My desire and that of my party is to maintain as far as possible a common position on Northern Ireland with other parties here and, secondly, never under any circumstances to seek political advantage on this issue. This involves, however, first identifying the essential elements of a common position and adherence to these by all and, secondly, allowing constructive criticism of tactics or statements which may be viewed as unhelpful to the achievement of the agreed objective.
So far as the question of a common position is concerned, in a speech at Portora College on 22 February shortly after the Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis—only one section of that speech, a parenthesis on what I thought to be the privately held British political attitudes to Irish unity, received any publicity at the time—I drew attention first to the avoidance by the Taoiseach in his Ard Fheis speech of any reference to the 1975 Fianna Fáil policy statement about the British commitment to withdraw and to his reference in that speech to the unity of Ireland being achieved "by agreement and in peace", as well as to his pointed refusal to re-commit himself to the October 1975 policy in the Dáil a few days later when pressed on his Northern Ireland policy. I drew the conclusion in that speech at Portora that on the essentials of policy we remained agreed, although we would have criticisms to make on tactics and on expressions used in formulating the Government's position.
It is not enough just to avoid a reversion to the October 1975 policy and to adhere to the concept of unity by consent if other statements on Northern Ireland are not consistent with and supportive of this principle. There is no room for discordant voices or for ambiguity on this issue. Both discordance and ambiguity can undermine the positive value of the policy of unity by consent, and the weakness of the Fianna Fáil policy has traditionally lain, in that party's inability to grasp this and to carry through the logic of unity by consent. On the basis of the Taoiseach's statements to date, this remains a weakness of the present Government's policy, despite some evident efforts to minimise this problem which I recognise.
It is, of course, understandable that a temptation should exist to take up positions or to make statements that are not compatible with the "consent" approach because of the persistently negative attitude of Northern Unionist leaders, even on issues that could not constitute a threat to their position. A question comes easily to many of our lips as to why this minority in the island of Ireland and in the two islands should have a veto on progress either towards devolved self-government with participation of the minority in the North or towards constructive development of North-South relations. And if we concede them such a veto, are we abandoning the minority in the North, who have suffered so grievously both through discrimination over half-a-century of devolved majority government, and at the hands of IRA intimidation, murder campaigns by Protestant paramilitaries, and harassment, at times in the past acute, by security forces?
In so far as it relates to the problem of devolved self-government within Northern Ireland, this emotional reaction is one which corresponds in some measure, I believe, to a rational perception of an appropriate path ahead. The very insistence of a majority in Northern Ireland on their continuing participation in the United Kingdom at this time, and on the maintenance of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, deprives them of a rational democratic argument for resisting decisions of that Parliament as to the form devolution may take. By their own theory of British sovereignty, the Unionists concede to Westminster the final voice in this matter.
The position with respect to responding emotionally to the North-South situation is of its nature quite different. Our Parliament and people are pledged to the proposition that unity can and should come about only with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. By this pledge we recognise that whatever the historical origins of the division of the island may be, and whatever legalistic or historical arguments may be put forward for the thesis that self-determination in Ireland should be on the basis of the whole island, and the whole island alone—there was an echo of that in the Taoiseach's speech— the only practical way in which, as a Christian people, we can seek to restore the political unity of the island is by the consent of a majority.
I say a majority and not the majority in Northern Ireland, and such a majority could comprise various combinations of the two sections of the community there ranging, for example, from the entire Roman Catholic population plus a quarter of the Protestant population, to, for example, three-quarters of the Roman Catholic population and two-fifths of the Protestant population.
I emphasise this point because I believe there is sometimes confusion about it; there are some who see in the proposition of "unity by consent" the granting of a right of veto to the majority section of the population in Northern Ireland as a group, but this is simply not the case. The proportion of the Protestant population whose consent would be needed to a change in the North-South relationship could range from one-quarter upwards, depending on the degree of commitment of the Roman Catholic population to such a solution which, it must be said, has been suggested by many surveys to fall somewhat short of 100 per cent. At the same time many would concede the unwisdom of seeking to effect a fundamental change in North-South relationships on the basis of a single referendum yielding a majority of fractionally over 50 per cent of those voting. A solidly-based arrangement for the government of the whole of Ireland might, in wisdom, require something more than that.
Without wishing to divert from my main theme at this point—which is, the manner in which emotional reactions to what is seen as a Northern Unionist veto on political progress between North and South sometimes tempts politicians here into counter-productive statements—I should, I think, add that this point about the nature of the majority required to secure a basis for a new North-South relationship is very relevant to the question—to which I shall turn later—of what kind of steps we here could usefully take in order to encourage Northern Unionists to take a further look at the idea of North and South working together. Frequently a proposition to the effect that we should take certain actions here to encourage this development is met with the response that nothing we can do will change the minds of a majority of Northern Unionists.
But we do not have to change the minds of a majority of Northern Unionists. Neither our formula nor that employed by the British Government requires anything of the kind. Depending upon the solidity with which the minority of the Northern community endorses the idea of a new North South relationship, we need to convince as little as a quarter of the Protestant population of our proposition, for a majority to merge in favour of change. And both before the violence began, and even today after ten years of violence, which has hardened many liberal hearts amongst the Unionist community, there exists a significant minority of Protestants in Northern Ireland who do see the eventual solution as lying in a new relationship between North and South, and who, as I hear from them every time I visit Northern Ireland, are utterly frustrated at what seems to them our unwillingness to do anything to help them convert others to this belief. But to that theme I shall return later.
At this point I simply want to remark that it is these irrational emotions, conflicting with a rational analysis of the policies best pursued in the interest of the minority, of peace in Northern Ireland, and of an eventual resolution of the North-South problem, that have at different times led one or other political figures in this part of Ireland to a use of language or exposition of ideas that are counter-productive. Sometimes such counter-productive language has been used, or such ideas expressed in simple ignorance, without any real understanding of the damage they do to the cause we should all be seeking to serve. Sometimes, however, they have been more calculated, designed to play on popular feelings in this State so as to secure domestic political advantage. Then they are unforgivable.
Let us be clear on the logic of the stance on "unity by consent". This implies the creation of conditions in which North and South come together because a majority in Northern Ireland favour such a solution as being in their interest. For this to happen two sets of conditions have to be created. First, the removal of obstacles to the evolution of such a majority within Northern Ireland, and, secondly, the development of positive incentives towards a coming together of North and South. Some attempt has been made, albeit intermittently, and rather half-heartedly, to remove some of the obstacles. Very little has been done to create positive incentives. Indeed, to be frank, it is hard to think of anything concrete yet done under this heading, apart from the proposals put forward by Fine Gael 15 months ago which, for the first time that I am aware of in the history of the State, argued rationally the case for Northern Ireland joining with us on the basis of advantages which Northern Ireland could gain from such a relationship.
What are the obstacles that must first be removed? The very first, which transcends all else, is the removal of fear, that all-persuasive fear that is shared by the bulk of the Unionist community, the fear of being constrained to accept a solution in which they might lose their identity, even their freedom, as they define that term. This fear of being constrained to accept a solution that they at present reject is heightened by every act on our part that departs in any way from the principle of unity by free consent. It is heightened, for example by a reversion to the type of sentiment expressed in the Taoiseach's speech today, that "no part of the Irish nation has a right to opt out of the nation", a phrase which, whatever the waves of emotion or of abstract constitutional theory behind it, is calculated to raise the hackles of even the most moderate Northern Unionist. It is heightened also by talk of a solution to be arrived at by the two sovereign governments, where this is not explicitly accompanied by a simultaneous reference to the full involvement of the representatives of the people of Northern Ireland. For, most of all, the Unionists fear what they would describe as a British betrayal, and the events of the past ten years, seen from their viewpoint, are interpreted as containing already elements of such a betrayal—the abolition of Stormont, and in what they see, however perversely as we may view it, as the failure of the British Government to assure their security.
The Taoiseach did not show himself sensitive to this fear when he spoke in his Ard-Fheis speech of the time having "surely come for the two sovereign governments to work together to find a formula and lift the situation on to a new plane". Secondly, Unionist fears are heightened by any attempt to bring overt external pressures to bear on the UK Government to "persuade" it to force a solution to the problem of North South relations over the heads of a majority in Northern Ireland.
To revert to the previous point, I should like to state that when pressed by me in this House the Taoiseach finally accepted that the democratically elected parties in Northern Ireland would have to be fully involved in any discussions towards a solution, but this belated qualification of his Ard Fheis speech, extracted under pressure, did little or nothing to undo the unfortunate impression created by the part of his Ard Fheis speech, in so far, indeed, as that Dáil exchange penetrated the Northern media at all.
Thirdly, Unionist fears are heightened by anything which confirms their belief that the Roman Catholic Church exercises significant influence on the political affairs of this State. Little has been done to dispel this illusion. There are hundreds of thousands of people in Northern Ireland who believe that we politicians in some way "take our orders" from this Church. There is almost total unawareness in the North of the degree of separation of Church and State here, of the constitutional provisions that ban the endowment of religion, and of the marked distinction, indeed, which exists between the United Kingdom and ourselves, with a State-established Church in the former, and a Church completely unconnected with the State here.
Given that factual situation we have to ask ourselves why this impression is so prevalent in the North, and what we can do about it, for it is a potent source of fear amongst the Protestant, Unionist, community, and no one who has any real knowledge of Northern Ireland can dismiss it.
The Catholic Church itself has offered us some assistance in this matter. After a confrontation four years ago between a bishop of the National Coalition government—I am sorry, a Minister of the National Coalition government; it was a somewhat Freudian slip—between a Minister in the National Coalition Government and the Bishop of Limerick on the issue of Church-State relations, I entered this controversy myself with a view to preventing what seemed an absurd polarisation of extreme views that did not, I felt, reflect the consensus of either Church or politicians or people. The position I put forward in that speech in April 1976 was that it is not the function of legislators to follow the views of the Church to which they belong when legislating, but that they must put their public morality on a broader and more fundamental basis. Two months later in June 1976 the Catholic Hierarchy enunciated their position on the matter by saying that the issue is not one of the State enforcing or not enforcing Catholic morality; "The question to be decided in matters of this kind as far as the State law is concerned, is the impact on society which a change in the law would be likely to have".
It might seem that this would have settled the matter of Church-State relations, and at the formal level, it has. But it is not perceived by many Northern Unionists as having done so. They judge us not by our words, but by our deeds; they judge us politicians not by the words of the Bishops but by the actions of Governments. And their suspicion that the absence of any formal link between the Catholic Church and politicians does not prevent legislation from being strongly influenced by the teaching of that Church were given ample grounds by the way in which the Taoiseach as Minister for Health and Minister for Social Welfare, handled the contraception legislation, producing what he described as "an Irish solution to an Irish problem".
That legislation, in its use of specifically Roman Catholic terminology about "natural family planning", was denominational and was seen as such in Northern Ireland. It did lasting damage, by re-opening an issue which was perhaps dying, as time distanced us from the period back in the thirties that saw the introduction into our Constitution and laws of specifically Roman Catholic concepts, and the period in the fifties of the Mother and Child Health controversy and the original adoption legislation, which forbade adoptions by couples who had contracted mixed marriages.
The man who last year piloted through the House legislation that employed this denominational language and was clearly influenced by Catholic teaching in its provisions for doctors' authorisations for medically-unrelated contraceptives, is not credible to Northern Unionists as an exponent of a pluralist united Ireland. He is precluded by virtue of this performance from presenting himself as an apostle of a united Ireland in which what Unionists see as their rights could be subject to the will of a political majority in the island which they see as having been, as late as last year, impelled to introduce aspects of the teaching of one Church into legislation.
These may be and are unpalatable words, but it is time we faced this issue. Northern Unionists will fear a united Ireland so long as the other and larger part of that united Ireland, regardless of constitutional separation of Church and State, and regardless of the Hierarchy's own enunciation of the duties of Catholic legislators as not requiring them to incorporate Catholic teaching into legislation, continues to act in this way. And it is the politicians, specifically in this instance those of the party opposite, who are responsible for perpetuating this fear. At the same time it is only we, the politicians, who have the power to dispel this fear, by legislating for the common good, and by resisting in matters of this kind popular pressures from some members of the laity who are more Catholic than the Bishops.
Until we have the courage to do this, and the ability to lead our whole people to accept the concept of a pluralist society inspired by the Christian ethic, rather than a society reflecting the particular ethos of the religious majority here, so long will this island remain divided. We can choose, by inertia or by action, between a 26-county State predominantly Catholic in its Constitution and laws, or a 32-county pluralist island. It is our choice. But we should not go on fooling ourselves that we can dodge this choice, or that we will be accepted as sincere in our concern to achieve unity if we reject pluralism here. Only people who have no knowledge of Northern Protestants—and, with respect, far too many members of this House, as of our people generally, have kept themselves notably free from any contact with this section of the Irish people—could be under any illusion on this score, and those of us who know these people, and specifically those of us who personally share in that background, have a duty, however unpopular, to perform in asserting this truth, as I do here, in this debate.
I have been speaking of the need to remove obstacles between North and South, obstacles that we have created or maintained, and above all fears for which we remain responsible, even if only because we have not acted to remove them. There are of course, other obstacles than fear. More could be done by the Government, in placing contracts, and by the private sector in its equipment and materials purchasing policy, to forge closer links with the North. If our economic policies are totally orientated towards this part of Ireland—if we give preference to goods made here against goods made in Northern Ireland, we are partitioning our island by so doing. How many of our Government Department or State concerns have positive policies of establishing or strengthening economic ties with the North? We know that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions is an all-Ireland body and that the banking system is organised on an all-Ireland basis, whereas the same has not been possible in the case of industrialists. But could not more be done by industry—even if only to emulate the co-operative relationship that exists in the agricultural sector between farming organisations north and south? I shall not labour the point, beyond congratulating those who are attempting to do something positive in these areas— such as Co-operation North and, at a different level of human contacts, bodies like the Glencree Reconciliation Centre and Corrymeel. They deserve the generous support of all our people.
I have been speaking about steps to be taken to remove fears that stand in the way of a new North-South relationship. I mentioned also that it will not be enough merely to remove these fears, and to establish the genuineness of our concern for a coming-together of the two parts of Ireland by agreement. If a new relationship is to develop with the willing consent of a majority in the North, then such a majority will have to be convinced that this relationship will not merely be free from danger from their point of view, but will in fact be advantageous to them—more advantageous than their present situation. What has been done to put forward this case?
So far the only attempt to argue why Northern Unionists should positively want to be linked to us rather than Britain has been the Fine Gael policy document published in February of last year. There we made the case, objectively, that Northern Ireland would be better off in a confederal arrangement, linked as a State to our State, for purposes of common concern, where our interests and theirs are more closely linked than their interests are with Britain.
We pointed to the commonality of interests between North and South, and the divergence of interest between Ireland as a whole and Britain, in relation to EEC policies, documenting this by reference to the common agricultural policy and regional policy. We argued that Northern Ireland could never have any voice in the Community's institutions, apart from a grossly under-represented Parliamentary delegation of three, contrasting with our 15, so long as it was linked to Britain, and proposed that in a confederal structure Northern Ireland should have an equal voice with that of this part of Ireland, sharing equally the island's representation in the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the other institutions.
We argued too the long-term benefits of being linked to an expanding economy, such as that of Ireland—when it is not being knocked temporarily off course by Fianna Fáil mismanagement—rather than to a declining Britain. We argued the advantages of a single Irish security authority and security force under a confederal Government, to overcome the existing inhibitions of two separate forces dealing effectively across a frontier with cross Border terrorists.
These are concrete specific arguments. I presented them subsequently at meetings in Belfast, and it was heartening to find myself in dialogue with committed Unionists, not on the emotional national issue that normally arises on these occasions, but rather on such concrete questions as the relative importance of the CAP to Northern Ireland and the Republic, and whether the CAP would survive to provide an enduring bond of common interest between North and South, and vis-à-vis Britain.
I regret that the Taoiseach has not turned his mind to these issues. I regret that when asked twice at the London Press Conference what advantages the North would secure from being linked to us, he was lost for a reply having apparently no brief on this subject, not even a copy of our policy. I should like to cite his answers to these questions.
His first answer was to say that he could: "indicate the advantages best by reference to the disadvantages from which the Northern Ireland economy is at present suffering—industrial and agricultural decline, with a danger of disintegration of the social fabric beyond repair; any long-term lasting solution can deal with these disadvantages—and must do so. Correctly diagnosing the somewhat confused thinking behind this reply, a journalist asked "You are offering the advantage of not having violence any more". The Taoiseach answered that he believed the elimination of violence could only be in the context of a long-term acceptable solution. When asked: "Otherwise violence continues?" he replied: "Regrettably so". Later he was asked "What will you do to persuade the Northern Ireland majority?" and he replied in the vaguest terms that there was: "no one answer—a comprehensive range of things—discussions, meetings, visits". That was all.
This part of the press conference was, frankly, an abysmal performance. If the only advantages an Irish Taoiseach can suggest as being likely to accrue to Northern Ireland from unity are, first, peace—I will come back to that—and, secondly, "a comprehensive range of things—discussions, meetings, visits" he would have done better to have continued his domestic tradition of avoiding press conferences and interviews. For the reference to peace as the single, net, clear advantage of unity is a most dangerous approach which could be read by the IRA as encouraging them to continue their campaign with a view to forcing the North to capitulate in order to secure peace, which of course the North will not do.
I hope we shall never again have to suffer the ignominy of hearing an Irish Taoiseach unable to tell the world press of any concrete and specific advantages that could accrue to Northern Ireland if the two parts of our island came together in peace, advantages which we, for our part, have fully documented. The Taoiseach has emphasised his own roots in Northern Ireland. These roots lie deep, we have been told, 5,000 years deep. But roots that are not watered can wither, and I think it fair to ask by how many visits to Northern Ireland, and how many contacts there with Unionists as well as Nationalists, have these roots been watered, over the past decade, or even quarter of a century? And I do not regard a meeting here with UDA representatives as a very relevant contact, in view of the failure of this group to secure any support from the Northern Ireland electorate when they presented candidates.
The Taoiseach's silence on Northern Ireland for ten long years, excused on the extraordinary grounds of its being outside his responsibilities, has deprived us of any indication of what contacts he has had with Northern opinion over these years. If I am wrong in thinking that they have been minimal, so far as the Unionists are concerned at any rate, then I shall be glad to hear this. But I feel that I may not be wrong in this assumption.
This lack of contact with Northern opinion, especially on the Unionist side, has been a feature of Fianna Fáil as a party—and of course—the Taoiseach is no different from most other members of his party in this respect. This has been one of the great weaknesses of Southern approaches to the Northern problem for half a century. I am glad to have been able during my period as Minister for Foreign Affairs to establish contacts with Unionists as well as to re-establish links with minority leaders which appear to have lapsed for several months in late 1972 and early 1973 because of divisions that existed then between the Taoiseach of the day and his Minister for Foreign Affairs. I met those people on their own home ground, or at Westminster, and I secured the acceptance by Unionists as well as Nationalists of invitations to visit Dublin informally and for social occasions. I regret that these contacts were absent before the National Coalition was established and that they seem to have largely, if not completely, ended with the return of Fianna Fáil.
But in the Taoiseach's case the problem has, perhaps, a further dimension. I know that it is his wish—and I believe it is his sincere wish—to contribute to a resolution of this problem, and I take him at his word in saying that he will give it the highest priority. But in the manner in which he tackles it he may be constrained by his own history to approach the problem not through direct contact with those whom we have to convince in Northern Ireland but rather exclusively through the British Government. His choice of an exclusively British route rather than a joint Northern Ireland/British route towards a solution, despite the evident dangers of producing a negative result by seeming to by-pass the Northern Ireland politicians, may not have been a completely free choice but may have been forced on him by the fact that the events of ten years ago have deprived him of the possibility of being, at this stage in any event, a valid interlocutor with unionism in Northern Ireland, while at the same time not depriving him of the possibility of working with realistic political leaders in London and perhaps even establishing a good relationship with them, as he is reported to have done at his first meeting with the present British Prime Minister.
Needless to say this relationship is important. The Taoiseach was not as fortunate as I have been in having had the chance to get to know the British Prime Minister during her period as Leader of the Opposition, first at an international conference in Turkey and later frequently in London, both at the House of Commons and at our Embassy, where I had the opportunity on a number of occasions both before and since our period in government to brief her on the Irish viewpoint on Northern Ireland, to discuss with her various aspects of European and world affairs, as well as indeed meeting during those years others who are now Ministers in her Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary. It is right that the Taoiseach should have taken an early opportunity to get to know the Prime Minister.
But during the period of the National Coalition our efforts were directed as much towards Northern Ireland as towards British political leaders. It is here that a gap now exists, which is unfortunate and which could make this Government something of a lame duck administration so far as Northern Ireland is concerned. For at this point what we need above all is to intensify our relationship with the political representatives of the people of Northern Ireland.
I do not of course wish to diminish the potential importance of a fruitful development of the Anglo-Irish relationship. Indeed, in developing the themes of Fine Gael's Northern Ireland policy I have indicated some of the directions in which this development might go. Ideas of a Nordic Union type relationship between Ireland and Britain—which, contrary to one comment I have seen, has no conceivable defence implications, as Sweden, the largest member of the Nordic Union, is of course neutral—or of common citizenship, which I have suggested for consideration, are constructive ones, worth pursuing in their own right, but most especially as helping to provide part of the framework for an eventual resolution of the complex relationships between the two parts of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain.
But the essence of the problem does not lie there. While a new Anglo-Irish relationship in which each country would be closely linked to the other, while of course preserving its own sovereignty, might make some contribution to easing Unionist fears about their relationship with Britain in the context of a close North-South link, this is a somewhat remote and intangible factor at the present time and must be set against the suspicions that will be aroused by anything that looks like an attempt to settle the problem between the sovereign Governments without the participation of the Northern Ireland parties.
The fact that the route to Belfast, which I opened in 1973 and kept open until the Government changed in 1977, has now not merely fallen into disuse but may even be blocked by virtue of the Taoiseach's own background is, I believe, singularly unfortunate at a time like the present, and I fear the distorting effects of this blockage on the whole shape and direction of our policy.
I also fear the effects of certain insensitivity to Northern Unionist opinion which the Taoiseach, despite his Northern roots, has shown in his handling of the matter to date. As I have already indicated, I listened with care and attention to his London press conference, as did hundreds of thousands of others on this island. In so far as he was able to convey that he had established a good working relationship with the British Prime Minister and that our aim is to secure unity by consent, the conference was useful if not—perhaps in the nature of things—very informative. If he had nothing concrete to show for his visit, no assurance about the shape of the impending British initiative and a very negative stance in the House of Commons on the question of our interest in the matter, this was perhaps not surprising, though it may have disappointed many who after the rhetoric of the Ard Fheis expected something more.
But there were other features of this press conference which I found puzzling, and others again which, as I have mentioned, I found disappointing. I was puzzled by the contrast between the direct negative bluntly given to a question as to whether Ireland might as part of a solution rejoin the Commonwealth, membership of which entails no obligations and which is now overwhelmingly a Third World Body with a very able Third World Secretary General—and the very different and much more circumstantial answer given to the question about NATO membership, with all its obligations. In relation to NATO the Taoiseach did not offer the blunt negative given to the Commonwealth suggestion but replied:
Anything of that nature would be a very big change of policy and would be a matter for the Government and the Oireachtas.
If the answers to these two questions needed to be differentiated I should have thought the differentiation might have been rather in the reverse direction in the light of the different obligations entailed in membership of the two organisations. Perhaps the Taoiseach would clarify his thinking on these issues in his reply to the debate.
But what depressed me most about the Taoiseach's remarks at this press conference was his reaction to the idea of any initiative by us in this part of Ireland to create conditions more favourable to a developing North/South relationship. Asked whether there was not an onus on Dublin to take some initiative in relation, for example, to our Constitution, he answered:
I would never accept that there is an onus on Dublin more than anyone else to allay fears and misunderstandings...
No one had suggested that there was any special onus on us, and he went on to add:
But we should avail of any opportunity that offers itself to us to remove any misunderstandings and any fears that are based on misunderstandings and therefore we should not neglect any opportunity to dissipate these misunderstandings.
In further reply, following up an answer to a question about divorce, he said:
I have always said that only Northern Ireland people can tell me what they want, desire, what kind of United Ireland they want. I think it would not be realistic and might indeed be impertinent on my part to predicate what I think the people of Northern Ireland want on any of these social areas. I think that they should discuss with me and tell me what changes they would like to see in our set-up.
And, later:
If the Northerners would sit down and discuss with me the changes they want in our Constitution or in the Constitution of a United Ireland, there would be no difficulty ... everybody would be quite surprised with the lengths to which we would go.
But all this, repeated in other language, in his speech here today, is grossly disingenuous. The Taoiseach knows as well as I do, and as well as everyone else in this House and in the country, that the elected representatives of Northern unionism are not going to come to his "open door" to tell him "what kind of United Ireland they want", or "what changes they want in our Constitution or in the Constitution of a united Ireland". For them to act in this way would be to imply, and be seen by their supporters to imply, that they had some interest either in the internal affairs of our State, thereby legitimating in their terms our interest in the internal affairs of their area or in a united Ireland.
Moreover, to say that he would regard it as impertinent on his part to suggest which changes in our Constitution might help to create a better climate for an evolution of North South relations is equally disingenuous. The Taoiseach knows as well as I do, and as does everyone else in this House and in this country, that Northern Unionists object above all to the wording of Articles 2 and 3, which they interpret as representing a claim by us on their territory. There is not a soul in the Unionist community in Northern Ireland who would regard it as impertinent of the Taoiseach to identify these Articles as a source of tension and to propose their removal. This statement by the Taoiseach can only be described, and must be dismissed, as an attempt to find a clever way out of the reluctance of his Government and his party to face this issue.
This is something of a tragedy because his background, the position he holds, and the kind of support that brought him to that position while inhibiting his relations with the North gives him a freedom of action here in this State in relation to this constitutional issue, that factually his predecessors did not have. He has the opportunity, if he has the statesmanship and the courage to grasp it, of doing what so far no one has been able to do—to get rid of the obstacle to improved North South relations posed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution in their present formulation.
Their reformulation need not pose any insuperable obstacle—a re-wording of Article 3, although not one that I would recommend in that precise form at this time, was in fact put forward unanimously by a committee of this House under the Tánaiste's chairmanship 13 years ago, and in the light of all that we have learnt since, a further and better attempt to deal with the problem would now be possible. We in this party are available at any time for consultation on this subject, if the Taoiseach is willing, despite his disappointing attempt to dodge the issue disingenuously in London, to take, and to make use of, the opportunity he enjoys in order to push ahead on this front.
It is tragic that this should be so, and I can only say that I hope sincerely that the Taoiseach will reflect further and consider what a remarkable opportunity he has to act in a statesmanlike manner, through initiating action that could transform the atmosphere of the North-South relationship, both by giving heart to our friends among the moderate Unionists, who accept the inevitability and in many cases indeed the desirability of a united Ireland, and by depriving the extremists of their main argument against us—spurious though we may believe it to be—namely that we claim sovereignty over their territory.
Each party in this House have their own role to play, and there are limits on the roles each of us can play. In Government we could not have initiated successfully a constitutional referendum on Articles 2 and 3 because the Fianna Fáil members of the All-Party Committee made it clear they would not support it, and there was little chance of such a referendum being successful in the face of opposition from Fianna Fáil.
But Fianna Fáil in Government suffer from no such inhibition. They know that if they initiated such a measure they would have our support, and that it could be carried. And the Taoiseach, having come to power in the circumstances he did, with the support he did, is better placed than his predecessor to take such an initiative, for his predecessor, had he attempted to do so, could have sparked off the kind of movement against him which his agreement on cross-Border helicopter flights eventually set off, with the results we see before us. The Taoiseach is the first person in that office since violence began who has the power successfully to take this particular initiative, which could help to break the log-jam and which would show conclusively that we are serious about the concept of unity by consent. I urge him to rise to that occasion, and to earn for himself by doing so a place of honour among those who have striven for Irish unity.
Another point I want to make relates to this mysterious business of the British guarantee. I have tried to understand the Taoiseach's thinking on this matter and I think I am beginning to see how he proposes to re-define this issue. On the face of it, as journalist after journalist pointed out at the press conference, it appears impossible to reconcile the joint acceptance by himself and Mrs. Thatcher of the principle of reunification by consent only, with his criticism of the British guarantee—which is a British statement that Northern Ireland will remain in the United Kingdom so long as this represents the wish of the majority of its people, but that Britain will support a united Ireland if this reflects the wishes of a majority in both parts of Ireland. Why, he was asked repeatedly, should he object to the British Government saying on their own what he himself was willing to say jointly with that Government.
His replies were convoluted in the extreme worthy of certain earlier leaders of his party in this respect, but they bear careful parsing and analysing. First, he said that the guarantee to the majority in the North is a very real stumbling block. He said: "Unless some modification, some parallel situation, in relation to that guarantee is evolved, there won't be the degree of progress we desire".
Later he said: "We believe that while the British Government wish to reassure the majority that nothing will be imposed on them, at the same time we would like to see the British Government holding out, indicating, to the Unionists the advantages, all the many economic and social advantages, that would flow from a unified Ireland—or some new arrangement."
Taking these two passages together, it would seem that what the Taoiseach is seeking is not in fact a withdrawal of the British statement that Northern Ireland will remain in the United Kingdom as long as this represents the wishes of the majority of its people, but the addition to that of a phrase in line with or perhaps a development of, that contained in the relevant British declaration at Sunningdale, which stated British support for a united Ireland achieved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland. Today the Taoiseach told us:
I would like, therefore, to see the British Government modifying the present guarantee by adding a positive element, a new departure that would open the door to progress. I have in mind that the Northern majority would be invited to look at unity as a prospect offering them great advantage.
This is a useful clarification of what is meant by statements referring to the British guarantee as a stumbling block. On this interpretation—and I admit that the exegesis of these texts would test the skill of a biblical scholar—it would appear that there is a common view on this matter as between the Taoiseach and this party. The Taoiseach might wish to consider the possible advantages, however, of speaking in plainer language to the plain people of Northern Ireland and of this State.
In the meantime, whatever criticisms we have of tactical mistakes he has made, of insensitive phrases or obscure circumlocutions, he can be assured that if he can clear aside this verbal debris, arising partly from his lack of experience and assurance in this, for him, unfamiliar, area, and can concentrate on bringing to its full and logical conclusion the concept of unity by consent, he will have the support of this party just as, if he departs from this course, he will have our criticism and if necessary our opposition.
He will be aware of the efforts I have made through visiting London on three occasions within the past two months to further the common cause, by urging on British political leaders a sensitive Northern Ireland initiative, one that will create the conditions for a devolution of government in Northern Ireland on a basis that will ensure participation by representatives of the minority at executive level as and when executive power is transferred, and that will reflect the good wishes that the British public generally, and most British politicians clearly feel towards the concept of Irishmen from North and South, eventually working together in political harmony for the good of their island, and in close and friendly co-operation with the neighbouring island. He can be assured that my efforts, and those of my party will continue to be directed towards these objectives.
In conclusion, I address myself to the British Government. There exists at this moment a possibility of a breakthrough towards a gradual solution of the Northern Ireland problem. Success in this will require Britain to act with skill and firmness in devising a solution to the problem of devolved self-government in Northern Ireland. That solution must ensure against a return to majority rule until the political system in Northern Ireland breaks away from its present ethnically-based structure and develops along more normal lines, so that alternation in government will emerge, as elsewhere, from a majority-based structure. I believe—I hope I am right—that a formula can be found to achieve this result—one in which the different groups might be prepared to participate.
But there is another element to this equation. The balance of the Anglo-Irish relationship has been disturbed since 1973 by the failure of British Governments to match Irish Governments in adherence to the principles solemnly proclaimed at Sunningdale. Successive Irish Governments, including that headed by the present Taoiseach, have reiterated our solemn declaration in the Sunningdale communique that we seek unity only by consent. Successive British Governments have, however, failed to reiterate Britain's parallel solemn declaration—or rather they have reiterated one half of it and have pointedly dropped the other. They have repeated that part of the proposition that is to the effect that Northern Ireland shall remain part of the United Kingdom as long as that reflects the wishes of the people there, but they have remained conspicuously silent on the other half—the declaration of Britain's support for a united Ireland should such a united Ireland be in accordance with the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland.
The time has come to restore the balance. The time has come for Britain to honour its solemn declaration and make it clear once more, as it did in 1920, and again in 1973, that it supports Irish unity by consent. I do not say in the curiously weak, indeed pessimistic, language of the Taoiseach, that "ideally I would like to see the British Government express an interest in the ultimate achievement of unity". I say that to compensate for its prolonged silence on this point it should at this stage proclaim clearly that it would indeed be happy to see the political representatives of the two parts of Ireland reaching agreement as to how Ireland should be governed. Pending such a development, devolved self-government must be installed on a basis that will ensure against any repetition of the monopoly of one-party rule which proved so disastrous not just for the minority, but ultimately for all the people of Northern Ireland, over a period of half a century.
We seek from Britain that she honours her undertakings, and that she give expression to the evident wish of her people, and the great majority of her politicians, that Irish men and women find together as soon as may be a solution to the government of Ireland. May she have the wisdom so to act, for by so acting she could set in motion a process—and it has to be a process; it may, as the Taoiseach said in London, be a long process—through which a solution can eventually be found to the centuries-old conundrum of the ultimate relationships between Britain and Ireland, and between Irishmen of diverse ethnic origins, living in this island, North and South.
