Dáil Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 10 Dec 2002

Vol. 559 No. 1

Adjournment Debate. - Electronic Voting System.

Mr. Allen

I am asking the Minister for the Environment and Local Government, who is not in the Chamber, to explain why he did not publish a report that has been in his possession since last March. The report claims that the new electronic system is not tamper-proof. I ask him to publish in full the report on electronic voting by the information security company Zerflow. The report has raised concerns about the new electronic system. I was astounded to discover today that this report was submitted to the Minister on 27 March this year, well in advance of the general election and the Nice treaty referendum, for which electronic voting was widely used.

I wish the Minister was here to clarify a number of questions as a matter of urgency. Why was this report not published? Why were these electronic voting systems used in the general election and the referendum? Were the problems identified by Zerflow resolved before the general election?

This report has been wrongfully suppressed by the Government so I am calling on the Minister to publish it now, in full. Members of the House must be able to judge whether or not it is safe to proceed with the electronic voting system, and in order to do so we must obtain the honest account contained in that report. Nothing less than a full explanation as to why the report was suppressed, and its immediate publication, will suffice.

While the report is confidential, I understand it examined the vulnerability of the electronic voting system from a number of perspectives. I have been informed that the lid of the voting machine used in polling stations could be lifted and the ballot paper removed and substituted with a bogus one. The machines are unable to distinguish between genuine ballot paper and bogus ones.

I have also been informed that the machine contained two cartridges, one of which was taken to the main count centre and the other remained in the machines. Keys used to unlock the cartridges were of poor quality and could easily be duplicated. As a result the original cartridge could be removed from the machine.

In view of this report, has the Department of the Environment and Local Government carried out an assessment of the electronic voting system? If so, what were the findings? Has any assessment been carried out of the security of the central computer at the main count centre? If such an assessment was carried out, the Minister should publish that report also.

How could the Minister announce an extension of the electronic voting system to cover all constituencies in the next local and European elections, if a major question mark is hanging over the security of the system? The Minister should provide us with a full report on his findings as well as publishing the Zerflow report in full. The Minister should also appear before the Committee on the Environment and Local Government to answer questions on this issue. The security company involved should also appear before that committee to answer questions on aspects of its report.

I do not have the report because it was suppressed by the Department but I am demanding that it now be published in full. In recent days we have seen that this Government cannot be trusted with anything it does. It lied and deceived the public prior to the general election, and it would do anything to stay in power.

Minister of State at the Department of the Environment and Local Government (Mr. Gallagher)

Go raibh maith agat, a Cheann Comhairle, as ucht deis a thabhairt dom páirt a ghlacadh san díospóireacht seo atá ardaithe ar an Athló ag an Teachta Allen. The matter to which the Deputy referred has attracted a considerable amount of media coverage in the last few days. I welcome the opportunity to bring some balance to that reporting and I want to reassure Deputies that the electronic voting system is accurate, reliable and secure.

From the outset, security has been paramount in the design, testing and implementation of the new system. The testing programme, in particular, has been rigorous. The voting machine has been tested by two international test institutes, PTB in Germany and TNO in the Netherlands, both of whom have certified the machine as suitable for use.

Zerflow, an information security company, was requested by my Department in March 2002 to carry out a further security assessment of the procedures to be applied in the use of voting machines in the physical environment of polling stations. This was a subsidiary and less extensive exercise than the other tests to which I have referred, carried out by PTB and TNO. It was carried out at a cost of some €4,000 plus VAT over 14 days.

The report was received on 27 March 2002 and it contained 16 recommendations. A small number of these were embodied in my Department's subsequent instructions to returning officers. An analysis of the report's main recommendations, however, revealed an inadequate understanding of the organisation of election preparations, including arrangements in polling stations.

The concerns raised by the Zerflow report were fully assessed by the Department and the machine manufacturers. They were not considered to present any realistic threat to the security of the voting process, having regard to the design of the machine and to the security arrangements operating in polling stations.

It was also relevant to this assessment that similar machines are used extensively in Germany and the Netherlands. The concerns raised by Zerflow have not been identified in risk assessments in these countries.

As most of the focus of media attention has been directed to the first recommendation in the report, I would like to deal with it.

Mr. Allen

On a point of order, may we have a copy of the Minister's speech?

Mr. Gallagher

It is available.

Mr. Allen

It is the normal custom to supply us with copies of a Minister's speech.

Mr. Gallagher

It is available.

Mr. Allen

Where is it?

Mr. Gallagher

The recommendation contained three parts, as follows: a perspex or glass cover should be placed over the ballot paper and the cover should be secured and alarmed; regular checks should be made to ensure nobody defaced or interfered with the surface of the protective glass; and regular checks should be made to ensure that the voting buttons represent the correct candidates and that candidate information is correct. The latter two items have in fact been addressed in my Department's instructions to returning officers.

As regards the first item, the present cover used for the machine ballot paper is considered adequate. It is not accepted that the ballot paper can be easily interfered with. The security arrangements in polling stations involve the deployment of a full-time poll clerk to supervise the use of each voting machine. Given the highly intrusive operations which would be necessary to remove the ballot paper cover from the machine, interference of the kind suggested could not occur without active collusion of polling station staff. The well supervised and honest administration of polling stations, under the authority of returning officers, is a key prerequisite for the good conduct of elections, in relation both to manual and electronic voting.

My Department's conclusion, therefore, was that the main scenarios identified by Zerflow were implausible, and that the probability of their occurrence without detection was so remote as to be properly discountable. Electronic voting is rightly seen as a progressive and welcome modernisation of our electoral process. I acknowledge that it is integral to the acceptability of the new system that there should be confidence in its security, as well as in its greater accuracy and efficiency.

Deputies should also bear in mind that the electronic voting machines in their present form will be replaced at the 2004 elections by new or upgraded machines. As part of the process of acquiring and commissioning these machines, we will of course look again at security issues.