I will do my best not to impugn anybody's integrity although some of the contents of this report might persuade many people that they have not done a very good job although I will not mention anyone by name.
We were asked to conduct some research into voter behaviour at the referendum on Oireachtas inquiries and to reflect on our findings. As academics always say, many of the results would call for more research but no doubt, some of the questions from members will help to deal with them.
I am using a PowerPoint presentation as I can see the information more easily. First, we began by finding out why people voted as they did. We needed to know this information in order to assess how effectively the referendum was run as an exercise in citizen consultation. Second, we were asked to find out what the public thinks about the political reform agenda to which the Government is committed. Third, we were asked to find out what lessons can be learned for future votes on reform. There are lessons to be learned as regards any future votes on any subject.
I refer to a chart which indicates the difficulty facing voters in the polling booth when voting on a referendum, at least, those of us who vote on referenda. The first item on the chart is SQ - which means the status quo on any issue; where the status quo puts us and the line indicates a dimension of policy. X1 denotes where the referendum will take us on that, for instance, a decision to give a lot more freedom in terms of Oireachtas inquiries. The letter “I” is where I am; this is my view on where we should be; in this case, “I” means a voter. If I have to fill in my ballot paper, I really have to say whether X1 is closer to me than SQ and if it is not, then I should vote “No”. However, if it is, then I should vote “Yes”, because I would rather be where X1 is than where SQ is. This means that as a voter I prefer where the referendum is taking me as opposed to the status quo. It could be X2.
Funny things happen when one draws these lines on the screen. One of the things that happened is that the denominator, "I" moved; it used to be further to the right, closer to X1 than to SQ. Even if I say it is more or less in between, whereas X2 is miles away, I would certainly vote "No" for X2 because that is a long way from where I want to be, even though I do not think we should be where we actually are with SQ. I hope this is clear.
In order to make a competent and reasoned decision, voters need to know where the status quo is, where the referendum proposal will take us. They also need to know where they are. Do voters have views on what Oireachtas inquiries should be and did they have them before anybody else, before the campaign started? They also need to assess whether a rejection of the proposal will lead to a continuation of the status quo or take us somewhere else. Arguably, for Oireachtas inquiries, it leaves us where we were, but for other things, let us say, the vote on Lisbon II, it might have taken us somewhere else. Voting “No” could move the status quo as voting “No” does not necessarily leave the status quo where it was.
When little information is available, voters may not know where the ballot proposition is actually located. If we vote "Yes" to Oireachtas inquiries, it is a case of wondering exactly what that will mean, how much freedom for inquiries, how much freedom to investigate individuals. They may not know what the status quo is and they may not know where they are, therefore, it is quite difficult to make a decision. One of the things we hope to do in a referendum campaign is to provide clarity about all those things. In a normal court of law presided over by a judge, 12 good people and true do not know much when they start but they sit there for a week or two or three. They are given advice from conflicting sides over the truth and at the end, maybe guided by a judge, they reach a conclusion and we are happy with that. However, in a referendum campaign, we do not confine them to a room for a number of weeks and we do not actually know what information is informative for voters nor do we necessarily provide information in the best way. I have provided all this information on the PowerPoint slide.
A few polls were conducted during the campaign and in the early stages it seemed almost everybody said they were going to vote "Yes". By the end of the campaign, however, a majority had been persuaded to reject the proposal. The campaign mattered in that a significant number of voters, apparently, changed their mind. They certainly changed their mind from the top-of-the head response they had given in opinion polls at the beginning of the campaign to the decision they took in the ballot box.
Referendums are not new here or anywhere else and many studies have been conducted around them. It is common to see this downward slope in support for a particular proposal. The explanation for this typically is that the campaign raises uncertainty about the consequences. In other words, it leaves people unsure of whether the change will be closer to their position or further away. As a consequence, many who do not know vote "No". That is perfectly reasonable, particularly if the status quo is not unacceptable to them and where it is unclear whether the change will be better or worse, which only those who are very well informed are likely to know. I contend that rejecting a proposal on that basis is not daft but rational. There is an argument that if one does not know, one should stay at home. However, voting “No” when one does not know makes sense if it has not been clearly shown that one will be better off and where there is a chance one will, in fact, be worse off.
An observation that applies very well, if indirectly, to referendums was made by one of the world's most significant analysts of public opinion, Philip Converse, based on a comment made by an American political journalist. I found it in a book on European referendums: "Never overestimate the information of the electorate, but never underestimate its intelligence." To put it another way, people are not stupid, but they do not know very much and often they are not very interested in knowing very much. As such, it is a major challenge for the political system when it consults the people, particularly by way of a referendum.
To find out what happened in the course of this referendum campaign, we carried out two major pieces of research. One was a quantitative study - a conventional opinion poll - involving 1,005 interviews and using random digit dialling. Half of the sample was interviewed on a landline and the other using a mobile phone. This is the methodology usually employed by Red C. Interviews were conducted across the country with a random sample of adults. We also undertook some qualitative research using four focus groups each comprising ten people, with interviews conducted at the beginning of December. All of the participants said they had voted in the referendum. Each group was comprised of a mix of "Yes" and "No" voters, but some groups were more middle class and others more working class, and they were constrained in terms of age group, with some groups consisting of younger voters and others older voters. The objective was to have reasonably similar people in each group and get a cross-section by using the four groups. Unlike the quantitative study, where one asks a set number of questions and people give responses, the qualitative research involved a structured discussion around a number of questions asked by the moderator. The responses were recorded, written down and can be analysed.
The results of our quantitative research were striking. For example, in asking questions about several elements of the reform agenda we asked whether the Oireachtas should be able to hold inquiries into matters of general public interest. I am sure members would all agree it should, which was, in fact, also the view of the majority of respondents, who agreed either strongly or slightly with that statement. A fairly small proportion disagreed. This finding is somewhat odd, given that the electorate had just rejected this very proposal. Of those who had voted "Yes" in the referendum, 93% were of the view that Oireachtas inquiries were a good idea. It makes one wonder about the remaining 7%; perhaps that finding can be accounted for by confusion.
Of those who had voted "No", 58% supported Oireachtas reform, which immediately begs the question as to why they rejected the referendum proposal. There seems to be three reasons for this. First, while the people concerned like the idea of Oireachtas inquiries, they did not support the level of inquiry power proposed. In other words, the change was too great. That sounds like a plausible reason for voting "No". Second, there was too much uncertainty and they were not sure exactly what they were voting for. These voters did not see a conflict between liking Oireachtas inquiries in principle and rejecting the referendum proposal when the paper was put in front of their nose. Third, some people did not make their decision based on anything to do with Oireachtas inquiries but voted on some other grounds altogether.
Although there is a great deal of fascinating and valuable information in our presentation, the information on the slide is particularly significant. I am not always convinced by the answers people give when asked why they accepted or rejected a particular referendum proposal. What is striking is that when we asked people why they had voted "Yes", 18% said they did not know. An additional 40% said something along of the lines of "It seemed appropriate". That does not seem to be much better than "I do not know," but members can judge for themselves. Of those who rejected the proposal, 44% said they did not know why they had done so, with a few more saying things that sounded like "I do not know". That is set out in the small print.
When we asked voters who had supported the proposal whether they could recall the arguments for a "Yes" vote, 42% could not. In response to the same question, 47% of those who had voted "No" gave the same reply. Half of "Yes" voters could not recall the arguments for a "No" vote; 42% of voters who had rejected the proposal gave the same response. Asked whether they could recall who had argued for a "Yes" vote, 50% did not know.
On the question of which parties had supported the proposal, a significant number of respondents identified the Fine Gael Party, with a smaller number citing the Labour Party. This seems sensible enough, given that they are the parties of government. However, some 50% of respondents could not answer. To the question of whether they could recall who had called for the referendum to be rejected, 57% could not think of anybody. When it came to the political parties, a modest number named the Sinn Féin Party as one which had called for a "No" vote, which was probably a reasonable guess.
What does all of this add up to? When asked a relatively short time later for any information on the referendum campaign, a substantial proportion - bear in mind that these are people who said they had actually voted - could not remember or did not know what the arguments had been for voting "Yes" or "No" or who had made them. That is an indictment of the way in which the referendum was run and an indictment more generally of how any referendum is run.
When it comes to trust in sources of information, we asked people to indicate their level of trust on a five point scale, from one to five. The slide shows the numbers who had a high degree of trust in the various groups offering them information. Members will probably not be surprised to see that politicians do not score very highly, at 9%.