The sense of unreality of this Government and this budget is best illustrated by the few remarks we have just heard from the Minister for Agriculture. Incidentally, he has disappeared from the House already, as well he might. We have been told that 1983 was a very satisfactory year for agriculture. Does that man, the Minister for Agriculture, live in this country? Would he like to come down to Limerick, Cork or Tipperary and talk to the stream of farmers who are on the verge of bankruptcy, who owe the banks hundreds of thousands of pounds they have no chance of paying and who have receivers in? At least one farmer has been in jail as a result of his inability to meet his obligations.
We have been told that 1983, the year in which all these things happened in Irish agriculture for the first time, was a very satisfactory year and that the wish of the Minister for Agriculture is that 1984 will be equally satisfactory. If I had not been sitting here listening to him I would not have believed that any Member of this House, least of all the Minister for Agriculture of the day, would have made such remarks. When one of the major members of the Government — major at least by virtue of his office if by virtue of nothing else — has as unreal a view of the economic scene in this country as what we have heard in the past few minutes, it is no wonder that the whole of the budget is equally unreal and equally unrelated to the problems facing the country today.
I want to deal in some detail with an aspect of the budget that has given rise to much controversy and difficulty. However, I want to make my position clear before I start because I can see virtually anyone talking on this topic being instantly misrepresented as trying to assist people who are trying to evade tax. I want to talk about what was described in the budget as "bond washing" as if it were some new-fangled thing that had come in in the past few months, used by rich individuals and rich institutions to do the Exchequer out of tax that would otherwise have been paid. I want to make it perfectly clear I hold no brief for anyone who is trying to avoid the payment of tax to the Exchequer that is properly payable but I want, after a week, to put this whole matter in some kind of perspective because it has had the most fundamental and jarring effect on the financial institutions of the State and on future prospects for the Government of the day to raise money and to finance public needs from the public market that has always been available here to the Government.
To make my point, unfortunately I shall have to quote many figures. Most of them are contained on page 46 of the yellow pages of the Winter 1983 Quarterly Report of the Central Bank published on 18 January 1984. The figures are contained in the three parts of Table D. 4 on that page.
We have been told by no less an authority than the Taoiseach himself in the course of a rather strange statement he made in Trinity College at a breakfast on Tuesday of this week that up to £1,000 million was in the process of being improperly used in some fashion for the evasion of tax. This was in the course of a long homily on the iniquities of what he described as the rich. Not since the story in the Bible of the eye of the needle have the so-called evil rich come in for quite the level of criticism they got in Trinity College over bacon and eggs last Tuesday morning.
This sum of £1,000 million which we are told has been kept from the Exchequer by these evil people will have to be looked at in the context of Table D. 4 of the Central Bank Report. The total amount of marketable Irish Government securities outstanding on 30 September 1983, the latest available date, was £6.102 billion nominal value. The current figure, allowing for the tranches issued yesterday and for the redemptions, is £6.2 billion. That is held by nine different classifications of holders as set out in the first part of Table D. 4.
The first is the Central Bank which, in effect, is paying dividends to itself so it does not arise. The next seven are all dealers in securities and, therefore, are subject to tax. They are the associated banks, the non-associated banks, the building societies, insurance companies, Government Departments, including the Post Office Savings Bank, State-sponsored bodies, local authorities and other financial institutions.
The position with them is that they are dealers in securities and, therefore, they are subject to tax on the result of their profit and loss account, tax both on interest and on capital gains if they make them. They pay corporation tax at 50 per cent on their profit for the year. There can be no question of tax not being paid on what the Central Bank hold because it is paying itself and there can be no question of tax not being paid by these seven groups of holders. That leaves us with the ninth classification described as "other" and this classification held £2.2 billion nominal in marketable Irish Government securities on 30 September last and there is no reason to believe they hold anything very much different now. Therefore, they hold roughly one-third of marketable Irish securities.
The second part of Table D. 4 gives the maturity times in absolute amounts and one finds that the first column, those of less than three years to maturity, constitute £2.2 billion out of the £6.2 billion outstanding. In round terms that is roughly one-third. Therefore, of the short-dated securities held by non-dealing institutions and individuals, one-third of one-third, or one-ninth in all, comes into that category. The amount of nominal securities on which this activity could go on is one-ninth at maximum of the total amount outstanding at £6.2 billion. That comes roughly to £750 million nominal.
Then, you must go back to note (b) attached to "other" in No. 9 on the first table to see who these "others" are, what their liability is or their position with regard to the selling of securities with the right to the dividend attached. They are defined by the Central Bank in this note as companies' nominees, third party bank accounts, churches and schools, courts of justice, individuals, accounts under £5,000 and holdings by non-residents other than foreign insurance companies. Let us have a look at that list and see how many of those are liable for tax. A substantial part of that holding of £2.2 billion, of which only one-third relates to short-dated gilts and therefore only a third is relevant, are held by, for example, the Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests. Are these engaging in this practice which we are told is so devious? I doubt it very much. Their holdings would come to a couple of hundred million pounds.
We are told here by the Central Bank that churches and schools hold many of these. Are these people engaged in this practice which we have been led to believe over the past week has become suddenly the most disreputable thing happening in Irish economic life? Foreign residents are not liable for tax on Irish Government securities; therefore what is the advantage to them in it? They are not doing anything wrong because they are not liable for tax anyway under any circumstances.
With regard to the courts of justice, these are the funds of suitors — the amounts of money in the name of the accountant of the High Court, running to several hundred million pounds at any given time. This is money invested in the courts on behalf of infants and persons of unsound mind. Is the accountant of the courts of justice, who is a civil servant in the Department of Justice, engaged in this practice in respect of the £50 million or £100 million of funds which are under his control? I suggest very strongly that he is not, nor are any of these other people. Taking a gross figure of £750 million in respect of which dividends could be used in this fashion and having extracted from that figure all these people who are listed here by the Central Bank, who clearly are not engaged in anything of that kind and who are simply holding the securities for the people who are entitled to them, this gives a figure, at the very outside, of about £400 million nominal value in securities where the bond could be washed, as the phrase now goes, or sold cum dividend.
The situation is that that £400 million, assuming that there was an interest rate of 12 per cent — and that is putting it pretty high, because on most of the shorter term bonds the interest rate is a good deal lower, as we saw from the tranches issued yesterday — would give a gross dividend of approximately £45 million. This, in turn, would yield a gross ceiling tax potential of about £15 million at the normal withholding or standard rate. That, in effect, is what we are talking about. That is the potential to do wrong in this way — at the very outside, £15 million per annum. In practice, the sum will be a fair bit lower, but I have not discounted the various factors which I outlined fully, in order not to weaken my argument by exaggerating.
Fifteen million pounds roughly is paid out in gross dividends on these funds. These are sold cum dividend some days before the dividends actually become payable and the purchaser acquires the right to the dividend. Let us assume, therefore, that that amount of dividend, £15 million worth, is sold. It is sold to somebody — and this point seems to have been totally overlooked in this debate — and the person who buys those short-dated stocks cum dividend has to take his dividend a day or two later and has to pay tax on it. What loss does the Exchequer suffer as a result? In practice, the people who buy them are banks and they do not have to buy very many, as I have shown. Indeed, there have been instances in the past year or two, I am advised, where there have been shortages on the market of this kind of stock being bought cum dividend as their payment date arises. There are simply not enough of them. This is borne out by the fact that the amount appears to be less than £400 million in all.
When the banks buy these, as they do, a day or two before the dividend is payable, for the purpose of maintaining their liquidity ratio, they then pay tax on the dividend. So what is the Exchequer's loss? What is all the fuss about? I feel that we are entitled to ask that question. The interesting thing is that because it is the banks who buy them, the income of about £15 million is computed into the banks' profits and the banks pay corporation tax of 50 per cent on their profits. If these were maintained by individuals to the date of the payment of the dividend, the average tax that they would bear would be more likely the general withholding or standard rate of 35 per cent.
The real joke of the situation is that the Exchequer is actually better off if the dividends bear corporation tax at 50 per cent, rather than general withholding tax at 35 per cent. With what is now being done, the Exchequer is likely to lose money, rather than gain it. That is borne out by one of the most telling points of all in the Minister for Finance's budget speech and in the accompanying table where, in spite of all the fuss which he and others have made about this matter, no figure is given by the Department of Finance for any increased revenue as a result of what the Minister for Finance is doing in this matter — none at all. There cannot be, because the Department of Finance are right.
There will be no increased revenue. Indeed, if anything, there may be a marginal decrease in revenue to the Exchequer as a result of what is now being done. What is being done is not being done to penalise people who are doing anything improper, or to penalise the institutions, or anything else. It is being done because it is perceived, by those who do not understand this — which includes the Minister for Finance — as being another of these illusory sops which are thrown to the Labour Party to keep the 16 of them toddling along behind Fine Gael like good little boys. That was one of the principal objectives of this budget and this is one of the ways in which it is being done. Now the poor Labour Party, God love them, who do not know from Adam what any of this is about, have read in the papers that some kind of a fiddle is going on in the Stock Exchange and the Minister for Finance at their insistence, got rid of it.
On my calculations the Minister for Finance certainly has gained no revenue and probably has lost some. But, far more important than the few million pounds of revenue one way or the other, the Minister for Finance has succeeded in the past seven days in bringing the Stock Exchange to a halt. We saw yesterday that he issued tranches of £80 million of new stocks. It is very interesting to see the new stocks he issued because they all bear a very low coupon, all very short-dated, all issued to try to overcome the difficulties that have been created by this matter. But there is no market in the Stock Exchange at present. All that happened yesterday was that £80 million of £120 million of redemptions which had come up yesterday and the £45 million of dividends which had been paid by the Government yesterday were taken back in by people who had nowhere else to put them. They were taken in on terms that were quite favourable because the Department of Finance had to fall over themselves making the terms favourable.
How much ordinary stock other than the tranches that were issued yesterday did the Government stockbroker buy in Anglesea Street yesterday? He bought nothing. The Central Bank Report — in table D4, page 46 describes all these stocks as marketable Irish securities. Where is the market? Who can sell their stocks if one happens to be a holder of Irish Government gilts at present? Perhaps these are not simply devices or paper used by rich people for their own purposes; these are trustee securities. A lot of those stocks are held for the benefit of infants, people of unsound mind, others for whom money has to be invested and who are entitled to get the benefit of it from time to time. What is the position of an infant who became 21 last week, who had obligations to the bank because he had borrowed against the money that would be paid to him out of court on his 21st birthday? He cannot sell his stock; it is valueless; it is Government paper and no more. He has not been able to sell it for a week. I do not know whether he will be able to sell it today or indeed next week. But these are not marketable securities. In treating their own paper in this way in the past week the Government, due to their incompetence, have pulled the rug out from under the beneficiaries of these trustee securities and have treated them in a fashion I can only describe as most improper.
Among the many lectures we had in the past week we were treated to the inequities of the institutions operating in the Irish money market. Let us look at who are the biggest institutions operating in this market. Without having checked all the figures, probably the biggest two are the two main banking groups, Allied Irish and the Bank of Ireland. Apart from those two banks, without doubt the biggest institution is the Irish Life Assurance Company. Who owns the Irish Life Assurance Company? The Minister for Finance owns 99.99 per cent of the shares. On whose behalf does he own these? On behalf of the people of Ireland. They are the biggest operators in the money market. They are the people who buy and sell more gilts than anybody else. Are these people criminals? Is that company — happily, one of the few rare exceptions of an extremely commercially successful State-owned company here — are the management, the board and the shareholders of that company engaged in something disreputable? That is what we have got for a week now from the handlers behind the Government who churn out to us what we should think about certain matters.
Who else deals in a big way in short-term gilts on the Irish market? Perhaps the next two biggest operators on the short-term gilt scene are the Industrial Credit Company and the Agricultural Credit Corporation. Who owns them? What are they there for? Whose money are they using? Whose interests are they trying to protect? Do these also fall into this category of quasi-criminal people?
The most distressing thing about all of this is not so much the principle of what was set out to be done but the grossly incompetent way it was done by people who do not understand what they are doing. And look at the long-term damage they have caused. Then, see it compounded and see the lack of understanding compounded by the silly speech made by the Taoiseach in Trinity College last Tuesday morning. He gets up there and because he feels he is under pressure from students about their medical cards he describes a scenario in this country that is enormously damaging internationally. The obligation of the Taoiseach of the day, whoever he might be, is not just to a group of aggrieved students. Every time he opens his mouth he has to recall that what he says will have repercussions for this country in Wall Street, in London, in Zurich and in Tokyo. If that speech is read there, as inevitably it will be, what will the people there think of this country headed by a Prime Minister who makes the kinds of statements made in Trinity College last Tuesday morning? He complained about divisiveness within the community. Has any single speech made by any political leader in this country in the last ten years contributed more to divisiveness than what was said last Tuesday? It was supposed to be a philosophical apologia for the mistakes made in the budget last Wednesday week. Look at how it has compounded those mistakes, perpetuated them and intensified the damage. He told that audience that he could speak with objectivity because he was a man of little or no property. There are 600,000 people in this country who own their own houses. I suppose they lack objectivity for that reason, or will they be looked on in coming months and years as people who, because they provided something for themselves and their families out of their savings and borrowings from building societies and so on, in some way form an undesirable part of our society? That is not the Ireland I want to see or to foresee.
That kind of attitude will destroy any spirit in this country that would get us back into the frame of mind in which we can take advantage of our natural resources and abilities. This is an effort, not to equalise society by trying to give a reasonable level of prosperity to everybody, but rather another effort — we have heard it from time to time from some people but we would never have expected it from a Taoiseach of this country — to drag us all down to a level of equality of poverty. Somebody who is in the position of Taoiseach should be able to resist the intellectual or emotional pressures imposed sometimes by articulate people to get us in this country into that frame of mind. That whole attitude, represented by that speech of the Taoiseach and by things done in this latest budget, runs counter to the frame of mind in which the Irish people and nation will best work. It is little wonder, therefore, that we have seen the Irish people and the Irish economy decline so markedly, in the past 12 months in particular, and facing into this rather awesome year of 1984 with less hope than ever.
We were told in the course of various remarks during the week by the Minister for Finance that the situation in the Stock Exchange was now under control. Indeed, it was; it had closed down. It is the same as if the Minister for the Environment told this House that traffic accidents were under control because he had banned all traffic. How foolish can you get?
Last night I watched the Minister for Finance on a "Today Tonight" programme. You often get more information from one throw away phrase than from a long dialogue. In the course of that programme he stated that the Government were not interested in the purchasing of securities. The Government's attitude was that it would be better for people to hold securities until they matured. I do not think the Minister for Finance realised the significance of what he was saying, but in effect he was saying that if you buy Irish Government paper the Irish Government do not want to deal in it until it matures. If that is so, how many people will buy Irish Government paper willingly from now on? We will be told that that was a slip of the tongue, that he did not mean it that way, that it was said in the course of discussion and was not a considered remark. However, it denotes an attitude of mind that frightens people who have to deal with these matters and shakes the already well-rattled confidence of potential investors in our economy.
Most of the discussions that have taken place over the past week in relation to this matter related to interest payments, with the benefit of which the stocks are sold. The capital gain has tended to be ignored, although not by the Department of Finance who were very careful indeed in what they placed on the market yesterday in the £80 million worth of tranches which they sold very astutely to try to overcome the difficulties that were created in the past week. In all the discussions that have taken place I do not think anybody has adverted to the fact that in this new arrangement proposed by the Minister for Finance no allowance is made for variations in interest rates here which would bring about capital losses in the market price of these short-dated securities. If the Minister for Finance is going to change the system he cannot ignore this obvious consequential part of the difficulties he is creating. Capital losses did not matter under the present system because one could offset them against the accumulated dividend. Now the situation is that you are taxed on the dividend and if as a result of this budget and the things that have been done in relation to it you suffer a capital loss of, say, five points, which will be quite likely in the weeks and months ahead, you cannot set that off against the income that accrued on the bond. That is ridiculous. The Minister countered that by saying that you are free of tax on the capital gain. There will not be very many capital gains in this situation except very small ones in respect of bonds which were very close to maturity. That problem did not arise before but it arises now and does not seem to have been dealt with. It will soon be spotted by people who have the responsibility of investing tens of millions of pounds of other people's money and, therefore, must be ultra careful of it. Most of this money is other people's money, those who have life policies with Irish Life, who make deposits with the ACC or put money into life assurance and so on.
Most attention has tended to concentrate on the short-term gilts but the Members of the House will recall that in the paragraph immediately following the very short one which referred to gilts there is a reference to Exchequer bills and what will happen in relation to them. Because for some years past there was an incentive for high taxpayers to tender for Exchequer bills — there is £15 million allotted by the Department of Finance each week for these bonds — the appearance of private individuals in the market created competition for the first time for the associated and other banks, who up to then were the principal tenderers for Exchequer bills. As a result the State was able to get a lower average cost on the Exchequer bills which they were allotting.
In view of the changes that have now been made in relation to Exchequer bills by subjecting the capital gain to income tax the private individual and the high taxpayer will disappear from the Exchequer bill tendering scene. The banks can now, as they have inadvertently done in the past, jockey up the interest rate structure by a few telephone calls to determine the level at which they will tender. If the Minister for Finance does not understand the consequences of that, I hope the Department of Finance understand it and put a stop to it because it is going to force up the effective interest rate on Exchequer bills by perhaps 2 per cent or 2½ per cent over the next couple of months. If that happens in relation to Exchequer bills, inevitably the whole interest rate structure here will be affected and, instead of hoping as we were some weeks ago for a reduction in interest rates, we may well now have further increases which will be directly attributable to these provisions in the budget and to the incompetent way in which they were put across.
We are entitled to ask what the standoff situation is in the gilt market and what are the new Exchequer bills going to do to the structure and the mechanism of the money market here. I do not think it is fully realised that all these are fully interlocking and we can, therefore, expect increased interest costs on Exchequer bills and, inevitably, a tendency for interest rates generally to go up. It is worth reflecting on the situation that has existed here over the last four or five years while the level of inflation was very high. There was no great incentive for private individuals to get into Government gilts. In one year recently inflation was 23 per cent. The highest yield obtainable at that time from gilts was perhaps 15 per cent or 15½ per cent. The only incentive therefore, to be in these Government securities at all lay in the dividend and, even with the payment of very high interest rates like that, investment in Government securities in those years represented a very big capital loss for anyone who happened to be in them. Some people were in them because they were innocent and did not understand what was happening. Others like institutions were in them because they had nowhere else to go. They were suffering a very big loss. They were unattractive for quite a long number of years. Therefore, any of these alleged malpractices which were taking place can only have taken place on a very limited scale. We should realise that and put the whole situation into some reasonable perspective.
As a result of the uncertainty created and the damage that uncertainty does, in much of the economy at present we have a form of paralysis which has been accentuated by the budget rather than alleviated by it. There is one particular form of paralysis — and it is only one of many examples one could give — which could usefully be referred to here today in this debate because of all the consequences there were when it was referred to in the House in December, that is, the question of the Dublin Gas Company, which led to the resignation of a member of the Government because he did not approve of the decision the Government had come to in relation to that company.
What is the position today? Is it any different from the position on whatever the date was, 12 December, when Deputy Cluskey resigned as Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism? It is not. Have that company made any progress since? They have not. Has anything specific or concrete been done in relation to the company since then? It has not. The agreement to which Deputy Cluskey objected has not been finalised by the Government, because they and the Dublin Gas Company are in a state of paralysis, as so much business the Government lay their heavy hand on these days is in a state of paralysis. The contractors are stopping work; 1,100 workers are under protective notice; the credibility of the company has been damaged; and of course the cost of their contracts which they still need to carry out has been greatly increased.
Confidence is missing in that situation as it is missing in so many others in the economy today. The detail of the individual instances does not matter. It is an overall aura of lack of confidence, deepened in every week that passes by these kind of things and, in particular, deepened by the budget of last week. Since the Government, I understand, have discovered in recent weeks that the letter of comfort they issued last year has no legal validity, since the banks will not deal with the company in this situation and since this paralysis is all pervading, could I say very plaintively to Deputy Cluskey: "Come back Frank, all is forgiven, because the thing you resigned about has not been implemented by the Government. You are as entitled to be back in Government today on 2 February 1984 as you were on 2 December 1983."
They have not done anything. Nor are they likely to do anything. Nor are they likely to do anything about the myriad of problems which beset so many companies throughout the country at present, so many of whom want, in private at least, to give up the ghost and the wiser ones of which in retrospect, I regret to have to say, are probably the ones who shifted the main emphasis of their investment out of this country in recent times. It is very regrettable to have to say that. One also recognises that they are the most successful. Those who did that will be able to survive and the profits they are generating abroad as a result of their foreign investment are keeping in being the Irish parts of the company which would otherwise have collapsed in 1983 or 1984.
What is needed now is not some approach to budgetary arithmetic or some emotional ideological approach which will simply satisfy a few Deputies here or there and keep them together for another year.