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JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE debate -
Wednesday, 21 Jan 2009

Banking Sector Issues: Discussion with Financial Regulator and Central Bank.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 and the relationship between financial institutions and the regulatory and supervisory environment. Before we commence, I ask people to ensure that their mobile telephones are switched off. Members are reminded of the parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses, or an official either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. I draw witnesses' attention to the fact that members of the committee have absolute privilege, but this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before the committee.

I welcome from the office of the Financial Regulator Mr. Jim Farrell, chairman, Ms Mary O'Dea, acting chief executive, and Mr. Con Horan, prudential director. I also welcome Mr. Dermot Quigley, a member of the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. I call on Mr. Jim Farrell to make his presentation which will be followed by a question and answer session.

Mr. Jim Farrell

I thank the Chairman and members of the joint committee for inviting us to meet them. As the Chairman said, I am accompanied by Mr. Dermot Quigley, a member of the authority, Ms Mary O'Dea, acting chief executive, and Mr. Con Horan, head of prudential regulation.

The Financial Regulator's key responsibilities are prudential regulation in financial institutions in Ireland and consumer protection. Today, I would like to cover three main areas with the joint committee. First, the system of financial regulation that is in place in Ireland and how the Financial Regulator carries out its prudential regulation role within the system. The second is the examination which is now under way in the Financial Regulator to determine the changes required to the system of regulation in the light of events over the past 18 months and, third, the new regulatory measures we have put in place in regard to the banks covered by the Government guarantee.

The Financial Regulator's responsibilities include the prudential regulation of the individual financial institutions and consumer protection. Some 13,000 entities varying from investment intermediaries and funds to banks are regulated by the Financial Regulator. Developments in international financial markets over the past 18 months, and particularly in recent months, have rightly focused attention on systems of regulation employed, both here and in other jurisdictions, and on the issues of global co-operation between regulators.

When the Financial Regulator was established in 2003, all the key stakeholders in the economy were consulted to determine the most appropriate system of supervision. A principles-led supervision system was agreed with the key stakeholders and was set out in our strategic plans each year. This approach was aimed at protecting consumers while facilitating competition and innovation among financial services providers required in a growing economy.

This system was aligned with the principles outlined in the Government's better regulation approach and was considered a cost-effective approach to regulation. It was well regarded internationally. Indeed, a number of reports from bodies such as the IMF and the OECD recognised this explicitly.

Under our principles-led supervision system, responsibility for the proper management and control of a financial services provider and the integrity of its systems rests with the board of directors and senior management. Prudent risk management, ethical behaviour and transparency in business dealings are key values expected of boards and senior management in regulated firms.

I stress that the principles-led supervision system that was applied to the 48 banks we regulate is not a rules-free environment where regulated firms can do as they wish. In addition to the principles set out by the Financial Regulator, there is a vast number of rules that apply to the banking industry. These range from rules and requirements put in place by the Financial Regulator, including capital requirements and weekly liquidity reporting, and the consumer protection code, to rules applied under EU directives and the rules that apply under the law of the land. For example, under Basel II, the EU capital requirements directive, there are hundreds of detailed rules with which banks must comply.

In operating the principles-led supervision system, the Financial Regulator has relied on appropriate management and controls in firms, ethical behaviour and true and fair reporting by firms and their auditors, as well as on-site inspections by supervision actions by the regulator. It is clear that in the case of Anglo Irish Bank this did not happen. The authority takes an extremely serious view of the issues around directors' loans that have emerged at Anglo Irish Bank. We are currently carrying out a comprehensive investigation into these matters. We have been in contact with the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and, therefore, it is not possible to get into any specific detail on it with the committee today. However, I can assure the committee that the authority is committed to fully investigating all aspects of this and completing such investigations without delay, and taking whatever actions are appropriate.

We are also engaged in a parallel investigation into all other covered institutions regarding directors' loans and we expect to complete our work in this area within a matter of weeks. We are committed to putting in place measures to try to ensure that nothing of this sort can happen again, including, if necessary, requesting Government to introduce new legislation in this area. Furthermore, we will engage with the auditing profession on any changes that may be required.

Apart from controls over directors' loans, it is clear that key areas such as risk management, compliance and general control processes in banks need to be re-examined in light of recent market turmoil. Liquidity management and risk concentration are also areas that need particular attention.

In carrying out its functions, the regulator is informed by the assessments of both international and domestic economic developments. It is instructive to read the forecasts made over the past 12 to 24 months. While they varied in their assessments, it is fair to say that almost without exception the severity and rapidity of the downturn, both in Ireland and internationally, far exceeded their forecasts.

Against the background of these positive assessments, we nevertheless took strong action on lending. Our steps included the following. In 2004, consumers were warned about the risk of debt, including warnings about re-financing personal debts into mortgages. In October 2005, new requirements for credit loss provisioning, including requirements for credit risk management, were introduced. In May 2006, increased capital requirements on high loan-to-value mortgages were introduced. In August 2006, we tackled aggressive lending by introducing consumer protections on affordability and suitability, and banned unsolicited credit offers. In June 2006, we introduced new liquidity requirements which came into effect in mid-2007. In January 2007, a stringent approach to property-related requirements under the capital requirements directive was introduced, with 150% risk weighting from the previously 100% weighting on exposures to speculative real estate and high capital requirements on residential investment properties. These measures recognised concerns that were being expressed at that time about problems in the property market.

Such measures were not taken elsewhere in countries with similar growth in property prices. Indeed, it was argued that the fact that we only had the power to impose the requirements on our domestic banks put them at a competitive disadvantage to other foreign banks operating here.

In the changed environment in which we operate, there is now much debate here and abroad about how banking regulation should be structured for the future. This is a complex debate and will embrace issues such as principles versus rules, market transparency, accounting changes and the extent of co-operation between regulators in different jurisdictions.

The current debate seems to be focused on changing the current principles-based supervision system to a more intensive rules-based system. This would involve detailed prescriptive rules to cover virtually every aspect of the business of banking and would require a significant increases in resources to implement, with associated costs. However, as we know from the Enron experience in the US, a rules-based system would not necessarily guarantee the required regulatory outcomes. Indeed, no system of regulation will guarantee a problem-free environment.

Any system of regulation will be greatly challenged by unethical or dishonest behaviour, collusion to conceal information or the impact of global events outside the control of the local regulator. Notwithstanding this, the need to revisit and improve the regulatory system is clear against the background of both the international crisis, the severity of which no banking regulator, central bank or Government anywhere was able to foresee, and the domestic economic downturn and its implications for our financial system.

The authority is now examining this as a matter of urgency, including an assessment of the effectiveness of our regulatory approach in the context of EU and international developments, whether a differentiated approach is needed for different financial sectors or institutions, our risk appetite, including an evaluation of our risk-rating system, and our inspection framework.

It is clear that a more intensive form of regulation is now required. We have already begun to put this in place in the banks covered by the Government guarantee scheme. The new regulatory measures for the covered institutions are as follows. A number of actions have been taken by the authority since September last to deal with the evolving international financial market crisis and its impact on our own system and institutions. For our part, under the legislation introducing the Government guarantee scheme, the Financial Regulator has a number of specific new responsibilities which we must carry out in consultation with the Minister for Finance. These are to impose conditions regulating the commercial conduct of a covered institution's business, having regard to capital ratios, market share and balance sheet growth in order to minimise any potential competitive distortion that may otherwise arise and to avoid any abuse of the guarantee.

To meet these responsibilities, we established a new supervisory unit, the role of which is to define, impose and monitor conditions and targets under the Government guarantee scheme. Our involvement with the institutions covered by the scheme is intensive, including an on-site presence and increased interaction with their boards. We are closely monitoring corporate governance, credit, liquidity management, audit and risk.

We have requested and received detailed business plans from the institutions. These plans focus on the need to reduce the risk profile of the institutions and to outline how their business models are sustainable. We have examined these plans and commenced a series of engagements with the institutions at the most senior level in order to determine the soundness of their plans. The key areas we are addressing are: the performance of existing loans; ensuring that the institutions are making progress in achieving the targets set in their business plans; ensuring that the institutions have in place robust processes in respect of credit risk management; actively monitoring compliance with liquidity requirements; and assessing the ability of the institutions to fund their business without undue reliance on ECB operations.

We are also reviewing the governance structures of the institutions to ensure that there are proper systems of internal control. As part of this process we are working with the banks on clarifying for the Minister for Finance their plans to grow lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. We will be reporting to the Minister shortly on the levels of lending that the banks are applying in respect of this sector.

The chief executive and chairman of each institution must report on a quarterly basis to the Financial Regulator — acting on behalf of the Minister for Finance — regarding overall compliance with the guarantee scheme. These are significant measures and they are necessary as a result of the changed environment in which we are operating. It is a priority for us to ensure that the institutions covered by the scheme are subject to the highest form of scrutiny.

I wish to assure the committee that the Financial Regulator has already made changes to the way in which it goes about its business. We will continue to work closely with our colleagues in the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland at board and executive level. This system, which includes common directors and high level working committees, provides a basis from which to move forward and ensure that the financial system operates to the highest standard. I will be glad to answer any questions members may wish to pose.

I thank Mr. Farrell for his comprehensive presentation, which brings to the fore the dilemma we face in the context of ensuring that while there should be regulation in place, we must see to it that we do not over-regulate. It is unfortunate that the individuals who caused many of the problems under discussion did not agree with the type of regulation being pursued by the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland and that they broke all rules. Mr. Farrell stated that more strict rules and examination procedures are being put in place, which is extremely important in the context of ensuring the credibility of our financial institutions.

I thank Mr. Farrell and his colleagues for coming before the committee this morning. Matters have moved on since the previous occasion on which we met. To put this issue in context and regardless of who considers it, the previous system of financial regulation imposed by the Financial Regulator has failed. A property bubble was allowed to develop in this country when a global downturn was taking place. In that context, the capital ratios relating to weighting and loans should have been introduced much sooner. The principles-led system adopted by the Financial Regulator did not work and was abused by the banks. Mr. Farrell stated that the Financial Regulator proposes to introduce new regulations going forward, but did not provide details in respect of these.

The major issue with which we are faced at present relates to the two main banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland. The share prices of these two institutions continue to fall. I understand that the Financial Regulator issued a statement yesterday to the effect that the ban on the short selling of shares remains in place. The taking of short selling positions was referred to yesterday as one of the reasons for the share prices of banks falling. What is the Financial Regulator's view on the matter?

Is the Financial Regulator of the view that AIB and the Bank of Ireland are financially sound? What measures has it taken to ensure that they are financially sound? What advice has it provided to the Government in the context of ensuring that these banks will, in whatever form, be financially sound going forward? What is the Financial Regulator's view with regard to Anglo Irish Bank being established as a repository into which toxic debt from the other banks might be placed?

Mr. Farrell referred to small businesses. It is clear that, for whatever reason, the banks are not providing such businesses with funding. Liquidity has again become a major problem for the banks. What measures has the Financial Regulator suggested to the Minister for Finance might be introduced in order to ensure that the banks make available funding for small businesses? What steps might the Government take to ensure that this happens? When the Government guarantee scheme was introduced, the key aspect was that it would ensure that funds would flow to small businesses in order that they might deal with the difficulties they were experiencing, trade their way out of trouble and retain their employees.

The Financial Regulator is currently engaged in investigating directors' loans at Anglo Irish Bank and the other banks. What are the terms of reference that govern these investigations? Have the investigations at Anglo Irish Bank been extended to include the Quinn Group?

What are the other issues under examination by the Financial Regulator? Has it informed the Government as to what should be done to ensure that AIB and Bank of Ireland remain in operation as sound institutions and prevent further falls in their share prices?

Mr. Jim Farrell

The Deputy stated that the system of financial regulation has failed. As stated earlier, there are 13,000 regulated entities in Ireland. It is clear that there are issues with regard to the banks and we are not pretending that the position is otherwise. There is no form of regulation that would contend with the downturn that has taken place internationally and domestically. It would not be realistic to have in place a form of regulation that would have catered for the events that have transpired.

Breaches of corporate governance occurred at one bank in particular. We have made our views on what happened in that regard very clear. The Deputy can rest assured that we will get to the bottom of what occurred. This will take some time. If one wishes to do a thorough job, it takes a while to do so.

With respect, it took almost a year for this matter to emerge. The Financial Regulator was aware of what was taking place. Mr. Farrell is going over old ground. The fact is that the system failed. As regards the various measures the Financial Regulator introduced from 2004 onwards, the dogs in the street knew there was a problem with the housing market. The IMF, the ESRI and various other commentators raised this issue. Why was a more severe form of stress testing not introduced? Why were weightings not attached to loans? Banks were allowed to operate unchecked. Young people were given 100% mortgages they could not afford. The facts do not stack up to support the statement that the Financial Regulator was doing a good job. We represent the people and the financial system and the regulator have failed the customer, bank shareholders and Ireland Inc over the past number of years. The key issue is everything in the presentation refers to the future. Proper regulation is needed now and it must be ensured that a sound financial system is in place, to which the two main banks are critical. They are sound but, based on their share price, the markets do not believe that to be the case. Regulation is about providing confidence and certainty and the regulator is not doing so.

Mr. Jim Farrell

The regulator has made changes. I fully agree what has happened in Irish banking, as has happened in virtually all western economies——

Not in the same severe form. The downturn is not the same.

Mr. Jim Farrell

I am not here to make excuses. In the European Economic Area, 17 countries have had to resort to government guarantees while 14 have had to resort to equity injections from government. That does not make what has happened in Ireland right and I am not present to paint over what has happened. I have been chairman of this organisation since last May and we are making a great deal of headway now. People in the Financial Regulator's office were regulating in an environment that was totally different from what we have today. The Deputy can say we should have taken more pre-emptive action. Action was taken in the context of the environment at the time. With hindsight, more severe ratios could have been applied but nobody forecasted the contraction in the economy of between 4% and 5% this year. If somebody said that 12 months ago, they would have been laughed out of court.

I did not refer to that.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the Bill and the relationship between financial institutions and the regulatory environment. I ask everyone to concentrate on this aspect.

Will Mr. Farrell address my question regarding AIB and Bank of Ireland?

Mr. Jim Farrell

The head of prudential regulation is present and I will ask him to take this question.

Mr. Con Horan

Since the end of the last year, the major action taken was that the Financial Regulator carried out an investigation using PricewaterhouseCoopers to examine the banks covered by the legislation. That report analysed, particularly from the perspective of large property development, the situation in each of the banks. Banks are going through their audits at the moment but the view from that was that the banks were able to absorb the losses in their portfolios. They have confirmed to the market that there will be losses in their portfolios but they have the capacity to absorb them. On our behalf, PwC also stress tested the portfolios beyond the losses forecast by the banks in a number of different scenarios and, in all known scenarios, the regulatory capital levels would be maintained by the banks between 2009 and 2011. That gave us reassurance regarding the two institutions referred to by the Deputy.

Their share prices are falling.

Mr. Con Horan

The Deputy is correct and the dramatic movements of the past few days reflect events in global markets. Since last Friday, Bank of America and Citibank have come out with very bad news, which spread into the UK market where we saw significant falls in the share price of Barclays Bank and it appears the international markets have become nervous of banking again in an even more severe way. There is an international trend in banking, particularly over the past week or so, because of events in Ireland and more generally internationally in the banking system.

With regard to AIB, the Financial Regulator is commissioning reports such as that by PwC, which should be made public, but we have a problem. What is the regulator doing to provide further confidence to the international markets that our two main banks are financially sound? That is the key question. What Mr. Horan outlined regarding the PwC report is clearly not working.

Mr. Con Horan

Measures have been taken at Government level, in which we have played a part in dealing with the Department of Finance and others. The Government guarantee scheme introduced at the end of September was a significant development and it certainly helped Irish banks in managing their liquidity in a tough period towards the end of the year. That lent a great deal of support to the banks. Clearly, the recapitalisation scheme is also designed to give further confidence to international investors that Irish banks are recapitalising themselves to the levels demanded by the market. We work with Government and other parties to assist in putting these programmes together.

Mr. Jim Farrell

We do not control stock markets but the question was rightly asked about what we are doing to ensure confidence. I assure the Deputy that the regulator is completely satisfied with the solvency and liquidity position of the two Irish banks. Beyond that, the markets must make their judgments. There is not much difference between the share price drop experienced by Royal Bank of Scotland and Barclays as a percentage versus what has happened in Ireland. It is probably a little more dramatic over the past few days. We are in a global market storm and Irish banks operate in an open economy where they are exposed to the whims of foreign investors. When capital takes fright, it tends to go to the centres. Ireland is a small country and it has taken firm steps to assure foreign investors, including at government level. As a regulator, we have done what we can to ensure the solvency and liquidity of the banks. The market must make up its mind as to the value of the banks. That is where we are coming from.

I welcome the delegation. I understood our invitation extended to Mr. Neary and I understood from newspapers reports that he would not retire until 31 January. If so, why was he unable to attend? Mr. Neary appeared before the committee on many occasions and a number of members, including myself, questioned him. Many of us suggested there was something very wrong with the bubble in the property market and it would end badly. Journalists, economists and other commentators strongly suggested the same over the past two and a half to three years. On every occasion, Mr. Neary assured us that through his stress testing and so on there were no difficulties and everything was right. We are owed an explanation as to why Mr. Neary is not here. Is he still employed with the authority, has his contract expired or has he been retired?

I understand approximately 300 to 400 people are employed in IFSRA. Perhaps the delegation will tell us the number of people employed in IFSRA and the cost in that regard, which I understand is funded by the taxpayer and the banks. As far as I am aware, the bulk of the cost is met by the financial institutions. In addition, how many people are employed in the Central Bank? This information will help to put some context on our discussion.

I want to ask some specific questions in regard to recent events. One of the issues facing us in respect of the covered institutions and the authority is the restoration to Ireland of some level of reputation. Our reputation has been shredded by recent events, principally the events concerning Anglo Irish Bank, in so far as they have been disclosed. What exactly is the regulator doing in regard to the warehousing for eight years of Mr. FitzPatrick's loans? The internal auditor may have been aware of these loans. I am not sure whether the Chairman agrees with me but it appears to me that loans of the magnitude taken out by Mr. FitzPatrick must have been known to the bank's credit committee, loans committee, senior executives and, I assume, the board, if operating as a board of a financial institution. It would seem to me that at least 30 or, perhaps, 40 or 50 people must have been aware of the arrangements in relation to Mr. FitzPatrick. These arrangements were made with another covered institution, Irish Nationwide Building Society, the deposits of which the taxpayer is also guaranteeing.

The biggest risk to a bank, in terms of fraud, is not a clerk with a gambling habit who may steal petty cash but people at the top who are crooked and may steal from depositors and shareholders. This is identified in all auditing literature as the first risk. The first risk is the movement of information on and off balance sheets so that at year end information is concealed. This is what appears to have happened in respect of Mr. FitzPatrick unless his ownership of those loans was disguised by reference to names and so on. In a bank of the size concerned — we are told of loans totalling €87 million or €120 million — the identity of that debtor must have been known, even if disguised in some way by numbers or nominee accounts, to the key people in the loan committee, credit committee and to key executives. Anglo Irish Bank dealt in large sums but had only a relatively small number of clients. Perhaps the delegation will outline why this practice was not spotted and what is being done in terms of investigation of the matter, including whether the fraud squad and the Criminal Assets Bureau have been consulted. We know IFSRA has consulted on the matter with the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement.

There is a common understanding in company accounting. Various provisions in company law, including various sections of the old Companies Act from the 1960s, require a director to give a true and honest account in respect of transactions with companies and of their loan accounts. It is common for directors to make representations to the auditors in respect of transactions with a company. This is routine in every company. Did this system fail and, if so, is that not a clear breach of company law? I have seen references to this being a sad item but not illegal, which I do not understand based on my knowledge of company law.

Many Anglo Irish Bank shareholders are pensioners who have been significantly impoverished by what has happened.

The Deputy cannot continue indefinitely. That matter has been dealt with already.

No, it has not been dealt with to my satisfaction.

The Deputy should allow the chairman to respond to some of her questions.

The Chairman took up his position as Chairman of this committee some seven or eight months ago. I have been a member of this committee for six years. The ghost of Mr. Neary is sitting opposite telling us everything is all right. I want an explanation as to why this was missed and why Mr. Neary is not here.

Please allow the delegation to answer.

Can the delegation tell us what investigations are being carried out in respect of the Quinn affair and the acquisition of shares in Anglo Irish Bank via contracts for difference. I understand an attempt was made to acquire contracts for difference in respect of approximately one quarter of the share capital of the bank and subsequently to acquire shares amounting to approximately 15% of the value of the bank. Why was this not a matter for investigation by the regulator and for public comment and disclosure by the regulator? I would have thought, in terms of Anglo Irish Bank being the third largest bank in the country, an attempt to acquire a significant stake in the bank, in practise almost a controlling stake, would have been a matter of serious interest to any regulatory system.

Mr. Jim Farrell

Mr. Neary will retire on 31 January. Given the transition taking place — Mr. Neary has agreed to facilitate us in this regard — we believed Ms O'Dea, the acting chief executive, to be the appropriate person to bring along in the circumstances. Along with taking over this role, she is director of consumer affairs. During the past couple of days, Ms O'Dea has played a more active role in the authority than has Mr. Neary. That is the reason she is here today.

With regard to the number of people employed in the authority, the number is 380 and will soon increase to 400. The budget in this regard for 2008 was €58 million.

The budget was €58 million.

Mr. Jim Farrell

Yes.

How much do the banks pay?

Mr. Jim Farrell

The industry pays 50% and the State pays 50%.

The budget for 2008 was €58 million.

Mr. Jim Farrell

That is correct.

How many people are employed in the authority?

Mr. Jim Farrell

There are currently 380 people employed in the authority. This figure will increase to 400 owing to the covered institutions. In addition, there will be an allocation to those institutions in respect of these costs.

With regard to Mr. FitzPatrick and Anglo Irish Bank, I share the annoyance and disgust of everybody in regard to what happened. We will get to the bottom of what happened. Deputy Burton referred to various investigations. Many good questions raised here today will need to be answered. We are getting on with the job. Clearly, the auditors have a case to answer. I worked in banks for more than 30 years and I know that if I borrowed money for anything other than a car or a mortgage, questions would have been asked. Clearly, there are big issues involved and we will get to the bottom of what happened. This will take not months but weeks given the resources being allocated to this project.

Deputy Burton referred to the Quinn affair. I will ask my colleague, Ms O'Dea, to respond to the Deputy's question in that regard.

Ms Mary O’Dea

An acquiring transaction is defined as a 10% shareholding. It is important to point out that contracts for difference, CFD, positions were not covered in terms of holdings. We have written to the Department of Finance on this matter and believe the legislation should be amended to cover CFD positions. We are investigating issues within Anglo Irish Bank currently and, therefore, cannot comment further on those issues until we have fully investigated them.

It became obvious about two and a half to three years ago that the Dublin exchange was, effectively, being turned in large part into a casino with regard to CFDs. I issued statements on the situation at the time and asked Mr. Neary about it. I also wrote to him and met him before Christmas with Ms O'Dea. I wrote to him subsequently to say that I find the explanations that have been given inadequate.

Can Ms O'Dea explain the situation to us? It is the prerogative of business people to attempt to acquire stakeholdings, but it is the job of the regulator to secure the public interest. I understand an attempt was clearly being made to acquire an approximate 25% stake in the third largest Irish bank through CFDs. Will Ms O'Dea confirm this and am I broadly correct?

Ms Mary O’Dea

I cannot confirm that one way or the other, but I can say that according to the legislation, positions held in CFDs do not constitute an acquiring transaction. That is the difficulty as we saw it.

If IFSRA has overall responsibility for the stability of a bank, the fact someone can acquire a significant shareholding should be a concern. Suppose, for example, a Russian oligarch sailed up the Liffey and attempted, through CFDs, to buy 25% of our third largest bank, would that not give rise to concern in the overall regulatory system? Would it not at least give rise to desire to know more about the attempt and its implications?

Mr. Jim Farrell

Such an attempt is not illegal. The difficulty is that we can only act within the powers given to us. The issue is important and should be addressed in terms of the law dealing with these matters. That is the bottom line. If we do not have power to do something, we cannot do it.

Is this not our Lehman Brothers issue? A financial product was developed, but it holds tremendous risk. While it is financially innovative, the other side of the product is that it is incredibly risky and is key to bringing down a significant part of our financial system.

IFSRA is making a recommendation to the Government to change that.

Mr. Jim Farrell

Yes.

I thank Mr. Farrell and his colleagues from the authority for coming before the committee. It is unacceptable that Mr. Neary is not here. He is still employed by the authority and should be held accountable for the decisions he made during his tenure. He should appear before this Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service and I am extremely disappointed that we cannot hold him to account on this final opportunity to do so. IFSRA has deprived us of that opportunity for some reason, but that is wrong.

Mr. Jim Farrell

I did not stop him from coming before the committee.

Did Mr. Farrell ask Mr. Neary to come?

Mr. Jim Farrell

We discussed it.

And how did Mr. Neary respond?

Mr. Jim Farrell

Having considered all the facts, we thought it more appropriate that Ms O'Dea would come.

They could both have come.

We must carry on with regard to the purpose of the meeting. I ask the Deputy to move on with his questions.

There are five separate headings relating to the bank guarantee scheme and covered liabilities, namely, retail corporate deposits; interbank deposits; senior unsecured debt; corporate bonds; and dated subordinated debt. Will Mr. Farrell give us a breakdown of the total potential exposure of the State across those headings? There has been some comment in the media that significant exposure exists and I would like to hear the breakdown on that exposure under those headings.

With regard to the ability of the covered banks to secure loans on the market currently, are they having difficulty securing loans with a maturity date beyond the expiry of the guarantee scheme in September 2010? I am concerned about that and would like a response in this regard.

The collapse in the share prices of the banks is part of a global phenomenon. This collapse is particularly severe in Ireland and is a serious concern with regard to the institutions covered by the guarantee. From the regulatory perspective, what is the impact of a collapse in the share price of a covered institution? Does the collapse have any consequence for the conclusions set out in the PwC report with regard to capital adequacy or any of the other measures used by IFSRA to arrive at conclusions on the robustness of the institutions? Will Mr. Farrell comment on the implications of a collapse in the share prices?

On the issue of Mr. FitzPatrick's loans and the decision taken by the Oireachtas yesterday to nationalise Anglo Irish Bank, what rules or regulations were breached by Mr. FitzPatrick? It is clear to me that what he did was wrong, unethical and reckless in concealing significant loans from the financial statements. It is now clear that concealment had an impact in terms of undermining investor confidence, causing the State to have to nationalise the bank and obvious consequences for shareholders. The loans were not the only reason, but they were a contributory factor. Of what was Mr. FitzPatrick in breach? Was it company law, regulatory requirements or was it simply that he did wrong? Is there a loophole in that regard? It is not enough to say the situation is being investigated. The issue became clear to the authority last December and it should have some answers by now.

To put matters in context, a gentleman who came to my advice clinic during the week holds 27,500 shares in Anglo Irish Bank. At their peak, these shares would have been worth close to €500,000, but today they are worth nothing. This is the reality of the situation for this gentleman who put his life savings into the bank. I accept that everyone who invests in equities takes a gamble, but nobody could have seen a collapse of this nature or that the bank would be nationalised.

With regard to IFSRA's appearance last week at the Joint Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs relating to internal communication, as IFSRA calls it, of the handling of the FitzPatrick loan saga within the authority, there seems to me to have been a whitewash of the situation. There is no accountability following what happened. Mr. Farrell admitted that some members of staff would have become aware of the situation as far back as autumn 2007, but would have us believe that this information did not make its way to Mr. Neary, any members of the board or any senior management. However, IFSRA has produced a report, over which Mr. Farrell stands, which holds nobody accountable for this. That is unacceptable. The fact Mr. Neary is not here today does not inspire confidence.

I want to believe everything we are being told by IFSRA about the steps being taken and I listened in good faith. However, the report does not do the authority any credit, because nobody is held accountable. We are none the wiser as to what happened within the authority in terms of the handling of the information on the loans when it became available.

Deputy O'Donnell raised a point about the availability of liquidity and credit for small and medium-sized businesses. Is it possible that because of the more stringent regulatory requirements in monitoring control that IFSRA is putting in place for the covered institutions, they are more reluctant to lend? They have submitted their business plans, which focus on reducing the risk profile of the institutions. The only sure way of them reducing their risks is not to lend, and, unfortunately, that is happening.

I am aware IFSRA is completing a report for the Minister on the issue of lending to small and medium-sized business and this must now be our priority. An obvious consequence of the more stringent controls and monitoring that IFSRA is putting in place is that unfortunately the banks will not lend as much. I do not know to what extent that is because of the extra regulation or the genuine difficulty they are having on the liquidity markets but I want the witnesses to be conscious of that in the weeks ahead.

Mr. Jim Farrell

I will start where Deputy McGrath finished. Yesterday morning I attended a meeting with the chairmen and chief executives of the two Irish banks, at which the Minister forcefully raised the subject of lending to SMEs to impress upon them the need to support industry. He was given assurances and some statistics for the ratio of requests to approvals and rejections. The Minister is giving that matter serious attention.

Ms Mary O’Dea

Under the terms of the scheme the Financial Regulator has been asked to develop a code for business lending. We expect to bring this to the authority this month and then to pass it to the Minister for Finance. The code will include various measures which will assist business lending, particularly an element of reassurance that sustainable and productive business propositions will not be declined loan facilities. That is a key part of the re-capitalisation programme.

Is that code binding on the institutions?

Ms Mary O’Dea

Yes. It will be introduced under our powers to issue a code similar to the consumer protection code and breaches will therefore attract sanctions.

Mr. Jim Farrell

As a business person I have to say this cannot even wait for codes and so on. They have to get on with the business. Everyone at that meeting yesterday morning told them they should get on with it.

In respect of the report on internal communications we have reorganised the office. Some people's duties have changed as a result of this. We have not just sat still. Progress has been made since our last meeting with this committee, to make sure that we have better communications within the organisation and that this does not happen again. As the Deputy knows from the report, there was a serious disagreement about whether information was passed up the line. We have been unable to resolve that because one person says one thing and two people say something else. Short of applying the thumbscrews what can one do?

What does Mr. Farrell mean when he says people have changed duties or roles?

Mr. Jim Farrell

People are doing different jobs.

Why, if nobody was found to be responsible?

Mr. Jim Farrell

To make it a more effective organisation.

If the person who did not pass the word up the line or did not tell the truth has not been identified, on what basis were people moved sideways? Why play musical chairs?

Mr. Jim Farrell

I am not saying people moved sideways. We believe we have a flatter organisation which is more effective as we have reconfigured it.

Ms Mary O’Dea

One of the findings of the report on which Mr. Quigley may wish to elaborate was the level of work and how it was divided. The reorganisation was carried out to divide the work in a way that would prevent that happening.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

There is a significant volume of important work of increasing complexity. One of the recommendations of the report was that we should begin to consider our processes and our organisation. Early last year, before this serious matter occurred, we engaged external consultants to examine and review our business processes and compare us with regulators in other countries to see whether we were appropriately structured. That is a major issue for us. The work of the consultants is concluding and will be a good basis for future decisions of the authority. The level of inspections and so on in which others engage as part of prudential regulation will probably come into focus as part of that review.

Deputy McGrath has rightly asked why there is no detailed explanation of what happened. That is unsatisfactory. The report states clearly that there was a breakdown in communication but that does not excuse it. It was a serious matter in terms of corporate governance and how institutions are run. There was a breakdown within the authority which we must put right. We are determined that the procedures will achieve this.

It is not that we did not give the committee the information that came from the review. Between January and December this issue did not surface. It surfaced with the board of the regulatory authority in December and the board set up the review, which we have done. The board has accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the report and has work to do on foot of that.

Mr. Jim Farrell

The reorganisation we have carried out is to make the organisation more effective. We are not implying in any way that anybody did anything wrong or that anyone has been moved aside. That is not happening.

With respect, I cannot let that go.

Mr. Jim Farrell

We have not been able to prove it.

We are talking about €87 million.

Mr. Jim Farrell

We have not been able to prove whether there was communication——

Then we should be going after the Financial Regulator for €87 million of a director's loan.

Mr. Jim Farrell

It is a very serious matter but the reorganisation we have done is to improve the effectiveness of the organisation.

We heard evidence last week that there was a series of meetings in January 2008 involving the regulator's staff where these loans were discussed.

Mr. Jim Farrell

That is right.

How can Mr. Farrell come here today and say nobody did anything wrong when people did not do their job? The regulator has held nobody accountable for that and it has contributed to the loss of confidence among investors and to the ultimate decision of the State to nationalise the bank. There could not be a more serious outcome. While it was not the only factor it was an important one.

Mr. Jim Farrell

We have changed the way business is done in the regulatory authority as a result of this.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

The report found that within the organisation there was a breakdown in communications. I will not repeat the conflict of information the committee received. The authority issued a statement in that regard. Nonetheless, the issue, which was significant for everybody involved, did not come to the surface. Our determination is that while we recognise the significant pressures on the staff during this period, from August 2007 when the international financial crisis started and in terms of implementing the complex capital requirements directive, that is not an excuse. There was a serious internal breakdown and the obligation on management and on the authority is to put that right and ensure that it does not happen again.

Deputy McGrath, like Deputy Burton, asked what breaches there may have been of company law and so on. The work we did in the committee of the authority in which I participated was not concerned with that. It was concerned with the in-house problem of communication and process around this issue that we have been discussing. The purpose of the separate review or examination, mentioned by the Chairman and my colleagues, is to look at the directors' loans in all of the institutions, including Anglo Irish Bank. That work is ongoing and will be completed as quickly as possible. That separate exercise is to look at all aspects of this, including the arrangements in the institution for approval, how these loans arise, the arrangement for re-financing at the end of the year and so on. It will be a comprehensive review. The intention of that review is to find out the facts. When the facts are fully known, and as part of the work, one would have to have regard to the legal requirements, whether company law or other issues, accounting requirements and accounting conventions. There are serious matters to be looked at, but it is part of the separate review which is under way at present. It will be completed as quickly as possible. The Chairman mentioned weeks rather than months. We are doing everything we can to advance that work.

I thank the delegation for attending.

Sorry, has Deputy McGrath some questions?

I want to ask about the breakdown among the five categories of corporate liabilities and the impact from a regulatory perspective of the collapse in the share price.

Mr. Jim Farrell

The regulator is still satisfied with regard to the solvency and liquidity of the banks. Clearly the drop in the share price is the response of the market to whatever information it has about the institution. That is its call. It is not for us to comment on its judgment. That is the call a buyer or a seller makes. The regulator does not comment on share prices. It would be inappropriate to do that.

I want to raise a number of issues.

Let us have questions, not speeches.

Everyone else was exempt from that requirement. I do not intend to cut my contribution short. I will be as quick and as succinct as I can. One point arose from the last question. We are saying, and all and sundry know, there was a problem. Something happened, and Mr. Farrell states that we have not been able to prove it. I would say, with the greatest of respect to the members of the delegation and their professionalism, that they had better set about doing it very quickly. They had better establish proof very quickly of precisely what went on and what needs to be done to ensure it never happens again. On the one hand IFSRA is saying it has made the organisation more flat, it has made improvements to ensure that what may or may not have happened will not happen again. What we need to know is what happened, who is responsible, and precisely and exactly what structural changes can be put in place to guarantee that it cannot happen again. The future reputation of this country, and in particular confidence in our regulatory system, depends on it.

The Chairman mentioned that the OECD and the IMF had commented favourably on our regulatory system in the past. Circumstances have changed and respected publications such as the Financial Times now use words such as “novice”, which frightens us all and does not do anything to help our system. We need to establish proof, not a theory that something went wrong. It is clear something did. We need to very confidently tell people that we know what that was, that we have taken very specific actions to ensure it will not happen again, and outline what they are in a definite, confident and determined fashion.

Returning to the events that occurred in the first place, you said earlier, Chairman, that it would not have been realistic to cater for the issues that arose. I find that shocking in the extreme. I received a text message in advance of this meeting from a bank employee who knows I am a member of this committee asking why there is such a concentration on ensuring that lower and middle level staff dot every "i" and cross every "t" when at senior level €87 million plus can be brushed under the carpet, and stating that regulation for the sake of regulation is costing the customer dearly while the lack of regulation is costing the State. How can one argue with that? I ask Mr. Farrell honestly, because he mentioned he has been involved in banking for many years, whether there is an over-familiarity at senior levels within the banking system and the regulatory authority, and whether that prevented us from taking appropriate actions at the appropriate time to address issues such as corporate loans to directors. Were we over-concerned with the enforcement of the minutiae of day-to-day SMEs such as the many brokers who constitute most of the 13,000 institutions as opposed to enforcement of regulations in the 48 larger scale banks and, more specifically eight or nine of those and, in particular, the one that is experiencing difficulties at the moment?

Regulation globally has been criticised as inadequate and as being the reason we are the situation we are in. Is there active interaction of an appropriate level with other regulatory authorities in Europe and beyond to set up a broad set of regulation parameters to be followed to ensure we do not get ourselves into these messes again?

Can Mr. Farrell expand on the level of co-operation with the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement on ensuring that anything that is deemed to be a breach of the law will be subject to the full rigours of the law and punished accordingly?

It has been mentioned that IFSRA is to put to the Minister suggestions for improvements to the legislation. I recall a former chief executive of a bank expressing amazement that we keep coming up with new ways of losing money when the old ways were just fine. Are there other financial instruments and products about which there is concern? Will IFSRA be bringing forward suggestions for improving legislation in regard to those?

Mr. Jim Farrell

I completely agree with Senator MacSharry's statement regarding senior levels of management of boards and banks. It is not the case in all banks. However, in the bank in question the principles-based approach involved putting trust in these people and that trust has been broken.

Mr. Jim Farrell

Trust has been broken and it will take a while for it to be restored. Let it be clear that I am not talking about all institutions. We talked about regulating 48 banks here and 13,000 entities in total.

Ms Mary O’Dea

I would add that there is a distinction to be made both in the law and in our regulatory practices between those who operate at a senior level and those who operate at the middle and lower levels. Those who operate at a senior level undergo a test of their fitness and probity to do that and where there are issues pertaining to those people we may consider disqualification. Those are all issues we would investigate in this matter and matters like it. There is a higher hurdle for those who operate at a senior level, and when issues are investigated that lead us to consider those, there is appropriate recourse within the law for that.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

Let me add in regard to the comments made by my colleagues that there is nonetheless an issue here. There was reliance on corporate governance and that was at the root of the principles-based regulation system. We must learn from what has happened. It is now fairly clear that, given certain unacceptable things that have occurred, we must have a much greater concentration on the regulation and look at the detailed operation of these corporate governance systems in the institutions we are regulating. That is quite clear. That may mean that our inspectors will have to go in to a greater extent to core areas we accepted would work properly. We have started that in the covered institutions in being much more involved through our permanent on-site staff and in participating in committees, whether it is credit, risk management or other committees. There is an implication for the format of the regulation which is in place and we must learn that lesson and implement it in our changes and restructuring within the organisation.

We will hear from Senator Quinn who will be followed by Deputy Kenneally and then Deputy Flanagan.

May I preface my remarks by saying that if I use the word "you" I am not referring to the representatives as individuals but the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority?

One of the seminal points in my 45 years in business was the day 20 years ago when a group of customers I was sitting with said to me, "We trust you. Don't let us down". They were talking about food safety. That impacted on me to such an extent that I took careful steps not to let them down. When I say "you" I believe you have let us, the citizens of Ireland, down. We entrusted you with funding of €58 million per year and, as we heard earlier, a staff of 380.

Regarding the scandal of inefficiency that I have learned has occurred and which the representatives spoke about in that organisation, there is public outrage at what has happened and that should be the case. We are in a far worse position than many other countries and we cannot blame it solely on international monetary financial crises. They do have an effect but in the British newspapers, and Senator MacSharry referred to the Financial Times and others, we are being singled out on the front pages in such a manner that we have been identified. I blame you, the authority, for that.

We learned today that 50% of the authority's €58 million funding, €29 million, comes from the banks. Is it possible that because the authority depends on the banks for 50% of its income it almost determines a close relationship with the institutions which makes it less easy for it to criticise them.

I believe the word used earlier by the representatives of the authority, referring to the case of the loans in Anglo Irish Bank, was "inappropriate". That may not be the right word. Perhaps the word "illegal" should have been used.

I will deal with the case of the quarterly accounts that I believe are obliged to be sent to the authority every quarter. If a bank director owes €70 million in the first, second and third quarters, which apparently was in the books, zero in the fourth quarter, which is the last quarter of the year, and then €70 million again in the first quarter of the next year, that is not just inefficiency; it is gross inefficiency. We trusted you, the authority, with that and we have been let down.

On the second point, which is the question of whether this was illegal or inappropriate, if the other institution which agreed to accept the debt for one week or one month each year looked for a guarantee from the individual, it would not have been sufficient because I do not believe they would have accepted that. If, on the other hand, it said it wanted it from the bank itself, and the bank gave a guarantee but did not disclose it, on that basis I believe illegality took place rather than something inappropriate. I have a grave concern about that. I repeat that when I talk about "you" I am not talking about individuals. I am talking about the authority because the authority is not one individual.

A point was made that The Sunday Business Post stated that Anglo Irish Bank gave the Financial Regulator a report in 2007 disclosing secret loans but the regulator did not spot it. The regulator is the authority. It then sent a letter which I read in The Sunday Business Post was subsequently lost. Do the representatives have any comment on that because it did appear in the newspaper?

My last point concerns the question of funds for business in the future. If the State is giving money in whatever manner, be it capitalisation or whatever, there must be a temptation in any bank to use that money to support its capital. I do not know the answer to this question but do the representatives believe that half of that money should go to recapitalisation and the other half be used for funding and lending to businesses? That might mean it would not just be a question of hoping they would lend but that they would lend.

The month before last a group representing businesses came before the committee and said that all the evidence indicated they were not getting loans from banks. I would like to see the businesses of Ireland being able to operate again from loans. We must find a formula that is not just wishful thinking but where the banks are constrained.

Do the delegates wish to comment on Senator Quinn's contribution?

Mr. Dermot Quigley

If I may I would like to make some comments on Senator Quinn's remarks. I would not have any difficulty with some of the points he made. Sweeping all that has happened together, focusing on one very serious matter and concluding on that basis that the entire system of regulation has failed the public, and the consumer by implication from the safe food analogy, is not correct. The system of regulation which has operated has done very well for the consumer, with many hundreds of millions of euro being returned to consumers in terms of excessive bank charges on individuals or on small or medium size enterprises, which are so important for employment. That has been the result of a new focus on the consumer under the regulatory system.

What about the pensioners who have just lost their pensions?

Mr. Dermot Quigley

Absolutely. It is a very serious matter but I would like to focus on the wider question of prudential regulation. With hindsight we can see clearly that our system needs some changes and part of that may be the level and intensity of the inspections carried out, whether on corporate governance or other prudential matters. With respect, in reaching the conclusion the Senator reached, I do not believe he factored in sufficiently the sea change that has taken place in the international financial system over the period we are talking about and what that has meant for us. An assessment of regulation will find that there are difficulties, and we have said that. There is an international move to change regulation but I suggest, with respect, that the overall assessment should examine what has happened here, what we have done well, what we have done badly, what the international implications of what has happened in the international financial system means, and what we have done as part of that for the consumer and the pensioner. That type of overall assessment is needed.

Senator Quinn said that "inappropriate" was too soft a word, without putting words in his mouth, in the context of the very serious issue of the director of loans. I would not disagree with the Senator. There is a point of substance at issue here and there may well be issues of law, whether company law or otherwise. Company law is a matter for the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, and I do not want to stray into that terrain, but as an authority we cannot conclude facts on the basis of what is in the media or a piece of information. The way to proceed on that is the way we are proceeding, which is to investigate fully and comprehensively, establish the facts, and, as part of that, examine the regimes of law, disclosure, accounting or other requirements that may arise. In so far as the authority is concerned, that is the basis on which further work is going on. We made that clear on foot of the report and the discussions which took place.

It is not that we are dodging giving the facts today. There is work to be done and proper procedure to be followed to reach proper conclusions. However, the word "inappropriate" may have been inappropriate. Certainly, we should not prejudge or anticipate what the implications of all of this will be. The investigation of directors' loans will yield the facts which will then have certain implications. I will confine myself to that.

When I spoke to the authority, I also used the word "inefficient".

We must move on.

The authority has been inefficient. If the authority was given quarterly accounts and did not notice what I suggested, that the situation changed in the fourth quarter and then went back to where it was, it was inefficient.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

I was going to conclude on that point. The Senator is absolutely right. The authority in the statement put out on 9 January accepted that. Our staff did very well in spotting this issue in a second institution, the INBS. It was the first time this particular lending was included in the large exposures.

Most members of the authority's staff already knew about it. That is a total contradiction. I raise a point of clarification. I take the point made but certain staff members already knew about this. Mr. Quigley said other staff members found it in another institution.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

No. I am talking about the staff of the organisation. This was spotted when looking at the large exposures returns in the institution to which the loans were transferred. The work was transferred across to the people dealing with Anglo Irish Bank. There were meetings and, initially, there was a lot of activity around this issue. Unfortunately, it was not pursued.

Senator Quinn mentioned the letter that went missing. The committee concluded that was part of it. The other dimension was that people were hard pressed and did their best in a very difficult period and that the issue went off the radar screen at that time. That was the conclusion the committee reached.

However, I do not want to dodge the specific issue of the quarterly returns the Senator mentioned. We acknowledged in our press statement that we, as an organisation, were not monitoring as actively as we should have been the large exposure returns received on a quarterly basis. As an institution — I do not want to individualise this — it was not the practice to monitor them because the concentration was on another part of those returns which dealt with large exposures in terms of overall loans, and not for directors. There was a separate return dealing with directors.

Nonetheless, the Senator is correct that if it had been the practice to monitor those directors' portions of the returns more actively, we could have spotted this sooner. That is the reality, and we said that. We have made recommendations about how to avoid that in the future and the importance to be accorded to all the large exposure returns we get in the organisation.

Ms Mary O’Dea

I wish to make a point on the funding of the regulator and how that is split between the industry and the taxpayer. The 50% is not only banks but the whole industry. There is a question as to whether the regulator should be entirely publicly funded for the reasons pointed out. That debate has gone on internationally. There are pros and cons. If it is entirely funded by the taxpayer, some people will feel aggrieved and state that because banks and other institutions are in a privileged position, they should foot the bill of the cost of regulation and not the taxpayers and that it should be 100% industry funded. Others believe it should be publicly funded.

I want to ensure the committee that regardless of how that funding operates — indeed, it is a matter for the Minister as to whether it is 100%, or less, funded by the industry — all the staff in the Financial Regulator operate in the public interest. Nobody believes that the funding or the picking up of the bill in any way affects how he or she does his or her job as a public servant.

How we consult and go about doing our job is entirely in line with the Government approach of regulatory impact analysis. That is to avoid over-regulation because it would be inappropriate for us to introduce regulations that were unnecessary and did not protect consumers.

In our regulatory impact analysis, we assess the benefits to consumers of regulation and the costs because the consumer ends up paying one way or the other, whether through the industry passing on the cost to the consumer or through the taxpayer. We are very conscious of that.

However, it has not stopped us introducing important protections and, since last year, introducing a concept of suitable lending which no other jurisdiction has. We do not shirk our responsibilities and we ensure we act in the public interest and in the interests of consumers.

Mr. Jim Farrell

I wish to add to what Ms O'Dea said. The Senator rightly addressed and was rightly entitled to be annoyed about what happened in this particular instance, and so are we. As I said earlier, the deficiencies in the system which were identified have been corrected. We are now in a better position to ensure this never happens again. We are as determined to ensure this never happens as the Senator is determined to hold us to account. The Senator should be in no doubt about that.

We pride ourselves on trying to do the best job possible. This matter has outraged everybody, including us. Having said that, the Senator should not overlook a lot of the good work being done in the regulator. As I said, there are 13,000 entities being regulated. We have a very big industry in this country. While members are entitled to really dig into this, all I ask is that they understand there are other things going on here and that there is a lot of good work being done elsewhere.

It now almost 12.50 p.m. and the governor and officials from the Central Bank of Ireland are coming in. I ask that members ask relevant questions.

Mr. Jim Farrell

The Senator asked about the 2007 report in The Sunday Business Post. Does anybody wish to comment on that?

For what it is worth, one of my questions was missed.

Other members should ask questions because the governor and officials from the Central Bank of Ireland are coming in.

I thank the witnesses for attending. It is obvious the office has failed and that the country's international reputation is in tatters with investors which is shown in the price of AIB and Bank of Ireland shares. It is really sad to see elderly people who have lost their life savings, which they had invested in shares, and pension funds completely wiped out. The regulator was the watchdog which fell asleep and did not bark. It has definitely failed these people.

To try to help restore stability and confidence into this area, it is important there are resignations at the top in the Financial Regulator's office as well as in the Central Bank of Ireland and in the Irish banks. That may help restore our reputation internationally.

It is widely reported that there seems to be a cosy relationship between the regulator and senior management in many of the Irish banks, that the regulator knows many of these people on a personal friendly basis and that clearly the regulator will not take action against his friends. Do we need independent people running the office of the regulator, people who do not have banking backgrounds, who are from outside the industry and who are not afraid to take on those who may be trying to play the system? Having bankers regulating bankers is clearly no regulation. How many of the 380 to 400 staff have banking backgrounds such as in the Central Bank and other banks?

Mr. Farrell might also advise what sanctions have been taken over the years against Irish banks and Irish bank directors since the Financial Regulator's office has been set up.

On one of the points raised by Senator MacSharry, we have been advised there is a heavy-handed approach by Mr. Farrell's office towards small to medium sized insurance brokers where there are not large risks involved. It has been proven that he has been naive in his dealings with Irish banks, where there are much larger and greater risks.

Why did Anglo Irish Bank continue to give directors' loans after the Seán FitzPatrick revelation, which is outrageous? That was reported in the media recently. Also, why were land banks, the valuation of which is subjective, allowed to be accepted to secure large scale loans?

Mr. Farrell spoke of IFSRA's new supervisory unit which will monitor the conditions of the new Government guarantee scheme. Can he advise us as to who has been appointed to look after that?

How many of the 380 staff work on a day-to-day basis on banking regulation? Also, can he confirm that no fraud has taken place in Irish banks at the top level of management?

Another issue relates to crony capitalism and the fact that bank directors are giving loans to their friends. What investigations have taken place in this regard?

In IFSRA, Mr. Neary is retiring shortly. Has anyone else resigned or looked to retire as a result of what has happened?

Mr. Farrell might as well explain the differences that this new regulation will make on the day-to-day running of banks and what extra controls and checks will take place daily on Irish banks, which clearly have not happened in the past? What new confidence measures will IFSRA give to the Irish Stock Exchange, if it can, in relation to Bank of Ireland and AIB to help them while their stock price continues to fall dramatically?

How much time is spent on a day-to-day basis administering and monitoring the eight Irish banks and how many staff are involved? What suggestions on tightening the regulation in this area have Mr. Farrell or his office ever brought to the Minister for Finance, and was he listened to?

Mr. Jim Farrell

I do not accept there is a cosy relationship. The regulator recovered €167 million from the banks in respect of consumers. If that is a cosy relationship, Deputy Terence Flanagan has a different definition than I have.

Deputy Flanagan asked about land banks. In January 2007 we increased by 50% the amount of capital that banks had to provide when they were financing land banks. Therefore, we did take action on that.

We do not differentiate between insurance brokers or banks in our dealings. We treat all people based on a business relationship. If we see something wrong, we deal with it. I know Deputy Flanagan will refer to the Anglo Irish Bank matter, and it is an exception. We recognise that. Our policy is not to be cosy with anybody. We have a business relationship. We deal in a professional way with the providers of financial services in this country. Our objective is to ensure that Ireland has a regulatory system that is respected. We recognise that no doubt this has done damage, and Deputy Flanagan knows that as well.

He asked questions about loans to friends. I would be interested in knowing how the regulator would find out if a banker makes a loan to its friend. It is rather difficult. Short of going around and checking every loan to determine whether the guy was a friend of the banker, I suggest it would be rather difficult.

If that information is in the public domain, will that be investigated by Mr. Farrell's office?

Mr. Jim Farrell

Some friends are credit worthy in their own right. One must ask are the loans made because the person is a friend or because he or she is credit worthy.

Such allegations should be investigated.

Mr. Jim Farrell

There is a process for investigating the loan portfolios of banks and that process is followed. That is carried out. If there is information that would indicate cronyism or friendship, that the loan was not made on commercial terms, clearly we would have a duty to investigate and that we would do.

With regard to resignation, I do not know whether Deputy Flanagan was asking me to resign but I will take that question head-on. I have been chairman of IFSRA since May last. The Minister appointed me to do a job. I am honoured to be doing some public service. Deputy Flanagan might not agree that I am doing a great job. I and my colleagues are grappling with some very big issues here. That is the way I see it. Obviously, it is a matter for the Minister. However, I am prepared to continue and take the flak, if necessary, but above all, to put matters right. I believe that this country has a future in financial services and we want to ensure that it continues in that vein. I, personally, am committed and the members of the authority are committed. For example, Mr. Quigley and Mr. Dunne worked over Christmas and New Year, through the holidays, to ensure this report into the Anglo Irish Bank affair was delivered on time. That is an indication of public service. We are not looking for laurels for this but I just want to point out that there is a significant commitment here to ensure we keep on track and that this matter is sorted. I want to put that on the record.

Ms Mary O’Dea

To take up Deputy Flanagan's point about people who have worked previously in banking, there are very few who have worked previously in banking. One must remember that the Financial Regulator, and the 400 by the end of March of whom we have been speaking, covers a number of areas. It covers insurance, banking, consumer protection, consumer information, authorisation and fund supervision. There is a gamut of areas that IFSRA regulates. Everybody who works within the Financial Regulator joins to work in the public interest, and that is for what they are vetted. Some people over the years had left the Financial Regulator to work for much higher salaries in the private sector. That is an issue for all regulators.

One of the features a regulator must possess to do its job is people who have had experience of working in the private sector. We had difficulty in recruiting people from the private sector because of the different salary levels over the years. We had difficulty in getting people with the level and type of expertise we need to examine very complex risk models within banks and actuarial issues in insurance companies. We need to keep those skills within the Financial Regulator.

Everybody who works in the IFRSA does so for the public interest and the master we serve is the public. There is no issue whatsoever in the context of someone believing that those to whom I refer have cosy relationships with banks, insurance companies, fund management companies or others.

When one considers these people and their track records, it is obvious that, contrary to the view which seems to be abroad, the Financial Regulator is not run by bankers. Nothing could be further from the truth. I have never worked in a bank. People who work for the Financial Regulator remain in their positions and give service for many years. They do so in the public interest.

A number of Deputies referred to the fact that we are in the midst of one of the greatest global crises ever witnessed. It is correct that we should demand that our staff step up to the mark at this time. We have made mistakes and we acknowledged that fact to this and other committees. However, we expect our staff to step up to the plate and play their part in respect of the public interest in order to ensure that we steer a careful course in the coming weeks and months.

Is Ms O'Dea of the view that the staff are of sufficient quality to deal with the high level——

I ask that Deputy O'Donnell stop interrupting.

I will be brief because most of the questions I wished to ask have already been posed. I wish to comment on the non-appearance of Mr. Patrick Neary at this meeting. Mr. Farrell stated that he is of the view it would be better for Ms O'Dea rather than Mr. Neary to come before us. That was not Mr. Farrell's call to make. It is obviously the strong view of members that Mr. Neary should have been present. The latter will now ride off into the sunset and we will not have the opportunity to question him further. The committee has been let down by the fact that Mr. Neary is not present.

Mr. Farrell referred to the Financial Regulator's ongoing investigation into Anglo Irish Bank. A question was asked earlier which he did not answer, namely, whether the Garda fraud squad had or has been called in. Does Mr. Farrell anticipate criminal prosecutions arising as a result of the Financial Regulator's investigations?

Questions must arise in the context of the role played by the auditors in this case. As someone who had some experience in this area some years ago, I am of the view that it defies logic that the auditors could have missed the loan in question. Anyone who has every been involved in the field of auditing will be aware of that fact. The role of the auditors must be considered in the context of any criminal investigation. Will Mr. Farrell indicate what is the position in that regard?

What is the position in respect of the internal auditors? This matter was alluded to earlier but I do not believe a response was forthcoming. The internal auditors could certainly not have missed what was taking place. This suggests that some form of pressure was exerted upon them to ensure they did not blow the whistle.

Mr. Farrell stated that the Financial Regulator is also investigating loans to the directors of other financial institutions. There is plenty of evidence — probably more at international rather than national level — which indicates that fraud is usually committed by means of the method used in this case. I would have thought that matters such as that under discussion would be investigated on an ongoing basis and that the regulatory authority would give consideration to them as a matter of priority.

Mr. Farrell referred to the appointment of additional staff. How is it possible that the Financial Regulator can employ such staff when it is 50% funded by the Exchequer and when there is a difficulty in recruiting people into the public service at present? Why is the Financial Regulator being allowed to recruit additional staff or are these people being transferred in from elsewhere in the public sector?

Are the structures in place at the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator working well? In light of the fact that they work out of the same building and share a number of directors, is there any difference between the two bodies? Perhaps the two should be merged or perhaps their activities, etc., might be separated further.

Mr. Farrell referred to SMEs. I do not believe what the banks told the Financial Regulator yesterday. The representatives of the four main banks came before the committee last year and informed it that, in respect of mortgages, etc., it was business as usual. I spoke to a number of people who work for the banks at the time and they informed me that this statement was not true. What the representatives told the committee was a pack of lies.

The Deputy should ask a question. This part of the meeting is due to conclude in ten minutes.

I intend to conclude on this point.

I also spoke to people who stated that they invested money in the sector to which I refer in recent times. However, bank officials have indicated that SMEs are not being given funding. Such funding must be provided.

The Governor of the Central Bank is due to come before us in a few moments. Perhaps the Deputy might raise that matter with him.

I am seeking to ensure that steps are being taken to ensure that the funding to which I refer will be provided.

I apologise for my late arrival. I was astonished to hear that the Financial Regulator needs additional staff. In my view, the more other people do not do their job, the more staff the regulator will need to ensure that the position is reversed. It strikes me that greater powers are required and that greater obligations must be placed on auditors, particularly the larger firms that appear to be able to walk away without any great penalties being imposed on them.

The debacle under discussion should not have taken place, particularly if the auditors — external and internal — had done their jobs properly. In the context of changes to the regulations, surely massive fines should be imposed by the Financial Regulator on auditors who do not do their job. Such fines should also be imposed on individuals working within banks who have responsibility for internal audit procedures.

It is easy to discuss the past. However, in order to ensure that there is no recurrence of the events under discussion, I am of the view that the Financial Regulator should not have sole responsibility in this area. Immediate responsibility should lie with the auditors who consistently ignored the facts. Responsibility should also lie with those responsible for internal audit procedures.

I recall an incident involving AIB some years ago where, eventually, a whistleblower was responsible for making public what had occurred. If a bank appoints internal auditors, they should have additional powers over and above those which apply in respect of the normal employer-employee relationship. They should be independent in the context of their right to report directly to the Financial Regulator with regard to findings about which they are concerned. These people should be obliged, under law, to report directly to the Financial Regulator.

The auditors involved in this case should not be allowed to walk away without first being seen to pay a huge price in terms of funding activities of the Financial Regulator. Those auditors, not the taxpayer, should pay. The route to which I refer in this regard should be taken because the committee will otherwise continue to have arguments with the Financial Regulator. I respect the fact that our guests can only do so much. However, professional people who charge huge fees and people working for particular organisations who are paid major salaries have obligations to the taxpayer. I request that the Financial Regulator put forward proposals with regard to changing the legislation and imposing obligations on external and internal auditors.

In addition, and as already stated, internal auditors should be obliged to report directly to the regulator and should not be obliged to go through their managing directors or chief executives. Such auditors should have the right and an obligation to report to the regulator, findings by which they are disturbed. I do not accept that taxpayers should be obliged to foot the bill in respect of the appointment of a further 100 or 200 by the Financial Regulator. Those who cause the problems should be obliged to pay.

It is a pity the "I" in IFSRA does not stand for "Independent". This word has not been used by any witness or member. However, how can the regulatory authority be independent when it is funded by the people it is regulating? Reference was made to friends securing loans and cosy relationships, which I would describe as cartels, between the regulator, the auditors, the directors and the debtors. I am advised when the regulator investigated the credit unions, lists of their directors and the loans of directors were demanded. Credit unions have been kicked around the place by the Financial Regulator because they are small. The regulator's staff do not have the guts to take on the big boys. That is the logic I apply to the current crisis and this explains why it happened and why the regulator allowed it to happen. People ask how the authority missed the loans given to bank directors. The Financial Regulator's office had to know about them but the staff turned a blind eye. A nod and a wink environment prevailed between the regulator, the auditors, the debtors, the bankers and the directors. Is it merely a coincidence that a man could borrow up to €129 million from Anglo Irish Bank without the regulator knowing about it while a close relative of his holds a senior office in the Oireachtas?

I apologise for being late but I had to attend another meeting. Has anybody in IFSRA been sacked over the Anglo Irish Bank mess? How many Seán FitzPatricks might be in the system? If the regulator does not know, when is it likely to know? If others are found to have engaged in the same activity in Anglo Irish Bank, does it have the power to remove people from the institution?

I refer to auditors. Has the regulator a role in examining Ernst & Young and how it behaved in this case? A number of members alluded to another issue and asked the relevant question. However, it would be appreciated if we were given an answer rather than a sermon. Would it be more prudent to appoint an international figure as head of the regulatory authority rather than a local person? Would somebody, for example, from northern Europe not fit the bill better?

Mr. Jim Farrell

I was asked whether the fraud squad would be brought in. The investigation will go as wide as it has to go and wherever it leads, so be it. If it entails bringing in other bodies, investigators or arms of the State, there will be no boundaries. Auditors will not be exempt from an investigation of their role in this either. Be assured this will not have defined boundaries. It will go where it has to go and we will in so far as we have powers take whatever actions we can to ensure matters are put right. There are clearly powers we do not have and the Director of Corporate Enforcement has a particular role in this regard. I take the point made about the role of the auditors in this. That clearly must be looked into in some detail.

Will the Financial Regulator investigate their role?

Mr. Jim Farrell

The regulatory body for the auditors is the IASSA and I am sure it should investigate. We will investigate the whole problem.

Including the auditors?

Mr. Jim Farrell

And their role, what they said and the investigations they conducted as part of their work in the auditing process at this bank.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

Professional bodies are also involved.

I am asking about the Financial Regulator.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

The IASSA is involved and our investigation can cover all these areas and establish the facts. Legal issues must be pursued, which we indicated earlier. This covers internal audit also because one must examine the processes within the institutions.

I am slightly concerned about the regulator's future powers in the context of the need for changes.

Mr. Jim Farrell

That may well be the case. When this thing is done, we will have to examine the powers we should have and we will make recommendations to the Minister. We want to be more effective and to have greater penalties. The maximum fine we can impose is €5 million.

Questions were asked about staff, resources and so on. We are recruiting staff on two-year short-term contracts because the guarantee runs for two years and our objective is the banks, which are the beneficiaries of the guarantee, will pay the cost.

Would that be 100% of the cost?

Mr. Jim Farrell

That is our intention.

Deputy Sheahan mentioned a senior relative in the Oireachtas. We cannot comment on that but that is news to me. That is a matter outside our domain.

I asked a question about the credit unions.

Mr. Jim Farrell

The Registrar of Credit Unions has a statutory role to carry out his duties and my understanding is he is going about that in a very professional way. He is not scapegoating anybody. I am sure the committee would want us, as a regulator, to ensure credit unions are supervised in a prudential way that safeguards the deposits of their members. That is his objective and he meets this in a professional way. If there are specific complaints regarding how he does his job, please feel free to give us specific instances.

When the regulator's staff went into the credit unions, they sought and were given a list of directors and their loans. Did the same happen in Anglo Irish Bank?

Mr. Con Horan

As Mr. Quigley said, there is a procedure on a quarterly basis whereby directors in banks send in information relating to their loans with the institutions. That is provided on an ongoing basis and there are regulatory limits on the amounts banks can lend to directors. That was the primary purpose for obtaining that information.

How did the regulator not find out?

Mr. Con Horan

That is being investigated.

We must draw this session to an end.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

I refer to staffing because Deputy O'Donnell asked about the quality of the staff in the organisation.

That needs to be asked.

Mr. Dermot Quigley

In my experience staff are highly qualified, professional and committed given the onerous nature of the job, in particular during the past couple of years. What happened is an unfortunate occurrence, a serious matter for which we make no excuses. However, I would like to put on the record that in our experience staff in the organisation are highly qualified. They are committed to doing their job as best they can. In my experience, they have been successful in the implementation of our approach to regulation, which itself may have to change.

On staffing, it is correct to say that the answer is not always one of throwing more staff at issues. More staff will be needed. They are already required to ensure operation of the Government's bank guarantee scheme. The consultants' review is partly to benchmark us, in terms of staffing, against other organisations, including similar regulators abroad and, to examine whether we are doing all the right things in terms of the deployment of staff and so on. I have no doubt that given the requirement for a more intensive form of regulation, we will have to review staffing. We are also examining where we can achieve efficiency through reallocation of resources.

The point I was making was that more staff would not be required if others were doing their job.

I thank Mr. Farrell, Ms O'Dea, Mr. Horan and Mr. Quigley for their attendance this morning and this afternoon and for the comprehensive replies and information they have given us. It is hoped that the next time they appear before us the problems we are currently facing will have been resolved.

Mr. Jim Farrell

Thank you.

Sitting suspended at 1.22 p.m. and resumed at 1.24 p.m.

I welcome from the Central Bank, Mr. John Hurley, Governor, Mr. Tony Grimes, director general and Mr. Tom O'Connell, assistant director general. I invite Mr. Hurley to make his presentation, a copy of which has been circulated.

Mr. John Hurley

I thank the committee for the invitation to attend today's meeting. I am accompanied by Mr. Tony Grimes, director general and Mr. Tom O'Connell, assistant director general, economics. The committee is, I believe, clear at this stage on the different responsibilities of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator. The Central Bank's responsibilities are the maintenance of price stability, the provision of liquidity and to contribute to financial stability. The regulator's key responsibilities are prudential regulation focusing on individual financial institutions and consumer protection.

In my opening remarks, I would like to briefly recall the background to the current issues in our financial system and, more generally, the economy up to and including the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and to outline the ongoing role of the Central Bank in dealing with these issues. Members will be aware that last week's Government decision regarding Anglo Irish Bank was taken in consultation with the Central Bank and Financial Regulator. This necessary decision reflects the commitment of the authorities here to maintain the stability of the financial system and demonstrates that whatever actions are necessary in this regard will be taken.

With reference to more general financial stability issues, I will comment on the actions taken by the authorities here to secure the stability of our domestic financial system, in particular since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers last September. The Irish economy is currently going through a difficult period and is facing into a second consecutive year of contraction. The contraction in output is set to result in significant job losses and a sharp rise in unemployment. Given the uncertainty as to the speed at which the global financial market crisis can be overcome, the assessment of the domestic economic outlook is particularly difficult.

What is certain is that we are in a significant downturn and two courses of action are essential. It is imperative that we move to correct within a reasonable timeframe the sizeable deficit in the public finances. It is also vital that we improve our competitiveness, which has weakened steadily in recent years. This is necessary to protect employment, to maintain and attract foreign investment and in the longer term to improve the potential for the economy to grow.

In our current circumstances, pay developments need, for example, to take account of the changed outlook for inflation and the extremely difficult situation facing the Government's finances. They must also take account of the necessity to restore competitiveness in a difficult international trading environment to ensure Ireland is in a position to avail of improved economic conditions worldwide when these emerge.

Notwithstanding current difficulties, Ireland's medium-term prospects are good. On the basis of still favourable demographic trends and some improvement in productivity growth, Ireland has the potential to grow strongly again in a few years. However, the achievement of this potential is not inevitable and is contingent on sound economic management. In the short term this will involve painful but necessary action to ensure long-term sustainability in the public finances and to restore our competitive position.

On the global financial crisis, when I appeared before this committee last July I pointed out that we were in a challenging environment. At that time Ireland was experiencing a greater than expected slowdown in domestic growth in conjunction with a generalised disruption in international money markets. In mid-September, this situation deteriorated dramatically with the failure of Lehman Brothers Bank in the United States. This event served both to accentuate and accelerate the adverse effects of the crisis across global financial markets. Among developed countries, as confidence and trust waned, even the strongest banking systems were affected. To protect financial systems which are so vital to the economy of every country policy-makers internationally moved from intervention to individual institutions to scaled-up assistance, including funding guarantees and recapitalisations on a system-wide basis.

I have made clear during the past number of years that the Irish economy was facing an increasing number of downside risks and that if an international shock interacted with these domestic vulnerabilities, it would give rise to serious consequences for our economy. In the event, this is what occurred and a rebalancing in the domestic economy, which could have been painful but manageable, has turned into a much more difficult challenge.

The excess supply of liquidity and large global imbalances which emerged in recent years of this decade were major causes of the significant vulnerabilities that materialised within the global financial system. These vulnerabilities included excessive credit growth, increased leverage in the financial sector and a search for a yield leading to an under-pricing of risk in financial markets generally. These developments had a marked influence on the Irish financial system. Although the Irish banks avoided the toxic assets associated with the US sub-prime market, there were specific domestic vulnerabilities, such as the banking system's strong credit growth, over-exposure to property related assets and the growing dependence on international wholesale funding.

These domestic and international vulnerabilities were identified clearly in our financial stability reports in recent years. However, the severity, breadth and rapid onset of the financial crisis that has developed and the consequent impact on the global economy is unprecedented. This is reflected in the very large deterioration in financial global stocks and exemplified in our market. The upshot of these developments is that all banking systems in advanced industrial countries have now required a number of rounds of support from their respective authorities. We have seen actions in this regard by some of those authorities again this week.

The Central Bank has responded to the unfolding crisis in a number of ways. On behalf of the Eurosystem and along with central banks globally, it has been providing significant volumes of liquidity to the financial sector since major financial stress began to become evident in autumn 2007. The Eurosystem entered this crisis with a relatively broad collateral framework for supplying liquidity to banks, in comparison to other major central banks. It has since made its liquidity more accessible for banks by widening its list of eligible collateral, providing the funds on a full allotment basis and extending the maturity of its operations. Other central banks have since moved closer to the Eurosystem model.

In response to the turmoil and the associated impact on the real economy, the Eurosystem, along with other major central banks, has eased monetary policy, in some instances to levels not previously seen. The governing council of the ECB has cut its policy interest rate by 225 basis points cumulatively since last summer. This substantial fall in rates over the past few months has been a response to reduced inflation risks at a time of deteriorating economic and financial developments in the euro area. Clearly, if events cause our expectations regarding inflation to be revised, the governing council remains ready to act.

Membership of the euro area has given us significant advantages, for example, with regard to liquidity support to our banks and elimination of exchange rate risk within the euro area. The advantages can also be seen by the fact that debates are now taking place in countries outside the euro area regarding the benefits membership could bring them. However, membership of a monetary union and the absence of an independent monetary and exchange rate policy mean that member states' domestic economic policies must be appropriate. In particular, as I mentioned earlier, in the absence of an independent monetary policy, it is essential in current circumstances that a strong focus is placed on policies to restore competitiveness.

While monetary policy and liquidity provision have always been the key functions of central banks, in recent years there has been an increasing emphasis on their contribution to financial stability. Through the publication of financial stability assessments, central banks in the major industrial countries draw attention to risks to the financial system. This information and analysis is provided to the wider public, financial market participants and directly to the banks so that they are informed about the economic and financial environment, thus allowing them to adjust their behaviour consistent with those risks.

It is precisely this role that the Central Bank here has played over the past four to five years, pointing out the domestic and international risks to the economy at a time when house prices and credit growth were increasing at very high rates. These risks, based on our ongoing analysis and research, were highlighted not only in our annual financial stability reports, but also in our quarterly bulletins and in statements made by me regularly. In the context of an unprecedented period of expansion and wealth creation, this proved a difficult message to get across. It is evident there was not a sufficient or timely change in behaviour in response to these warnings. Other central banks around the world faced similar headwinds in changing behaviour, consistent with the risks identified in their own financial stability assessments.

An international debate has now begun on how authorities might directly change the behaviour of financial market participants to mitigate the risks identified in financial stability reports. This debate, in part, focuses on whether central banks need specific powers to intervene directly in this regard. For example, one proposal is that central banks might have an explicit role in setting capital ratios in response to emerging risks identified in their financial stability assessments. A further area for discussion is how monetary policy might better respond to asset price developments. For example, should policy "lean against the wind" by tackling asset price inflation more directly?

In late September, following the Lehman's bankruptcy and when the global interbank markets froze and funding was unavailable even at the shortest maturities, the Central Bank formed the view that the risks to financial stability were becoming unacceptably high, with knock-on effects for the wider economy. The scale of liquidity outflows was such that some of our institutions had acute liquidity risks. The concentrated nature of the Irish banking system meant that there was a high risk of contagion in the event of an individual bank encountering difficulties. There was no impending pan-European initiative to address these international pressures at that time, although it was to emerge subsequently. Our Government decision to guarantee key liabilities of the banking sector was taken at that time to protect the stability of the domestic financial system by ensuring renewed access to funding for Irish financial institutions. The success of this measure was evident by the immediate improvement in the liquidity situation, including a substantial net inflow of funds in the days after the guarantee was introduced and the ability of a number of the covered institutions subsequently to raise longer-term finance on the international markets. In the subsequent weeks, most other European countries moved to introduce some form of guarantee arrangements.

It was recognised at the time that it would also be necessary to determine if additional capital was required, particularly in the context of demands for higher tier 1 capital by international investors and pressure on property valuations in the context of a much more significant downturn. Accordingly, after consultation with the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the Government announced details last month of its capitalisation scheme. The risk for banks that do not meet higher market standards is that they face a much more difficult environment for raising funds. It was not acceptable to the authorities that banks would attempt to achieve these higher ratios by curtailing credit to the real economy. An important aspect of the capitalisation scheme is the agreement of the participating banks to develop specific credit policies targeted at small and medium-sized enterprises, first-time buyers and consumers generally.

As part of the response of the authorities to ongoing events, the Government last week made its decision to bring Anglo Irish Bank into full public ownership in order to secure the bank's continued viability. The action was in response to a weakened funding position and the reputational damage to the bank arising from unacceptable practices that took place within it at a time when overall market sentiment was already negative towards the institution. This meant that recapitalisation was no longer the appropriate and effective way to secure its continued viability. As far as AIB and Bank of Ireland are concerned, the Government has reiterated that it sees these banks as central to the Irish financial system and essential to the proper functioning of the economy. It has also indicated its intention that both banks remain as independent banks in private ownership and has stated that it is proceeding with the planned recapitalisations of both banks.

A well functioning financial system is central to the well-being of any economy. The Government has underlined the strong commitment of all the authorities to take whatever action is necessary to achieve this outcome.

I thank Mr. Hurley for his contribution and have a few brief questions for him. The first concerns the question of liquidity, a matter affecting small and medium-sized businesses. The changes that have been made in the past few months have increased liquidity for the banks, but has Mr. Hurley any evidence this is filtering down to small and medium enterprises? Second, is a stability report due from the Central Bank for 2008 and when is it likely to be published? Third, with regard to the structure of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, is that structure working satisfactorily?

Mr. John Hurley

I will respond to a number of those questions. On the issue of credit for small business, lending to the real economy is absolutely essential, given the contraction in output taking place. The data for the third quarter of 2008 showed the news was not good. It was clear there was a significant tightening of credit standards by financial institutions and also growth and lending reduced significantly. Much of the lending taking place was for financial intermediation and maybe not to the real economy itself and therefore, the figures would belie a more reduced level of lending to the real economy.

The October figures and November data also signalled significant tightening of credit to the real economy. There are issues here and in the context of the recapitalisation scheme. The Minister, in direct discussions with the financial institutions, received certain commitments with regard to lending to the real economy as a consequence of the recapitalisation.

It seems to me that this is to be monitored by the Financial Regulator and reports will be going to the Minister. It is critical and vital that if we are to reduce the contraction taking place in our economy, lending to businesses — good businesses with good ideas — continues. The information from the financial institutions would suggest that demand is very low, that quite a number of the propositions in some cases might be deserving of support whereas others might not. The financial institutions would say that they are continuing to lend significantly for worthy propositions. There is undoubtedly a significant reduction in the figures overall. There is a need, in my view, to ensure that lending to the real economy continues at an appropriate level. The monitoring of the commitments given to the Minister is vital in that context.

The contraction in our economy which occurred last year and is continuing this year, is very significant. It is significant because we have the interaction between the global shock and the domestic vulnerabilities that we have spoken about in this committee before. If the Central Bank was to make an assessment of that impact, we would say that the global shock has doubled the level of the contraction. In other words, there was a 6% growth in 2007 and a 1% contraction in 2008, a total of 7% and about half of that is being impacted upon by the international shock. In that type of situation, we have to support businesses — good businesses — and the agreements that have been reached must be monitored.

A question was asked about the stability report. Normally, the stability report would have been produced before now but in the context of the crisis we have been going through, particularly since September and as a result of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the United States, events were moving so quickly that we took the decision to defer the financial stability report until early this year. It is currently being finalised and I expect it would be published over the next month or two. It will be published as this analysis is critical.

In terms of the structure of the Central Bank and Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ireland, I indicated at the outset that we have an independent Financial Regulator and a Central Bank with certain functions and both have support services. What has emerged and is emerging internationally with regard to regulation is that the international architecture on regulation has failed; it has not succeeded in stemming the global international crisis we are faced with. In places like the financial stability forum in Basle and the G20, much work is afoot to try to improve the international institutional arrangements in this regard and to ensure co-operation between international agencies to try to deal with this. In addition, because no one foresaw this crisis of liquidity and the depth of it, regulators around the world have significant difficulty in dealing with the problems in their jurisdictions. All regulators are under ferocious pressure. It is quite clear that as a consequence, not only will the international architecture of regulation have to change, but domestic changes will also be necessary.

It is for the Oireachtas and the Government to determine the exact institutional arrangements but I will make one point from my experience of being present in international fora, particularly since September. After Lehman Brothers, if we did not have a close informational relationship with the regulator which ensured a flow of information since September, this would have been impossible to manage. The information flows were vital for the Central Bank as the liquidity provider and as the lender of last resort. It enabled me, in going to Frankfurt when we were designing liquidity and collateral arrangements in the midst of the crisis, to have the best information possible about our systems and our banking position. There is much reflection in the European Parliament, in the Jacques de Larosière Commission group and in the G20 in Basel. Whatever the institutional arrangements that result from this — banking supervision and central banking and liquidity provision — wherever those responsibilities are placed there has to be the closest possible co-operation. What has really been clear since September is that the liquidity and the crisis has to be managed all in one piece. This is an ongoing international debate. There is a debate as to where banking supervision should be located as distinct from other areas of supervision. I do not know what will be the outcome but it cannot be business as usual as this has been the most horrendous international crisis.

Every major country is either in a downturn or in a recession. The emerging economies are being increasingly affected in recent weeks and months. Unemployment levels are increasing around the world. Financial institutions and banks have lost the confidence of investors and fear stalks the market. Both the international and local architecture has to change; it cannot be business as usual. At the moment we are busy trying to get through the crisis that has unfolded. This country has two big issues to face — first, we must ensure the stability of our financial institutions, whatever that takes, and the Government has made a commitment that it will do whatever is necessary to achieve this; and second, we must stabilise our economy, stabilise the Government finances and recover the loss in competitiveness which has damaged our economy over the past number of years. These are the issues we must concentrate on in the coming months of 2009. We must then reflect very carefully on some of the broader lessons regarding the international regulatory architecture, for central banking and for the relationship between central banking and regulation, but particularly, for the relationship between banking supervision and the lenders of last resort. I will stop there.

What about the rating agencies?

Mr. John Hurley

As the Deputy knows, the rating agencies are a clear area of reform, which must be examined. Undoubtedly in terms of the rating agencies at present we must ensure there are no conflicts of interest. We need to ensure that the ratings that are applied stand up to scrutiny, and are adequate and professionally done. It seems to me that that is an area of particular concern at the moment. There needs to be a great deal of reflection on the way all of these ratings are done and how they interact with what is happening in the market at present. There are so many areas of work to be done as a result of this. What is clear is that it cannot be business as usual. This is an enormous failure internationally. Every developed country is in recession. Fiscal systems are being seriously damaged. Banking systems do not have the confidence of investors. Unquestionably the changes that will be required here will be very significant. There will need to be changes in our own arrangements.

I will call Deputies O'Donnell, Burton, McGrath and Flanagan, in that order. Members should bear in mind that we must leave this room by 2.15 p.m.

I thank the Governor and his colleagues for coming here today. The financial stability report has already been covered. Last year's report was published in November 2007. Rather than being published annually, financial stability reports should come out at more regular intervals considering the change in the economic climate.

It is clear that the guarantee scheme is not working in terms of the banks providing funds to small businesses. If we cannot find a mechanism to do that through the banking system, would the Central Bank favour direct Government intervention to provide funds directly as has been done in the UK with matching funds guarantees? The governor has specifically mentioned AIB and Bank of Ireland. Does he feel our banking system is under severe liquidity pressure? Does he feel that the proposed recapitalisation scheme will work? Was he in favour of the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank? The Central Bank report suggested that Ireland's medium-term prospects are good. How does the governor define medium term? At the moment we are facing into great difficulties.

The governor referred to specific powers the Central Bank might take to intervene directly. I understand the central bank in Spain introduced specific capital ratio requirements of its own that were more stringent than international and European standards. Why did the Central Bank here not consider that in recent years when we had the property bubble? Regulation could have brought sustainability to that sector.

I call Deputy Burton.

I would prefer to hear those answers.

I call Deputy McGrath.

I thank the Governor and his colleagues for coming in. He mentioned that the data available to the Central Bank indicates that the credit flow in November and December has again tightened considerably. Given the introduction of the guarantee scheme at the end of September why is the credit flow so poor? He mentioned that demand is low. Have the banks tightened their lending policy or is there still a residual liquidity issue for the banks? Regarding the ability of the banks to raise finance on the international inter-bank market, as the expiration of the guarantee scheme approaches in September next year, will they find it increasingly difficult to get loans with a maturity date beyond the expiry of the guarantee scheme?

The governor mentioned that in recent times the Central Bank had highlighted the risks in the Irish economy in its financial stability reports, quarterly bulletins, etc. The problem was that no heed was taken of the highlighting of those risks. The banks were too busy making money and nobody sat up and took notice. My question comes back to the governor's point about direct intervention. In hindsight should there have been direct intervention by the Central Bank in dictating to banks what their lending policies should have been to prevent them from exposing themselves to unnecessary risk? Did the Central Bank have that power? If not, should it be given that power and how can that happen?

What is the governor's opinion on the ability of AIB and Bank of Ireland to raise funds internationally as part of the recapitalisation programme? Does he believe they will be able to meet their requirements there? To what extent does he believe the Seán FitzPatrick loan saga in Anglo Irish Bank was a contributory factor in undermining investor confidence in Anglo Irish Bank resulting ultimately in the need for the State to step in to nationalise the bank?

Mr. John Hurley

I will try to cover everything. If I miss something perhaps members could remind me. I will start with the position in Spain. In Spain they look at the provisioning in the institutions. I do not know how to put this. It seems to me that the Spanish situation is different from what pertains in other countries. It has a system of dynamic provisioning. Other countries are not in that situation. We are not in that situation. However, that is now being particularly looked at. It is being looked at because of what has happened. It seems to me that it is a critical situation going forward. Regarding the powers that exist at the moment, there are many areas for reflection as a result of what has taken place. It is vital for us to reflect on the lessons that have clearly emerged from what has been a very difficult situation.

The other question related to——

It was about the liquidity of AIB and Bank of Ireland in terms of access to funds in the inter-bank market.

Mr. John Hurley

Regarding access to funds, in both Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks there has been a great deal of pressure in recent times. However, they are very strong institutions. They clearly are critical to this country going forward. I seem to have lost my train of thought for the moment.

I will outline the situation we now find ourselves in. The share prices of our two main banks are falling. There are concerns about the sustainability of all the banks following the recent nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank. I am worried about the capacity of AIB to raise interbank funds privately so that it has enough liquidity to function. How does Mr. Hurley view such issues, in the context of the current decreases in the share prices of AIB and Bank of Ireland?

Mr. John Hurley

Both institutions are strong. It is clear that they are vital to the future of this country — they are absolutely essential. It is important that they be secured. Their importance and significance for the Irish economy cannot be questioned. I have lost my train of thought once more.

How does Mr. Hurley view their liquidity — their capacity to raise funds? They need to be strong so they can survive. Their share prices are falling on the international markets and stock exchanges. There is a reason for that.

Mr. John Hurley

Yes. They have modest drawings from the ECB liquidity supply. There have been significant liquidity developments around the globe. Recent events have been extraordinary. It is important for us to ensure that lending to the economy is at a strong level. I am trying to catch my train of thought in this respect.

Does Mr. Hurley think AIB and Bank of Ireland will be able to raise sufficient funds privately under the recapitalisation programme to complement the funds being invested by the State?

Mr. John Hurley

Yes. They have a very good opportunity to do so. It seems to me that very significant funds are being provided by the State. It seems to me that the banks have an opportunity to raise private equity. It seems to me that this possibility should be given every chance. It is important to secure the banking system into the future. The banks in this country will have an absolutely critical and vital role in the period to come.

I will finish on this fundamental point. Does Mr. Hurley envisage that the two main banks will be able to trade as private and independent bodies into the future? Will they have sufficient liquidity and solvency? Will they be able to get access to funds so that they can provide money to small businesses? Would Mr. Hurley be in favour of direct Government intervention if a system could not be put in place to ensure that happens? I will repeat my primary question. Does Mr. Hurley believe that AIB and Bank of Ireland will be able to continue to trade and survive?

Mr. John Hurley

It is absolutely essential that the banking system supports business across the country. It is clear that the various financial institutions have to make an assessment of the risks facing them — the loans and other credit risks that exist. It is absolutely essential that such processes should continue. It is particularly vital at this time, when the economy is facing significant headwinds, that moneys should continue to be loaned into the economy. I am not sure, in the present context, that anything can be ruled out. The events that are taking place throughout the world are extraordinary. It seems to me that developments in Ireland are part of the worldwide developments I have mentioned. We have to ensure, for the benefit of our economy, that our institutions continue to give the best service they can to the people of this country.

I would like to answer some of Deputy O'Donnell's other questions. He raised a specific issue pertaining to the loans in Anglo Irish Bank. This is an important development. It seems to me that it was clearly intended to pursue the proposal that was originally made. In light of subsequent developments, it was necessary to amend the original decision. It was vital for the Government to recognise the changed situation. The decision taken late last week was made for that reason.

Does Mr. Hurley think that the Seán FitzPatrick loan scandal contributed to the decision to pursue nationalisation, rather than recapitalisation, in the case of Anglo Irish Bank? I understand that Mr. Hurley's position means he has to be very careful with the language he uses. I am concerned that Mr. Hurley has not yet confirmed that AIB and Bank of Ireland, which are this country's two main banks, are on a sound financial footing. Deputy O'Donnell has given him a few opportunities to do so. Does Mr. Hurley believe they will be able to continue to operate privately? He has not confirmed that they will.

Mr. John Hurley

I think they are strong institutions. It seems to me that financial institutions across the globe are under pressure at present.

I do not want to put Mr. Hurley under pressure. People are asking key questions about the liquidity of the two main banks in a specific context. Are the two banks getting access to liquidity, in terms of funds? What does Mr. Hurley think can be done? Would he be in favour of an insurance scheme, like that proposed in the UK, to provide a guarantee in the event of losses? What can the Central Bank and the Irish regulatory authorities do to ensure the future sustainability of the two main banks, which is vital? While it is generally felt in Ireland that the banks in question are fundamentally sound, the international markets do not appear to share that viewpoint. We are looking for direction from the Governor of the Central Bank. Can he give us confidence about the future? The banks are absolutely critical for the future of every town and village in Ireland.

Mr. John Hurley

These absolutely vital institutions are very strong. Their share prices are really not indicative of the situation at the present time. We are seeing a lack of confidence around the globe. There is a lack of confidence in financial institutions generally. It is clear that these are strong and solvent institutions. They are very critical to the future health of this economy.

Do they have problems with liquidity?

Mr. John Hurley

No. There is no real difficulty with the liquidity situation. Their modest drawings from the ECB are not significant.

Does Mr. Hurley believe they will continue to trade as independent banks?

Mr. John Hurley

I do, certainly. Yes.

To what extent did the director's loan scandal involving Mr. FitzPatrick at Anglo Irish Bank influence market sentiment and directly contribute to the change in Government policy from recapitalisation to nationalisation? As the Governor of the Central Bank, is Mr. Hurley concerned that this concealment of directors' loans was allowed to take place for eight years? Does he recognise the system failures which occurred in that regard? We questioned the Financial Regulator on this matter earlier. The Governor also has a role to play in this matter and I am interested in hearing his view on it.

Mr. John Hurley

The matter clearly was an issue for reputation. It is undoubtedly a serious issue which changed the earlier decision that had been taken. I have no doubt it had a significant effect on reputation.

If the banks do not provide funds for small businesses, does the Governor favour direct Government intervention similar to action being taken in the United Kingdom, for example, the provision of matching funds and guarantees?

Mr. John Hurley

We must give an opportunity to what is being played out in that area. If we see, as a consequence of what is happening, that this is not being successful, we will clearly have to think again. It is very important that funds flow for the sake of the economy.

Mr. Hurley's statement refers to the Government's view of Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland. In all of the statements made by the Minister for Finance on the bank guarantee scheme, recapitalisation and the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank, the Governor of the Central Bank is referred to as the leading provider of advice to the Minister. As an independent authority, what is the Governor's view, as opposed to that of the Government, of the current position of Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland?

Everybody is anxious that Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland should be sustained to the maximum possible extent. Under the recapitalisation arrangement, the Government will supply significant funding to recapitalise these two banks, which will also have to raise private funding. The difficulty we have in understanding the Governor's position on this matter is that the markets seem disinclined to believe that the banks can raise private funds. Does the Governor have knowledge of whether Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland have been able to raise private funding? If they cannot raise such funding, will the Government have to step forward to support them for a period? We know the Government's position but members would like to know Mr. Hurley's opinion, as Governor of the Central Bank and a member of the board of the European Central Bank. What is his view of the position of Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland? While we agree that these banks are terribly important and should be sustained, how should this be done? The recapitalisation programme announced by the Government and expanded on yesterday does not appear to pin down the confidence of the markets or the willingness of private capital to provide capital to these two banks.

Mr. John Hurley

AIB and Bank of Ireland are vital institutions for the State. They are central to the financial system and the proper functioning of the economy. It is the intention that both banks remain as independent banks in private ownership.

Under the recapitalisation arrangement, the Government will make available a certain amount of money and the banks are required to raise a certain amount from private investors. Does the Governor have advice to the banks as to how they can do this?

Mr. John Hurley

AIB and Bank of Ireland are clearly making every effort to tap the markets and raise these funds. We must see how this plays out. It is a vital part of the process. These are very important institutions for the State and it is critical that they are in a strong position.

As Mr. Hurley stated, the markets are uncertain and Ireland's reputation has, unfortunately, been badly damaged by other events which have been referred to. If the banks have a difficulty in meeting this requirement for a period, does the Governor believe the recapitalisation programme will have to be changed in some way to provide for a stronger measure of Government support to them?

Mr. John Hurley

It is critical that we first allow what is taking place to run its course. These are very important institutions for the State which are critical for the future of the economy. Whatever requires to be done will have to be done.

May I ask the Governor on that issue, what is the significance——

I apologise but I have been advised that we must vacate the room.

Can we get another room?

In that case, I wish to conclude my questions on this matter.

Mr. John Hurley

We cannot rule anything out. It is critical.

Everyone agrees with the Governor that AIB and Bank of Ireland are vital. The nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank is a sideshow compared to the recapitalisation of these banks, which is what we need to discuss. How long can the shares of these banks remain far below the intrinsic values of both institutions? How long can the current difficulty persist without some signal from Government on its support or on appropriate measures? The Minister for Finance refers repeatedly to the Governor of the Central Bank as the leading adviser. We are trying to restore the country's reputation and save its two largest banks.

Mr. John Hurley

The guarantee in place is important in that respect. These are vital institutions, the life blood of the State. What has been proposed should be given an opportunity to run its course. Whatever is necessary will have to be done in this regard. The financial institutions are a critical part of the economy and provide it with critical support. It is vital that they should function properly. While we cannot rule anything out, we must allow what is in course to run its course.

I must conclude the meeting.

It is unfair that I was not permitted to speak again.

I thank Mr. Hurley, Mr. Grimes and Mr. O'Connell for attending this early meeting. Unfortunately, we overran our time with the Financial Regulator. I know there will be another request and, perhaps when the financial stability report comes out, Mr. Hurley might be able to come before the committee again to discuss the matter further.

Mr. John Hurley

I would be very happy to do so. These issues are vital for the country at this time. It is a very difficult time but the issues at stake are critical to the health of the economy going forward.

I thank Mr. Hurley.

The joint committee adjourned at 2.20 p.m. until 2.15 p.m. on Wednesday, 11 February 2009.
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