I should like to conclude the Second Stage debate on the Bill by thanking the Deputies who contributed for their comments. Some points are worthy of specific attention and I will refer to them briefly. I will deal with other points on Committee Stage.
Deputy Bell is present and I congratulate him on his appointment as spokesperson on Justice. I wish him a long period in that position and I have no doubt that we will make progress together in the House on behalf of the people.
Deputy Flanagan referred to the Private Members' Bill introduced on this subject on 3 March 1988 by the former Deputy George Birmingham. The previous Government decided to support this Bill in principle subject to certain amendments, mainly of a technical or drafting nature. These changes are readily apparent to anyone looking at the text of both Bills.
The Private Members' Bill lapsed on the change of Government in June 1989 without ever having been debated. I do not know why the Bill was not reintroduced by the party oposite and this, of course, answers Deputy McCartan's criticism of the apparent delay in bringing the Commission's proposals before the Oireachtas in this matter.
Generally speaking, however, with regard to Deputy McCartan's point about the implementation of Law Reform Commission reports, the Commission would be the first to concede that their reports are not normally expressed in a form which permits immediate implementation of their recommendations, even assuming that their recommendations accorded with the views of the Government, which is not always the case. In some cases, extensive work is still required in my Department and in the parliamentary draftsman's office. Furthermore, that work can only be done in the context of the resources available to me and to the Attorney General and, most importantly, questions of settling priorities between different items of legislation are inevitable.
Deputy Flanagan referred to the absence of a definition of "significant injury". This is quite deliberate and in accordance with the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission. The publication, entitled The Supreme Court Practice, which is the authoritative guide to practice and procedure in English law, comments at paragraph 6152 of the 1988 edition that “significant injury” is defined in a somewhat curious way in the English legislation. It asks: “On this basis, that liability is not in dispute and the money is there for the asking, what injury would not be sufficiently serious to make a claim for compensation worthwhile?”.
The Law Reform Commission at page 17 of their report, noted this criticism and pointed out that the likely effect of such a provision would be that time would start to run against a person who became aware of an injury, however trivial; thus a person who received an apparently minor injury and let matters drift because of the minor nature could, if the injury turned out to have serious consequences after a period of years, find himself held to a date of knowledge considerably earlier than that on which he realised that the injury was significant in the normal sense of the word.
If the law contained a definition of "significant injury" on the lines of the English provision, then the injuries in a couple of examples which I can give would be "significant" and the injured person would be fixed with a date of knowledge contemporaneous with the accrual of the cause of action. This would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the Bill.
Deputy Flanagan, Deputy Cullimore and others referred to the problem of hit and run accidents where the identity of the defendant is not known. He should check the position in this regard with the Minister for the Environment as it does not arise in the context of this Bill. As I understand the position, changes were brought about in 1988 in these cases as a result of the implementation of an EC directive and that the MIBI scheme now covers the question of compensation in these cases. The new scheme replaces the earlier 1964 agreement in the case of road accidents occurring on or after 31 December 1988.
Deputy Flanagan and Deputy Cullimore also referred to the insurance implications of the proposals in the Bill. I acknowledge that, to some extent, we are stepping into the dark here. The high cost of insurance in the categories of motor, medical, public liability and employers' liability is always a worry. The Minister for Industry and Commerce has primary responsibility in that regard and Deputies will be well aware that measures to tackle these costs are high on his list of priorities. It is also relevant that, when similar changes were introduced in the neighbouring jurisdiction, there was no significant rise in insurance costs so it does not automatically follow that costs here will rise inexorably as a result of this legislation. The Government took the decision to proceed with this Bill having considered all the circumstances in detail. The present law is patently unjust and the strongest hints have come from the highest court in the land that it is also unconstitutional. We must have a fairer system and it may be that we have to pay a price for that fairer system.
I do not want to let this opportunity pass without adverting to the recent judicial criticisms of the insurance industry in the matter of the high cost of claims. When two eminent judges of the High Court come out within a month suggesting that the insurance industry should look to see if their own competence and procedures need examination, then it is time to take notice and I hope they will.
The position regarding cases on which a final determination has been made by a court is that this Bill will not allow them to be reopened as the doctrine of res judicata applies. To provide otherwise would, I am sure Deputies agree, lead to total uncertainty in that a court decision could no longer be held to mean what it said. For those cases where proceedings have not yet commenced, or where proceedings have commenced but have not yet been finally determined on the coming into effect of the new law, these provisions can be invoked.
Deputy Bell raised a point in relation to this and I want to assure him that where a case has not been decided on, the claim can come forward at this stage, not just from the passing of the Act, but prior to it. If somebody has been injured when the prior time limit was there under the new Bill they will be able to claim, which is a significant step forward.
As to the action on the EC directive in regard to products' liability referred to by Deputy McCartan, I wish to inform him that this does not come under my jurisdiction. It is the responsibility of the Minister for Industry and Commerce. The question of the introduction of a scheme of "no fault" compensation raises complex issues far outside the scope of debate on this Bill. It may well be a better way of dealing with the matter but it would require very detailed examination and consideration before we could decide to replace our present system of compensation for personal injuries.
The type of disease or industrial injury which Deputy Bell raised is exactly the sort of thing which this Bill is designed to encompass. The point the Deputy raises about insurance cover in the event of the employer's liqidation or related difficulties is outside the scope of this Bill. The point about long delays occurring in processing claims, not just personal injury claims, is of great interest and concern to me and I assure the Deputy that I am as anxious as he to ensure that justice is not only done, but is speedily done. With this in mind, I made statements only last week in relation to initiatives in the area of legal reform. I also have under active consideration specific proposals in relation to improvements in court systems and procedures, which will meet some of the genuine and legitimate concerns expressed by Deputy Bell.
I thank all Members who spoke for their warm welcome for this measure. If there are other points to be covered we can debate them at length on Committee Stage.
