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Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 6 Dec 1983

Vol. 346 No. 6

Private Members' Business. - Closure of Scarriff (Clare) Chipboard Factory: Motion.

I move:

That, in view of its importance to the national forestry programme and to the saw mill industry and its employment implications for the nation, Dáil Éireann calls on the Government to implement the development plan for Chipboard Products Ltd., Scarriff, already prepared by the company and meanwhile, to ensure that the commercial operation of the company is no longer prevented.

The decision taken after consultations between the Bank of Ireland, the Minister and the Government that a receiver be appointed to Chipboard Products Limited, Scarriff, will go down in history as one of the most treacherous acts of desertion in relation to our own raw material resources and our people that has ever been perpetrated by an Irish Government. It will rank as one of the most short-sighted, retrograde and irresponsible decisions ever taken by an Irish administration. The Government have sold out on Scarriff and on the people of east Clare. They have turned their backs on the timber industry and abandoned the hopes and ambitions of hundreds of people who saw their future in the development of Irish forestry resources and products. It may put a temporary end to Chipboard Limited in Scarriff but it will not be forgotten in County Clare and elsewhere that a Government in such a callous, uncaring and deliberate way, in the name of financial rectitude, left a ghost in Scarriff which will haunt the timber industry for generations.

The Marine Port and General Workers Union issued a statement on the matter on 24 November as follows:

On behalf of the executive committee of the Marine Port and General Workers Union we wish to state publicly our utter condemnation and rejection of the action of the Government in removing its financial support from the only chipboard factory in the State, thereby jeopardising the livelihood of almost 200 members of the union with its inevitable effect on their families and indeed on the whole community at Scarriff and the surrounding district. This callous and unfeeling decision is all the more incomprehensible when it is realised that in recent months due to the efforts of the reconstituted management and particularly due to the responsible attitude of the workers in accepting a lengthy pay pause and minimal wage increases the factory has achieved a substantial increase in productivity and viability. Even more incomprehensible to us is the fact that such a decision should be made by a Government which is composed by members of the Labour Party who by their very constitution one would expect to firmly reject and oppose a policy based on cold expediency at the expense of the dignity and human rights of the workers. This union will never cease to fight with every means in their power to safeguard the rights of their members in Scarriff and it calls on every member of the trade union movement to give them their unqualified support in achieving this aim.

Those words of Séamus Redmond, the general secretary of the union, describe in a fitting way the anger, frustration and annoyance not only of the workers in Scarriff but of people throughout County Clare.

It is difficult to understand the reasoning behind this incredible decision. The scant statement of six or seven sentences issued by the Government Information Services is poor compensation for the many people employed in the industry in Scarriff and the surrounding forests. It is poor compensation for the effort, endeavour and financial commitment made by workers, management and others in the area to ensure that with Government assistance the company would be established. It is apparent to anyone that the Government did not consider the matter fully. It is equally obvious that the decision to cut off support was taken in the context of the Estimates. We must ask the Government to reconsider and look again at the Forestry Estimate and ask whether the small saving of about £600,000 which will ensue as a result of this decision justifies the misery, hardship, frustration and anger which will be caused for so many people, as well as the knock-on effect in the region and throughout the saw milling industry.

Almost 50 per cent of the timber which goes to a sawmill is disposed of by way of waste or residue. An outlet must be available in order to make viable the operations of both large and small sawmills. In Mountshannon there is a small sawmill employing 25 people where the income from waste disposal through chipboard is valued at about £100,000 a year. The loss of that income to this small industry will put at risk the jobs of those working there and cause financial problems for the company. This affects not only the Mountshannon plant but a series of plants who were supplying their residues to Chipboard Limited. These sawmills are scattered not only throughout County Clare at Mountshannon and Kilrush but as far away as Bunclody, Longford, Mullingar, Banagher, Mountrath, Tuam, Woodford, Loughrea and Ballinrobe. Already concern has been voiced by the sawmillers' association who recognise that there is no longer an outlet for their waste.

If the necessary equipment is to be installed in those plants, the de-barking machinery which is essential, investments of £100,000 will have to be made in each plant. Such investment will be necessary if those plants are to be made viable. Since the closure of the Scarriff factory there has been a knock-on effect throughout the saw-milling industry which will send other concerns rushing to the IDA, and other agencies, seeking financial aid to instal the machinery which is essential if those concerns are to have any outlet for their waste material.

It is likely that in the event of that machinery being installed the high quality chip which will then be available will be exported by the companies concerned because there is not, and will not be, an outlet for it. That material will be manufactured into chipboard abroad and imported by us at a cost of between £20 million and £30 million. Does any Member know of anything so daft or outrageous?

I should like to give some of the history of the Scarriff factory, why it was established by Fianna Fáil, why it was considered desirable to support it and why it is essential that the chipboard industry is supported in the future. The Forest and Wildlife Service, in conjunction with the IDA, have consistently followed a policy of orderly development of the wood processing and wood using industry bearing in mind the availability of supplies and resources. Since the fifties a series of forecasts have been circulated indicating, nationally and regionally, the returns which will be available by way of timber resources in future years. It has been estimated that timber output will double in this decade and increase by four times in the nineties. It is expected that we will reach a total timber output of 3 million cubic metres by the year 2,000. Those forecasts are available for inspection.

A factor which emerged in the late seventies was that the growth rate of forests planted in the late fifties was significantly higher than earlier forecasts indicated. A policy decision had been arrived at that by reducing the age of clear felling in rotation in the bulk of forest crops there would be a remarkable increase in the timber resources which would become available, particularly for the saw-log industry. While it was expected that substantial amounts of saw-log and pulp wood would become available those two factors meant that there would be a significant increase in the availability of pulp wood in this decade and in the nineties. In the light of those changing circumstances the Forestry Division, and the IDA, embarked on an intensive study to identify the measures required to use the available resources to the maximum capacity so that the return to the economy by way of finance and job opportunities could be maximised. The study on developing the Irish timber industry for the eighties, carried out in consultation with the Forest and Wildlife Service was published by the IDA in July 1981 and it was on the basis of that study that the plans to develop the chipboard industry in Scarriff were undertaken.

The development plans for Scarriff were undertaken on the detailed forecasts and information contained in the 1981 study. That report indicated the projections for future output from State plantations, the best method of exploiting them in terms of financial return and job potential. It has been estimated that up to £400 million has been invested in the last 50 years by far-sighted planners and politicians who recognised the need to buy and plant land so that we would have sufficient raw material to meet the ever-increasing demand for wood and wood products. It is an indication of confidence and commitment that successive Fianna Fáil Governments, and other Governments, had in the timber industry that this investment was undertaken. The forest development plan was carefully executed and it is a scandal that the work carried on in those years is being replaced by cowardice and defeatism by the Government who have knocked at every opportunity any proposals to develop our own resources. The Government are running away from the challenge identified in the IDA study and are not prepared to make the necessary financial commitment so that we can exploit the investments made by successive Governments in the last 50 years.

There were certain problems in the saw-milling industry and they were identified in the late seventies. Many of the factories had serious problems. The IDA, in co-operation with Fóir Teoranta, commissioned A.D. Little of London in the late seventies to study the board and chipboard industries, to look at all aspects such as production facilities, operating costs, markets, product quality, financial viability, competitiveness and advise on future development and the formulation of strategy. A detailed study was carried out of the Scarriff plant. The IDA report on the study of the internationally recognised consultants, A. D. Little, stated:

As a result of these studies A. D. Little concluded that: Particleboard was an eminently suitable product for manufacture in Ireland. Chipboard Limited Scarriff had the plant and product range to form the nucleus of a healthy Irish particleboard industry. New investment would be required. A strong new parent company would bring definite benefits.

The London consultants also examined a plant similar to the Scarriff concern, Munster Chipboard. The various proposals put forward were examined including one to run the two plants together in order to cut down expenses. Those plans fell through. However, it was recognised that the Scarriff plant had the product range and their manpower levels seemed adequate. The marketing strategy was also adequate. The financial performance was examined and comparisons were made in relation to the manufacture of chipboard and distribution costs of companies in the UK, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Germany. Not alone did they examine the whole structure of the industries at that time, management, manpower levels and so on, but they also examined the availability of timber and concluded that the plant did have the potential of a sound chipboard industry. It was on that basis alone — at the time when Chipboard were in financial difficulties — recognising the potential of Scarriff, recognising its importance from the point of view of forestry development, the Government decided to invest in Scarriff, to form a partnership with local communities there. They so decided in the best interests not alone of the timber industry but in the whole development of afforestation in the future that they should embark upon a project in Chipboard Products Limited in Scarriff. That was the reasoning behind and the background to the establishment of the chipboard factory at Scarriff.

The Minister seems to base strongly part of his argument for his decision not to support the chipboard industry on the recommendations of another consultancy undertaken at a later stage. I think the Minister will agree with me that the study later undertaken — and which now forms the basis for his argument that Scarriff is not a viable proposition — examined Scarriff on the basis of whether it was a commercially viable operation and on no other basis whatsoever. For example, such study did not take into account the problems which arose through lack of outlets for forestry products, the importance of having an outlet for forestry thinnings, the social impact of the closure of a plant such as that at Scarriff, with its repercussions throughout the entire region, of east Clare in particular and its effect on saw-mills there.

I deplore in the strongest possible way here this evening the selected leakage of passages from that document, done deliberately by somebody, to undermine the efforts being made and at present engaged in by the action committee at Scarriff to find an alternative solution to the problem obtaining there. The most damaging sections of that report, which should be the direct responsibility of the Minister for Forestry, were leaked by a journalist in a Sunday newspaper. I challenge the Minister to state clearly in this debate from what section of his Department that information was supplied, how it came to be available to a newspaper journalist and why it was that selective and damaging statements only were taken from it and published rather than the whole report which the journalist claimed to have in his possession. It was obvious that the report was leaked with the intention of effecting the maximum amount of damage to any prospect of a reopening of the Scarriff plant. I want the Minister to explain now to the House how that report came into the hands of a newspaper journalist and why it was that those damaging sections only were published. It is obvious that they were selectively given in order to do maximum damage to the plant.

I want to revert to the establishment of the chipboard factory, to get the facts right behind the reasoning for its establishment. When the company went into receivership in 1980 efforts were made to attract overseas investors and developers who might be interested in taking over the plant. A number of groups visited the plant at that time. But, as is now known, there were enormous problems being encountered in the industry not alone here but throughout Europe generally. There was the problem of reduced demand, over capacity in the industry, reduced profitability and other problems affecting the European scene as well. Mergers were taking place, sawmills were going out of business, new technology and restructuring were on the way. At that time it was not possible to attract new investment from abroad. Recognising that it was not possible to attract new investment from abroad the Government rightly at that time set up this company with the support, help, assistance and indeed the financial backing of some local people. It is important to note here that many people in Scarriff, within the community itself — small shopkeepers and so on — and indeed many of the work force employed at that time — invested their money and savings. They did so knowing that they were going into a venture 64 per cent Government-owned. Many people would not have invested at that time were it not for the fact that they understood they were going into a company which was 64 per cent Government-owned and in which there was some security for them. They were prepared to place the whole of their life savings in this venture at a time when there were difficulties being encountered in the timber industry generally, mainly because they recognised the need to maintain the plant there, that they were secure in their investment in the knowledge that the Government was with them in support of that project. They are now being shamefully treated by the Government, who pull the plug, leaving them high and dry without any prospect of any return on their investment in the company since its formation.

I want to speak for a few moments about the importance of the thinning operation. If there is to be properly developed afforestation here it is vital that we have constructive and forward planning in regard to the thinnings programme. Equally it is recognised that there will be created major forestry problems unless such thinnings process is proceeded with. This is especially important here because so many of our plantations are young and in need of the thinning process if afforestation is to be developed to its maximum potential. I do not disagree with the Minister when he contends that the national forestry programme permits some flexibility of the thinnings programme. When replying to the Private Notice Question I had down here on the eve of the closure of the plant the Minister did not seem to be unduly perturbed about the fact that the thinnings process would not be undertaken, or that it might be delayed or postponed. I feel the Minister is under-estimating its importance. He must be aware that failure to thin our forests over a protracted period will have a detrimental effect on the whole of the timber industry.

Now that this Government have closed the Scarriff plant there is the grave possibility that the whole of our forestry development will be damaged by the delaying of the thinnings process, or of the failure to thin adequately. Are we to see a reversion to the days when Irish timber was exported £1 a ton from Water-ford and other ports with all the scandal and annoyance that fact created, with all the confusion there was then nationally throughout the industry? Then we had questions here day after day as to why it was, at a time when we were importing timber to the tune of £400 million to £500 million a year, which we could successfully grow at home, we were exporting ours at £1 a ton to be processed abroad, thereby creating jobs abroad. Yet timber was being imported here at enormous cost to this State, with people recognising that this was a lunatic policy being pursued. If we are to revert to that kind of situation I do not share the complacency of the Minister in regard to the thinning process. If for this one reason alone, in order to provide an outlet for forestry thinnings and ensure the properly planned development of afforestation the expenditure involved in keeping the Scarriff plant open for our thinnings is justified. But they have been slowed down for various reasons, above all, because of cutbacks being effected in the Minister's Department. This thinnings process must be undertaken more rapidly, particularly because there is not now any outlet for them. By being kept open Scarriff would provide such outlet. For this reason the expenditure about which we talk would be justified.

It was also anticipated that when the plant was planned for Clonmel, when the Medford Corporation came there, that the western European market for the medium-density board which they would produce there, when in full operation, would increase substantially to something like 1 million cubic metres by 1985.

Can anyone say if the markets for medite have expanded to that extent? Is it not a fact that the markets throughout Europe are suffering from the special effects of the recession and that the planned output to meet the anticipated need for medite products otherwise would be enormous and would take up to 400,000 cubic feet of timber for a year's supply? Will that type of development take place? Is it not a fact that already similar plants have been established throughout Europe to cater for the anticipated demand there, and that it is likely the output from medite would not be to the extent anticipated? It had been anticipated that 400,000 cubic feet of timber would be required per year to supply the demands for medite. Is it not likely this will be needed in the future?

We must bear in mind that when medite was planned there were pulpwood outputs in Munster, Clondalkin, Scarriff and Athy which were using in the region of 250,000 cubic feet of timber every year and that when the decision was made to support medite an assurance was given that the operation in Clonmel would not affect the wood supply that would be available to the existing plants? It must now be questioned whether there is need not only for one but for two chipboard plants here, thus processing the amount of pulpwood available, thus creating significant job opportunities if we were to use the residue available from small sawmills throughout the country and thus producing the financial turnover available.

I will deal briefly with the financial position in the Scarriff plant. It would be fair to say that the claims and counterclaims of the past few days have genuinely confused people about the real situation in regard to CPL. One thing is undeniable, that the financial injection which was part of the plan for the Scarriff plant was never made. The energy saving machinery, the investment needed to improve quality, the other essential plant equipment necessary in order to make the plant profitable and to enable the business to secure the markets that were available were not provided. The financial investment which was part of the original recommendation for the establishment of the plant was never made. There were reasons for that.

The company were established in 1981. As a young company they experienced financial difficulties at the outset and were endeavouring to tighten up their managerial structure and their work force in other areas in order to make their chances of viability greater and the undertaking more economic. The workers made a determined effort to help, through working substantially longer hours and by working harder. However, they were left without financial resources and could not themselves raise the money needed to buy the machinery which they wanted. Over a year attempts were made by the Government to find people to build up the company with them, who would strengthen their marketing strategy, who would reinforce their technology and find new financial support for them. Various attempts were made to bring in international companies involved in similar operations — a joint venture operation to realise the potential of the Scarriff plant.

After some discussion with them the Minister decided that he could not see any further benefit in continuing the discussions and, after talks with the bank he decided to appoint a receiver and close the plant. I find it strange now that the Minister can say to us that he is looking at the possibility of getting some alternative foreign investment to restructure the plant and establish a viable chipboard industry in Ireland. In the circumstances, how can the Minister expect any international company to come in to build up a chipboard industry when the Government, a 64 per cent owner in the industry, opt out? In these circumstances can anyone expect an international company to come here to establish a chipboard industry when the Government opt out? Is it not strange to find an Irish Government calling for help from firms in Germany or Spain when they do not have the courage or the initiative or the commitment to do something themselves?

I should like to refer to the board of management of this company and in particular to the chairman, Ambrose McInerney, who deserves our gratitude. His commitment to Scarriff has never failed: he stood by Scarriff no matter how difficult the circumstances were. He acted honourably and courageously. The other board members put their energy and efforts into CPL in the national interest at a time when they could have been engaged more profitably in other directions. We owe them a great debt of gratitude.

In making their announcement through the GIS, the Government showed indecent haste and it was an indication of the way in which the Government have been treating many Irish businesses. It showed their lack of interest in getting Irish business to invest in Irish companies and to build up Irish industry so that we can utilise our own resources. If this is the way they will continue to operate I can see little hope of getting anyone to support Irish industry in the future.

Finally, I appeal to Fine Gael Deputies from my constituency who will be voting on this issue tomorrow night to realise that they cannot sit on the fence any longer in regard to this matter. They cannot sign resolutions calling for special meetings of the county council to discuss the issue and at the same time refuse to vote with us on this motion. I ask the Government to reconsider their foolishness and to support the Scarriff industry, to re-open the chipboard plant, to provide the timber for it, put back the electricity and the telephones and to get the plant into production to provide jobs and a financial return to our economy.

I move amendment No. 1:

To delete all the words after "That" and substitute the following:

"Dáil Éireann urges the Government to support the development of a viable chipboard industry."

My amendment is much more positive in that I am seeking to ensure that the scarce financial and physical resources of the State are used only on identifiably viable projects. The Opposition Deputies are calling on the Government to support a mill which has a track record of losses amounting to over £3.5 million over the last seven years and which has no chance of viability unless it receives massive and continuing State assistance in the years ahead. I would have preferred not to have brought the unhappy details of this mill's performance before the House but the motion put down by Deputies on the Opposition benches has left me no option. I would have hoped that Deputies might have seen that the interests of CPL would be best served by allowing the receiver to proceed with his job. A receiver always prefers to dispose of a company as a going concern. Unfortunately, by opening the company's affairs in this public forum I fear that the Opposition Deputies may only be hindering the receiver and thus putting the jobs of the work force in CPL in greater jeopardy.

At this point some background information on the pulpwood processing industries in Ireland would be useful. The seventies and eighties have not been a happy period for the Irish pulpwood processing industry. The 1974 recession had a serious impact on the western European timber industry in general and on the pulpwood processing industries in particular. The recession was particularly severe on the older, smaller scale pulpwood industries. These plants, lacking new technology and economies of scale, found it very difficult to compete in over-supplied markets.

In the seventies there were four pulpwood using industries in Ireland: two produced chipboard, one made hardboard and one produced thermo-mechanical pulp. By 1980 three of these four pulpwood using industries had closed. The only surviving mill was Chipboard Limited, Scarriff, and it too ended up in receivership in 1980. As far back as 1977 the company had experienced severe financial problems and Fóir Teoranta, which were owed £1.5 million, put in an executive to run the company. Efforts were made by the IDA and the receiver to find someone to take over the plant. A number of groups expressed some interest and visited Scarriff to assess the situation. For various reasons it did not prove possible to secure a take-over by any of them. Eventually, in 1981 — no doubt in the shadow of a general election — the Government of the day approved a unusually generous rescue package negotiated with private interest in order to maintain the jobs and the production of particleboard at Scarriff. This involved the State providing 92½ per cent of the funding in return for a 64 per cent stake in a new private company — Chipboard Products Limited.

The following is a summary of the financial arrangements for the establishment of CPL in May 1981: £1 ‘A' ordinary shares held by Mr. A. McInerney and local interests, £193,000; £1 ‘B' ordinary shares held by Minister for Finance, £334,000; £115 per cent cumulative preference shares held by Minister for Finance, £200,000; debenture loan provided by Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, £466,000; bank loan guaranteed by Minister for Finance, £400,000; private loan, £57,000; bank overdraft facility secured by assignment of debtors, £350,000. In addition the Minister for Fisheries and Forestry agreed to provide capital equipment grants of £1.012 million over a three year period on terms similar to those for IDA grants.

The Minister also entered into a timber supply agreement with the company for a three year period. This provided for the supply of (a) up to 64,000 cubic metres of pulpwood-size timber to the company in the first year and payment of £7 per cubic metre towards its harvesting costs, and (b) up to 85,000 cubic metres of pulpwood in each of the second and third years. The rate of payment was subject to review at the end of year one but has remained at £7 per cubic metre. The company are allowed to remove the timber free of charge. No other firm in the timber trade has ever got such a favourable deal.

I must point out that already £3.3 million has been provided by the State to the company in the form of shares and direct loan, £1 million; grant assistance, £200,000; free timber and harvesting subvention £1 million; loan guarantees which have to be honoured by the State, £1 million; total £3.3 million. Against this level of State aid the private sector has only put in £254,000 — 7½ per cent.

Some Opposition Deputies may be in a better position than I am to illuminate the House on the background to the establishment of CPL in 1981. It seems most strange to me that the IDA refused to become involved in this rescue package and that it was left to the Minister for Fisheries and Forestry to arrange the restructuring. For my part, I can deal only with the situation as I found it since taking up office. In order to protect the taxpayers' interest in the company, I have had its performance monitored carefully. While it may be idle at this stage to speculate why the 1981 package did not achieve the desired effect, I have been most concerned to ensure that the proposals for further State assistance were critically examined.

It is clear that the company showed unhealthy signs from early on and was the subject of several memoranda to the Government over the past two-and-a-half years. In June 1982, within a year of its setting up, CPL sought additional State investment and the then Government decided: (i) that a consultancy report on the company should be commissioned; and (ii) that working capital of £200,000 should be sought for the company by way of bank loan, subject to State guarantee, if necessary.

The additional working capital of £200,000 was obtained from the company's bankers and a leading firm of accountants was appointed to carry out a consultancy study. The consultants reported at the end of August 1982 and the report can be summarised as follows.

First, on the basis of the company's own projections, which the consultants consider to be optimistic: (a) CPL can continue as a going concern over the next three years only if it receives State aid of at least £4.2 million — in the form of equipment grants, £1.4 million, a timber harvesting subsidy, £2.5 million and free timber £0.3 million — and also a State guarantee of bank borrowing rising to £2.6 million by the end of 1985; (b) continued substantial annual assistance from the State will be required after 1985, particularly if the present imbalance between the level of inflation in Ireland compared to competitor countries continues.

Second, a technical agency, namely Fahrni Engineering AG of Zurich, employed by the consultants to assess CPL's capital expenditure proposals are highly critical of the poor standards of existing plant maintenance, waste of raw materials and damage to finished stock. They also highlight the risk of serious fire or explosion. The report stated that as failure to eliminate this hazard could lead to loss of life, with consequential embarrassment to the Government, this matter had been taken up with CPL and it was understood that remedial measures were in train.

My predecessor is on record as being most concerned at the findings and on the matter of risk to life and property he immediately sought a report from the local fire service authority. He also reported to the Government on the general findings of the consultants' report.

The Government, having considered the consultants' report, decided in November 1982, to underwrite additional working capital of £0.5 million for CPL while negotiations took place with prospective clients interested in a take-over of the company. A German chipboard manufacturer had expressed an interest in CPL but would not participate without a strong Irish partner. After much difficulty the Germans' advisers — The Investment Bank of Ireland — located an interested partner. While preliminary negotiations with the group were under way a Spanish chipboard manufacturer also expressed an interest in CPL and were invited to enter negotiations. Both the German and Spanish were requested to submit proposals for the purchase of the State's shareholding in CPL and it was not until October 1983 that discussions with both interested parties were concluded.

The level of State assistance sought by the German-led consortium was totally disproportionate to the benefits that might be derived. Apart from the State's ability or otherwise to even contemplate the magnitude of the assistance sought the Germans' raw material requirements far exceeded what was envisaged for a plant located at Scarriff. CPL's existing usage of pulpwood is 60,000 cubic metres approximately per annum. The Forest and Wildlife Service have guaranteed to supply 85,000 cubic metres per annum to CPL. The German-led group proposed a plant using 160,000 cubic metres per annum to be supplied within a very short distance. In view of the Forest and Wildlife Service commitments to existing pulpwood users the level of supply sought by the Germans could not be guaranteed. The group advised that they saw "no future in pursuing discussions with a view to taking over the Scarriff company and establishing a virtually new plant at that location".

The Spanish proposal likewise involved substantial State assistance. Funding of a capital and non-capital nature in fact exceeded that sought by the German group. Moreover, their raw material requirements were similar to the Germans'. The package presented by the Spaniards was, therefore, deemed unacceptable.

In passing, I would like to refer to an eleventh hour approach which was made by the Irish Timber Council (ITC) — which represents the sawmilling industry — indicating the possibility of an interest on the part of its members in an involvement in CPL. It emerged from discussions that the ITC was not in a position to provide any financial investment in a restructuring of CPL. Its primary interest was to seek limited participation, with the State, as a shareholder in CPL to secure a continuing outlet for some small part of sawmill residues: in that situation the ITC would have to be prepared to offer such residues to CPL at a preferential price.

Against the possibility that negotiations with both the Germans and Spaniards breaking down, I asked CPL to submit the company's own proposals. These were received and explored in detail with the company and given a thorough evaluation. The total amount of State assistance sought would involve the provision by the Exchequer of about £3.5 million to the company in 1984; thereafter, further State assistance of the order of £3 million including the continuation of a timber harvesting subvention and the continued supply of free timber would be required.

The Government, after serious consideration, decided that this level of further assistance to CPL was entirely disproportionate to the benefits likely to accrue. The £6 to £7 million, which the company's proposals would have cost the State, must be judged in the light of the assistance which the State has already provided to CPL.

Let me repeat. Since 1981 the State has provided funds by way of ordinary and preference share capital, loans and guaranteed borrowings, capital grants, timber harvesting subsidies and free timber, amounting in all to some total £3 million.

Despite the level of State assistance the company has accumulated losses of £887,000 since May 1981. If we take the free timber and harvesting subsidy into account then the losses can be said to be of the order of £1.9 million.

The following is a breakdown of the company's losses over the past three years: May-December 1981, £256,000; January-December 1982, £292,000; January-October 1983, £339,000; total, £887,000.

The question of profitability over the past five months has been raised. Let me say categorically that on the basis of the latest information provided to me by the company itself the record shows that £9,000 was lost in the last five months. In the comparable period of 1982 the company showed losses of £21,000. A minor reduction in losses, which could be attributable to a small adjustment arising within any accounting period, is not evidence of a turnaround.

The pattern of profit and loss in recent months against the comparable periods in 1982 is as follows:

Profit/(Loss)

1982

1983

£'000

£'000

January

(75)

(69)

February

62

(54)

March

(151)

(14)

April

(74)

(92)

May

31

(101)

June

23

(21)

July

(1)

15

August

(77)

(21)

(37)

(9)

September

30

25

October

4

9

(228)

(339)

These data do not suggest any real turnaround in the company's trading position in recent months. It should be borne in mind that from month to month there are always adjustments in accounts. Therefore, no particular inference can be taken from minor changes in the results shown in monthly management accounts. It is patently obvious that the company's recent results are following the same pattern as those of 1982. I never heard mention of profits of £1,000 a day until after the receiver had been appointed and I have no evidence to support it.

CPL is in arrears with its payments to the Revenue Commissioners and has been using approximately £600,000 of money deducted from the employees' pay for tax and PRSI and in amounts due for VAT.

I would remind the House that the present mill in Scarriff is the very same one that was managed by a previous receiver between April 1980-April 1981. During that year its trading loss was over £400,000 plus free timber and harvesting subsidy. That first receivership followed several previous years of loss making as follows: 1979, £300,000; 1978, £400,000; 1977, £1,100,000.

That receivership followed a consultant's report on the chipboard industry in Ireland which led the IDA and Fóir Teoranta to refuse to put in more money into a mill for which they could see no viable future. In short this mill has been a consistent loss maker and a drain on public funds for nearly a decade. In the light of such a history can the State be reasonably expected to pour in another £6 to £7 million?

With CPL fast approaching yet another cash crisis the company's bank was seeking intimation of the Government's intentions on the provision of further funding for the company from public funds. In view of this and with the company itself pressing for a decision on its proposals the position was considered in the greatest detail by the Government.

On 15 November 1983 the Government decided that, without prejudice to existing agreements, no additional State assistance would be provided for CPL. On 17 November 1983 I informed the board of CPL of the Government's decision not to provide additional State assistance to the company. I further informed the board that the inevitable consequence of this decision would likely result in the appointment of a receiver by the Bank of Ireland. On 18 November 1983 Mr. William M. McCann of Craig Gardner and Co. was appointed by the Bank of Ireland as receiver and manager to CPL.

On 22 November 1983 I received a deputation on behalf of CPL who requested, inter alia, that I would agree to fund the receiver until a solution to CPL's problems could be found. I informed the deputation that a request for a meeting had been received from the receiver. Until this meeting took place I could not respond to the deputation's request.

A meeting between Departmental officials and the receiver took place on 22 November 1983. The receiver sought inter alia, an unconditional guarantee of funds from the State to allow him to continue production and employment at CPL. The receiver estimated that he would require £188,000 per week and an immediate sum of £97,000 to pay the ESB. I raised the receiver's request at a Government meeting on 22 November 1983 and the Government decided that the terms of the receiver's proposals should not be accepted. On 23 November 1983 I met the chairman, chief executive and a director of CPL and informed them that the Government's decision not to provide additional State assistance still stood and furthermore that the Government was not prepared to fund the receiver.

I would now like to turn to the question of the implementation of CPL's Capital Programme and the question of the dust-burner. Of the total of £1.012 million allocated by the Department of Fisheries and Forestry to CPL in the original restructuring of May 1981, only £200,000 was taken up by the company. This was due to the cash flow problems and difficulties in relation to commercial credit facilities which the company encountered in 1981 and 1982. In undertaking the expenditure against which the Department of Fisheries and Forestry provided £200,000 CPL required and obtained an unusual degree of flexibility in the administration of the grant agreement from my Department.

Reference has also been made to the company's need for a dust-burner which would use timber waste rather than oil as a fuel. The original development plan for CPL included provision for a dust-burner-cum-dryer which was valued in 1981 at over £1 million. CPL was unable to generate the resources to purchase this, even against a grant commitment of 60 per cent from my Department. It would appear that the company was not then aware that the dust-burner could be purchased separately from the dryer for about £100,000. It could in fact have purchased the dust-burner in May 1981 following the provision in cash by the Exchequer of £1 million of start-up finance. However, it seems that the company did not become aware of the existence of the dust-burner, as a separate purchasable item of equipment, until June 1983. Thereafter funds for the purchase of this item of equipment were sought from my Department in the form of a 100 per cent grant. Given that negotiations were in train with two separate foreign interests in respect of participation in CPL and that CPL itself was preparing a comprehensive development programme of its own, it would have been quite unwise at that stage to allow CPL to proceed with the acquisition of the dust-burner on the basis of a 100 per cent grant.

I would like to comment on the supply of pulpwood to CPL from State forests concerning which a lot of play has been made in recent weeks. Let me now set the record straight on this issue. The timber supply arrangement entered into between CPL and the Forest and Wildlife Service in 1981 provided for the supply of up to 90 per cent of the company puplwood requirements free of charge. In addition, the Forest and Wildlife Service gave the company a contribution of £7 per cubic metre towards the cost of harvesting this pulpwood. The agreement was for a three-year period from May 1981 and the company was guaranteed a total free supply of 235,000 cubic metres in that period.

In the current year of the agreement the company had on offer from the Forest and Wildlife Service 106,000 cubic metres from which to select its requirements. The agreement only requires a guarantee to provide 85,000 cubic metres of timber in the current year. May I repeat — free of charge. In any one year to date the company has at best only managed to take-up about 50,000 cubic metres. Much publicity has been made of the distance which CPL had to travel for its free timber. Let me spell out the facts. Since May 1983, that is, the current operational year of the timber supply agreement, the company has the following on offer: Within 0-10 miles radius of Scarriff, 12,000m³; within 10-20 miles radius of Scarriff, 43,000m³; within 20-30 miles radius of Scarriff, 11,000m³; within 30-40 miles radius of Scarriff, 9,000m³; within 40-50 miles radius of Scarriff, 6,000m³; within 50-60 miles radius of Scarriff, 25,000m³. Total, 106,000m³. It will be noted that 58 per cent or 55,000 cubic metres of what was offered in the current year of the agreement was within 20 miles of Scarriff; 76 per cent or 81,000 cubic metres within 50 miles and the balance outside 50 miles.

Since January 1983 CPL has removed only 50,000 cubic metres of pulpwood from State forests; 64 per cent or 32,000 cubic metres was offered since January 1983 within 20 miles of Scarriff; 94 per cent or 47,000 cubic metres within 50 miles. Specific mention has been made of supplies from Mayo and Kerry. Since 1981 CPL has taken only 1,000 cubic metres from Mayo and Kerry or less than 1 per cent of the total supply taken from State forests since 1981.

Needless to say the Government are most concerned about the employment in Scarriff and share the concern expressed by Deputies. The IDA have been fully briefed on the situation and have already sent out inquiries to several chipboard manufacturers with a view to interesting them in taking over the plant. The receiver, I understand, has done likewise.

I have repeatedly told everybody who has come to me about the receivership that they should put proposals in mind direct to the receiver. The receiver is the legal holder of the assets of the company and will be only too willing to consider any worthwhile proposal. I can quote the IDA and say that they too will consider any proposal which can be shown to be viable.

If the receiver can identify an interest in this mill as a viable project — at an acceptable cost to the State — then there can still be a future for this company, but the Government are no longer prepared to underwrite with an open cheque projects which cannot be justified on sound economic criteria.

I should like to refer briefly to some of the statements made by my predecessor, Deputy Daly. He used emotive language more fitting to the theatre stage. I share his concern for the people in his constituency. As a rural Deputy I recognise the social problems which result from this type of closure with no alternative in sight to take up the slack. The Government are aware of those problems. Having regard to what I have said, on the basis of the information available to us from independent sources is it reasonable to suggest that the Government should be asked to pursue the line they were pursuing with no light at the end of the tunnel so far as financial assistance is concerned?

We have pulpwood available to us. The thinnings must be taken out of the forests. I hope they will be used here, and that we will not revert to the position of exporting thinnings for £1 per tonne. I hope the receiver will find it possible to dispose of Scarriff as a going concern to sustain employment in the area. That is my wish for this industry. There are people there with experience of the timber industry. I hope Members of the House who have influence in the area will impress on the people who are now precluding the receiver from carrying out his functions that they should desist from that line of action.

I will be involved in any proposed take-over and in the supply of raw materials. The House can be assured that my Department and I will look sympathetically with any potential manufacturer at the supply situation. We will not be found wanting. If any interest is shown by outsiders or anybody within the State, I will direct them to the place where this facility is needed most, that is, in Scarriff.

Tomorrow night at 8.30 p.m. we will have a vote in this House which will ask the House to decide whether it wants this plant kept open and developed or closed down. Those who vote to have it closed down are those who will support this meaningless amendment which was just moved by the Minister. They need not cod themselves, or their constituents, or the public at large, into thinking it is anything else. If they vote in support of this meaningless milk and water amendment they are voting to close the plant down.

I want to address my remarks in particular to the members of the Labour Party who are not thick on the ground here tonight as, indeed, they rarely are when these kind of matters are at hand in the House, or when a State company is being closed down by the action of a Minister, as in this case. No doubt we will get the Pontius Pilate act again. They will wash their hands, and their hearts will bleed. These keepers of the spirit of 1913 will march into the lobby tomorrow night like 16 little pigmy William Martin Murphys to ensure that their masters, the Fine Gael Party, will achieve another of their objectives in closing another company and in taking on a State company particularly, because the fault of the private shareholders who put up £25,000 that was collected in sums of £50 and £100 from the people of Scarriff — I have a list of their names — is that they are Irish. If they were not they might be treated in a somewhat different fashion.

I do not propose to go into all the facts and figures that the Minister quoted because I regard them as meaningless and his efforts to defend his decision were pathetic. In the short time at my disposal I should like to go into some of the legal and commercial ethics of what is being done in relation to this company within the past month. On page 1 of the shareholders' agreement of 13 May 1981, entered into between the private shareholders and the Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, it says that these presents are entered into for the purpose of regulating certain aspects of their future relationship as shareholders in the company and otherwise and to govern the future conduct of the proposed business and affairs of the company which shall be governed by normal commercial principles and practices.

I should like to lay some emphasis on the words "which shall be governed by normal commercial principles and practices". At 8.15 p.m. on Wednesday, 11 November 1983 the chief executive of this company got a telephone call from the Minister for Fisheries and Forestry telling him to be in Leinster House with his chairman at 11.30 a.m. the following morning as the Minister wanted to talk to him. He explained that his chairman was abroad, could not be contacted and that he could not have him there at 11.30 a.m. the following morning. He was told that that did not matter, that he could bring the other private director if he could locate him. The chief executive turned up at 11.30 a.m. and he was told that the Minister was engaged in talking to three State directors of this company because one of them was also abroad. At 12 o'clock he was ushered into the Minister, who had three or four civil servants with him, and was told for the first time that the Government were withdrawing support from the factory and that he could presumably expect a receiver to be appointed by a bank shortly. This came from the same Minister who, only a couple of months beforehand, had assured the chief executive and the other directors of his full support for the company and all that they were going to do.

Five of the seven directors who were available had an informal chat in the corridor when these two separate sessions were over and they all expressed their anger and opposition to what had happened. They made contact with the other two directors, each of whom individually expressed his great anger. Here we have a situation of a company of seven directors, four of them appointed by the State for the purpose of looking after its interests and all seven are unanimously furious at what the Minister has done. It has been the practice for a number of years in this country that a receiver is not put in by a bank unless the board meet and request a bank to do so. This was not done in this case. There was no board meeting and no member of the board was given any indication that anything like this could happen. Indeed, the discussions between the chief executive and other directors with that bank only a matter of days before this happened led them to believe that the bank were extremely happy at the way things were going. The bank congratulated them on the great improvement that had been shown and yet the Bank of Ireland, at the behest of the Minister without notice to anybody, appointed a receiver. The Bank of Ireland were not owed any interest. Interest was paid monthly by the company. The ESB were not owed anything by the company who paid their bill every month and the figure the Minister is talking about is what would have been paid two days later in the normal course of business which they could have done without any difficulty. Similarly, their oil suppliers who were quoted as being owed a large sum of money were paid every month. The company did not owe any money, other than in the normal course of business. They paid their debts every month.

The amount that is alleged to be due to the Revenue Commissioners for PAYE and VAT is in respect of two months. What company does not owe VAT and PAYE for two months and how many companies are trading profitably and gaily owing six, nine and 12 months' arrears to the Revenue Commissioners? We all know there are thousands in that position but this company, which owed only two months' PRSI and VAT is picked out and pilloried by the Minister and his advisers as being reprehensible in some way. In connection with the activities that happened a week or so before the public announcement of the appointment of the receiver, certain things happened which entitle us to express great concern about the ethics of how they came about.

Some weeks before this, a debenture was sent to the company by the Department of Fisheries and Forestry for £700,000 for execution by the company. The chief executive informed the Department that, in the normal way, it would be put before the board at their next meeting and nobody objected to that. However, a few days before 9 November and while the chief executive was in England selling chipboard, there were frantic efforts on the part of the Department for Fisheries and Forestry to have this debenture executed by the company. There were telephone calls to the chief executive to come home and sign it. He was told it was part of the package which had been put up and which was under consideration by the Department. He was led to believe that if he did not sign the debenture his package, which would otherwise be approved, might well be turned down. He came back; he did not know very much about signing debentures and thought he could not do it except at a board meeting. He was told that he and another director should sign it, which they did without consulting the board and without the knowledge and the chairman or any of the other directors.

Two directors signed the debenture and sealed it other than when they were at a board meeting and I suggest its execution is invalid. That is borne out by Article 14 of the company which says that the quorum necessary for the transaction of business of the directors shall be one A director and one B director. The two who were present in this instance were A directors. They were Mr. Wilmot and Mr. McNamara. It is very doubtful that that debenture is valid. In any event it was signed and sent in but we know now why this was done. It was done after the Minister had made up his mind to pull the plug on this company and to put in a receiver. It was done so that the Minister for Finance would obtain payment of the moneys he had guaranteed to the Bank of Ireland, so that he would become a secured creditor and that he would be in that position to the detriment of the unsecured creditors and of the other shareholders. That is a scandal in commercial operation. It is a gross abuse of the Companies Act. It is the very kind of action that the Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism has condemned in this House and at various functions on up to six occasions in the past 12 months.

Acting to the detriment of unsecured creditors is not some vague activity that only lawyers, accountants or some other people understand. It means that the Government ensure they are paid while the ordinary tradesman who does a job, the shopkeeper who supplies goods or the trader who supplies goods in order to keep this factory going, who supplies those goods on credit in the belief that he is dealing with an Irish State company and that an Irish State company have never reneged on their commercial obligations, are left without money with the preference being given to the State in paying on foot of a guarantee in respect of which the bank is covered anyway by its own debentures, mortgages and floating charge on assets of £3 million including collectible debts of £2.2 million and saleable stock to the extent of £1 million. Except in the most formal fashion the bank never demanded repayment. Have we ever had a situation before where a bank put in a receiver without having seriously demanded repayment, where a bank is paid in full in respect of interest due up to the day of the receivership? How many companies in this country are able to do that? I would say very few but none of them expect the plug to be pulled from under them. This company had no reason to expect to be treated in this way either and the bank would not have so acted if the Minister had not taken the action he took.

Deputies

Hear, hear.

It is a shameful exercise. It is not just. Politically and socially it is callous. It is commercially unethical and it is bordering on the whole question of fraud and of fraudulent preference under the Companies Act. The Minister and his senior officials will one day have to answer to a tribunal other than this House. They will have to answer to some tribunal in the Four Courts for the action they have taken and they will find it very difficult to produce satisfactory answers.

It is noteworthy that, apart from the small unsecured Irish creditors who have been fraudulently done out of their money by this surreptitious effort at the last minute in order to have a debenture registered against this company, there are the large foreign creditors who are tougher and stronger people and who will not take this lying down. It is interesting to read the articles that have appeared about them in newspapers in the past week or so. Does the Minister realise what will be the consequences of his action in terms of the credibility of this State? These foreign suppliers got export credit insurance in their own country at cheap rates. They got export finance at cheap rates because they were supplying an Irish State company and because no Irish State company during our 62 years of independence have up to now reneged on their commercial obligations. What will be the consequences for every Irish importer if the word of the State cannot be accepted in commercial matters? We have a situation in which accepted bills of exchange have been dishonoured by an Irish State company. There are considerable repercussions in that. Why is it that a company like CIE, for example, who are expected to lose £100 million or more next year will have their obligations met by the State while this company who are borderline in so far as profitability is concerned, who were apparently coming into profitability in recent times, have the plug pulled on them in this extraordinary fashion? Will any foreign supplier be prepared to accept the word of Irish State companies again in this kind of situation? Can any foreign Government place reliance in the future on an Irish Government's commercial commitment? I do not think so but if they choose to deal with us they will do so on terms that will be a great deal more expensive both for the State here and for individual Irish importers.

I have dealt mainly with the legal and commercial consequences of what is being done and with the dishonest fashion in which it is being done, that is, to the detriment of innocent and trusting people. I wish to deal briefly with some more general aspects of the situation. We are talking about the first experiment of this kind between an Irish public agency and private enterprise but the result is that in the treatment of the minority of shareholders by the majority shareholders, not only have the minority shareholders no rights whatever but not even the majority and minority directors have any rights.

All seven of them were ignored with the plug being pulled from under them just as much as it was pulled from under the unfortunate people who thought the Irish State behaved honestly in commercial transactions and just as much as the plug was pulled from under the small people around Scarriff and elsewhere who put £250,000 into the company in the belief that the Irish State was an honourable partner to have in a commercial transaction.

The consequences of the Minister's action will spread far beyond the confines of Scarriff and beyond the unfortunate and tragic social and economic results for so many hundreds of people in that region and in other parts of the country. I am sure there are people who would willingly engage in the business of making chipboard in this country but who would not wish to do so in the light of this experience in partnership with the dead bureaucratic hand of the State. We must realise and accept now that the Department of Fisheries and Forestry is no longer a non-commercial activity simply buying land and planting young trees on it. The Department must become a commercial operation. It has a lot of mature timber and a lot of thinnings and waste available to it. By reason of the very nature of the Department, they will not become a commercial operation but will stultify the development of the timber trade for a long time if allowed to continue in the present way.

It is obvious in this debate that we must recognise the necessity for the establishment of a commercial timber board on which people who know about timber from a commercial point of view will be represented and will be in a position to have their voices heard. I have seen within recent weeks the map provided to this chipboard company by the Department of Fisheries and Forestry indicating the forests from which they may now take timber.

Debate adjourned.
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