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JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS debate -
Wednesday, 25 Jun 2003

Vol. 1 No. 33

EU Tax Harmonisation: Presentation.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss with officials from the Department of Finance proposals at EU level with implications for tax harmonisation. I welcome Ms Brigid McManus, assistant secretary; Mr. Michael McGrath, principal officer, and Ms Orlaith Gleeson, assistant principal officer. The meeting arises from an earlier discussion at the Sub-committee on European Scrutiny when a specific proposal on the harmonisation of duties for diesel fuels was considered. The sub-committee was of the view that the wider issue of tax harmonisation should be discussed, particularly in the light of the ideas which emerged from the Convention on the Future of Europe.

The proposed constitutional treaty has now been published and two specific proposals set out in Part 3, Articles 59.2 and 60, signal a move from unanimity to qualified majority voting, QMV, in certain limited circumstances. Article 59.2 provides for QMV on proposals relating to turnover tax and excise duties where the Council, acting unanimously, finds that the proposed measures relate to administrative co-operation and tax fraud. Article 60 provides for QMV on proposals relating to company taxation where the Council, acting unanimously, finds that the proposed measures relate to administrative co-operation and tax fraud, provided they are necessary for the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition. The result is that the Council has to act unanimously on a proposal. Only after unanimous decision can it decide on issues of administrative co-operation and tax fraud by QMV. That is the current position which could change at the Intergovernmental Conference.

Several member states, including Ireland, have refused to support these proposals. While supporting co-operation in the field of administration and efforts to combat fraud, some member states oppose the removal of unanimity, pointing to the existing right of member states to determine democratically the structure of the tax system and the levels of government spending which it supports.

I invite the assistant secretary at the Department of Finance, Ms McManus, to make her opening statement, following which members of the committee may ask questions.

I am the assistant secretary dealing with tax policy in the budget and economic division, including domestic tax policy issues in the context of the budget and Finance Bill as well as EU and some OECD tax issues. I am accompanied by my colleagues, Mr. Michael McGrath and Ms Orlaith Gleeson, who work on some of the EU and OECD issues which come within my area of responsibility.

I understand the committee's interest lies within the general framework of proposals at EU level in the context of tax harmonisation. The note prepared by the Department and circulated to the committee outlines the basis for dealing with tax matters at EU level.

Under the current EU treaty, the majority of directives and regulations in the taxation area, both direct and indirect taxes, are adopted under Article 93 or Article 94 or, occasionally, both. Both Articles require decision-making by unanimity - they require the agreement of all member states for any change in the law. As the Chairman mentioned, they have been the subject of considerable debate in the Convention on the Future of Europe. On that topic, Deputy Carey was particularly involved in the economic governance committee. While some member states, including Ireland, do not wish to have the rule on unanimity changed, others have a very strong view that it should change to a considerably greater extent than that envisaged in the Convention proposals.

It may be helpful to outline the current broad EU framework in the main tax areas. There was an EC-wide legislative basis for VAT before Ireland joined the Community in 1973. Currently, the EU sixth VAT directive, adopted in 1977, is the key directive in this area. EU rules provide the framework and there is a degree of harmonisation of approach. However, there is still considerable autonomy with regard to the level of VAT rates applied. Over a number of years the Commission had plans in the context of the Single Market to switch to a more harmonised approach such as, for example, to apply VAT at point of origin of goods rather than at destination, as is currently the case, and to have a more harmonised system of rates. Many member states had difficulties with this for various reasons. Accordingly, the current focus is on dealing with particular problems such as e-commerce or cross-border issues.

In the case of excise tax there are three broad product groups covered by the current EU rules - alcohol, tobacco and mineral oil products. Under the EU energy tax directive currently being finalised, a wider range of energy products will be covered such as gas, electricity and coal. There is a basic structure in place governing the control and movement of goods across borders and a system of minimum rates which are relatively low on most products. In practice, there is a wide range of variation in excise duties applied by member states. This reflects various traditions and political and cultural choices. Northern European countries tend to have high rates of excise duty on alcohol and tobacco, whereas southern European countries have a tradition of much lower taxes. Accordingly, while there is a framework in existence, there is still a degree of autonomy.

The Chairman referred to the proposal for a fixed rate for road diesel fuel which was rejected by 14 of the 15 member states. It was a somewhat unusual proposal by the Commission whose general approach has been towards narrowing the gap between the rates applied in different countries with higher minimum rates. It would probably favour the application of maximum rates also but has not succeeded in making much progress in that area.

The main existing directives in the direct tax area deal with the cross-border treatment of companies under the parent-subsidiary companies directive and the mergers directive adopted in 1990 under the Irish Presidency. The details of a directive on the treatment of interest and royalties applying to cross-border cases have just been agreed by the Council of Finance Ministers, ECOFIN - on 3 June - as well as a directive on the treatment of cross-border savings which has received considerable publicity. This relates to giving information or introducing a withholding tax to deal with offshore savings. Related arrangements in that regard are in the process of being finalised with third countries such as Switzerland. Clearly, there is no point in having a system in place by the European Union if the only result is that savings move to other third countries.

Much of the current approach to direct tax issues at EU level can be linked to a report by Commissioner Mario Monti in the mid-1990s which set out the case for greater tax co-ordination in order to support the Single Market and EU employment policy. Work undertaken by the Commission since culminated in a Commission communication on company taxation in 2001 which set out the developments it would like to see. We provided an information note in this regard for circulation to the committee.

The Commission's proposal involved a twin track approach, targeting particular cross-border problems such as parent-subsidiary companies or mergers or issues with regard to common approaches to transfer pricing. We have no difficulty with taking a direct approach to particular obstacles and finding specific solutions. It has advantages for an economy as open as ours if such issues are tackled at European level with a view to removal of trade barriers. We are generally supportive of the work in progress in this area.

The Commission's other proposal was for a longer-term "big bang" approach for a common consolidated corporate tax base for companies for their EU-wide activities. We view this approach as going far beyond the idea of co-ordination of EU policy in the direct tax area, being a disproportionate approach to dealing with obstacles and interfering with member states' autonomy and sovereignty in tax matters. Given the difficulties in resolving such issues as treatment of cross-border losses on a targeted, individual basis, a "big bang" approach towards solving all problems at once is unlikely to be successful.

Another important EU factor in tax policy formulation and implementation is the general EU rules on state aids which apply to tax measures as well as grants and other expenditure measures. Any tax measures regarded as discriminatory are subject to state aid rules. Ireland's 10% tax rate for manufacturing and IFSC companies has to be phased out because of these rules which, to a certain extent, produce a common approach at EU level.

In addition to formal legislative changes, work is under way to tackle harmful tax practices. The EU code of conduct is a political agreement designed to curb harmful competition between member states in business taxation. It focuses on national tax measures which have the potential to have an effect on the location of business within the Community and provide for a significantly lower effective rate than that generally applying in the member state in question. This refers to specific niche regimes established to attract mobile investment as opposed to general policy choices about how a taxation system operates. Interestingly, when we started work on this issue, we found that many of the member states which had been complaining bitterly about Ireland's general taxation rate operated these kinds of niche regimes with low effective rates. While Ireland's system was criticised more than others - it is generally more transparent - in practice, it was found to be more acceptable than others from the point of view of harmful tax competition.

In addition, the OECD has been working on harmful tax competition during roughly the same period. Many of its measures are geared towards mobile investment and focus, therefore, on the issue of mobile financial services which cover a much wider range of countries than the European Union. Members will probably have seen references to tax havens which have been designated as unco-operative. This was done in the context of work carried out by the OECD which we supported.

While we are happy to take common approaches at EU level where they benefit Ireland, we regard unanimity as crucial. This brings us to the Convention on the Future of Europe in which there is pressure to move to qualified majority voting. As the Chairman stated, Articles 59.2 and 60 of the draft constitution propose the extension of qualified majority voting to issues of administrative co-operation and combating tax fraud for both indirect and company tax once the Council has unanimously agreed that the matter in question can be defined as such.

We oppose any change in the principle of unanimity in decision-making on taxation issues. The Government's position on the matter has been clear. I am aware that the Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach, Deputy Roche, has appeared before the committee to discuss this issue. The right to decide the level of public spending and how it will be funded is a basic function of the democratic process which touches directly on the relationship of the citizen to the State. We want to preserve this asset by retaining its use at national level.

In addition, the right of member states to decide upon taxation issues is a powerful economic tool which allows them to take into account their particular position in the economic and business cycle or their geographical position, whether on the periphery of Europe or elsewhere. Losing this right could severely impair the ability of each member state to manage its particular economic conditions. The use of qualified majority voting could result in taxation measures being imposed with which Ireland disagreed. This does not mean, in the context of the proposals before the Convention, that we are opposed to administrative co-operation in tackling fraud. Rather, our view is that this can be done under a unanimity system. If a proposal is a genuine measure to tackle fraud, all member states should be prepared to sign up to it and it should not be impeded by the unanimity requirement.

When one hears the term "administrative co-operation on tax fraud" one assumes it to be an area on which every state would want to work. When one considers, however, that the Commission's savings taxation proposals, probably one of the most controversial dossiers ever produced at EU level, were proposed as an anti-fraud measure, one could easily argue that a measure to harmonise the current differentials in excise rates across member states should also be described in such terms. We are concerned that tackling fraud could be used to cover a multitude of issues.

On the current proposals, some Convention members could argue that the Council requirement for unanimity offers a strong degree of protection. Given that a proposal can change considerably between the point at which it is made and the time it reaches the end of the process, any agreement at the outset that the area addressed by the proposal in question is covered by qualified majority voting would mean that all subsequent proposals in this area would automatically fall within QMV. Ultimately, therefore, what started out as an unproblematic proposal could eventually present problems.

Although, in practice, it would be possible for a Minister to adopt a position of not allowing any proposal through, I am not sure it would be feasible to do this in one Council meeting after another, once the provision proposed in the article had been accepted. If the principle is that unanimity should apply, it should not be breached, even in the narrow manner proposed in the current wording.

We are not alone in our view on the current Convention proposals. Ireland jointly submitted a paper with the United Kingdom, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Sweden and Spain setting out concerns about the current Convention text. If members have questions or would like to raise issues, we will be happy to respond.

The discussion is broader than the issue of the Convention. As Ms McManus stated, I was the person who soldiered for a period on the economic governance working party. She also articulated the arguments we made then and later in the plenary. The preservation of the current position on taxation issues is a red line issue for Ireland, which is not to say we precluded issues of administrative co-operation from being discussed or developed.

Regarding the joint paper we submitted with our colleagues, to which Ms McManus referred, agreement on our position extended much further than the group of states mentioned. Most of the friends of the Community method, the network co-ordinated by the Minster of State, Deputy Roche, were sympathetic to our position for various reasons. Sweden supported it because it wanted to preserve its discretion to impose a higher level of taxation, whereas Estonia had other reasons for preserving the zero level of corporation taxation it applies.

Certain member states have devices for applying low taxation regimes, for example, in the area of corporation tax. The German Lånder are an example of such a device. If members want to get a flavour of our position, it is argued in the paper to which I referred. It is of fundamental importance that we maintain a strong position on unanimity on taxation matters, which does not, however, preclude closer co-operation in the administrative area of taxation matters.

I welcome Ms McManus and the delegation. The work of the Convention has been described as similar to the Philadelphia convention in the United States. This comparison is slightly inappropriate because the latter convention was where the famous phrase, "No taxation without representation", was coined. The irony of the Convention on the Future of Europe is that one has representation without taxation in the European Union. The two conventions are, therefore, different.

I agree that we need to protect our position on low corporation taxes. The most important function of a state in its natural form is the raising of taxes. Many in Europe want this function to be exercised by European Union institutions. Its loss would be a significant development for this country. We lost our control over monetary policy, if we ever had it, but it was not the end of the world. We need a debate on this issue. Our current position appears immutable.

I can understand the reason the issue of taxation would be raised at the Convention. Does Ms McManus believe it will also be addressed at the Intergovernmental Conference? Will the extension of qualified majority voting to taxation matters, in particular, be a serious issue at the Intergovernmental Conference?

I commend the succinctness of the comments made by Ms McManus and her colleagues. Is there a danger that the tabloidisation of Ireland's position on taxation could be misunderstood as being that we oppose any change towards integrating the taxation system of the European Union because we want to preserve what are incorrectly regarded by some countries as harmful taxation policies? That is the manner in which it is projected, as Ms McManus rightly alluded to in her off-script comments. When one looks closely at what the Dutch and the Germans are doing, in reality, they have designer taxes. One could go to the equivalent of the Dutch or Belgian revenue commissioners and make a sweetheart deal if one happened to locate in Wallonia. While the federal government has a formal tax system, the regional government, which has a function in tax matters, could make a specific company a sweetheart deal offering benefits greatly in excess of those available elsewhere.

We keep on saying no. Clearly, QMV will apply to Articles 93 and 94. Bearing this in mind, would it not be desirable for us to agree and be proactive, rather than reluctantly become part of the consensus? We should lead the debate by arguing for standardisation of the base of company taxation across the European Union, from the point of view of transparency and producing a level playing pitch. It should be the prerogative of a sovereign nation-state to decide the rate of corporation tax, be it 12.5% or 25%. It would be desirable, however, to have a degree of harmonisation in corporation tax profits and in respect of activities such as write-offs and what is deemed to be taxable or non-taxable income. The formal objection to Ireland's 10% rate, soon to be 12.5%, was that we got the best of both worlds. It would be beneficial to establish clarity and consistency across a Union of 25 member states. This would allow a company locating in the Union to make a decision as to whether it wanted to be in one country or another on the basis of the taxation rate.

The Department of Finance has done a wonderful job on our behalf over many years. I put it to its officials that the time may be right to separate the base from the rate. We need to come out of the bunker with the self-confidence we possess and be proactive in looking for harmonisation in those areas in which we have nothing to fear.

I am sure that it is the unanimous view of the committee, that there be unanimity on tax matters in the interests of the democratic process within the nation-state concerned. I have one brief question which relates to a matter which has not been mentioned so far in the discussion. How many countries are in difficulty in regard to the Stability and Growth Pact? What are the proposed changes? What lies behind the calls for changes to the pact and what is their likely outcome?

I repeat the words of congratulations to Ms McManus for the succinctness of her words, as Deputy Quinn put it. Deputy Haughey said there was probably unanimity in respect of tax matters but I am not sure that is the case, although I was inclined to think that way also.

Deputy Quinn neatly summed up the difficulty in tax matters in differentiating between the base and the tax rate. In my experience other Europeans do not regard us as true Europeans because of the almost underhand way in which we get the benefits of lower tax rates. The base is the important element. While it is essential that we hold on to the rates of tax, we do not really want to get involved in a scenario where we are regarded with disdain by other Europeans because of our perceived self-interest at the expense of the common good. We are wise, therefore, to enter into the debate. I am aware that Articles 93 and 94 include references to acting unanimously in this area and the introduction of qualified majority voting in the other. In order to get the best bargain we probably need to wear a wider hat, one that reflects an interest in the common good as well as what is good for us.

I questioned Peter Sutherland recently as to whether the benefits we got from a low tax rate, and our enthusiasm for it, would continue to apply if a number of the candidate countries introduced a zero tax rate, as, I think, one or two have announced? He was confident that we would not be a low wage employer and that, therefore, what we would be seeking would not be threatened. Our 12.5% tax rate will no longer sound attractive if some eastern European countries offer a zero tax rate. As it might well be the case that our views will change, it is important that we try to get the best deal we can.

It had not dawned on me until Ms McManus mentioned it that the level of taxation on tobacco and alcohol in southern Europe was very low in comparison to that in northern Europe. We regard this as being the right approach for health purposes. If we are to have tax harmonisation in other areas, perhaps it will also apply to excise duty. I do not think that would be in our interests. It seems, therefore, that to get the best deal we should certainly preserve the right to fix the rate we charge but not necessarily the base. On that basis I support the suggestion made by Deputy Quinn.

Another convert to Marx.

This has been an interesting debate. I am not sure what is emerging to my left. I did not know Senator Quinn formed part of that group.

I regard this as an important matter and concur with Ms McManus's statement: "The right to decide the level of public spending and how it will be funded is a basic function of the democratic process." The point has been well articulated. Perhaps Deputy Quinn will elaborate further on what he said.

I do not see any conflict between having a free open market and different rates of tax. It would be a sad day if the European Union was given the power to dictate not only the levels of taxation but also the types of taxes that may or may not be imposed in various parts of the Community.

I am pleased that Senator Quinn raised the issue of alcohol, not because he is an alcoholic, although he probably sells a few bottles every day. We are burdened with an unusually high excise duty on wine, which is a pity for the ordinary person who cannot enjoy one of the great fruits of Europe at the same rates as those enjoyed by most other people in the European Union. However, we put up with it because we recognise government has to be funded. It is our choice to have low tax rates in other areas.

I wish to be associated with the comments of Deputy Haughey and others that this is a fundamental issue. I praise the good work done by Deputy Carey and others at the Convention in steering those who believe in a superstate away from making the Convention their own. The Convention is careful to delineate the limits of sovereignty of member states. I am against tampering with taxation policy in this regard and glad to see this reiterated in the paper before us.

I welcome the officials from the Department of Finance and thank them for their presentation.

My views do not differ markedly from what has been said. It was suggested to us at the National Forum on Europe last week that the insertion of a provision that decisions would be taken on a unanimous basis implicitly suggested that at some stage the event would take place. In other words, a unanimous decision will be made and there will be convergence or a common taxation system across the European Union. I am not saying we can roll back on the work of the Convention, that the work of the Irish delegation has not been valuable, or that what has emerged is satisfactory.

In the European system of central banks we have vested responsibility for most of the economic levers that form part of our sovereignty. Taxation is a powerful economic policy tool, one of the few remaining that give us domestic capacity to exercise control over our economy and how it is managed. If this were to go, there would be a uniform way of doing things across the European Union and it would be a short step to federalism.

It is reasonable to argue that competition between member states is not bad from an EU point of view. If there are differentials to attract industry or jobs, they have certain merit in terms of the economic vibrancy of the European Union as a whole. I am interested in hearing the observations of the officials. In this regard, I noted the point made about the formula apportionment systems used in Canada and the United States. I wonder about the validity of using such a system in the European Union context.

It is a general principle that monetary policy is a matter for the European Central Bank while economic policy is a matter for member states. Anything that would take from this would be a source of great concern. Having attended many Council of Ministers meetings, I sometimes worry about the terms used. I note the use of the term "administrative co-operation". Will the officials clarify in greater detail what this actually covers as it seems to be a very bland term? Sometimes the French meaning of a term can be very different from the English version.

The briefing document circulated to us regarding the communication on taxation, dated 23 October 2001, refers to the formula apportionment systems used in the USA and Canada. Will the officials tell us how they operate?

Ms McManus also mentioned the ECOFIN meeting of 3 June as well as the directive on the treatment of cross-border savings and related arrangements with third countries such as Switzerland which are in the process of being finalised. Does this deal with savings accounts and the naming of savers or the avoidance of holding accounts in offshore locations within the European Union and the European economic area? At what is the directive aimed?

Ms McManus also mentioned the EU code of conduct which states that, in addition to formal legislative changes, work is under way to tackle harmful tax practices. It is a political agreement designed to curb harmful competition between member states in business taxation. Will she tell us something more about this?

It is worth pondering on the Agence Europe report of 16 June on levels of taxation. It states that, at 41% of GDP, the personal taxation burden in the European Union compares with a rate of 29% in the United States. However, it goes on to state that, according to the European Commission and EUROSTAT, the figure for taxes and social security contributions stood at 41.1% of GDP in 2001. The figure for the overall tax burden is highest in Sweden at 54.1%. It stands at 49.8% in Denmark, 46% in Finland and Belgium and is lowest in Ireland at 31.2%. The figure for Spain is 35.6%; 35.9% for Portugal and 36.8% for Greece. The report also states labour remains the main source of tax revenue in the European Union, accounting for over 50% of total revenue, compared with a figure of 20% for taxes on capital and 30% on consumption. Again, the figures are headed by Sweden. Clearly, the different rates which apply across the Union have different effects. How does the code of conduct on the harmful effects of taxation apply to this issue?

I chaired a review of the International Financial Services Centre at the Department of the Taoiseach. One of the issues that came up at the time was that in some member states the nominal rate of tax could have been anything because one could negotiate write-offs almost on a bilateral basis and certainly on an industry basis. This was done face to face with officials. This calls into question whether rates should be decided at national level.

Let us suppose there was harmony in corporation tax rates throughout the European Union with, for example, a 10% write-off rate in Ireland and Belgium. Transport costs in Belgium might amount to €100,000. Therefore, the tax write-off would be €10,000 leaving a figure of €90,000, whereas the cost of getting a product to the market in Ireland could be three times or more that figure at €300,000. Even if one had a higher write-off figure of €30,000, the cost would still be €270,000. If one is to take into account the effects of harmonisation on the market, how does one deal with transport costs in Ireland, the cost of getting goods to the market? Issues such as this have to be dealt with.

Other members have mentioned Articles 59 and 60. Is this a matter to which other member states are likely to return at the Convention? Will there be pressure to go back to the Giscard line when the report of the Convention comes out?

I will try to broadly group the questions together. The first question asked by Deputy Andrews and later by the Chairman was whether the Convention articles mentioned were likely to be a big issue at the Intergovernmental Conference. As I indicated, with others we are not happy with the current provisions. The French and Germans have indicated that, although Parts I and II were presented to the European Council in Thessaloníki last week, there is still technical work to be done on Parts III and IV. The two articles mentioned which deal with taxation are included in Part III. The French and Germans have signalled that they want to reopen the discussions on taxation issues.

It is difficult to say exactly how the Intergovernmental Conference will proceed and how fast. Will it concentrate on a few key issues such as institutional issues, taxation, justice and home affairs, or will it be a more detailed run through? While Germany, for example, may want to reopen the discussion on taxation, it appears to be taking the general position that it would not like to discuss matters in too much detail in order that something may be got through quickly. I would be very surprised if we got through the Intergovernmental Conference process without a discussion on taxation. It has been a lively issue in any of the forums at which it has been debated in the context of the Convention. From the point of view of the Department of Finance, I would be happy if we could say there was to be no change in taxation and no debate on the issue - that would make my life easier by removing one problem from my agenda. For the very reason that taxation is such a central economic interest it is hard to imagine the issue not being debated in an Intergovernmental Conference context.

Where will it rank? In a sense, in the Convention the debate has covered such a wide range of issues that it is only when one issue is particularly focused on that it is possible to assess how high the issues rank in terms of the priorities of each member state. Some countries may not like unanimity in taxation matters but it may not be the most important issue for them to fight. It is very hard to assess this at this stage; it is only as one gets into negotiations that the true feelings of countries can be seen.

A couple of members mentioned taxation being used as an economic instrument. Much of the economic literature tends to show that countries in a central position, or even regions within a federal system, will tend to have higher tax rates while countries on the periphery have lower rates. In Europe the countries with the highest rates are located in the central area, where there are large markets and other competitive advantages, especially, as the Chairman pointed out, in the area of transport.

Before the Commission's communication a study was conducted, the mandate of which was to consider taxation in the context of competitive advantage and location of industry in a European market. It considered the taxation factor without looking at all of the other economic factors. Taxation has always been a hugely important instrument for Ireland, from export sales relief to our 10% corporation tax rate. It is very hard to consider what drives the location of industry purely in the context of taxation when so many other factors are important. That is precisely the reason we want to keep it as an instrument and argue that in a single market every country does not need the same taxation system. The USA is a single market, as are Switzerland and Canada, and there are varying tax rates.

What about transfer pricing? Does our dependence on foreign direct investment have a disproportionate effect?

In one way it does. One article quotes a figure of 31% for our tax burden. It is more valid to quote the tax burden as a percentage of GNP because of the discrepancy between GDP and GNP. This brings the value to 37%, which is still lower than the EU average. In terms of our disposable resources, for most of our taxes one must consider GNP rather than GDP.

Surely GNP is subject to the 10% tax rate. Most consists of exported profits. Does the correction still allow for this adjustment from 31% to 37%?

No, the adjustment results from considering the total tax take as a percentage of GNP as opposed to GDP. The Deputy is correct in that it is fair to consider corporation tax as a percentage of GDP but for all other taxes - labour taxes, capital taxes and so on - it is more legitimate to consider them as well as our public expenditure in terms of GNP. This is only a matter of changing the denominator. Adjusting for the corporation tax figure would probably result in a lower value, which I do not have with me.

To return to the issue of transfer pricing, the difference between GNP and GDP arises because of repatriation. We have transfer pricing rules which are largely based on domestic concerns. Probably at the time of the 10% rate there were problems between the companies to which this rate applied and the higher rate companies but most of the countries with which businesses in Ireland are doing business - the USA and Japan, for example, where there is foreign direct investment - have stringent transfer pricing rules. We have generally not had difficulties about the rules with these countries and while allegations may be made at times that there is a degree of transfer pricing which over-inflates profits in Ireland and underestimates them somewhere else, there are internationally accepted rules and arrangements under most double taxation treaties to police them. There may be an element of overestimation but in taxation terms, there are well accepted rules for dealing with this.

The Intergovernmental Conference and the general economic issue lead on to the issue of perception raised by Deputy Quinn and Senator Quinn. That is one of the difficulties about the debate: there is a perception - this is one of the reasons I mentioned the differences in excise rates - that the only reason we are fighting for unanimity is that we want to have a low corporation tax rate to beat every other country. The French probably want a zero tax rate on wine but nobody says that is due to machiavellian reasoning. We do our best in our interactions with embassies and groups in other countries to offer a wider justification than this. It is not a case of Ireland trying to steal other countries' business and taxes.

There can be misinterpretations. It has been said we are only able to do something because we have received large amounts of Structural Funds. In such cases we show the relevant figures. We try to counter this but one has to look at it from the point of view of those who have an interest in indulging in propaganda, even if they know that, in practice, we have strict rules, for example, in respect of trading income to which the 12.5% rate applies. Passive income is subject to a rate of 25% which has to be related to some kind of substantive operation.

It suits people, either for domestic or other purposes, to produce an image of Ireland as taking this predatory approach, not least because it provides a defence against companies or individuals in their own countries who may be looking for a more competitive corporation tax rate. If people have an interest in arguing differently, they will. We all use our own arguments for our own purposes. In the document that we presented jointly with a range of member states we tried to argue from a wider base than the Irish perception.

This takes us back to the question of competition between member states. We cannot operate as if Europe was an island. If one brought tax rates in Ireland up to the level in Germany, 35%, foreign direct investment made in Ireland partly because of our 12.5% rate would not be made in France or Germany but in Switzerland or India. The fortress Europe argument suggests that there can be a corporation tax system within the European Union that ignores the fact that the Union is part of an international scene. We argue that there is significant evidence that lower corporation tax rates generate more activity which may generally be to everyone's benefit in terms of economic activity. Whether the argument can be made that the rate can be brought down to zero and still achieve the optimum mix for economic effect, without harmful competition, is debatable.

In the European context, if one were look at the matter from a labour point of view, there would be general agreement that the level of employment would improve if the tax wedge was reduced. In the case of labour the tax wedge has proved to be one of the difficulties in employment policy. One cannot have a taxation policy that ignores its economic effects, including in the wider international community. For example, in the context of the code of conduct and tackling the Dutch arrangements and the Belgian co-ordination centres, when for state aid reasons the Dutch had to get rid of their regime whereby one negotiated one's own personal tax rate with civil servants, the company in question moved its headquarters to Switzerland. We have to be conscious of this. Ireland is the beneficiary of about 5% of American foreign direct investment - a high figure - but we are not responsible for the woes of the European Union.

Is that 5% of foreign direct investment in Europe or in general?

In general, on average.

Of foreign direct investment in Europe.

Worldwide.

What would be the percentage in the case of Europe?

I do not know.

Mr. Michael McGrath

We can supply the figures. The source of the information is the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the United States.

I had heard that the figure stood at about 30% or 35%. Is that correct?

That seems high. Ireland and Denmark are the two main takers.

Mr. McGrath

We can supply the information.

That would be helpful.

Many of the core member states do not depend heavily on foreign direct investment. In that context, we have a PR job which is difficult. If one looks at the issue of whether we harmonise the base and argue on the rate——

Does administrative co-operation explicitly include harmonisation of the base, or is that a policy matter?

Ms McManus will come to that question.

Our concern is that it could include anything but, generally, it refers to mutual assistance arrangements where information is exchanged between revenue authorities, obligations to exchange information, common computer systems and training programmes. There could be issues that may cause concern for us such as joint audits in order that an auditor from another member state could operate in Ireland. This would give rise to legal problems. In general, however, administrative co-operation entails these types of measures. On the concept of the Single Market, when the treaties started, people would have thought in terms of indirect tax rates. Now it covers a multitude. Therefore, as the Chairman said, one would always be concerned that terms can be elastic but we signed up to administrative co-operation measures in the interests of unanimity.

In terms of the tax base and tax rates, given that the Department of Finance has been fighting on the issue for so long, perhaps we do have a bunker mentality but I would be reluctant to come out of my bunker on this one. It is difficult to see how once one started to standardise the base that it would not open up the tax rates issue. When the Commission launched its communication, it held a conference for practitioners in the private sector and public servants. Several senior officials from the German and French tax authorities took a strong line, that they would not countenance the Commission's proposal for an optional consolidated tax base in order that a company could choose which it preferred. This would be an administrative nightmare because a company would always choose the most advantageous system in order that its tax take would be reduced. The French and the Germans argued that the only basis on which they would consider this proposal was that, in the case of the base, it would have to be obligatory and that the issue of tax rates would also have to be tackled. Once one concedes on the issue of the base, almost inevitably the issue of tax rates will come up for discussion.

More fundamental is the issue of why one would do this. In practice, the code of conduct and the European Commission's big stick of state aids which has, in part, been an effective weapon have been reasonably good in tackling such matters as the Belgian co-ordination centres to which the committee may have seen reference in the media, the Dutch systems, or our IFSC regime, if one regards it as targeting mobile financial investment. That is how it has been perceived. EU state aid rules are tackling non-legislative, political co-operation arrangements while the code of conduct deals with the issues we want to tackle such as greater transparency to create a level playing field.

There would be a twofold risk in addressing the base: it would remove flexibility from a member state to deal with particular circumstances, for example, taking a particular approach to depreciation, or other issues within the normal corporation tax system. This would always have to be negotiated between 15 or 25 member states. If one found that the base was causing problems in terms of avoidance, the Minister for Finance would not be able to shut off a loophole as he can now. Even at the operational end, we would have a great many problems.

I am not sure that it is necessary to deal with the matter. Why do we want to do something with corporation tax at an EU level? We want to do something where it would be useful to facilitate businesses operating across borders. If one has a business which wants to operate across four of five member states to have a good scale that will make it competitive with American or other companies through giving it the advantages that they enjoy operating in bigger markets, this can be dealt with through targeted measures without affecting the base.

It comes back to a question asked by the Chairman about the apportionment formula. The idea is that a company calculates its total tax liability in the same way across the base. One then decides how much of the tax is due to each member state, or in the case of the United States, to each individual state. It is apportioned by a formula. In the United States the formula takes in such matters as payroll and properties or sales in the state. None of these bases would suit the operations we have in Ireland because they do not recognise whether one has highly value-added items or heavy intellectual property. Ireland would not emerge well from any formula apportionment based on physical items or sales.

The European Commission's paper talks about the value-added factor in a company and using a VAT-type base as the apportionment formula for corporation tax. However, it would be a very arbitrary instrument. Ironically, the European Union fought viciously against the United States when it started imposing it on some of its double taxation agreement arrangements. Now it is being proposed by the Commission. The formula apportionment tends to be made on these kinds of crude measures. One has to wonder how well the kinds of businesses we have in Ireland would come out of it. That is more of an issue for a country such as Ireland which has a very high proportion of international business than it might be for Germany or France where a very large proportion of the industrial sector and tax base is indigenous. We would have concerns about formula apportionment and how we would do out of it.

The position in eastern Europe was raised, which I suppose is an issue. If one accepts the logic of our position, that it is a matter of autonomy, one must accept that other countries such as Estonia can have a zero tax rate. Would that be a problem for Ireland? As Senator Quinn said, there are many other factors in the reason people come to countries, taking in a combination of tax rates, the labour force and so on. For example, I recall a person involved in financial services saying to me that while the Isle of Man had a very favourable tax regime, it only had a few hundred school-leavers every year. Therefore, if one wishes to build up a good and complex securitisation business, there must be enough labour.

It is a question of staying competitive in other issues. Tax is one element. Frank Barry of UCD conducted a study into the effect of accession, and his argument was that there would be more business from an enlarged market. We might receive a slightly lower share of foreign direct investment into the enlarged European Union but it would be at the same, if not a higher, level since the totality would go up. One is looking at the balance between the benefits of having new markets and a bigger European Union against a little more competition from some of the accession countries, which is in any case probable more in the longer term.

There was a question about cross-border savings. The idea behind the savings tax directive was that it was for non-residents. Residents in EU member states had savings in other member states and the question was whether their income was being taxed. It is limited to cross-border interest payments. It does not cover interest payments made within a country. It will require an institution to report to its own tax authority, which will then be transmitted to the tax authority of the other member state. It covers any payments of interest and some capital payments on bonds and so on. There was a long debate on this matter at EU level since there was an issue about whether the correct route was the exchange of information or a withholding tax. Three member states have opted for the withholding tax arrangement: Austria, Luxembourg and Belgium.

When it was adopted a few years ago, in principle, at EU level, the view was that it would only be workable if one could get key third countries which also attracted savings to be part of the deal. There were, therefore, lengthy negotiations with Switzerland which became somewhat fraught. It has now signed up but will apply a high withholding tax of 35% which, one hopes, will have an effect. There are several other third countries - Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino - which all said they would wait and see what we negotiated with Switzerland but one expects they will probably go along with it. The United States committed itself to the exchange of information.

As part of the deal, member states undertook that their associated territories such as the Isle of Man and Jersey, dependent territories such as the Cayman Islands and the Antilles would sign up, either through having a significant withholding tax or an exchange of information. That is all expected to come. The exchange of information is automatic rather than on request, as one would encounter in a suspected tax fraud.

If you were a Belgian citizen but had banked money in Luxembourg where you had an address, would the authorities pass on this information or apply the withholding tax?

The paying agent would have the responsibility to ensure one was genuinely resident in Luxembourg. He or she would have a certain responsibility. One would be caught by the domestic rules in Luxembourg but if one had a Luxembourg address, that would not be the case. One must pay tax, either in Luxembourg or Belgium. There may be scope for a degree of fraud that would have to be tackled with other measures.

One of the difficulties with Switzerland under double taxation agreements is that it is less inclined to exchange information than other countries. It has a definition of "fraud" narrower than most EU countries. It has also committed itself to try to move towards an OECD exchange of information. The ultimate aim is to have a complete exchange of information by the end of the period. However, several countries would see themselves as gaining more advantage through taking 35% from customers than passing on their names to their tax authorities. However, it should, at least, produce a somewhat more level playing field.

Deputy Haughey asked me about the Stability and Growth Pact. I do not deal with it but my understanding of the issue as it arose before was that no agreement could be reached on changing the conditions. I am sure that the issue will run and run, driven by those who argue that if countries have low debt ratios, they should be allowed some flexibility, and those who argue that other exceptional circumstances should apply. There is a degree of concern that once rules which were difficult to negotiate are breached, however justifiably, the doors will be opened. It is certainly a live issue, on which no agreement was reached. I suspect it will continue to be an issue. The Convention does not propose to change the rules but it was seeking changes in some of the sanction mechanisms.

I asked about the code of conduct.

It is related to harmful tax measures. The fact that it was defined as such is important because some of our competitors would argue that even a low rate of tax is harmful. However, that was not the context in which the code examined the matter. It was up to each member state to have its own regime. That was their political choice. If a member state had a special niche regime specifically targeted at the location of investment, the purpose would have been to target other people's investment, in effect, through tax measures, rather than have a general regime that offered an attractive location for foreign direct investment.

Can you give an example of what you would consider to be a harmful tax measure?

Ring-fenced regimes were looked at. For example, in Ireland's case one of the measures identified as a potentially harmful regime was the IFSC on the basis that it was ring-fenced in respect of international financial services rather than as a general regime for financial services. There was a good deal of debate about which matters were potentially harmful. As it happened, by the time the IFSC had been listed as a potentially harmful regime under the code of conduct, we had reached agreement with the European Commission to phase it out within the context of state aid rules. We, therefore, had no difficulty in agreeing to roll it back in line with the code.

One of the reasons the code of conduct process was reasonably successful as a political agreement was that in the background the European Commission had the "big stick" of EU state aid rules. The work done in identifying measures under the code made people realise there were issues about which they had not known which they could have pursued on state aid rule grounds. I am thinking of the Belgian co-ordination centres, for example, where there was very specific tax treatment for companies locating their headquarters in Belgium. As Deputy Quinn and the Chairman noted, under this scheme a company could negotiate almost a separate tax arrangement on write-offs which was different from the generality of the arrangements being applied to other concerns in similar circumstances. All of these were regarded as harmful measures.

A regime had to meet the concept of being a niche, a sub-set, for example, the tonnage tax regime for shipping. Initially, there was concern during the review of the code about whether this was a niche regime. In the shipping industry worldwide the tonnage tax regime is now generally accepted as the norm. Even though it is a notifiable measure under the code, it is one that most agree does not come within the harmful category. There was a stage, however, when it would have been regarded as a potentially harmful regime because it offered more favourable treatment to the shipping industry.

There is a risk in the process. At the time it was initiated it was suggested one of the benchmarks should be whether there was a much lower than average rate but this was not included among the agreed criteria. There was always a tendency for some member states to want this. The types of issues the OECD and the European Union regard as serious include the following: a lack of transparency; no exchange of information; the measure is ring-fenced in respect of a particular sector that, in general, is international in nature, not domestic. These are generally regarded as features of a predatory regime. It was not an attempt to identify the effects of differential tax rates. It was targeted at what were seen as predatory - or potentially predatory - regimes.

A total of 66 items were identified as potentially harmful tax measures. The report that finally went to the Council included a great many footnotes reflecting the views of those who had disagreed about whether particular measures were harmful. In practice, once the momentum had been developed, there was general agreement to work on rolling them back, without prejudice, and not to reintroduce similar measures. The general awareness and political pressure did, at least, stop people from introducing the worst excesses. The European Union's "big stick" of state aid rules managed to focus minds.

You mentioned the apportionment formula in the US system and the basis on which it might be introduced. Perhaps you will tell us in a short note how it works. I admired your admission that you were responsible for taxation policy at the Department of Finance. I always wondered who the culprit was.

I should have used the word "advise" in referring to taxation policy.

On that point, could it be made clear that in respect of the United States the formula includes both state and federal taxes in order that we are comparing like with like in both cases?

Ms McManus, I thank you and your colleagues for attending. Clearly, this is a matter that will remain sensitive for us. Taxation and institutional issues will remain sensitive right up to the end of the Intergovernmental Conference.

Thank you, Chairman.

The joint committee adjourned at 4.05 p.m.sine die.
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