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Dáil Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 21 Nov 2001

Vol. 544 No. 4

Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Bill, 2000: Report Stage (Resumed), and Final Stage.

Before we adjourned, I moved that this Bill be recommitted to Committee under Standing Order 120 because Report Stage contained new material which had not been discussed on Committee Stage. The Minister of State acknowledged, in two cases, that this is so. Also, it is now proposed that a section removed on Committee Stage be re-inserted into the Bill on Report Stage. We have tabled amendments to that proposal which are viewed in a different light in view of the fact that the Government has changed its mind on section 21.

I will move that the Bill be recommitted to Committee on the basis that—

Deputy O'Sullivan moved that before we adjourned at 1.30 p.m.

That argument is entirely rejected. It is nonsensical to recommit the entire Bill to Committee when it has already been discussed. Two amendments are being brought forward. I understand the Minister of State has very reasonably offered, on behalf of the Government, that these matters be recommitted to Committee through the procedures available to the House. I do not understand why one would want to go back over the same ground.

We cannot have further discussion on this matter. We have less than one hour left to deal with this Bill.

There will be no discussion on the three amendments.

That is not a point of order, Deputy. I am putting the question.

It is a point of order.

This matter was discussed before lunch.

The point is that law enacted this evening by this House will not be debated. I have not ever seen that happen before.

The Deputy is making a statement on the Bill. The position is that one speaker from each side is entitled to speak on this. That has already been done.

It is an outrageous abuse.

In fairness, Deputy O'Sullivan was allowed to repeat what she said before lunchtime now that the Minister is present. The question is: "That the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Bill, 2000, be recommitted to a committee of the whole Dáil".

Question put.

Allen, Bernard.Barnes, Monica.Belton, Louis J.Boylan, Andrew.Bradford, Paul.Broughan, Thomas P.Browne, John (Carlow-Kilkenny).Bruton, John.Bruton, Richard.Burke, Ulick.Carey, Donal.Clune, Deirdre.Connaughton, Paul.Coveney, Simon.Crawford, Seymour.

Creed, Michael.Deasy, Austin.Deenihan, Jimmy.Enright, Thomas.Farrelly, John.Gilmore, Éamon.Gormley, John.Hayes, Brian.Hayes, Tom.Healy, Séamus.Higgins, Michael.Hogan, Philip.Howlin, Brendan.Kenny, Enda. Tá–continued

McCormack, Pádraic.McDowell, Derek.McGahon, Brendan.McGinley, Dinny.McGrath, Paul.Mitchell, Gay.Mitchell, Olivia.Moynihan-Cronin, Breeda.Naughten, Denis.Neville, Dan.Noonan, Michael.O'Keeffe, Jim.O'Shea, Brian.O'Sullivan, Jan.

Owen, Nora.Penrose, William.Perry, John.Quinn, Ruairí.Reynolds, Gerard.Ring, Michael.Ryan, Seán.Sheehan, Patrick.Spring, Dick.Stagg, Emmet.Stanton, David.Timmins, Billy.Upton, Mary.Wall, Jack.

Níl

Ahern, Bertie.Ahern, Dermot.Ahern, Michael.Ahern, Noel.Andrews, David.Ardagh, Seán.Aylward, Liam.Blaney, Harry.Brady, Johnny.Brennan, Matt.Brennan, Séamus.Briscoe, Ben.Browne, John (Wexford).Byrne, Hugh.Callely, Ivor.Carey, Pat.Collins, Michael.Cooper-Flynn, Beverley.Coughlan, Mary.Davern, Noel.Dempsey, Noel.Dennehy, John.Ellis, John.Fleming, Seán.Flood, Chris.Fox, Mildred.Gildea, Thomas.Hanafin, Mary.Harney, Mary.Haughey, Seán.Healy-Rae, Jackie.Keaveney, Cecilia.

Kelleher, Billy.Kenneally, Brendan.Killeen, Tony.Kirk, Séamus.Kitt, Tom.Lenihan, Conor.McCreevy, Charlie.McDaid, James.McGennis, Marian.McGuinness, John J.Martin, Micheál.Moffatt, Thomas.Molloy, Robert.Moloney, John.Moynihan, Donal.Moynihan, Michael.Ó Cuív, Éamon.O'Dea, Willie.O'Donnell, Liz.O'Donoghue, John.O'Hanlon, Rory.O'Keeffe, Batt.O'Kennedy, Michael.O'Rourke, Mary.Roche, Dick.Ryan, Eoin.Smith, Brendan.Smith, Michael.Treacy, Noel.Wade, Eddie.Wallace, Dan.Wallace, Mary.Woods, Michael.Wright, G. V.

Tellers: Tá, Deputies Bradford and Stagg; Níl, Deputies S. Brennan and Briscoe.
Question declared lost.

We will proceed with amendment No. 1 which arises out of committee proceedings. Deputy O'Sullivan is to move the amendment.

I wish to first ask a procedural question in relation to the amendments the Minister proposes to recommit. Do we deal with the recommitting of those amendments now or does the Minister propose to deal with them now as, in effect—

We can deal with them when we get to them, Deputy. It depends on how quickly we get to that point. About which amendment is the Deputy concerned? Is it amendment No. 8?

I am concerned about the amendments which the Minister has agreed to recommit. Would it not be procedurally appropriate that those motions be taken now?

No, we will have to go through it here. If the Deputy does not wish to delay on the first few amendments, we would reach the areas she is concerned with more quickly.

I would like to be co-operative. Is the Leas-Cheann Comhairle ruling that we take the amendments in order?

Yes, we will take them in sequence. Amendment No. 1 is in Deputy O'Sullivan's name. If she wishes to propose or withdraw the amendment, either course is fine.

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 7, line 29, after "right" to insert "or other lawful authority or reasonable excuse".

I formally propose the amendment as I made the arguments on Committee Stage and will not take up the House's time.

Amendment put and declared lost.

Is amendment No. 2 being moved?

I will not move amendment No. 2 in the interest of getting to the more important amendments.

Amendment No. 2 to 4, inclusive, not moved.

I move amendment No. 5:

In page 10, to delete lines 28 to 38.

This amendment deals with the onus of proof which is one of my main concerns regarding some of the Minister's later amendments. Under the Bill, the onus of proof is on the accused. This is a reversal of the normal course of justice in which a person is assumed innocent until proven guilty.

I made these points on Committee Stage and do not have much to add. I would like to hear the Minister's views as to whether he has taken on board our points regarding the reversal of the onus of proof.

The effect of this amendment would be to remove from the Bill a presumption that a person who held property in trust for one or more persons had appropriated it for his or her own benefit or use in certain specific circumstances. Section 4(3) of the Bill is based on a recommendation by the Government's advisory committee on fraud which recommended the creation of what it described as a general deficiency offence, that is to make it an offence for a person who holds money in trust as agent for others not to maintain in the account sufficient funds at all times to pay in full what is due to each person.

For example, at present where an auctioneer or solicitor holds money on behalf of several clients in a mixed account and then takes some of the money for personal use, it may be difficult to prove an offence as it may not be clear whose money has been taken. This is the case because enough money may remain to pay some clients, but the general deficiency becomes apparent only if all clients seek repayment at the same time.

Section 4(3)(c) provides that where there is a deficiency and the person fails to provide a satis factory explanation, it will be presumed that he or she appropriated, without the consent of the owner or owners, all, or part, of the deficiency. Paragraph (c) provides that this presumption may be rebutted. The offence to which the presumption in section 4(3)(c) refers, requires an appropriation of property, a dishonest intent that the appropriation was without the owner's consent, and that there was an intent to deprive the owner.

The purpose of section 4(3)(c) is to provide that the person is presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have appropriated the deficiency without consent in the circumstances provided for in the section. It does not presume any intention to deprive or any dishonest intent and will not be activated if there is a satisfactory explanation. Therefore, it is not presuming guilt.

Where a person holds property in trust for one or more persons, it is not inconsistent with the presumption of innocence that the trustee, who has a duty to account for the property, and who alone is in a position to know exactly how a deficiency arose, should have to provide a satisfactory explanation of that deficiency when called upon to do so. Therefore, to delete section 4(3)(c) would be to leave the section without the necessary means to ensure trustees can be held responsible for the disappearance of property. I could go further on this issue, but I realise Deputy O'Sullivan wishes to move on to the amendments to which she has referred. I cannot accept the amendment.

Account is not being taken of, for example, an error made in a bank. I made these points on Committee Stage, but it seems draconian to assume a person is guilty and that he or she has to prove his or her innocence. Errors can be made of which the person may not be aware. The individual may also not be in a position to prove that he or she was not responsible for the error. This provision is draconian to some extent and should not be included in the legislation.

The Minister gave an example regarding a solicitor's accounts and money held in trust. He is aware that solicitors hold a significant amount of money on behalf of clients. He knows that, while an account is in the name of the solicitor or the solicitor's firm, each individual has a personal account in his or her name. If there is a need to carry out an investigation, one can easily ascertain in which account the money is and in whose name it is held. One will be able to inquire as to the name and address of the person involved. A paper trail will exist which makes it easy to account for the money. There is some concern regarding this provision and I share some of Deputy O'Sullivan's concerns.

The presumption is rebuttable. Many presumptions are made in law regarding various issues which are rebuttable, as is the case with this presumption if the individual involved can come forward with a satisfactory explanation.

I am not speaking about specific separate accounts, but about accounts held en bloc where there may be 100, 200, 300 or 400 clients, and all of the money is held in a client account regarding which there is a deficiency. In those circumstances it may not be possible to prove whose money has been interfered with. Therefore, it is fair and just that the presumption operates. Such a presumption is rebuttable. If the individual can do so, that is fine, if he or she cannot rebut the presumption, then that is a different matter.

We have to be pragmatic. This is a means of getting at dishonesty and there is no simple solution. I wish there were, but the fact that the presumption is rebuttable answers any concerns which people may have.

Surely this can be dealt with under the Finance Acts. If there is a problem, the Revenue Commissioners have powers under the Finance Acts. The Finance Act, 1994, gave the Minister for Finance powers to enter the office of a solicitor, an auctioneer or an accountant to obtain and retain books for examination to ascertain whether there is a problem. The provision in this Bill criminalises this matter, whereas, under the Finance Acts, the Revenue Commissioners have powers to enter such offices. The Statute Book includes broad powers to deal with problems which makes it unnecessary to proceed further.

Let us take an example in which a solicitor holds £1 million in trust for 100 different clients, and £100,000, or less, goes missing. It may not be impossible to prove an offence in the sense that it would not be possible to prove whose money was taken. This is so because there would be sufficient money to pay most, but not all, of the clients.

In those circumstances it is surely reasonable for people to accept that there has to be some form of a general deficiency offence to ensure all the funds are held intact for all of the clients – in other words, that there is a sufficient amount of money in the client account at all times to cover all clients, and that a person cannot abscond with one client's funds in the context in which it is impossible to prove a case against him or her on the basis that it is impossible to prove whose money was taken. The provision in the Bill is reasonable and sensible and this offence should be on the Statute Book.

I wish to press this amendment. We have an obligation to ensure, not only that people who are guilty are brought to justice, but also that innocent people are not wrongly accused or found guilty. Deputy Enright and I are indicating that there are circumstances in which a person might be considered guilty and be unable to prove otherwise. That is, in effect, what he or she is required to do under this section, rather than the State or someone else having to prove that he or she is guilty. People will have to prove that they are not guilty. This is a fundamental reversal of the normal procedures and that is why I wish to press the amendment.

Question, "That the words proposed to be deleted stand", put and declared carried.
Amendment declared lost.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 11, lines 6 and 7, to delete all words from and including "means" in line 6 down to and including "property" in line 7 and substitute "includes taking possession of such property, exercising dominion over such property, usurping or otherwise adversely interfering with the proprietary rights of the owners of such property".

This amendment aims to provide a clearer definition of the term "appropriates." In addition, while our amendment does not address it, the Minister might enlighten us on the concept of someone borrowing an item. If someone borrows an item with the intention of returning it in the future, is it covered by this section?

This amendment would broaden the meaning given to the word "appropriates" in the Bill by adding further to the circumstances which amount to taking ownership. In seeking to do this it would have the effect of creating uncertainty about when an appropriation is to be regarded as amounting to an essential element of the offence of theft. The intention in the Bill is that an appropriation will only arise where there is an assumption by a person of the rights of the owner. When taken with the requirement for dishonesty in section 4 it corresponds to the idea of converting the property for one's own use or benefit. It has the advantage, therefore, of clarity and certainty.

Perhaps this section does not actually deal with the point, but if someone borrows an item with the intention of returning it, yet the owner does not know – say, someone goes into a farmyard and takes a hay turner or tractor and has it in their possession – is that person guilty of theft?

That possibility arises under the definitions contained in this new legislation. I am aware that in older legislation the provision was that there had to be an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 7:

In page 12, line 9, before "induces" to insert "by any deception".

This amendment fulfils a commitment I gave on Committee Stage in relation to section 6 of the Bill. The side heading to section 6 states that it is concerned with making a gain or causing a loss by deception. Section 6, however, does not use the word "deception." Having examined the matter in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General, I have decided to amend the section by adding the words "by any deception." Thus a person will be guilty of an offence if he or she dishonestly, by any deception, induces another person to do or not to do something with the intention of making a gain for himself or herself or a third party, or to cause a loss to that person.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No. 8 is consequential on amendments Nos. 11, 12 and 18. Amendments Nos. 12 and 18 are also consequential on amendment No. 11. Amendments Nos. 8, 11, 12 and 18 may, therefore, be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 16, to delete lines 28 and 29 and substitute the following:

"(3) This Part is without prejudice to section 31 (as substituted by section 21 of this Act) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1994.”.

I am glad we have reached these amendments. It is particularly unfortunate that 50 minutes were wasted in speaking about whether we would actually get to these amendments. We now have only 20 minutes left as a result of the Labour Party, in particular, deciding to filibuster debate on an issue on which it states it wants a debate. It is very difficult to understand.

Does the Minister feel it is necessary to delay it further?

It is our duty as parliamentarians.

These amendments reverse a series of amendments which I proposed on Committee Stage arising out of a Government decision to deal with the amendment of the Criminal Justice Act, 1994, in the Illicit Traffic by Sea Bill, to which they were more relevant. However, the events of 11 September in the United States of America resulted in greater urgency being given to the fight against terrorism and associated money laundering. In order to be able to respond to this worldwide effort to defeat terrorism, it was decided that these changes to the 1994 Act should be reinserted in the Bill, as the Illicit Traffic by Sea Bill is unlikely to be enacted before the end of the year.

Amendment No. 11 is the principal amendment among this group of amendments. Its purpose is to substitute a new section for section 31 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1994, setting out a revised offence of money laundering. The main difference between the new section 31 and the current section 31 is the introduction of the concept of recklessness in the offence. The new section is long, but I will endeavour to set out the main elements.

Subsection (1) contains the elements of the offence of money laundering. It provides that a person will be guilty of money laundering in certain circumstances. These are that the person knows or believes, or is reckless about whether property is or represents criminal proceeds, and the person, without lawful authority or excuse, then acts in relation to the property by, for example, converting, transferring or handling it intending to conceal or disguise its true nature, source or ownership or helping another person to avoid prosecution or to avoid the making of a confiscation order, concealing or disguising its true nature, source or ownership, or acquiring, possessing or using the property.

Where a person does any of these things in such circumstances that it is reasonable to conclude that he or she knew or believed, or was reckless about whether, the property was criminal proceeds, he or she will be taken to have known or believed, or been reckless, unless the court or the jury is satisfied otherwise.

A person will be considered to be reckless for this purpose if he or she disregarded a substantial risk that the property was the proceeds of criminal conduct. A substantial risk in this context means a risk of such a nature and degree that, having regard to the circumstances, its disregard involves culpability of a high degree.

The section also sets out what is meant by converting, transferring or handling property, what is covered by the reference to believing that property is or represents criminal proceeds and what such proceeds are deemed to constitute as well as what is meant by handling such property. There is provision for the admissibility of documentary evidence.

The penalty for an offence under this section will be a fine of £1,500 and up to 12 months imprisonment, or both, following summary conviction, or an unlimited fine, or up to 14 years imprisonment, or both, following conviction on indictment.

Amendments Nos. 8 and 18 are consequential on amendment No. 3 and merely include reference to the new section 31 in sections 16 and 37 of the Bill which refer to money laundering.

Amendment No. 12 provides, in effect, that reference to an offence in Parts 4 or 7 of the 1994 Act, dealing with money laundering and international co-operation respectively, will be construed as reference to a revenue offence, that is, an offence in connection with taxes, duties or exchange control.

I am glad we have had the opportunity to look at these amendments. On Committee Stage we tabled an amendment to section 21, the object of this group of amend ments. However, the Minister withdrew the entire section on Committee Stage and, therefore, our amendment was not relevant. It has now been retabled on Report Stage. The main objection I have to this procedure is the fact that we are being asked to deal with issues that are either totally new, or about which we had no indication that they would be reintroduced on Report Stage.

The main concern we had about section 21 was the issue of reversing the onus of proof which, incidentally, relates to the Criminal Justice Act, 1994, not this Bill. The section states, "the proof of which shall lie on him or her." This relates specifically to being guilty of money laundering or being reckless as to whether the property concerned represents the proceeds of criminal conduct. First, we are placing the onus of proof on the person being accused, rather than whoever is accusing them and, second, they must prove that they were not reckless. One could understand that if somebody was caught money laundering, the onus of proof might have to be placed on them, but not if someone is reckless as to whether the material they are handling represents the proceeds of crime.

There is a very good market in Limerick on Saturday mornings, but if it turns out that what I have purchased there was related to the proceeds of criminal conduct, am I being reckless? Do I have to prove that I was not being reckless in buying this item from a stall-holder? The people concerned have a licence for their stalls, but the person who issues the licence does not go into the detail of where the stall-holders obtained the property they are selling. They are selling various items in different places around the country. I am concerned that we will criminalise those who may be totally innocent.

If I, as a member of the public, purchase an item at a market stall, and it turns out afterwards that the person who sold it to me had committed a crime because the item had been acquired illegally, have I been reckless and do I have to prove that I have not been? This is a serious matter which the Minister is proposing to insert in the Bill. I am particularly concerned by the method being used to deal with this matter. We are amending an Act through this Bill. We are reversing what the Government intended to do on Committee Stage, which was to remove the section, yet it is now being reinserted in the legislation. The whole procedure is unsatisfactory. I am particularly concerned about reversing the onus of proof as regards, not somebody who committed a crime, but someone who handled the goods, perhaps unknowingly. It is being suggested now that such a person may be considered reckless in handling such material. It is important to consider what might be the result for innocent individuals of including this in the legislation.

The Minister is a solicitor of long standing and he is heading into his fifth year as Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The one basic thing anyone learns in law school is the presumption of innocence. This goes back to the time when British laws were imposed in Britain and in Ireland. We are now removing that presumption of innocence. Amendment No. 11 states that the "proof of which shall lie on him or her".

One of the greatest atrocities and tragedies in my lifetime happened on 11 September. We were all saddened, worried, upset and traumatised by those events. A small group or cell of people planned that attack on America. However, what happened on 11 September is separate from what we are doing here. I agree with the Minister that we should do all we can to stamp out money laundering and the practice of people using the proceeds of crime. We should make every effort to introduce laws for people involved in money laundering, who use the proceeds of criminal conduct or who are reckless as to whether it is or represents such proceeds. The person must prove his innocence. Amendment No. 11 states:

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £1,500 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to both.

The Minister is the Minister in a country where we have always sought to protect innocent people, the downtrodden and those in difficulty. The danger with this and other legislation which is being introduced in the United Kingdom and across Europe and the western world is that many innocent people will be imprisoned. Serious wrongs are committed, but there is a danger that other wrongs will be committed if we pass such legislation. If the Minister was in Opposition and this legislation was introduced by us if we were on that side of the House, the Ceann Comhairle or the Leas-Cheann Comhairle would have difficulty controlling him because of his indignation at the fact that such a major mistake was being made. The Minister should consider what he is doing. Innocent people will be put in a position where they will not be able to prove their innocence. The Minister would not like to see anyone wrongly convicted. By removing the presumption of innocence and putting the onus of proof on the person, the Minister is in danger of making a mistake. I ask him to consider his position on that.

It is the position that legislation brought before the House, unless it is entering new territory, nearly always amends previous legislation. I say that to address Deputy O'Sullivan's point about this legislation amending other legislation.

Deputy O'Sullivan referred to the possibility of a person going to the Limerick mart and purchasing goods and being obliged subsequently to establish that he or she was not reckless in doing so. She asked whether in such circumstances where she handles goods which are laundered she would be held to be guilty under the section. The answer is that she would not nor is it conceivable that she would be charged. The reason is that the word reckless is defined in the interpretation section, section 16, for this purpose. It states:

For the purposes of this Part, a person is reckless if he or she disregards a substantial risk that the property handled is stolen, and for those purposes "substantial risk" means a risk of such a nature and degree that, having regard to the circumstances in which the person acquired the property and the extent of the information then available to him or her, its disregard involves culpability of a high degree.

A person buying goods at the mart in Limerick, as Deputy O'Sullivan described it, would not be caught under this section. The reason is that the degree of recklessness of a high degree, the degree of culpability of a high degree, would not exist.

As regards the question of the burden of proof, I am relatively used to being second guessed in the House about what I might or might not say in Opposition. When I introduced the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996, from the Opposition benches, which deals with the freezing of assets today by the Criminal Assets Bureau, I reversed the burden of proof. I stated that it was incumbent upon the person against whom the order was sought to establish that the goods were not illicit. That was a reversal of the burden of proof and a welcome and appropriate one in a civil order setting. This is a criminal sanction or at least it proposes or presumes there will be a criminal sanction.

The time for the Minister's contribution has concluded. He will have another opportunity to contribute.

I accept it is one thing to know or to believe something, but it is another thing being reckless as to whether it is or represents such proceeds. It is difficult to prove someone has not been reckless in terms of acquiring something innocently from someone else. I am concerned about the burden of proof in combination with the recklessness. One must prove one is innocent. If the person from whom I bought an item has a record of money laundering and it is subsequently proven that he or she is involved in money laundering, that person should be prosecuted and the force of the law should be brought against him or her. However, I may not have any way of proving how I acquired the property from that person. I will not get a receipt in those circumstances. It is fundamentally wrong that the onus of proof should be on me to prove I am innocent. It would be difficult in such circumstances because I would have acquired the property at the next remove. It is one thing if I know or believe it to be the proceeds of criminal conduct, but being reckless as to whether it is or represents such proceeds is another step. The onus of proof should not be on the individual.

I am sure the Limerick market is similar to many other markets. Many have to exercise a certain modicum of care. People exercise that modicum of care in regard to purchases at marts because problems can arise with property purchased. My main problem concerns the burden of proof. In regard to the proceeds of crime, the Criminal Assets Bureau has been successful in moving where there is money laundering and property has been acquired as the proceeds of crime. I am concerned about a person who may not be in a position to prove his or her innocence and is liable for a prison term of up to 14 years or a fine. That is a particularly penal law about which I have grave reservations. Most of those who will study this debate and law will also have grave reservations about it. While this provision will be pushed through, it is unwise. In the long-term, because of laws of this nature, we are heading into a situation where it is more likely that innocent people will be condemned, convicted and sentenced to prison in the wrong. That is something of which nobody wishes to be a part. There is an old tenet that suggests it is better to have a guilty person walk free than an innocent man sentenced to prison.

I regret I did not have the opportunity to finish what I was about to say on the burden of proof because of time constraints in my earlier contribution. Under this legislation there is no obligation on an accused person to prove that he or she was not reckless. The burden of proof, in so far as the ingredient of recklessness is concerned, does not extend to the accused. However, where the accused person states that he or she holds the property with lawful authority or excuse, it is perfectly reasonable to ask him or her to establish to the satisfaction of the court that this is the case. There is no question of the person being asked to establish, as a matter of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that the position is that he or she was not reckless. All we are saying is that the accused person, if he or she pleads lawful authority or excuse, should establish this. That is reasonable and perfectly fair.

In regard to the degree of recklessness, "reckless" is a word commonly used and commonly known, there would have to be a high degree of culpability. If a lady goes down to the market in Limerick and purchases a television for £100, one might say there was not a high degree of culpability even though the television was probably worth £200. On the other hand, if a person goes down to the market in Limerick and buys a perfectly new television worth £200 for £1, the argument might be successfully raised in court that this was reckless and that there was a high degree of culpability, in other words, that the person should or could have known, if he or she was not reckless, as to whether he or she knew or not.

The Minister referred to a person—

The Deputy does not have a right of reply. He can make two contributions on Report Stage. Unfortunately there is no provision for a right of reply.

Fair enough.

As it is now 5.15 p.m., I am obliged to put the following question in accordance with an order of the Dáil of this day: "That the amendments set down by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and not disposed of are hereby made to the Bill, that Fourth Stage is hereby completed and that the Bill is hereby passed".

Question put.

Ahern, Bertie.Ahern, Dermot.Ahern, Michael.Ahern, Noel.Andrews, David.Ardagh, Seán.Aylward, Liam.Blaney, Harry.Brady, Johnny.Brennan, Matt.Brennan, Séamus.Briscoe, Ben.Browne, John (Wexford).Byrne, Hugh.Callely, Ivor.Carey, Pat.Collins, Michael.Cooper-Flynn, Beverley.Coughlan, Mary.Cowen, Brian.Davern, Noel.Dempsey, Noel.Dennehy, John.Ellis, John.Fleming, Seán.Flood, Chris.Fox, Mildred.Gildea, Thomas.Hanafin, Mary.Harney, Mary.Haughey, Seán.Healy-Rae, Jackie.Keaveney, Cecilia.

Kelleher, Billy.Kenneally, Brendan.Killeen, Tony.Kirk, Séamus.Kitt, Tom.Lenihan, Conor.McCreevy, Charlie.McDaid, James.McGennis, Marian.McGuinness, John J.Martin, Micheál.Moffatt, Thomas.Molloy, Robert.Moloney, John.Moynihan, Donal.Moynihan, Michael.Ó Cuív, Éamon.O'Dea, Willie.O'Donnell, Liz.O'Donoghue, John.O'Hanlon, Rory.O'Keeffe, Batt.O'Kennedy, Michael.O'Rourke, Mary.Roche, Dick.Ryan, Eoin.Smith, Brendan.Smith, Michael.Treacy, Noel.Wade, Eddie.Wallace, Dan.Wallace, Mary.Woods, Michael.Wright, G. V.

Níl

Allen, Bernard.Barnes, Monica.Belton, Louis J.Boylan, Andrew.Bradford, Paul.Broughan, Thomas P.Browne, John (Carlow-Kilkenny).Bruton, John.Bruton, Richard.Burke, Ulick.Carey, Donal.Clune, Deirdre.Connaughton, Paul.Coveney, Simon.Crawford, Seymour.Creed, Michael.Deenihan, Jimmy.Dukes, Alan.Enright, Thomas.Farrelly, John.Flanagan, Charles.Gormley, John.Hayes, Brian.Hayes, Tom.Healy, Seamus.Higgins, Michael.Hogan, Philip.Kenny, Enda.

McCormack, Pádraic.McDowell, Derek.McGahon, Brendan.McGinley, Dinny.McGrath, Paul.McManus, Liz.Mitchell, Gay.Mitchell, Olivia.Naughten, Denis.Neville, Dan.Noonan, Michael.O'Keeffe, Jim.O'Shea, Brian.O'Sullivan, Jan.Owen, Nora.Penrose, William.Perry, John.Quinn, Ruairí.Reynolds, Gerard.Ring, Michael.Ryan, Seán.Sargent, Trevor.Sheehan, Patrick.Spring, Dick.Stagg, Emmet.Stanton, David.Timmins, Billy.Upton, Mary.

Tellers: Tá, Deputies S. Brennan and Briscoe; Níl, Deputies Bradford and Stagg.
Question declared carried.

A Cheann Comhairle, do we not have an opportunity to say something on the passage of the Bill?

No, it is completed.

A Cheann Comhairle, I was under the impression that there was a problem in that if matters were discussed on Report Stage that were not discussed in committee—

This is the first time that has happened in the House.

We must proceed to the next item, Residential Institutions Redress Bill, 2001. I call Deputy Browne.

People on this side of the House—

On a point of order—

What is the point of order?

This House has now passed into legislation material that has not been discussed either on Committee or Report Stages by the Members. Is that procedurally correct?

That is the Deputy's own fault. Fifty minutes was wasted.

There are many precedents for that. It happens nearly every week in the House.

No, this was new material.

We must proceed with No. 51.

On a point of order, if a matter has not been discussed in committee, are we now entitled to raise it on Report Stage? I do not believe we are, and if a Minister or anybody else can do it—

The Deputy is out of order. He should resume his seat.

I raise this matter because it is out of order. That is the problem.

It is the Deputy's own fault. He wasted 50 minutes talking nonsense.

It is not our fault.

(Interruptions.)

Deputy Enright should resume his seat and allow the business to proceed.

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