, in a year in which one of the major reasons for the balance of payments crisis we face here, and which has dire consequences for us, is the fall in agricultural production. If agricultural exports had been up to the 1978 level in 1979 we would not have half the problems we had this year. In a year when a fall off in agricultural production and exports has contributed to a very serious economic situation here the Government come along and increase the taxation on agriculture. Could any economic policy be more haywire than that? At a time when lack of agricultural production is causing problems for our economy the Government load on more tax on the agricultural sector. I really think that the Minister for Agriculture did not make the best of the arguments he must have had with his colleagues over this budget because if he had and if he had sought these figures, which could easily have been obtained, he would have done a lot better in the Cabinet discussions about taxation.