Anglo-Irish Relations: Motion.

The Taoiseach

I move:

That Dáil Éireann takes note of recent developments affecting Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations and reaffirms its determination to take any and all action necessary to ensure the full use of the procedures and structures set up by the Anglo-Irish Agreement and to secure the achievement of the goals of that Agreement.

We have had some technological difficulties. Copies of my statement should be available by now to party leaders and very shortly available to everybody.

I know that the House has been most anxious to have a further debate on the issues arising from the statement in the House of Commons on 25 January, 1988 by the British Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, on the Stalker-Sampson report, and the judgment of the British Appeal Court on 28 January, 1988 upholding the convictions of the Birmingham Six. I thought, however, it would be desirable to defer a debate until after the adjourned meeting yesterday of the Special Intergovernmental Conference had concluded. I am very grateful for the co-operation and patience shown by the House in deferring further debate until today.

In my statement I will also deal with my meeting with the British Prime Minister in Brussels on 12 February.

I have already outlined to the Dáil in my statement of 28 January the sequence of events and the principal happenings in the Stalker affair, but let me remind Deputies briefly of them again because of their importance as the background to the present difficulties.

Six men were shot dead and one seriously injured by members of the RUC in three separate shooting incidents in County Armagh in the period November-December 1982. Five of those killed were unarmed and they were killed from close range. Weapons which were old, without bolts and useless, were found at the scene of the shooting of two others in a hayshed near Lurgan. It was established that the security forces had the hayshed under close surveillance for some time and it has been suggested that these weapons may have been planted there by the security forces as part of a stake-out. These deaths naturally caused the greatest concern in Ireland, Britain and elsewhere.

We have to contemplate a situation in which six people were killed by the police and one seriously injured, all within three months. Of these seven victims, five were certainly unarmed and there is reason to believe that the other two were innocent victims of a stake-out. False evidence was given at a trial and there was evidence of an official cover-up to hide an undercover operation on the territory of this State. Police inquiry followed police inquiry at the insistence of the DPP, but no report was ever published. A senior British police officer appointed to clear up the matter says publicly that he was obstructed at a very high level and at the height of his inquiry he was removed in circumstances which strain credibility. Now in a statement to the House of Commons the British Attorney General has announced that evidence does exist sufficient to warrant prosecutions against members of the police for perversion of the course of justice. But he has also said that, following consultations with unnamed persons, it has been decided that no prosecutions will be taken for reasons of national interest and that the report will not be published.

It would, I think, be an under-statement to describe this sequence of events as `remarkable'. And it would certainly be extraordinary if the Irish Government, who have such a direct and vital interest in peace, stability and the rule of law in this island, North and South, were to consider the present situation satisfactory. We simply do not.

As the House will be aware, the Government decided on Tuesday, 26 January, that because of the serious implications of the British Attorney General's statement for public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland and for cross-border security co-operation, they would seek an immediate special meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference for the purpose of clarifying the issues involved. The Government's concerns were put to the British Government, through the British Co-Chairman of the Conference, Mr. King, on 2 February in Belfast and at the resumed meeting of the Conference, held yesterday also in Belfast. The two Ministers who represented the Government at these meetings, Mr. Gerry Collins, Minister for Justice, and Mr. Ray Burke, Minister for Energy and Communications, also had the opportunity of an informal meeting with Mr. King and his Minister of State, Mr. Stanley, in London on Wednesday, 10 February.

I also had a meeting with the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in the margins of the European Council in Brussels on 12 February. At that meeting, I conveyed the deep concern and the emotion aroused in Ireland by the developments of the Stalker-Sampson report, the Birmingham Six case and related matters and the importance I attached to an adequate response to the views and proposals put forward by the Irish side at the Special Inter-governmental Conference on 2 February. The Prime Minister stated that the formal response of the British Government would be provided through the Conference by Mr. King. She listened carefully and courteously throughout to the views I put forward, confirmed her view of the importance of the relationship between the two Governments and made it clear that she considers the Anglo-Irish Agreement the best hope for the future. I said that I considered the response by the British Government so far to be unsatisfactory. The British Prime Minister accepted that this way my view.

The issues that we put to the British side at the first meeting of the Conference were:

—that the Stalker-Sampson report be published;

—that the decision not to prosecute RUC officers identified in the Stalker-Sampson report against whom there is evidence of wrong-doing should be explained and the decision reconsidered;

—that there must be a response on the absence of consultation in the Conference prior to the announcement by the British Attorney General that there would be no prosecution in the public interest;

—that a full report should be provided on the covert operation by members of the Northern security forces in our jurisdiction on the night of 12 December 1982;

—that the trust and confidence which must exist between two police forces engaged in security co-operation has been seriously damaged;

—that the Home Secretary consider the use of the wide-ranging powers available to him in regard to the Birmingham Six;

—that there be an awareness of the importance for extradition of the handling of both the Stalker-Sampson affair and the Birmingham Six case because of the effects both these issues have on confidence in the administration of justice and on public confidence and that the requirements of the 1987 legislation be met.

The response to these proposals was, from our point of view, inadequate. We have been told that the Stalker-Sampson report will not be published and that there will be no reconsideration of the decision on prosecutions. Nor has there been anything in the nature of a positive response to our concerns about the Birmingham Six.

On the other hand, some progress has been made on other matters. I understand that Mr. King will be making a statement in the House of Commons this afternoon dealing with the possibility of disciplinary charges and with changes in the structure and control of the RUC. The Minister for Justice will intervene later in the debate on this aspect.

With regret, I have to conclude that no progress has been made on matters of grave concern to us. We have reached an impasse for the present on these issues.

Overall Anglo-Irish relations as such are not at an impasse. There can and must be progress on other important aspects of Northern affairs in discussions in the Anglo-Irish Conference, such as fair employment and other matters of very direct and practical concern to the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland.

I think it necessary at this point to explain clearly and in some detail to the House just why it is that we say the response on some of the main issues which we raised is unsatisfactory. The Government believe that confidence has been seriously eroded and they believe that they should have been entitled under the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Irish Agreement to be informed and consulted in advance of the Attorney General's statement on 25 January on issues which have such a critical bearing on mutual trust and confidence as between the two Governments, between the two police forces North and South and between the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland and the authorities who administer justice and who operate security policy. This was not done.

It is argued by the British Government that the Stalker-Sampson report is a police report and, to quote an answer which Mr. King has given in the House of Commons on a number of occasions, "police reports of this kind are not normally published". It may be that police reports are not normally published, but these are not normal circumstances.

It is said to us that in considering issues of the public interest and of national security the British Attorney General acts and must act alone, that he is not subject to political direction and that he would refuse political direction if it were given. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on this view of the British Attorney General's role. That is an internal British matter. Our concern is that there is an agreement. It is not an agreement with the Northern Ireland Secretary of State. It is an agreement with the British Government. It cannot be acceptable to us that matters which are of vital political importance, and in which our interest is formally recognised under the agreement, should be unexplained or unexplainable because, we are told, they are within the remit of the Attorney General's quasi-judicial role and a matter exclusively for him.

It is said, too, that the British Attorney General acts in this and similar cases in a manner described as "quasi-judicial". That in itself indicates that there is a political as well as a legal content to his consideration of these matters. In fact, in his statement he acknowledges that he went outside the legal and judicial area and took political considerations such as "public interest" and "national security" into account. The Attorney General has consulted others on these aspects. In his statement to the House of Commons he stated:

I have consulted. It is the right of those whom I consulted to indicate to me matters that in their view bear upon the public interest.

Quite clearly this brings his statement and the decision into the political arena and amenable to the political process.

Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement the Irish Government too have clear and explicit rights in this matter and these rights have not been met. Under Article 2 (b) of the Agreement for example:

The United Kingdom Government accepts that the Irish Government will pur forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference.... In the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences

This is clearly a matter within the field of activity of the conference. Indeed, it goes to the heart of a major issue addressed by the conference — the need to ensure that the security forces and the system of administration of justice in Northern Ireland are such that they can command the support of both communities. Yet, despite these explicit provisions, despite our additional interest arising from the subsidiary matter of an undercover operation on our territory and despite expectations raised by past comments by British Ministers at the conference and in parliament there was no consultation — there was not even an advance text before the Attorney General made his statement in the House of Commons on 25 January. We simply learned after the event that although there was evidence sufficient to warrant prosecutions for perversion of the course of justice, the Attorney General had held "consultations" and as a result the DPP in Northern Ireland, who acts under his aegis, had decided that no prosecutions would be brought. This, it appeared, was to be the end of the matter as far as prosecutions were concerned; and the report which had been so long in the preparation, would not be published.

I have to say — and I have said — the matter cannot be allowed to rest at that. It is not enough to speak of the position of the Attorney General; or that he himself must be the sole judge of who should be "consulted" on a matter where his consultations clearly extended beyond purely legal issues into the political field.

The Stalker-Samson affair and the Birmingham Six case also impinge in a very direct way on extradition. Although neither case itself involved extradition, both cases nevertheless have clear implications for confidence in the administration of justice and in the prospect of fair treatment for Irish people who might be extradited to Britain or the North. Extradition is an issue about which there has been widespread and increasing concern in this country. The major concerns have been that extradition should not be unreasonable or arbitrary and that a person who is extradited should get a fair trial in the requesting country. The events of the past few weeks have demonstrated how well-founded these concerns are.

It was to meet these concerns that the Government introduced the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987, so as to provide vital new safeguards for our people in our extradition arrangements with Britain and Northern Ireland. The principal safeguard, now enshrined in our law, is the requirement that the Attorney General must form an opinion concerning the existence of a clear intention to prosecute on the part of the requesting authorities and the evidential basis for such an intention. The Attorney General, after he has completed his consideration of each case, is required to give a direction to the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána not to endorse an extradition warrant unless he is of the opinion that there is such an intention and that this intention is funded on the existence of sufficient evidence.

The exercise of this important new function, is under the Act, a matter for the Attorney General and it is for him to consider in each case the information which he deems appropriate to enable him to discharge his statutory obligation. On 17 December last the Attorney General wrote to the British Attorney General confirming the requirements of Irish law under the new Act.

Notwithstanding this the Attorney General was informed by the British Attorney General that the latter would not provide any material relating to the evidence forming the basis for the British prosecuting authority's intention to prosecute.

I have been informed that warrants in a number of cases to which the 1987 Act applies have been received. I am informed by the Attorney General that a confirmatory note from the British Attorney was received by him in respect of one case but the absence of any material relating to the evidence in any of these cases means that the provisions of the 1987 Act have not been complied with. The present position is that no warrants to which the 1987 Act applies have, as yet, been endorsed. The implications of this situation are, of course, quite serious. If the British Government persist in refusing to operate the new procedures in accordance with the Irish law, and the Attorney General does not receive the necessary information, extradition will not be possible at all in cases covered by the new Act.

I want to give this House a solemn assurance that the new Act passed by the Oireachtas in December last will be strictly adhered to and the safeguards provided for will be fully implemented. The exercise of his functions under the Act is entirely a matter for the Attorney General and I have every confidence that he will exercise those functions fairly and effectively.

I also wish to remind the House of my announcement in December that it is the intention of the Government to monitor the trial of persons who are extradited from this country. Extradition is a very important instrument in the fight against serious crime and international subversion. Extradition is also an inherent part of the international rule of law as it is applied between civilised and democratic States.

It would not be a solution to anything to allow extradition to remain inoperative. Indeed to do so would create a grave problem in itself. The prudent, practical course is to have extradition but only to have it subject to reasonable and effective safeguards in the interests of Irish citizens. As I have already pointed out, these safeguards are now in place following the enactment of the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987 and it is on the basis of these safeguards, or not at all, that extradition will proceed. That represents a balanced rational approach to the needs of the situation. It is the approach adopted by the Government and the Oireachtas, as is our right.

I should also like to mention briefly another matter — the controversy about the intentions of the British Government in regard to the Prevention of Terrorism Act which cloud the atmosphere further.

Since the Act was first introduced in 1974 it has been renewable annually and it has been replaced by a wholly new Act every five years. The current Act is due to lapse in 1989 and it is expected that a new Bill will be introduced in the British Parliament to replace it. The Government have been informed that the present intention of the British Home Secretary is to propose that the Act will continue to be titled formally The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act and should continue to be renewable annually, but that the provision for replacement of the entire Act every five years should be removed.

The British Home Secretary's statement in the House of Commons last night was a first reaction by the British Government to the report of the person appointed to review the Act, Lord Colville. The Government have already expressed views to the British Government and to the reviewer, Lord Colville, on the content of the Act and on its day-to-day operation in Northern Ireland and in regard to Irish people in Britain. We have been assured by the British Government that we will have an opportunity for full discussion of their intentions before new legislation is introduced. It should be realised that whatever about the purposes of this legislation, its implementation has been discriminatory and insensitive and has caused widespread resentment among law-abiding Irish people who rightly or wrongly view it as racist in its operation.

I come now to the issues of security and security co-operation. I want to make our position absolutely clear. Responsibility for the security of this State and the obligations in the security field which we have towards our neighbours in Northern Ireland rest fundamentally on the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces. The Garda Síochána are the police force of this State and as such are responsible under our laws and Constitution to the people and Government of Ireland. They are not in any sense an Anglo-Irish police force.

The resources that we as a State have committed, and are committing, to the security area in general are in place because it is our judgment that they are necessary in the interests of all of the people who live in this island. We have put, and we retain, these resources in position, despite their very heavy cost, because we believe that it is right and necessary to do so. Our commitment in this area is freely given, in the common interest of society, North and South, to ensure that the forces of terrorism — whether domestic or of international origin — will not prevail. I want to emphasise that our determination and resolve to do everything in our power to defeat the men of violence and to maintain democracy and the rule of law will in no way be lessened by the unfortunate events and difficulties of recent weeks.

To be effective, however, co-operation in any sphere demands trust and confidence between those who co-operate. Trust and confidence of a very high degree are most certainly an essential requirement between two police forces who are engaged on co-operation as sensitive, as complex and indeed as dangerous as that engaged on by the Garda Síochána and the RUC. Any sensible and responsible person must acknowledge that a certain amount of damage has been done to our common security concerns by the developments we are discussing.

The events leading to the Stalker-Sampson report and the controversial removal of Mr. Stalker from his inquiries at a particularly crucial stage have cast a shadow over the reputation of the RUC for some time past. But relationships between the two forces did improve over recent years because of our expectation that the Stalker-Sampson report, when it eventually came, would clear the air.

The clear expectation, encouraged by numerous exchanges on the matter between Ministers and senior officials, was that all issues arising from the alleged shoot-to-kill incidents would be publicly aired, that those culpable in any wrong-doing would be identified and brought to justice and that the clearest possible signals would go out that events of the nature complained of could never again happen or be countenanced. To the extent that it has now become clear that this will not happen, all the doubts have surfaced again and may indeed have intensified.

I am well aware of the appalling casualties suffered by the RUC. Over 250 members have been killed or murdered, often in cold-blooded and callous circumstances, and hundreds more maimed or seriously injured. I understand the suffering and loss endured not just by the victims but by the widows and families, colleagues and friends. I am aware too of the determined efforts of the RUC in recent times to apply more even-handed policies, for example, in the control of parades. These things were securing for the force a level of acceptance. For this reason the recent decisions about the Stalker-Sampson report, which do so much to undermine this acceptance, cannot be in the ultimate interest of the RUC itself. Confidence has been eroded, or possibly it might be more accurate to say, confidence in those who have responsibility for these matters had been eroded.

This has very real implications for the Garda Síochána. The Garda Síochána here enjoy virtually total community support. This is one of the most valuable assets that any police force can have. It cannot be allowed to be endangered. A loss of confidence is not something that can be restored by direction; it is not possible to compel one force to have confidence in another or to give that full measure of confidential co-operation which should exist. These things come only from motivation based on trust in the standards and integrity of the other side.

It has been publicly stated that disciplinary proceedings may be considered, involving certain members of the RUC, arising out of findings of the Stalker-Sampson report and that certain structural changes may take place. We will observe any changes under these headings and see what impact they may have on the restoration of trust and confidence between the two police forces.

In the security area, we have two priority objectives: (1) the protection of the security of this State, and (2) the protection, to the utmost of our ability, of the interests and security of all the people of Northern Ireland. It is those objectives that dictate cross-Border co-operation. It is obviously in the interest of both communities that this co-operation should be as effective as possible. Only the men of violence stand to gain from anything less. As a civilised State we have an obligation to defeat the forces of terrorism and subversion and we will discharge that responsibility.

These then are our concerns. I have tried to give the House as clear an account as possible of just how serious they are and on what they are based; how far they have been met; and more significantly how far they have not been met; and what I believe our policy must be in face of this situation.

These concerns are, I believe, widely shared in Northern Ireland and in Britain; and they are well understood and shared abroad by news media and others who take a serious interest in Northern Ireland and in Anglo-Irish relations.

I believe that the debate in the European Parliament last week was also a remarkable manifestation of European opinion as well as considerable moral support to the position of the Irish Government on these issues.

Let me say before concluding how important it has been that the Government in presenting our case to the British Government were able to count on the full backing of this House. The Leader of the Opposition, Deputy Dukes, made it clear in the debate we had on 28 January that he found the decision of the British authorities not to bring prosecutions for perversion of the course of justice "astounding". He felt too that disciplinary proceedings would "not respond to the concerns that have been expressed in this House and elsewhere."

Likewise, Deputy O'Malley in the same debate said that the announcement of the British Attorney General "leaves in place within the RUC force in the North a cadre of police officers who are known to have perverted the course of justice and to have organised perjury and misinformation on a massive scale." He too thought that mere disciplinary action would be completely inadequate. Deputy Spring has also been strong and firm in asserting that what has happened is unacceptable.

The support in this House has done no more than reflect the strong feelings of Irish Public opinion on these issues. We want to see the present difficulties resolved to our satisfaction in the interests of political progress in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Dukes

The fact that this debate is beginning here this morning in advance of a statement in the House of Commons this afternoon by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the one hand gives us in the House an opportunity to make our views known before that statement is made, although I am bound to say that on the record of the past few weeks it does not seem to me that it would be realistic to expect that what we say here will be listened to with any great attention in the House of Commons.

On the other hand, it puts us at some disadvantage since we in the House and the general public will not be aware until later this afternoon of what the British Government's response is to a number of the issues that have been raised by the Taoiseach and by two of his Ministers in recent days. Timing is not perhaps as we would wish it to be. Nevertheless it is important that we in this House should put on record our view of how and why we have arrived at this point and draw some conclusions from that as to our conduct in the future. I do not intend to rehearse the events that have started off this whole process. They have already been well detailed in this House and need no further elaboration.

What I want to look at is the sequence of events since 25 January this year and what shaped those events. There is a certain air of unreality about all the things that have happened since then. It started with the extraordinary announcement on that date by the UK Attorney General — as the Taoiseach has reminded the House I found that announcement astounding — that no criminal proceedings would be instituted on foot of the Stalker-Sampson report. But, following that statement, the publication of John Stalker's book and the revelations that he made in the course of numerous interviews and articles brought into the public arena and gave shape to a number of suspicions, doubts and questions which have surrounded the events of November and December 1982, the Stalker-Sampson inquiry itself and the circumstances of Mr. Stalker's removal from that inquiry.

On the 15th of this month the public here learned for the first time, from reports which the newspapers said came from Government sources, that, as a result of objections on the part of the United Kingdom Attorney General, the British authorities have been sending extradition applications to our jurisdiction without any supporting evidence. We were told by the same reports that, notwithstanding discussions during the course of two meetings at senior official level and one meeting at ministerial level, the matter has not been resolved. That seems to give a fairly clear picture. However, the puzzling feature of this part of the picture is that it is apparently seen very differently by the British authorities. Again I am relying in what the newspapers call Government sources. But I have been given to understand by such sources that the United Kingdom Attorney General and his officials for some time have been seeking a meeting with their Irish counterparts in order to work out the practical details of what has to be done in order to conform to our requirements following the passing of the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that one or other of the Governments is not being entirely frank about this. But it is possible that both statements are true and that this is yet another example of mutual incomprehension and of muddle caused by a lack of commitment and proper application to the Anglo-Irish process. Our Government's complaint appears to be that the United Kingdon Attorney General is sending over warrants without any supporting evidence. Section 2 (a) of the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987 surely places the onus on our Attorney General to specify what information he needs in any case in order to consider that information and allow him discharge his duties under the terms of the Act. It seems to me that it is at least possible that there is an area there of simple, straightforward, mutual incomprehension that could properly be resolved or that should properly be dealt with by a correct commitment and use of the procedures set up under the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

On Monday night last we heard of the latest twist in this whole affair with the news that the United Kingdom authorities intend to make permanent the provisions of the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, making that Act a permanent part of United Kingdom law, as it was up to 1984.

I have not included the decision of the Court of Appeal on the Birmingham Six case in this list of events because I do not believe it properly belongs there. Whatever our feelings about this case — and there are very strong feelings about that case in this House — it is not part of the group of problems and issues addressed by the Anglo-Irish agreement. In my view it was quite wrong of the Government to raise this as one of the issues and present it as one of the five demands mde by the Ministers for Justice and Communications during the course of the Anglo-Irish Conference meeting last week. This is a matter for direct contact between Dublin and London outside the framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, not one to be passed through the secretariat or through the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who has no function in relation to that matter. While mentioning that matter briefly I should like to say that I join with a good many other people, both here and in the United Kingdom, who feel that if people who have been investigating this case have information, who claim to have information to name people other than the six who are now in prison — who were involved in that crime they have an obligation to make that information available——

Deputies

Hear, hear.

Mr. Dukes

——so that, if it is the case that other people carried out that crime, they can be brought to justice and innocent people can be set free and vindicated.

All of these events, the sequence I have mentioned since 15 January last, have had a dramatic impact, bursting unexpectedly, as they did, on public opinion here. The Government clearly knew about the problem in relation to extradition before that difficulty became public. But it appears that the Government were just as surprised as public opinion in general by the statement last month by the United Kingdom Attorney General about the Stalker-Sampson report. It appears also that the Government, again, were just as surprised as the general public by Monday night's news about the Prevention of Terrorism Act. I must say that the Government must be faulted on both counts. If the Government had been giving the proper and necessary attention to each of these areas it is hardly conceivable that they would have been so taken by surprise. Had the Government, through the meeting and procedures of the Anglo-Irish Conference, been giving sufficiently strong and regular emphasis to their proper concerns with the Stalker-Sampson report it is inconceivable that they would not have foreseen, have had knowledge of or have been forewarned, in however confidential a way, of a substantial change in direction by the United Kingdom authorities.

I want to make it clear again — lest there by any shadow of doubt about it — that the United Kingdom Attorney General's statement of 25 January last constituted a major change of direction on this issue. As I have said before in this House and elsewhere, we had reason to believe, late in 1986, that a number of senior RUC officers would be prosecuted on foot of the investigations carried out by Mr. Stalker and Mr. Sampson. I believe our Government did not devote enough time, resources or attention to the Anglo-Irish process during the course of 1987. As a result I believe they failed to get information which a proper use of the mechanisms of the Anglo-Irish Conference would have provided.

I believe much the same kind of thing can be said about the developments in relation to the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Act, in its present form, dates from 1984 and lapses in 1989. As I understand it, the powers vested in the British Government under that Act fall to be renewed annually. The British Government have been presented with a report which strongly recommends that the Act be made permanent. They must, of course make up their own minds as to the appropriate course of action to be followed but they still have an obligation, under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, to consult the Irish Government, through the conference, on matters affecting the areas covered by the agreement. The operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in relation to people from this jurisdiction and Northern Ireland is very clearly a matter which comes within the framework of that agreement.

The proposal now appears to be that the Act will be made permanent with effect from 1989 and that the powers vested in the British Government by the Act would continue to be subject to annual review. To say that that means that the provisions of the Act are not being made permanent — as has indeed been said by the British Home Secretary and others — seems to me to draw a very fine distinction indeed. Of course, the British Government's proposal immediately raises the question as to whether it is a matter of any significance that the decision be taken now or later in relation to the permanence of an Act which lapses in 1989. Given the claimate which has surrounded Anglo-Irish relations since 25 January last it seems to me to be tactless, to say the least, to raise the issue in this way at this time. A decision at any time to make that Act permanent, that is to revert to the pre-1984 position, would be a matter of some difficulty in discussion between any Irish Government and British Government of the day but to compound that difficulty by bringing it forward, when it does not seem strictly necessary, seems to be unnecessarily provocative.

It may be that this is another example of muddle on the part of the British Government. It is conceivable that the British Government arrived at the final stage of their consideration of this measure before the Attorney General made his statement on 25 January and that it has taken until the beginning of this week for the process of printing the Bill and the other paraphernalia which goes with it, to produce a Bill. But even if that were the case, it was open to the British Government to make a decision to scrap the Bill as it was, to defer the consideration of a proposal to make the Act permanent until a later stage and simply to renew or review the powers, as they are required to do anyway.

Here again our Government had warning that the matter was coming up. As I said, the powers vested in the British Government under the Act have to be reviewed annually. There is in existence a report which recommends that the Act be made permanent. Had the Government been using the channels of the Anglo-Irish Agreement properly, had they been expressing their concern about the operation of this Act on a sufficiently regular and firm basis, they would surely have been in a position to divine the intentions of the United Kingdom authorities, and indeed, they might well have been consulted in advance.

Last summer I stated it was my impression that the Government were not giving enough attention to the work of the Anglo-Irish Conference and that they were not devoting enough resources to the work of the Secretariat. Nothing I have heard since then gives me any reason to change this view. On that basis I can only conclude that the Government have missed opportunities to take action which might possibly have avoided, and would probably have lessened, the difficulties we are now facing. These difficulties must, therefore, be attributed not only to insensitivity on the part of the British Government but also, in part, to inactivity on the part of our own.

The statements and actions of the British Government must be considered against the background of the provisions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and measured against the commitments and undertakings freely entered into by two Governments when they signed that agreement. The United Kingdom Attorney General's statement of 25 January last clearly implied a step back by the United Kingdom Government from the obligations contained in article 7 of the agreement. In so far as it gave priority to a particular view of the public interest and the importance of national security over the application of the rule of law in all circumstances to a police force, it moved away from the conviction expressed by the two Governments in article 8 of the agreement on the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

The British Government's move in relation to the Prevention of Terrorism Act certainly moves away from the obligation of consultation which is implicit in the structure of the agreement itself. It also represents a step back from the obligations on the two Governments to consider together questions of security policy as provided for in article 7, and I would argue that it does not accord with the concern set out in article 8 with the improvement of public confidence in the administration of justice.

The United Kingdom Attorney General's position in relation to extradition, while less clear, must be viewed in the light of the specific provision in article 8 of the agreement that the Conference shall be concerned with policy aspects of extradition. The actions of our own Government must also be examined in the light of the provisions contained in the agreement. Article 2 (b) of the agreement specifies:

The United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference in so far as these matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences.

There are grounds for believing that the present Government have not measured up to that task and, in that way, have been negligent in their approach to the operation of the agreement. These deficiencies on the part of each of the two Governments must be remedied.

I want to turn attention to the future and where we go from here. The obligation on our Government and the prescription for their behaviour can be very quickly and easily stated. They must take the agreement seriously and they must approach the opportunities and obligations of the agreement vigorously and with determination. They must use the facility given by article 2 of the agreement to the full. They must use the structures and procedures set out in article 3 to the full and they must live up to their obligations under all the other articles of the Treaty without equivocation. It is for these reasons I consider it essential to underline the emphasis in the motion before us on ensuring the full use of the procedures and structures set up by the agreement.

It is clear that no further progress towards the peace and security which are the goals of the Anglo-Irish Agreement can be achieved without a proper and wholehearted response by the British Government. A review and assessment of the events and statements of the last three weeks beside the duties and obligations of the agreement indicate the path that must be followed.

First, the British Government must publicly recognise that their actions, whether intentionally or otherwise, have been direct causes of tension. Second, they must agree to give our Government full access to the Stalker-Sampson report and full briefing on all aspects and angles of that report. Third, they must give our Government a full account of the cross-Border incursions which have remained unexplained since the end of 1982. Fourth, they must immediately undertake disciplinary proceedings within the RUC so that those who have deliberately attempted to pervert the course of justice and to obstruct a valid and properly authorised investigation no longer play a part in the operation of the force.

Fifth, they must quickly announce the changes in the structures and management of the RUC which the Stalker-Sampson report reveals as necessary. In this regard there is an irony in the conclusion to which I think most of us have come on the basis of information we have so far, that one of the changes in the structure of the RUC must be to abolish the division in command between certain special units in the force and the main body of the police force itself. For quite a considerable period in discussing matters under articles 8 and 9 of the agreement, the British authorities and the RUC were anxious to press upon us the proposal that we should adopt in our Garda force the same kind of structure that is in operation in the RUC, a structure which it now appears had a big part to play in the incidents which took place at the end of 1982 and which caused so much trouble. We resisted that on the simple grounds that experience here indicated that to have units of a police force operating semi-independently, or almost totally independently, of the command structure of that force in a given division was a recipe for trouble, and that turned out to be the case in Northern Ireland.

Sixth, the British Government must review their position in relation to the Prevention of Terrorism Act and enter into real and meaningful discussions with our Government both on the problems which, in the British Government's view, continue to necessitate the Act itself, and on the problems to which the Act gives rise in connection with public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly here and in Northern Ireland. Seventh, I think it essential that the two Attorneys General meet very quickly to agree on the means by which effect can be given to the new provisions in relation to extradition. It is time to stop what seems to be a slow hesitation waltz between the two Attorneys General. Far be it from me to criticise holders of that office, either here or anywhere else, but it seems that there may be excessive concern with the formalities of positions on the two sides of the Irish Sea which are probably getting in the way of a proper meeting of minds to give effect to procedures which both Governments have agreed to put into operation. Finally, the British authorities must take steps and indicate what those steps are to ensure that there are no further unauthorised incursions by British or Northern Ireland security forces whether on the surface or in the air.

We in this House must make it very clear that there can be no question of any withdrawal from full co-operation on cross-Border security matters. Any such move would be utterly futile, endanger people in all parts of this island, give a clear signal to terrorists that they can step up their campaign of violence and, in a very short time, would put the UK authorities and ourselves in an absurd situation from which nobody else could rescue us. I regret that the Taoiseach has prevaricated on this issue since 15 January. In a statement to this House shortly after the UK Attorney General's statement, he indicated that cross-Border security might be affected. In a later speech in Cork he indicated that it would be affected. I have no doubts whatever on this issue. Cross-Border security co-operation is vital for everybody in Northern Ireland and in our jurisdiction. Whatever we might feel about UK Government policy and however much we may disapprove of it — and whatever steps we take to get the British Government to change their policy — cross-Border security co-operation is not a bargaining counter, a tradeable commodity or a means of retaliation.

I am glad to note, on the basis of his statement to the House this morning, that the Taoiseach seems to have come around and to have rejoined those of us who will not accept that we should further damage ourselves by reducing the ability of the Garda Síochána as well as the RUC to deal with the problem of terrorism. It should be clear to all of us that there is a very serious and continuing threat from outside our shores. The Provisional IRA seem to have access to large quantities of modern arms. We all congratulate the Garda on their recent success in unearthing a large find of such arms. It is equally the case that the so-called Loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland have access to similar types of arms and we must congratulate the RUC on their success in intercepting quantities of arms apparently destined for these terrorist groups.

A large external supplier — if not more than one — is prepared to supply these arms to terrorists in this country. Indeed, given the similarity between the arms contained in the recent hauls made by the Garda Síochána and those found by the RUC, there seems to be room for speculation as to whether the one supplier or dealer is not trading with opposing groups of terrorists on this island. That would not surprise me since illegal arms traders have no scruples.

We have had another hysterical reminder in recent days that the Libyan leader is still of a mind to cause trouble on this island, partly for reasons that have no connection whatever with us and partly on the basis of his frequently stated support for the Provisional IRA. In the light of recent events, that can only mean he is prepared to supply arms or to facilitate their supply to terrorist groups here. In the light of all those considerations, no sane person with any concern for human life on this island could possibly contemplate any interference with the process of cross-Border security co-operation.

As I said at the opening of my remarks, we may be in a position later this afternoon to have more information about the response of the British authorities to the matters that exercise us here today. I hope at that stage that we in this House will be in a position to show unanimity on the path we need to follow from here. The motion stresses the full use of the procedures and structures set up by the Anglo-Irish Agreement and again stresses the importance which we attach to the achievement of the goals of that agreement. On the basis that that formulation of our wishes had the agreement of all parties, I decided we would support that motion. Some people appear to have had second thoughts in the meantime but that is not particularly important. However, the amendment put down in the name of The Workers' Party is the most unwise formulation that could possibly have been devised and one which will give aid and comfort to people who want to see the disappearance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and, therefore, to take out of our system the most valuable tool we have been able to construct for many years to deal with the problems that face us.

My concern is that, whatever our view about how we have arrived at the present point and however we allocate responsibility between the British Government and the Irish Government for errors that have led to that situation, this House should be unanimous in deciding what path we follow from here. We must make it absolutely clear that we are determined to use the instruments which the Anglo-Irish Agreement has given us to achieve peace and stability on this island, to do it in a way which respects the identities, traditions and the cultures of all the groups of people who live on this island and to give them their proper place in an island, which for too long, has been at the mercy of violent men and women who seem to care more for the traditions of the past, for the values of a society which never existed here and who are prepared to sacrifice their own brothers and sisters in the pursuit of that illusion.

Mr. D. O'Malley

The motion before the House seems to be extraordinarily vague and I presume it is only intended as a vehicle to allow a discussion to take place. It would be more appropriate to try to set out in a brief way the feelings of the House — and perhaps the country generally — in regard to the matters we are discussing at present. I sought to do that in the form of an amendment but I understand it is not possible to move it. If it causes any difficulties to anybody or if there is any understanding to the contrary that our views would not be set out in a form like this, I am certainly quite prepared not to press it or to move it.

Nonetheless, I want to read the amendment as a way of summing up adequately the present situation and some of the things that should be done. After noting the developments in Northern Ireland and in Anglo-Irish affairs the amendment reads "that Dáil Éireann deplores the decision of the British Attorney General in relation to the Stalker-Sampson report, and its adverse consequences for constitutional nationalism on this island; reasserts its strong commitment to the maintenance of the rule of law through every means at its disposal, including maximum cross-Border security co-operation; and reaffirming its support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement, calls for the establishment of an inter-parliamentary tier as provided for, and urges an early summit meeting between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister with a view to normalising Anglo-Irish relations."

The amendment expresses fairly clearly the views which many people hold in relation to things that have happened in recent weeks and it also sets out a number of the things they would like to see happening in the next few weeks to try to rectify the situation.

I listened carefully to the Taoiseach's speech as delivered this morning and as is often the case there is nothing in it with which I would take issue. What I do take issue with is what is not in it. There is absolutely nothing said about what will happen or what should happen from now on. It is a recital in some detail of what has happened in recent times. It reflects with some disappointment, some anger and some sorrow on some of the things which have happened in recent times but it does not put forward any policy for this country in relation to it: it simply suggests that we will have more or less to wait and see. Our own attitudes and policies should be far more positively and strongly expressed than has been the case on the part of the Taoiseach here this morning. I know he may not be as free to say all the things he might like to say, as are some other people in the House. Nonetheless, he has an obligation to point more precisely and more positively in particular directions than what we have heard from him this morning.

It is difficult to realise that three months have elapsed since the virtual unanimous consensus of views in both Ireland and Britain which arose after the Enniskillen outrage, a consensus that terrorism had to be defeated and that the people of both countries and both parts of Ireland had far more uniting them than they had dividing them. There was plenty of earnest on the Irish side following that democratic Anglo-Irish consensus against terrorism, that we were willing to play our part in pursuit of that ideal. Despite a bout of predictable verbal Republicanism from some of their backbenchers, the Fianna Fáil Party came around to endorsing the Extradition Act, the first Act of 1987, and bringing it into force on 1 December last.

There was an unprecedented nationwide arms search shortly afterwards, for which I commend the Government and which had the unqualified approval of the great majority of Irish people. Of course, the uncovering of bunkers and the discovery of arms then and since only underlines the fundamental necessity for this State to combat terrorism and the evils of the IRA in particular, not only because of the damage it is causing in the North but also because of the threat of destabilisation which it poses for us in the Republic. That is why in part the Progressive Democrats have been rather dissatisfied with hints, suggestions, nods and winks emanating from the Taoiseach, and occasionally from unnamed Government sources, that there could be a pull back on cross-Border security co-operation. That would be a most retrograde step and one which we would not at all countenance. The amendment we have put down underlines precisely our concern in this matter.

In the short speech delivered this morning by the Taoiseach three pages are devoted to security co-operation and to the difficulties the Garda are seen to face because of what has happened within the RUC. The theory is put forward that the Garda would find it difficult to achieve the proper degree of co-operation with a force they felt they could not trust because there were within it people who had been identified by Stalker as conspiring to pervert the course of justice. That, with all due respects, is being a little bit precious. The Garda Síochána are not shrinking violets, they have been out in the world for a long time. There are plenty of rough diamonds within the Garda Síochána, as there are within all police forces. They all know that they all contain various kinds of rough diamonds. They all know, as we all do for six years, that all is not well within the RUC. They have been able to co-operate very successfully with them to the benefit of all of us on this island for a long time and I think that that can continue to be the case if they cease getting signals which put them in doubt as to whether they should have that co-operation. If any member of the Garda Síochána was in any doubt about some of the things that happen north of the Border — they have known since the time of the Dowra, for example, that unusual or strange things are liable to happen — I do not think they get too upset about it. I would have preferred if today the Taoiseach had been more specific in what he has had to say on this matter rather than leave it in the realms of doubt even though he devoted three pages of his speech to it.

Unfortunately coincidence of events in recent times have heightened the perception of a concerted anti-Irish convulsion on the part of the British Government. This is most unfortunate. I do not believe it to be the case. What is vital, therefore, is that we focus on the real targets where British insensitivity and intransigence are concerned and on areas which enable us to appeal for changed attitudes and a far more constructive response from the British side. In the process we can make a legitimate appeal to British public opinion, which should be just as concerned for the implications of civil rights in their own country that flow from the wrong decisions of their own Government.

The Stalker-Sampson affair is pre-eminently the issue on which we must retain our focus, not only for the implications for the rule of law in the North and confidence on the part of the Nationalist minority in the RUC, but also for the integrity of that police force. Allied to that was the attempted frame-up and fitting out of a senior British police officer, namely John Stalker, who was got at probably by MI5 and other elements of the British establishment because of his pursuit of the truth in Northern Ireland. The attempted framing of that man, a senior British police officer, by a conspiracy that involved apparently his own Chief Constable, the head of the largest police force in Britain outside of London, and the Chief Constable of another major police force, the West Yorkshire Constabulary, has chilling implications for civil liberties in Britain which are a matter of concern not only for Irish people but which should and do concern mainstream British life.

It is interesting to remind ourselves of the manner in which Mr. Stalker was removed and of the fact that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland apparently was not involved in that procedure. He felt that the Irish Government had a very clear interest in the work which Mr. Stalker was doing and that they were entitled to have that. I will quote briefly from page 165 of the recently published book by Mr. Stalker as follows:

In the House of Commons on 18 July 1986 the Prime Minister declined again to answer questions or comment while the investigation continued. Two days later the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King, revealed in a letter to his Opposition counterpart, Peter Archer, that it had been Sir John Hermon who had statutorily approved my removal from the enquiry into his Force, after consultation with the Attorney General and Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Laurence Byford. This was the first official acknowledgement of the role played by Sir John in events surrounding my removal.

Tom King also made it clear that the appointment of Colin Sampson to replace me as investigator was also made by the Chief Constable of the RUC. Mr. King carefully emphasised that he personally had played no part in the decision to appoint Mr. Sampson to the Northern Ireland investigation. He said again, very forcibly, that "The Irish Government naturally is taking an interest in this enquiry, which has a clear bearing on relations between the RUC and the minority community.

They share my concern to see that all issues are resolved as quickly as possible".

It seems that there are very valid grounds for deep concern in Britain as well as here and in Northern Ireland at what has been done. That is why, unlike the Taoiseach and some other speakers, I lay the primary emphasis on the Stalker-Sampson matter because I think that is what goes to the root of it. The British Government legitimately claim that the decision in the Birmingham Six case, for example is an entirely judicial and legal matter and that they have no control over it. I think that is true. Its importance here is its contribution to the atmosphere and the sense of persecution almost which many Irish people feel in Britain.

What is far more important from our point of view and from the point of view of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is the question of the Stalker-Sampson report, the removal of Stalker, the circumstances in which he was removed and the decision not to prosecute afterwards. It is clear from the instances which I have given already, particularly section 3 of the order setting up the prosecution service in Northern Ireland in 1972, that all decisions in these matters are ultimately made by the Attorney General in Britain except, of course, in those matters which he delegates — which he is not interested in — to the DPP in Northern Ireland. Let me quote from page 250 of The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest by J.L. Edwards where he deals with the relationship between the Attorney General and the DPP in Northern Ireland:

This, he explained——

that is, Sir Peter Rawlinson who was the Attorney General at that time——

——is to be found in Article 3 of the Order which ordains that during the currency of the Temporary Provisions Act, the Director in Northern Ireland shall discharge his functions under my superintendence and shall be subject to my directions in all matters. This arises from my new role as Attorney General for Northern Ireland and my answerability to this House in Westminster.

An attempt was made after this announcement by the Attorney General in January to suggest that the decision had been made by the DPP in Northern Ireland and that it had been approved of in some fashion by the Attorney General who had no other function in it. It is now clear that it was the other way around, that essentially the DPP had no function. If the decision was made at political level and after consultation — obviously it was consultation with other political people — it would give rise for legitimate concern as to how far up the line that matter went. It would make it understandable that if there were to be prosecutions some of the defendants might claim they were acting under orders or authorisation from people who were superior to them. It is and will remain the key factor in all of this. It is as important within Britain as it is within Ireland.

It is vital that there should be some way round the effective cover up which seems to be implicit in this so-called national interest decision of the British Attorney General to seek to suppress the report and any prosecutions. I endorse the call which was made in the last day or two by the British Liberal Party's Northern Ireland spokesman, David Alton MP, for a select committee of the House of Commons to examine the Stalker-Sampson affair in the way such a committee examined the Westland controversy in Britain which seemed to get a lot of the way towards establishing the truth and as a result of which several very prominent heads rolled. We must also impress on the British side the enormous damage which is being done to constitutionalism, nationalism, to the cause of peace on this island and to the furtherance of the political process by their Government's obduracy, intransigence and insensitivity. As I see it the tragedy, and I have said it several times, is that only those who resort to violence can benefit from what is now happening.

The attitude taken by the British authorities in recent times also has implications for the level of support enjoyed by the IRA in the United States. Over recent years successive Irish Governments and the Department of Foreign Affairs have worked hard to inform Irish American opinion as to the true nature of the problems on this island and as to the need to build peace and understanding between people living on this island of both the Nationalist and Unionist persuasions. It is not, as they have so often pointed out, a case of the simplistic "Brits Out" sloganeering which unfortunately was very dominant in Irish American circles in the United States ten or 15 years ago and which unfortunately is now likely to enjoy a resurgence in that country. The importance of what Irish American opinion is in the United States is considerable because of the funds and other forms of aid which came from there in the past to this country and which largely had been blocked off in recent times.

It is heartening to see in recent weeks the consistent level of understanding emanating from so many British MPs, including various Conservative backbenchers, and most of the better quality British media which appear to realise that the Irish side cannot in this instance be blamed for the breakdown which unfortunately has taken place. That is why I believe the time is now so appropriate to establish the interparliamentary tier of Members of the Dáil and Westminster as is provided for in the Anglo-Irish Agreement and in respect of which preliminary meetings were held last year but which unfortunately do not seem to have come to anything.

We need to re-establish the post-Enniskillen consensus on this island which extended to a great deal of positive understanding in Britain also. This is now being strained and is in danger of being poisoned. The Irish side have broadly maintained and worked for their bona fides in relation to amicable and constructive Anglo-Irish relations with a shared aim of defeating terrorism and affording the people of both Northern communities the chance to enjoy a normal life. It is time the British began to look very seriously at what has happened on their part over the past month and to realise that they have a very major part to play — 50 per cent — in achieving those objectives which I would have hoped and thought we all shared.

One of the remarkable features of what has been going on over the last three or four weeks, with all the difficulties that have arisen and so on, has been the attitude of the Unionists in Northern Ireland. Some of the recent speeches by Mr. Molyneaux are particularly useful, helpful and significant. What makes them especially important is the fact that those views are being articulated at a time when Anglo-Irish relations at Government level have got tied up in very serious knots. That might be a time when Unionists would have seen an opportunity to take advantage of an apparent falling out between the partners to the Anglo-Irish Agreement but they have not done that. The Taoiseach's response has been a very low key one and was to the effect that if representatives of any responsible body of opinion in Northern Ireland want to meet him he is available for such a meeting. I suggest to the Taoiseach that it is his duty, and indeed his opportunity, to turn that around, act positively in regard to this matter and invite the Unionist leadership to talks.

We are in a period of flux. We need to have some fairly unusual and, perhaps, dramatic things to happen to change it. We have not had an indication of that up to now and we need it. Obviously, while it is very desirable that communications be opened, at least in a semi-formal way, with the representatives of Unionist opinion and that we might hope to see them as frequently as we often see some of the representatives of Nationalist opinion in the North, the vital thing to be done in the short term is to have a full scale summit at Taoiseach and Prime Minister level to try to overcome the misunderstandings or whatever else that have arisen and have caused such anguish to so many people over the past month.

It has not been satisfactory that since the Taoiseach was elected to office just under 12 months ago he has not had a meeting with the British Prime Minister other than three brief meetings, lasting between 20 and 30 minutes each, in what were described as the margins of three of the European Council meetings, on the last occasion when Anglo-Irish problems had become quite serious in some matters, and when the European Council was bogged down in very severe difficulties and the British Prime Minister was obviously under enormous pressure in relation to that, there could be no hope that in a brief meeting in that context anything would be resolved. This is something that needs to be sorted out now at that level. The Anglo-Irish Conference in the last couple of weeks does not seem to be capable of doing that and I do not think it was designed for such fundamental problems as have now arisen. They are problems that could best be tackled by meetings at the level I have suggested. That is why we have put forward that together with other proposals we think would reflect the view of many Members of the House and many people in the country. They are expressed in a positive way with a view and a hope to having progress made and ensuring that the disappointments, and even the anguish that constitutionalists have felt on this island over the last month can be rectified.

Mr. Spring

At the outset on behalf of the Labour Party I should like to very warmly welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs back to the House. We are glad to see him back.

Mr. D. O'Malley

I should like to join with Deputy Spring in that statement. It was remiss of me not to have done that earlier. I am delighted to see the Minister back and looking so well.

Mr. Spring

At the outset I should like to say that there seems to be some confusion or lack of understanding in relation to the amendments, particularly the amendment in my name and put forward on behalf of my party. I should like to clarify the position in regard to our amendment. We received the Government's motion last night and on looking at it I considered it inadequate. On that basis I considered that an appropriate amendment should be put on the Order Paper without further discussion. That was done.

I move amendment No. 1:

To delete all words after "Dáil Éireann" and insert:

1. "deplores the present state of Anglo-Irish relations. Dáil Éireann considers that the failure of the British Government to institute prosecutions on foot of the Stalker-Sampson report brings the British legal system into disrepute and is completely unacceptable. Dáil Éireann also rejects any intention to make the Prevention of Terrorism Act a permanent feature of British law. Dáil Éireann calls on the British Government to exercise its powers of clemency in relation to the Birmingham Six.

Dáil Éireann reaffirms its rejection of armed terrorism, and its commitment to the highest level of cross-Border security. In this connection, Dáil Éireann calls on both the Irish and British Governments to ensure that the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987 is operated effectively, and that any difficulties of understanding or interpretation are resolved as a matter of urgency.

Dáil Éireann calls on the Government to reassess its approach to negotiations with the British authorities on these issues. All future negotiations should take place against the background of an intensive diplomatic compaign aimed at ensuring that our position is understood by those countries which are both supportive of Ireland's interests and influential with Britain.

Dáil Éireann further resolves that in the current situation it is of critical importance that the Inter-governmental Conference should resume its effective role as provided for in Article 2 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and that consideration must be given to removing future negotiation on the issues mentioned in this resolution, and those alone, from the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference, in order to protect the Conference from becoming embroiled in the existing impasse.

Dáil Éireann reaffirms its commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement as the best available vehicle for the resolution of differences between the two Governments in relation to the government and administration of Northern Ireland, and the reconcilliation of the rights and identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland. Further real progress in improving the relations between the two communities cannot be advanced without purposeful and committed dialogue being commenced between diverse political leaders of democratic parties in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. Dáil Éireann resolves that an unequivocal and open offer of such dialogue should be extended to all political leaders who have rejected violence as a solution in Northern Ireland."

In submitting that amendment on behalf of the Labour Party I considered that the Government's motion was inadequate. On brief consideration of the Taoiseach's contribution I must say that many of the fears I held last night have not been allayed.

The Taoiseach recited in detail the problems with which we are all familiar and recited the conduct of diplomacy in international relations for the last fortnight but should we be satisfied with the conclusions he has reached? For example, the Taoiseach stated that the matter cannot be allowed to rest at that. We can all agree that the matter cannot be allowed to rest at that but the questions that must be answered today are: what is going to be done? What are we going to seek from the British Government and what initiative are we going to take given that we have made no progress? If there has been progress or there is perceived to have been some, we have not been informed of it this morning. The Taoiseach might clarify that matter.

Responsibility rests firmly in this House with the Minister for Justice and the Minister for Defence as well as the Government as a whole in relation to the security of the State. If at any time a Government are not satisfied, steps are taken to remove people from office. This happened in the case of a Government of which the Taoiseach was a member and also in the case of a Government in which I served. If the responsible law officers are not conducting their affairs to the satisfaction of the Government, then the Government have power to intervene. Questions which I had expected the Taoiseach to answer have not been answered. I understand the Taoiseach will be replying to the debate and he may try to shed more light on these questions.

The events of the last few weeks have given rise to something worse than an impasse in Anglo-Irish relations. Perhaps the word "impasse" in this connection is a diplomatic expression. If we are going to be truthful with one another, we must admit that those relations are now in a worse condition than they have been for many years. We have to decide in this House where the fault for that situation lies, and what steps must be taken to remedy it.

There must be no mistaking the importance of this debate today. Good relations between this country and our nearest neighbour are of crucial importance for us and for the people we represent. Good relations are only possible if they are built on an atmosphere of mutual trust and mutual respect. It is not in our national interest, and it is not in Britain's national interest, for those relations to break down. There is much more than good neighbourliness involved. Good relations between us and Britain hold the key to a great deal of what is important for us — ranging from continued economic development to the resolution, through peaceful means, of the centuries-old problem of division on this island.

And when they are at the point of breakdown, as they are now, we must be prepared to ask hard questions. It would be easy — may be too easy — to say that the fault lies entirely with the Government of Great Britain. And there is no doubt that that Government have displayed a special kind of arrogance in their dealings with this Republic in the last few weeks.

But we owe it to ourselves also to ask whether there are things we could have done differently here, not only in the interests of preserving relations, but also to ensure that our own house is in order. In this connection, I have to say that I have found it increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that the management of this whole affair by the Irish Government has been amateurish — to the point where I am beginning to wonder if there is a real interest in resolving the matters in dispute.

I intend to develop these points in more detail, but I want first to deal with some of the specific issues that have given rise to this crisis.

We have discussed already in this House the grave issues that arise from the decision of the British Attorney General not to prosecute individuals against whom there is a body of evidence arising from the Stalker-Sampson report. In another context I have already said that the Mayhew decision on that matter must rank with some of the other issues that have come in the eyes of many to personify the current administration in Britain — issues like the Belgrano affair, the Westland affair, and the Spycatcher scandal. It has been gratifying to note that there is a growing body of opinion within Britain itself that regards the Mayhew decision as casting a slur on the entire British legal system, and that finds that decision both inexplicable and unacceptable.

In that connection I find it odd in the extreme that there has not been a concerted diplomatic effort to ensure that that opinion is consolidated and mobilised. On previous occasions when the Irish Government had a point of view to put forward, a great deal of effort was put into ensuring that all sympathetic and influential opinion, not alone in Britain but around the world, was informed. That effort frequently led to a heightened understanding of this country's position, and was instrumental in securing a widespread acceptance of our point of view. There is no evidence that on this occasion any effort was made to keep Ireland's friends and allies fully involved in helping to seek a resolution of the problems, and that must count as a missed opportunity.

On the last occasion I spoke in this House about the Stalker affair, I asked whether it was appropriate to proceed through the Anglo-Irish Conference on this issue. I put forward the view then that we should examine the lead given by David Lange, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, in his dispute with France over the Rainbow Warrior tragedy. Confronted with a situation that was not dissimilar in some ways to the Stalker affair, New Zealand took their case to the court of world opinion, and succeeded in winning the sympathy and support of the world for their case. Instead of doing that, we sought meetings to clarify the situation, and it appears that those meetings were doomed to failure before they began.

As a result of the failure of the negotiations that have taken place to date, we have been hearing ambivalent noises about cross-Border security. Let me make it abundantly clear that there is no way that we in this House should tolerate any diminution in the effort to combat armed terrorism. It would be diametrically opposed to the interests of our people that we should. The use of security as a bargaining counter in our relations with the British would not only be unacceptable, it would be profoundly dangerous. Its long term repercussions for the whole of this island, and especially for the people whom we are directly elected to represent, could be untold. Enough damage has already been done by all these events. We cannot compound that damage by any slippage in our vigilance against terrorism.

It is impossible to talk about cross-border security without dwelling on the subject of extradition. When the Extradition (Amendment) Bill was before this House, speakers from the Labour Party warned about the dangers inherent in the Bill. I would like to quote specifically from what our Justice spokesman, Mervyn Taylor, had to say on the Second Stage debate on that Bill:

If we in law leave it to an individual, in this case the Attorney General, to decide what information he needs, are we not subjecting that individual to the possibility of intolerable political pressure before he makes his mind up? ...One way of avoiding pressure, from the Attorney General's point of view, would be to decide that no information was adequate. The Attorney General who decided that he was going to stop all warrants might not be doing his job, but he might find himself a lot more free from political pressure.

It was obvious to us from a careful study of that Bill that it was essential that any safeguards built into the Bill would have to be specific. We argued that in the absence of specific safeguards the Attorney General, whoever he might be, would find himself most likely following one of two alternatives. Either he would act to stop all warrants, or he would choose not to intervene at all.

In considering the Act that is now the law of the land, the attitude of the British authorities only becomes relevant after one central question has been answered. The Act is only operable, with the best will in the world, if the law officers in Britain know with certainty what are the requirements of the Irish Attorney General. In other words, they must know what he needs in order to be able to form an opinion about the warrant in front of him. Since they cannot read his mind, there is a clear obligation on the Irish Attorney General to tell them, clearly and concisely, what his requirements are. Once the British authorities know what the Irish Attorney General needs, they must comply, but they can only comply when they know his mind.

The first question we have to ask, therefore, is: have the British authorities been advised of the Attorney General's requirements under the Act? If they have not, then someone on our side has been guilty of dereliction of duty. If they have not, then the suspicion must arise that it is the Irish Government, for their own purposes, who want to bog down the operation of extradition.

If, on the other hand, the British authorities are fully briefed about how the Attorney General will exercise his responsibilities under the Act, and if in that situation they are choosing to supply only the information that they deem appropriate, then clearly it is the British authorities, for whatever reason, who wish to stifle extradition between these two jurisdictions. It would take extraordinary arrogance for any law officer to decide that he will operate the law of another jurisdiction in whatever way he sees fit. I do not want to suggest that the British law officers lack arrogance — we have had plenty of evidence to the contrary — but what is puzzling is that any decision not to operate our law would be totally counter-productive from the British point of view. I can think of no conceivable reason why they would want extradition to collapse.

Perhaps the Taoiseach when responding will clarify whether since our Attorney General received a communication from the British Attorney General anything has been done between the two Attorneys General, for example, in relation to the practical operation of the Act at this stage. Would it not be sensible for the Attorneys General of both countries to meet? There is provision for this in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They should get together in order to secure a working arrangement in relation to the Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1987. It is vital that we get firm answers to the questions raised. The absence of a proper and effective extradition procedure is not in the interest of either country. If what is needed is a sharp direction to either or both law officers involved in this dispute, they should get that direction from their respective Prime Ministers. If, however, we discover that our Attorney General has been remiss in carrying out the clear responsibilities that the Act of 1987 placed on him, we cannot let that pass without condemning that omission in the severest way.

There must be many in Britain who were horrified at the announcement last night by the United Kingdom Home Secretary that it is the intention of the British Government to make the Prevention of Terrorism Act a permanent fixture of British law. Anyone who is concerned about civil liberties must have the deepest possible reservations about that Act, even if its necessity has been argued for against a background of terrorism. It is clear that the effects of the Act in combating terrorism have been extremely poor, and its justification cannot be measured in terms of a glorious success in preventing crime.

However, of even more significance than the announcement was the timing of the announcement. In the midst of a delicate situation, the timing can only be construed either as gross incompetence or as the result of a deliberate decision to add fuel to the flames. Either way, it bodies ill for the development of the relations that we need.

Having said that, let me add, in fairness, that I welcome the announcement by the British Home Secretary that it is intended to continue the practice of requiring a positive decision in the House of Commons on a yearly basis in respect of the continued use of the powers in the Act. I hope that the day will not be far away, when those powers will be unable to attract a majority in the Commons.

I must now make some points that some Members of this House may not wish to hear. At the start of my remarks I referred to the approach being followed by the Irish Government as amateurish. That is the kindest of the many words I could have used.

The criticisms that must be levelled at the Government's handling of this affair cover several areas. First, there was a marked indifference to the procedures and structures of the Anglo-Irish Agreement throughout the first eight months of this Administration. Those same procedures and structures about which we are being asked to reaffirm our determination today did not witness much determination in the period I have mentioned. Instead, there was a distinct impression that this Government did not regard the agreement as high on their list of priorities at all. Given Fianna Fáil's track record in relation to the agreement, that may not be surprising, but it must be said that closer attention to the agreement would have conveyed a different impression to the British Government about our commitment to the use of the procedures. We must ask whether an impression was allowed to go abroad that we were not really serious about the procedures and structures in the agreement until trouble loomed on the horizon.

Secondly, there have been many accusations in this House of insensitivity on the part of the British Government. I concur — we have witnessed incredible insensitivity on more than one occasion — but have our hands been clean in this area? Many people must have been puzzled, as I was, by the visit of a member of the Irish Government to the North of Ireland in a blaze of publicity within the last couple of weeks. I must ask here, was this visit notified to the authorities in the North of Ireland? Were they asked to provide security and other back-up for a private visit, with no advance warning that this was going to be used as an opporunity for an attack on their security arrangements? I have some reason to believe that it was the latter set of circumstances that prevailed, and that that visit was seen as so provocative that it led to a postponement of the Inter-governmental Conference meeting. This is something that needs to be cleared up.

Thirdly, it is fairly clear that the approach to negotiations in this area has been clumsy. The Taoiseach has told us of the specific demands that were made, and the predictable and inevitable replies that were received. He admits that the negotiations have resulted in an impasse. He must have known beforehand that they would, if approached in this way. The situation he describes is the immutable force meeting the immovable mass. That is not the way to negotiate.

Why have we not been told of the contingency plans made by the Government in the event of the predictable replies being received? Is it because there are no contingency plans? Why were these negotiations approached in this way in the first place? Surely it would have been infinitely preferable to avoid putting forward specific demands, inviting predictable replies? The Government should have concentrated on conveying the outrage of the great majority of the Irish people, and ensuring that the onus to come forward with specifics was placed firmly and squarely where it belonged, on the British.

In short, there is an impasse and that impasse threatens the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I cannot say for certain whether it could have been avoided by more astute negotiation, but it was inevitable given the clumsy approach that was taken.

Fourthly, I referred earlier to the absence of any diplomatic background to this whole affair. This makes no sense at all. We have friends in the world, people who understand our position and are prepared to help. Not only are they not being asked to help, I understand they are being kept in the dark as much as the rest of us.

In conclusion, I regret to have to say to the House that we have been told nothing today that we did not know already. I hope the Taoiseach will take the further opportunity afforded him when replying to this debate to clarify some of the questions which remain. It is in the interests of all of us to seek consensus, the consensus which the Taoiseach looked for this morning, in relation to a very delicate matter, the relationship between this Government and the UK Government. Answers must be forthcoming.

It will be in the interests of this House and this country if consensus can be brought about in relation to the working of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That consensus was not present in this House on 19 November 1985 when the Taoiseach addressed this House on the debate as to whether we should accept the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I hope that in further contributions made by the Government some effort will be made to strive to achieve that consensus.

The Anglo-Irish parliamentary tier was mentioned and there is provision for this in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. At the Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Meeting which took place in April-May 1987, both sides agreed with the desirability of a Dublin-London parliamentary tier. Will the Government confirm whether any progress has been made with the British Government in relation to the development of an Anglo-Irish parliamentary tier? That would be of benefit to the agreement, it would provide a forum for politicians interested in avoiding the type of impasse we now have and it would allow for development.

I have no wish to divide this House. The matters are far too serious. I know of the constraints surrounding the Taoiseach in matters of this nature but if the questions posed are clarified and if we can get some idea of the direction which the Government will now take it would be of help. For example, will the Taoiseach be seeking a full scale summit meeting? I have stated publicly and I repeat this morning that the idea of discussing, not to mind solving, problems of a major nature which exist in Anglo-Irish relations at the margin of a summit meeting which was itself embroiled in problems of a nightmare scale in relation to the funding of the Community is not an adequate response and certainly not an adequate avenue for resolving these discussions. Perhaps the Taoiseach will inform the House if his intention is to seek a summit meeting at an early stage to try to put Anglo-Irish relations back on an even keel and the Anglo-Irish Agreement back on a working track. The impasse we have at present will not be resolved by a succession of meetings at ministerial level. We have had three of them in the past fortnight and nothing has emerged from them. In the interests of seeking consensus and unity in this House I will look out for directions from the Taoiseach in the course of this debate before deciding whether the motion on the Order Paper in the name of the Government has to be opposed.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy, entirely in the matter of good order, can I get you to confirm that you have formally moved the amendment?

Mr. Spring

Yes.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy Dick Roche.

Tomás Mac Giolla

On a point of order, I had expected to be called after Deputy Spring even though my time would have been cut in two to 20 minutes. Perhaps you will call me now.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I think Deputy Mac Giolla is familiar with the circumstances that have obtained in respect of a debate of this kind, where a spokesperson for each of what can be described as the three major Opposition parties having been called, the debate then went to the Government side after which the spokesperson for The Workers Party was called. It is not proposed to depart from that today.

Mr. Roche

As a long term aspiration of any Nationalist politician must be a united Ireland in which all traditions of this country can find expression by agreement and in peace, those who believe this result can be achieved by violence are hindering progress along that road. Not alone is violence abhorrent in itself, the measures which are necessary to deal with it are both a constant drain on limited economic resources and, unfortunately and all too frequently, impositions which are required to deal with that violence can threaten the civil liberties which can be expected in any civilised society. The path to progress must lie elsewhere.

The Northern Ireland issue has avoided instant solutions in the past and it seems unlikely to be amenable to instant solutions at this stage. However, certain elements that must be considered in any approach to the question have been identified and bear repetition at this point. First, any lasting solution must take into account the relationship between the communities in Northern Ireland. The identities, needs and aspirations of both must be recognised and accommodated. Respective traditions and interests must be protected and safeguarded if any change is to gain widespread acceptance. Second, the rest of the country is clearly involved with the Northern Ireland issue and, therefore, must be involved in any solution. An arrangement which would take into account only the internal situation in Northern Ireland could not be expected to prevail.

The third and critical element as far as we are concerned here at this time is the relationship between the Government in Dublin and the Government in London. That relationship is central to forming a framework on which any solution could be build. Close co-operation and willingness by both Governments to bring imagination, determination, goodwill and sensitivity to bear on the Northern Ireland problem would do much to help advance a solution and a resolution. The present impasse in Anglo-Irish relations arises because the goodwill has been coming from one side only, from our side, while a singular lack of imagination coupled with an almost crass insensitivity is being portrayed by the other side.

It is worth reminding ourselves of the efforts of successive Irish Governments in this decade to record progress. The Summit in Dublin Castle in December 1980 between the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, and the present British Prime Minister gave a new momentum through the efforts of two sovereign Governments in London and Dublin to try to address the problems jointly and find a common way forward. A period followed in which various aspects of current relations between the two countries were examined in depth.

In 1983 the New Ireland Forum brought together constitutional Nationalist politicians from all parts of Ireland and explored the possibilities of advancement. In November 1985 the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the Irish and British Governments set up an Anglo-Irish Conference chaired jointly by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with a secretariat in Belfast staffed by officials from both Governments. The agreement did not fire Fianna Fáil with the same enthusiasm as it did politicians on the other side. In Government, in spite of such doubts as had been harboured at the time of its conclusion, Fianna Fáil have actively and in good faith operated the agreement. It is extraordinary here today to hear speakers from the benches opposite questioning the degree of goodwill this Government brought to the agreement. The allegations made from the benches opposite on this matter are at the same time mischievous and inaccurate to the point of being untruthful, and I will prove this by reference to the facts.

In spite of what has been said by Deputy Spring and by Deputy Barry outside this House and Deputy Dukes inside this House on the operation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement since March last, the facts are as follows. No meeting of the conference took place in the last three months of the Coalition Government and only one regular meeting of the conference was held in the period between June and September 1986. There was, of course, as we are all aware, a special meeting of the conference in 1986 in July. This was requested by the then Coalition because of serious problems which had emerged during the marching season, particularly in Portadown. This meeting was by way of a firefighting operation and was necessitated by a failure of the then Government on this side of the Border to anticipate difficulties and use the conference and its secretariat effectively to head off those difficulties before they burst into flames. There was no need for a similar special marching season meeting of the conference in 1987. The marching season was quieter then than in the previous year, not because the Lambeg drummers and those who strut in their wake had exhausted their energies or enthusiasms nor because more positive pursuits presented themselves to them, but because the Government had effectively used the secretariat and the Anglo-Irish instruments to impress on the Northern authorities that there must be no repetition of the 1986 season's events. To their credit, the Northern Ireland authorities were conscious of the need to avoid the repetition. The effective use of the secretariat and agreement by this Government was well recognised by the SDLP Chairman, Alban Magennis when he said:

... that the (1987) ... marching season... was less troublesome and we welcome that. The better management of parades is a net result of the working of the conference. I think that Loyalists now accept that they can no longer parade willy nilly wherever and whenever they want. That is history now.

That proves that this Government have been conscious of the usefulness of the agreement and anxious to use it. While use of the Anglo-Irish Conference in the closing months of the last Government was tardy, the same cannot in truth be said about the use of the agreement by this Government. In the first six months of office the Minister for Foreign Affairs had three separate meetings with Mr. King, two within the formal conference format and one informal meeting took place in London. That meeting took place literally within days of this Government taking office. The British general election, the Single European Act referendum, the August period of break all intervened in the meantime and following these events were two further meetings of the conference followed by a series of informal meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Northern Ireland Secretary culminating in a meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the British Home Secretary in the closing weeks of 1987 in which we had discussions on the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four and Maguire cases. To say that this Government have not fully used the operations afforded by the Anglo-Irish Agreement is a lie.

Mr. Carey

Is that parliamentary?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Sorry Deputy, "lie" is a word we ask people to rephrase.

Mr. Carey

He will need to rephrase much more than that.

Mr. Roche

Lest I upset anybody's sensitivies in this matter, I am not imputing the lie to any Member here but I will say it is a calculated untruth. The fact that this calculated untruth is repeated here and elsewhere does not improve in any way the validity of the calculated untruth.

I think it would be wrong for me not to recognise that the agreement has facilitated some positive achievements. The conference which it established provides a useful mechanism whereby issues which have given rise to legitimate concern in the Nationalist Northern population can be ventilated. Tangible progress has been made on a number of issues, and there has been an observable reduction in the tensions of the marching season, as I have referred to. Supergrass trials have been discontinued and we look forward to progress with the implementation of a police code of conduct and the introduction of employment equality legislation. These are the positive fruits.

Against this positive background, however glacial the pace of the achievements, the recent body blows to Anglo-Irish relationships must be regarded not only as regrettable but as totally incomprehensible. It would seem from the Irish standpoint that the British Government have embarked on a policy of being progressively, needlessly and destructively provocative. There seems to be a calculated attempt to perpetrate a new outrage virtually with each day that passes. The extraordinary statement by the British Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, that the Stalker-Sampson report was to go unpublished and, because of some considerations of national security, criminal proceedings were not to be pressed, in spite of the evidence of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, was a body blow not just to Anglo-Irish relations but to logic. It was an extraordinary statement for any Attorney General to make in the House of any democratic parliament in any democratic State. It offends logic and indeed if offends the rule of law. Moreover, it was a blow which raises serious questions as to the British intentions with regard to the building of confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, one of the central aims of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. it showed also the beginning of a series of indications of total insensitivity by the British in Anglo-Irish matters.

Deputy Dukes implied this morning that the Irish Government should have known that Sir Patrick Mayhew was about to make his statement on 25 January and should also have known the content of that statement. I submit that all of the evidence flies against Deputy Dukes's allegation. It would be reasonable to believe that the British Government would have informed the Irish Government as to their intentions in this matter. The facts are that they did not and the facts were laid before us by the Taoiseach this morning. Unless Deputy Dukes can prove the opposite is the case, he should desist from hinting that there was some foreknowledge in this matter.

I was in the company of senior members from the main Opposition party when the Stalker announcement was made and to say that they were amazed and that it ran against all they had been led to believe in Government would be an understatement. Not only was there amazement on this side of the Border but it is my information that there was amazement and astonishment on the other side of the unfortunate Border also. There is clear evidence that as late as the Sunday evening preceding Sir Patrick Mayhew's statement journalists in Northern Ireland were briefed to expect that there would be a series of prosecutions. Indeed, even on the morning of the statement a journalist who was in the presence of senior RUC officers reported that there was an anticipation and gloom about the level of prosecutions. It is very clear that there was a reversal of views on this matter at a very high political level in the United Kingdom, probably on the Sunday preceding the announcement. It is equally clear, in the circumstances, that there could have been no forewarning to the Government here and it is unhelpful that the Leader of the Opposition should suggest that this was the case.

The extraordinary statement by the British Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, that the Stalker-Sampson report was to go unpublished was the first of a series of major blows. The second blow in so far as confidence in what is loosely to be termed British justice came later that same week in the judgment on the Birmingham Six case. I do not accept the judgment in this case because it is so blatantly unjust, it runs so blatantly against the facts and it so blatantly and obviously influences the atmosphere with regard to Anglo-Irish relations. I do not accept the suggestion that it is inappropriate for Ministers to use the Anglo-Irish context or any other context to bring this matter before the British authorities. I find it extraordinary that Deputy Dukes this morning should have faulted Government Ministers for seeking to promote the interests of Irish people who are held in British jails for crimes which all of the evidence clearly indicates they did not commit.

Mr. Cooney

What people?

Mr. Roche

The Deputy knows full well what I am referring to. I am not referring to all persons of Irish nationality in all jails; I am referring to the Six, whom some of us have met, to the Four and to Mrs. Maguire and her family who have been left out of much of the comment here today. It is entirely appropriate that Irish Ministers and members of this and the other House should on each and every occasion seek to progress the case of those unfortunate people.

Mr. Carey

Deputy Dukes did not deny that this morning.

Mr. Roche

The Deputy should read his statement closely. The only crime they committed was that they were Irish and were in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The undermining of Anglo-Irish relations by these two events was carried a step further by the revelation that the British Attorney General who had kicked over the hornets nest on 25 January was to take this matter a step further by in effect, rejecting the constitutional authority of the Oireachtas to legislate for Ireland by his refusal to operate the extradition rules introduced by the Extradition (Amendment) Act. The commentary by Deputy Dukes on this issue this morning was incomprehensible, as indeed was the commentary by Deputy Spring. As I have focused on the inconsistency on the former's approach on other issues I will deal with the inconsistencies of the latter's approach on this second issue.

Deputy Spring made an inference that somehow the Irish Attorney General should be responsible for this matter. He did not produce a shred of evidence to support this serious inference but nonetheless he made it in a must unhelpful manner. Whatever else we can presume about Sir Patrick Mayhew and his advisers, I think it is not unreasonable for us to assume that the man and his advisers can read. The requirements of Ireland's Legislature are written down in the Extradition (Amendment) Act and Sir Patrick Mayhew can read the requirements there. His obduracy in this matter should not be used as the basis for pillorying any servant of the Irish State.

As if all this was not enough to sour relations, in a final piece of maladroit timing we had the announcement that the Prevention of Terrorism Act — which has rightly been referred to by Deputy Spring as an odious piece of legislation which flies in the face of civil liberties — is to be made permanent. In spite of the protests which have been made from time to time by British politicians, this odious legislation is not focused primarily on international terrorism; it is focused primarily on Irish citizens. The major burden of this legislation is carried by Irish citizens.

Deputies opposite and Deputies on this side of the House have made the point and will continue to make it throughout this debate that Anglo-Irish relations have reached a sorry impasse, as indeed they have. They have reached a sorry impasse because of bad faith, bad judgment and incomprehensible activities on behalf of another Government.

I commend the activities of the Ministers who are handling this matter on the Irish side. Their response to the provocation has been correct. I do not accept the suggestions that were made outside this House this morning by Deputy Spring that a more provocative, gutsy and aggressive stance is called for. In the face of blank obduracy, intimidatory activities and the total breakdown of logic on the part of another Government, it would not be appropriate for us to respond in kind. We are above all a patient race. For over 800 years we have dealt with the idiosyncrasies of our nearest, closest and dearest neighbour and we have learned during that period, if we have learned nothing else, that we cannot expect that they will come instantly to their senses.

It strikes me that the Government's measured response is a correct response. The motion which is put before the House by the Government deserves support from all sides because the way out of this impasse is for us to subsume such differences in approach as may exist between us and to present a united front on this most serious issue.

Tomás Mac Giolla

Again, I must protest at the restriction of the time allowed to me to deal with this issue, but I will do the best I can to keep within the 20 minutes allowed. Nobody who wants to see progress towards peace and democracy in Northern Ireland, and that is certainly our objective, can be anything but appalled at the sequence of events over the past few weeks which have led to the present crisis in Anglo-Irish relations. It is important to remember that just a few weeks ago the paramilitaries, and particularly the Provisional IRA were more isolated, demoralised and dispirited than at any time in recent years. They were shaken to their foundations by the unprecedented demonstration of revulsion at the Enniskillen massacre by the majority of people, both North and South. There was a feeling that at last sectarian terror could be defeated and that real progress could be made in Northern Ireland. However, the situation has changed in little more than a month. A series of extraordinary decisions by the British Government which were at best enormous errors of judgment and, at worst, deliberate provocations, have given a kiss of life to the Provisionals and done serious damage to the struggle for peace and democracy and civil rights in Northern Ireland.

It can hardly be that Mrs. Thatcher is unaware of the depth of public opinion caused by her decisions in all sections of the community in Ireland. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that she has deliberately chosen to ignore it. Mrs. Thatcher's lack of sympathy and understanding for Irish people, Nationalist or Unionist, has always been evident but in the past few weeks she has treated the people of this island with the sort of contempt that she normally reserves for the British working class and in particular the trade union movement. She has behaved like some sort of medieval empress, ruling by diktat, prepared to bend the law to suit her own political needs and expecting the serfs in the far flung corners of her empire to meekly bend the knee and accept her imperial rule. It is difficult to find any other rational explanation of these recent decisions of hers than a personal grudge and a desire for revenge against the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey. Mrs. Thatcher has never forgotten the independent and neutral stance adopted by the Taoiseach, Deputy Haughey, during the Falklands War, her imperial war, when he refused to go along with sanctions and he condemned the sinking of the Belgrano.

The first and most serious decision in the recent chain of events was the inexplicable and inexcusable decision of the British authorities not to publish the Stalker-Sampson report and not to initiate any proceedings against those involved in the 1982 shootings or the subsequent cover-up. An acceptable police force in which the majority of people can have confidence is an essential prerequisite for political progress in Northern Ireland. This decision did much to undermine the considerable progress that has been made in recent years towards achieving an acceptable police force. It is worth remembering that a major objective of the civil rights campaign, which took to the streets in Northern Ireland 20 years ago and in which we were very much involved, was to secure the reform and disarming of the RUC. These demands were largely conceded by the British Government but the progress made was literally blown away by the Provisionals when they launched their campaign of violence in the early seventies.

The RUC have had a chequered career since then. There were certainly events in the seventies in which their conduct was totally unacceptable. However, there is little doubt that in the past ten years significant progress was being made in reforming the RUC. In recent years, especially, the RUC had become increasingly accepted by the majority of people across the sectarian divide. People in Nationalist areas were seeing the RUC more and more as a normal police force and were prepared to call on them to deal with normal petty crime, house breaking, car stealing etc. which has become such an unfortunate feature of urban life both in Northern Ireland and in the South. As part of our constant campaign for a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland, The Workers' Party have always called for reform of the RUC, the setting up of an independent complaints procedure and the placing of the police service under civilian control. The killing of six people by the RUC in dubious circumstances within a period of a few weeks in 1982, quite rightly shocked many people in Britain and Ireland. The decision to hold a full inquiry into the 1982 shootings was a welcome development but unfortunately the way it has been handled since then is a disaster. The paramilitary groups are the only ones to benefit from it.

The circumstances in which the Deputy Chief Constable for Manchester, John Stalker, was removed from the investigation is a cause for concern, but the decision not to publish the findings of the inquiry or to take any action against those involved is a blunder of enormous proportions which will undermine the efforts of those involved in the difficult task of fulfilling civil rights in Northern Ireland. The British Attorney General in his statement to the House of Commons stated quite clearly that there are grounds for proceeding against persons alleged to have conspired to pervert the course of justice. The decision not to do so on the grounds of security is quite unacceptable and simply illustrates the deplorable double standards that have become the hallmark of the Thatcher Administration. Mrs. Thatcher's obsession with protecting her security forces is legendary, but on this occasion she has shown an unprecedented contempt for legality. One must suspect that the real reason she wanted to put the lid on this affair was that publication of the report would, as the Belfast Newsletter put it in its editorial last week, “point to a trail leading to Downing Street,” meaning, as Dr. Paisley, MEP said in Europe that the Prime Minister through MI5 had direct responsibility for the shoot-to-kill policy.

The disquiet created by the British Government on the Stalker-Sampson affair was compounded by the verdict of the Appeal Court in the Birmingham Six case. This was not altogether unexpected. It was not so much the decision itself that created outrage as the manner in which the British establishment, in the form of the Appeal Court judges contemptuously dismissed and rejected every shred of evidence put forward on behalf of the men and the immediate rejection by the British Home Secretary of any suggestion that he might consider exercising clemency in the case.

Two further developments in the past week have made an already difficult situation almost impossible. The decision of the British Attorney General to refuse to make extradition requests in accordance with the terms of the legislation passed by the Oireachtas is a challenge to the very sovereignty of this State. It is extraordinarily hypocritical that a Government who have made such an issue of the alleged reluctance of this State to extradite persons suspected of being involved in terrorism, should now refuse to operate the legislation designed to facilitate the extradition of these very people. Mrs. Thatcher seems to indicate that we have no right to legislate for the manner in which extradition should be implemented.

The final turn of the screw was the decision to make permanent the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In a submission last year to Viscount Colville, when he was reviewing the Act, The Workers' Party said:

As far as The Workers' Party is concerned adequate provisions exist, in the common law and on the Statute Books, in both Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to deal with offences arising out of terrorism. Emergency legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act only has the effect of alienating large sections of the population from those charged with administering the law and its existence makes a mockery of government concern for civil rights and justice.

The Workers' Party is totally opposed to all forms of terrorism and violence. In our view terrorist activity has not only brought death and suffering to many families, but it has seriously inhibited the development of political and economic progress. It has deepened sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland and increased fear and mistrust within the community. Our Party is very much concerned that terrorist violence should be ended. We are convinced that the elimination of terrorism can only be achieved by combining a rigorous application of the normal rule of law with the development of democratic politics.

We are opposed to the Prevention of Terrorism Act because it brings the rule of law into disrepute and because it diminishes the rights of all citizens. The PTA provides the government, the police and the army with powers which are unchallengeable in the courts.

This then is the background against which this debate takes place.

Before considering where we should go from here, there are two important points that should be remembered. The first is that, while we have every right to be concerned at the actions of the British Government, we should not fall into the temptation of a ritual knee jerk anti-Brit reaction. We cannot afford to be smug. In this State we, too, have had our miscarriages of justice. We, too, have our draconian laws, including the right to use the death penalty. We, too, have had, under successive Governments, serious abuses of police power. People have died in this State in mysterious and unexplained circumstances while in Garda custody. We should also acknowledge that those who have fought longest and hardest to establish the innocence of the Birmingham Six have been British and that it was a British policeman who, at great personal cost and risk to himself, tried to get to the bottom of the killings in 1982 and the subsequent murky cover-up.

The second point is that we should remember that those who have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of murders and destruction in Northern Ireland since 1970 have been the Provisional IRA. While we are right to be concerned about any suggestion of a shoot-to-kill policy by security forces in Northern Ireland, the Provisionals have engaged in a murderous campaign of sectarian violence against the Protestant community in Northern Ireland and have had a policy of shoot to kill and bomb to kill and maim. They have done this for 17 years and for much of that time public opinion in the South has remained quite indifferent and, indeed, at certain times, such as during the H Block issues, have been quite prepared to go a long way along the road with the Provos. Indeed, The Workers' Party were almost the only political party to take a stand against the Provos and the H Block hysteria back in 1982. The same paramilitaries continue to claim victims of their sectarian murder campaign. We have constantly emphasised the sectarianism of the Provisionals' campaign. Only this week, a young Protestant worker who was in the UDR, Alan Johnston, was cruelly murdered at his place of work.

The central need for progress in Northern Ireland is peace. This requires the total defeat of sectarianism and terrorism. That cannot be achieved by security measures alone. It cannot be achieved by allowing the security forces to bend the law. It cannot be achieved by repressive legislation. It cannot be achieved by refusing to acknowledge the errors of the past, or by further restrictions on civil liberties. No legislation, no matter how draconian and no topping up of military measures, can be absolutely successful. The ultimate total rooting out of terrorism will only be achieved through a combination of political, economic and social measures. The objective of the defeat of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland must, despite our anger at recent British decisions, remain the foremost objective of this State and this House. Nothing should be done which is going to make this more difficult and we should be prepared honestly to look at anything that stands in the way of peace.

The events of the past few weeks have exposed the glaring inadequacies of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It was evident from the very beginning that the whole way in which the agreement had been negotiated and the contemptuous way in which the Unionist parties had been excluded by the Dublin and London Governments would lead to the total alienation of the political representatives of the majority community in Northern Ireland. There may have been those who felt that this was a price worth paying in return for what they believed would be a more sensitive approach by the British Government to the feelings of the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland and a say for Dublin in major decisions affecting Northern Ireland. This clearly has not happened. The Unionists have been alienated by the agreement, but the British Government have not delivered on the other matters.

There should be no sacred cows allowed to block the path to progress. The crisis facing the people of Northern Ireland is too serious for that. If the structures and institutions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement are acting as barriers to dialogue between the people of this island, then they must be confronted. What is the sense in clinging rigidly to arrangements which may now be posing a major threat to the achievement of the agreement's original objectives of peace and devolved democratic government in Northern Ireland? At least, we believe that those were the original objectives of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. We would be interested to know from the Taoiseach in his reply if, when he refers to the goals of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the motion, he regards the goal of that agreement as the achieving of democratic devolved government in Northern Ireland.

It is pointless for any group to claim that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is written on tablets of stone and that it is unmovable or unalterable. There have been signs that the Unionist parties are preparing to adopt a more flexible position, but there is a need for a response from Dublin. Does the Taoiseach have the capacity and courage to grasp that nettle from which successive Governments have shrunk. It is clear that there will be no progress in Northern Ireland unless there is some concession to the Unionist parties. The procedures of the Anglo-Irish Conference, which is the substance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, come up for renewal at the end of this year. Why could the Taoiseach here today, before this debate ends, not invite the Leaders of the Unionist parties to meet him, as he has invited the SDLP, to discuss what changes are necessary in the Anglo-Irish Agreement to facilitate progress towards the important and generally agreed objectives of democratic government and a Bill of Rights? Given the positive response of the Unionist leader, Mr. Molyneaux, to Mr. Haughey's comments in reply to my Dáil question last week, I am sure that a genuine offer of talks without preconditions would provoke a positive response among Unionist Leaders. If they say that they will talk if he sets aside the Anglo-Irish Agreement, or suspends it for a period of three, four or six months, then why should we not suspend it or do whatever is necessary to ensure that those talks will take place? The Taoiseach could hardly get a worse response from the Unionist parties than he has from the British Prime Minister over the past few weeks. It has not stopped him talking to Mrs. Thatcher. Why should he not begin to talk to political parties in Northern Ireland? He should also be telling the SDLP to get off their high horse and enter into dialogue with other parties in Northern Ireland without preconditions and I mean Unionist parties.

Deputy Spring spoke of consensus in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement but, as with everybody who speaks of consensus down here, I presume that he was talking as usual, about consensus of Nationalist parties. If we are talking about consensus we must have it with Unionist as well as with Nationalist parties.

The long term objective of Irish unity remains a legitimate aspiration for this Government, for the Dáil, for the political parties and for the people of Ireland to hold. But we must all acknowledge that unity means unity of our people, not just geographical unity and that this is neither possible, nor desirable, without the free consent of the people of Northern Ireland.

The only items on the immediate agenda are the issues of peace and democracy. If politicians, North and South, are not prepared to do whatever is necessary to build strong, democratic structures in Northern Ireland, then they are surrendering public life in Northern Ireland without a struggle to the paramilitaries and when the next savage atrocity is inflicted on the community, then those who have failed to grasp the nettle and give the people of Northern Ireland the political leadership they are crying out for, will have to bear their share of the responsibility.

I will end by referring to the extraordinarily serious situation which is developing and which has not been commented on in the context to which we see it. I refer to the enormous finds of arms both with the Provisional IRA, the UVF and the UDA. Someone somewhere is supplying enormous amounts of weaponry to both sides to promote a major sectarian war of Lebanese proportions in Northern Ireland. Do we know who is doing that? If Gadaffi is supplying the Provisionals, who is supplying the UVF and the UDA with precisely the same weaponry? This is something that all parties here must look at very seriously to discover what has been happening during the past year and to look at the serious developments which could take place here if those weapons were used in the way they are used in Lebanon.

Minister for Energy and Minister for Communications (Mr. R. Burke)

On the motion that Dáil Éireann takes note of recent developments affecting Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations and reaffirms its determination to take any and all action necessary to ensure the full use of procedures and structures set up by the Anglo-Irish Agreement and to secure the achievements of the goals in that agreement, due to the unfortunate indisposition of my good friend and colleague, the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have been entrusted by the Taoiseach with a direct role in the Government's efforts to seek a solution to the——

Tomás Mac Giolla

Go mo leith scéal, I forgot to move our amendment. Is it taken that I have moved it?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Already one amendment has been moved and, while you are entitled to speak on what was in your own amendment, the requirement is that we can only have one amendment formally moved.

Mr. R. Burke

Due to the unfortunate indisposition of my good friend and colleague, the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have been entrusted by the Taoiseach with a direct role in the Government's efforts to seek a solution to the very serious difficulties created by the decision of the British authorities in the matter of the Stalker-Sampson report. I know, in reference to the Tánaiste, that both sides of the House will join with me in welcoming him back to full action. The report is that he was in sterling form yesterday at Question Time, as Deputies on the opposite side will be the first to appreciate.

Let me summarise the present position. The decision of the British authorities to refuse to prosecute policemen against whom there is evidence of perversion of the course of justice in the investigation of these alleged shoot-to-kill incidents in County Armagh in November-December 1982, to refuse to explain the decision not to prosecute, to refuse to publish the Stalker-Sampson report or to provide any information on that investigation, and to fail to consult with, or even inform, the Government in advance of the decision announced by Sir Patrick Mayhew on 25 January, have the most disturbing implications for public confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland, for relations between the security forces and the Nationalist community, and for trust and confidence between the Garda Síochána and the RUC.

It is hardly surprising that the reaction in this country, and indeed elsewhere, to Sir Patrick Mayhew's statement of 25 January should have been one of utter disbelief. The clear consequence born of this decision not to prosecute is that in Northern Ireland the rule of law must take second or third place to undefined reasons of "public interest" and of "national security". The famous Lord Denning once offered the following definition of British justice: "Be you ever so high, the law is above you". Not in Northern Ireland, not now.

The concepts of public interest and national security are proposed as tombstones for the pain of one man who survived the shootings, for the distress of the families of the six men who died, for the widespread suspicion of a shoot-to-kill policy, for the efforts of the Northern DPP and honest policemen who sought the truth, and for the concern of successive Irish Governments, repeated insistently in the conference, in the secretariat and in many other contacts with British Ministers and officials. This whole affair should be cleared up honestly.

Since 1982 there has been great concern in this country that members of the police force in Northern Ireland, either with or without official sanction, were taking the law into their own hands and substituting a policy of "shoot-to-kill" in place of, where possible, one of arrest and prosecution. That concern was not confined either to Irish people or the Irish Government. It existed and grew in many countries, not least in Britain itself and it led eventually to the setting up by the British Government of what was known initially as "the Stalker Investigation".

I do not propose to dwell at length on the many extraordinary happenings which occurred during the course of that investigation and which led to its eventual completion by Mr. Sampson. Suffice it to say that successive Irish Governments reacted with forebearance and patience to events and delays which encouraged neither.

I believe there is wide support both in Ireland and abroad for the way in which we have approached the difficulties created by the British authorities' decision on the Stalker-Sampson report, that it has been measured, fair and reasonable. The Government have endeavoured to demonstrate to the British Government at two special sessions of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and at other meetings, that in this instance they are in the wrong and must remedy the problem they have created. It is as simple as that.

We have got certain responses and public statements in regard to changes in the RUC and the question of the incursion into our jurisdiction on the night of 12 December 1982 but these responses do not touch on the principal issues at stake here. The first is the issue of consultation. Sir Patrick Mayhew is a distinguished lawyer who served as Solicitor General at the time of the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. He is familiar with the agreement and its procedures. He could explain why the views and proposals we put forward within the conference were ignored or, if not ignored, put aside in favour of other unknown considerations. He has not done so nor has any other British representative explained it on his behalf.

The Irish Government have explicit and formal rights under the agreement in regard to relations between the security forces and the community, in regard to security policy and the security situation, in regard to the enforcement of the criminal law, and confidence in the administration of justice. The British Attorney General could explain why these rights were disregarded. He has not done so nor has any other British representative explained it on his behalf and this is plainly intolerable.

There are other features of the British Attorney General's role in this affair which raise deep concern. Sir Hartley Shawcross in his statement of 1951 made it clear that in making up his mind on these matters i.e. prosecutions, he had the advice of the DPP and very often of Treasury Counsel as well and had hardly ever, if ever, refused to prosecute when they advised prosecution. The central question, therefore, is what were the views of Sir Barry Shaw, the Northern DPP on prosecutions at the point when he consulted the Attorney General? I do not know but I think a brief consideration of what facts are known to us would strongly suggest that his inclination was certainly in the direction of prosecution.

Sir Barry Shaw has a reputation for independence. He is the DPP who considered that there was sufficient evidence of the commission of murder to warrant prosecutions against four members of the RUC involved in the incidents in Armagh in November-December 1982 and who gave directions accordingly. I recall here that the judge in the trial of one of these cases, actually criticised the bringing of the prosecution. He is the DPP who demanded an RUC investigation into whether there was evidence to suggest perversion of the course of justice in the light of statements of a police cover-up made by Constable Robinson in court. I recall here that, by an extraordinary omission, the trial judge did not refer to sworn statements of Constable Robinson to the DPP. He is the DPP who exercised statutory powers to initiate the Stalker inquiry because he believed he had been misled by the internal investigation conducted by the RUC itself. He is the DPP who, on foot of the Stalker-Sampson report, considered there was evidence of the commission of offences of perverting or attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice.

What was the point of all of this activity over several years by the DPP if he were not interested in pursuing the requirements of the law to the full? He could simply have satisfied himself with the findings of the internal RUC investigation and closed the files a long time ago. He did not do that. The revelations of John Stalker demonstrate that his misgivings were fully justified. Surely then Sir Barry Shaw's strong inclination at the end of this long process as he consulted the Attorney General on the public interest aspect of the affair must have been to prosecute?

It would appear from these considerations and from the evidence of the Attorney General's own statement that the DPP's decision not to prosecute can only have stemmed from whatever directions, instruction, advice, information — call it what you will — he received from the Attorney General. In terms of the Shawcross description of the Attorney General's role in these matters he said he had rarely, if ever, refused to prosecute when the DPP had advised it. The eventual decision in this case is, to say the least, very unusual. Even within the definition of his role which the Attorney General has himself espoused and quoted, this decision requires an explanation.

It is the Attorney General himself who is responsible here, not the DPP. The decision finally attributed to the DPP, with which the Attorney General says he agreed, is not surprising. The present holder of the office in Northern Ireland has a reputation for independence. But his formal position is one of dependency on the Attorney General. Under statute — the Prosecution of Offences (NI) Order, 1972, and the Constitution Act, 1973 —"he shall discharge his functions under the superintendence of the Attorney General and shall be subject to the directions of the Attorney General in all matters...." Whatever may be said to be the practice of the relationship between the Attorney General and the DPP, it is impossible to believe that a matter touching security police and high politics should not be decided in the end by the Attorney General. It is impossible in turn to believe that, whatever the formalities, the views of the Attorney General on the public interest and national security are not guided by the competent members of the Government.

The lack of consultation with us has already been offered by the Taoiseach in his contribution this morning but it is quite clear that, under specific articles of the agreement, we have rights, of consultation in these matters and those rights were ignored. The whole question of the failure to consult or communicate through the permanent institution of the agreement is a most serious matter. However, in relation to that and the other items we decided to respond within the spirit and the framework of the agreement. We convened the meetings of the Anglo-Irish Agreement which were held. The position and views of the Irish Government were fully explained to the British representatives. It was pointed out that the decision not to prosecute members of the RUC against whom the British Government's own appointee, the DPP for Northern Ireland, found sufficient evidence of grave criminal offences but instead to allow them to remain actively involved in law enforcement can only undermine, if not destroy, whatever confidence is reposed in the RUC by the Northern minority.

It was pointed out that to ignore evidence of a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice further perverts that course. It was pointed out that until the administration of justice in Northern Ireland is not only fair and impartial but seen to be so can we ever hope to isolate and remove the virus of terrorism.

I do not intend to use disingenuous references to public interest and national security to hide from the House the disappointing outcome of our meetings. All too often in recent decades those responsible for security in Northern Ireland have snatched moral defeat from the jaws of terrorist outrage. It has happened again. What therefore can we do?

In 1945, Eamon de Valera was pressed to respond to what many saw as a grossly provocative and offensive speech at the end of the war in Europe by the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill. In a radio broadcast he finally responded as follows:

I know the kind of answer I am expected to make. I know the answer that just springs to the lips of every person of Irish blood.... I know the answer I would have given a quarter of a century ago. But I have deliberately decided that this is not the reply I shall make tonight. I shall strive not to be guilty of adding any fuel to the flames of hatred and passion which, if continued to be fed, promise to burn up whatever is left by way of decent human feeling in Europe.

I do not intend to add any fuel to the flames of Anglo-Irish dissent which have been fanned into life during the last week. We can understand why the former Tánaiste, Deputy Spring, has called on our Government to shame and embarrass the British Government on this matter. We can understand, but cannot and will not adopt that course.

There are, however, some things which must be said. Like Eamon de Valera, I shall try to say them as dispassionately as I can. If the members of the RUC identified in the Stalker-Sampson report as having conspired to pervert the course of justice are not prosecuted, it will be difficult for a long time to say that the law is applied justly in Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, the Government will be pressing through the Anglo-Irish Conference for much more rapid progress in ending discrimination against the Northern minority and in bringing about the other reforms so widely talked about in 1985. Our patience, and more important the patience of the Northern minority, is not unlimited and it would be a mistake for anybody to assume that it is.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was hailed by many as providing supposedly a panacea for all problems existing between our two countries. Any expression of caution about either its significance or its likely effects were denigrated and denounced. It is ironic but forgiveable that those who most exaggerated its significance are now the most surprised by its limitations.

I listened with dismay this morning to statements by Deputy Dukes, Deputy Spring and other Deputies accusing the Government of not working hard enough on the agreement. It is dismaying that those who authorised the agreement should now be attacking it. We had our doubts about the agreement in Opposition. We did not see it as the panacea for all our ills. We had the more sober and realistic view of its potential. Whatever our doubts, the Taoiseach made it absolutely clear on entering office that we would honour it and that we would work it. In the year we have been in office we have had three regular meetings of the conference, and two special meetings, the last of these in two lengthy series devoted to the Stalker-Sampson affair.

In the same period, the Taoiseach has met Mrs. Thatcher twice, the Tánaiste has met informally twice with Mr. King and has also met with Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Hurd. The Minister for Justice has met separately twice with Mr. King's Deputy, Mr. Stanley. The Minister for Justice and I had a further informal meeting with Mr. King and Mr. Stanley in London on 10 February. There has been frequent contact by telephone or letter between Ministers and, of course, there has been contact at official level in Belfast, as well as contact in Dublin and London.

I do not need to remind Deputies that all of this activity took place in a year when general elections were held in both Ireland and Britain which naturally disturbed the rhythm of conference meetings. I could answer the Opposition by pointing out that no meetings of the conference took place in their last three months in office, but I think it is pointless and unwise to engage in this kind of backbiting and minor squabbling when great national interests are at stake.

I deeply regret that in a situation where the Irish people as a whole have been wronged, Irish political leaders should be seen to fight for an illusory short term political gain and so divert the spotlight from where it should be — on the failures of London. This is a time for a rallying together on the high ground that we have.

There is a serious problem here which must be overcome. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is an agreement between two Governments, not between one Government and part of another. It is perfectly clear that the role of the British Attorney General in this matter touched on political as well as purely legal matters. The Government should have been consulted on the political aspect of the role.

The Leader of the Opposition questioned earlier the wisdom of raising the case of the Birmingham Six with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, given the particular responsibilities of Mr. King. There are at least two answers to this. In the first place, as the Taoiseach clearly said this morning, the Birmingham Six case has obvious implications for extradition between these islands and, as Deputy Dukes will be more aware than most, the political aspect of extradition is a matter which not only comes within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement but is specifically mentioned in that agreement.

Secondly, in putting our demands to Mr. King, the Minister for Justice and I did so in his capacity as a member of the British Cabinet. We made it clear that these were the views and proposals of the Government which we were putting to him as a member of his Government and which required a Government response. There is no question, therefore, but that we were perfectly entitled to raise this matter with Mr. King in the Anglo-Irish Conference and that we would have been failing in our duty to operate the mechanisms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement actively, forcefully and to their maximum potential if we had not done so. It is only right that we should do so. The fields of activity in which the Irish Government are entitled to put forward views and proposals in relation to consultation, generally amount to a definition of the elements of the public interest in Northern Ireland. It refers to protection of human rights, relations between the security forces and the community, security policy, the security situation, enforcement of the criminal law and public confidence in the administration of justice.

Now that all of us have a realistic view of the state of Anglo-Irish relations and how much still needs to be done to achieve justice both in and for our country, we can renew the task with even greater determination and strength of purpose.

Unlike other problems which our Government have been able to tackle decisively since taking office, a solution to the Northern problem is not achievable by any Irish Government alone. The problem was created over centuries; it will not be solved overnight. I cannot promise Deputies any instant solution or any instant progress. I can and do assure the House that regardless of any setback or disappointment we shall press on, resolute and convinced that in the end justice will prevail.

Debate adjourned.

Sitting suspended at 1.30 p.m. and resumed at 2.30 p.m.

Dáil Éireann debate - Wednesday, 17 Feb 1988

Anglo-Irish Relations: Motion.

Deputies

Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 17 Feb 1988