I move:—
That Seanad Eireann is of opinion that Emergency Powers (No. 98) Order, 1941 (Compensation) Scheme, 1941, dated 17th September, 1941, should be revoked.
I put down this motion, not because I object to the compensation for personal injury but because it is the only course in order to have the matter discussed. It will be in the recollection of members of the House that the question of damage to property by bombs or other kind of war action, whether accidental or otherwise, was dealt with in a Bill and was discussed here in what turned out to be a very fruitful and, on the whole, a satisfactory manner. No doubt for good reasons, the Minister chose to provide for compensation for personal injury, not by way of an Act of Parliament but by way of a Statutory Rule and Order under the Emergency Powers Act passed at the beginning of this war. The difficulty of procedure by order is that the Minister is never called upon to explain the order in detail and we are in a different position from the one we occupy in dealing with a Bill, as a member of the House has to initiate the discussion and give his own rendering—which may not be correct—of the meaning of various parts of the order. I want to deal with the order with regard to its principles; I want also to deal with certain specific points in the order; and I want to argue that the order needs very drastic amendment, and that in some particulars it could be amended without any extra outlay to the State.
The order deals with civilian casualties only and expressly excludes members of the Defence Forces, Gárda, the Local Defence Force and the Local Security Force or A.R.P. Services. While I am on that point, I might ask the Minister to tell us when it will be possible to know what precise provision is being made for members of the Local Defence Force and Local Security Force who are injured while on duty. I have not been able to find any order at home dealing with these matters. I believe I am right in saying that the general principle on which this order is based is that compensation is to be paid only for injury and dependency: no compensation is granted under these provisions for what one might call sentimental loss. Perhaps we cannot disagree with that. The general principle of the order is that it recognises the necessity for compensation by the State for dependants of persons fatally injured and makes provision for persons either injured totally or to a degree.
Another very important principle that goes with that is contained at the end of the Order in Rule 36, which states:
"Where compensation might be granted under this scheme, the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, either make or refuse to make such grants."
It should be understood, therefore, that any person who is injured by bombs dropped deliberately or by accident in this country or by any form of war action in this country has no legal right whatever to compensation under this order. The grants contemplated, although they are set out in detail, are entirely ex gratia. The Minister reserves to himself—why he does it I cannot quite understand—the right to refuse to compensate. It seems extraordinary that, under the Damage to Property Act, it is provided specifically that a person whose property is injured can go to the courts, while a widow whose husband has been killed by a bomb dropped from an aeroplane has no right to go to the courts at all. She makes application to the Minister and, under Rule 36, which I have read, the Minister may, it would appear, entirely refuse to grant compensation.
The order deals with two distinct things—with disablement and fatal injury. In regard to disablement, it provides that a maximum figure of 30/- a week is payable. That figure applies to a single man, and to a married man no matter how many dependents he may have. Therefore, the maximum figure obtainable by a married man totally disabled, with a wife and five or six or even ten children, is 30/- a week. Not only is that the maximum he can get from the State, but elaborate precautions are taken in this order to ensure that he can get nothing else either from his employer or any form of local or public funds. I will deal with that later. I do not understand by what process the Minister arrives at the conclusion that an employer should not be allowed to supplement the very meagre State grant in this case. So much for disablement. With regard to compensation for fatal injury, the maximum sum that goes to the dependents, the wife and children, is £600. It may be considerably less, but that is the maximum contemplated by the order, less any sums which may at the date of death be due to the State and less any sums granted ex gratia by an employer.
The Minister will agree that these terms are not generous. I do not think they are just or well thought out. The order contemplates a flat rate of compensation and ignores all differences of earning power. It is quite unlike the Acts which regulate compensation for civil injury—for example, in the case of a person run down by a motor car. In that case there are what are called Lord Campbell's Acts, where compensation is based upon the loss occasioned by the death or injury of the person concerned in the accident.
This order contemplates a flat rate —the same compensation, and very meagre compensation—for everybody independent of overhead expenses, independent of commitments, independent of his children's prospects before he was killed. It is based upon the Workmen's Compensation Acts. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 was, of course, a substantial change in English law. It has been amended since—I think we had an amendment here in 1932—and the figure of 30/- a week for the person totally disabled is, I think, taken from that. But the Workmen's Compensation Acts are now recognised as inadequate and anomalous. Frequently attention is drawn in the courts by the judges to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Acts which make it difficult to arrange the compensation on a rational or equitable basis.
In olden times the doctrine of common employment—as lawyers call it—obtained; that is to say, if I were injured by a person in the same employment, the employer had no liability whatever. In fact, the view taken of a workman was that, if he were injured, fatally or otherwise, that was too bad; but no liability fell on the employer, and the widow or crippled man was left to the workhouse or the charity of his fellows. The Workmen's Compensation Act is an improvement —but not a very substantial improvement. I think everybody recognises that, even to deal with the things for which it was intended, it needs substantial amendment. I want to suggest that the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Act rules and sums for these particular persons is what I might call a lazy solution of this matter. It was there to hand and was accepted, taken and put in.
There is no analogy whatever between a person injured by a war machine and one injured in employment. The employer is one individual or a firm, responsible only for a limited number of people. There is no analogy at all between the liability of the State for its citizens and the liability of an employer for his employees. It is a handy scheme for the Minister to adopt, but it is quite inequitable and unsuitable. I suggest that the war has made many changes and has made people change their ideas in regard to various matters. In the present circumstances, it would have been much more enterprising and much more just to devise a scheme to deal with this kind of personal damage. I might recall to the Minister's mind, en passant, that after 1916, when funds were collected to compensate widows and men who had suffered imprisonment or wounds, both the National Aid Fund and the White Cross Fund made a distinction between persons from the point of view of their earning powers. Similar minimum regulations for compensation for wounds pensions recognise differences between officers and men.
I understand that British Army allowances, since conscription, have different scales for different persons, according to their overhead costs, their educational commitments for their children and so on. So much for the principle. I see no analogy whatever between the Workmen's Compensation Act, which is applied in this case, and the situation which the order is intended to meet. I think that the principle is thoroughly bad and that we need a different one. If we are to have a different one, I suggest that it should be based on Lord Campbell's Act, that earning capacity should be recognised to some extent and that compensation should bear some relation to the actual loss.
Since I shall have no other opportunity of doing so, may I put to the Minister some detailed points with reference to this matter? Section 8 of the order sets out the rate of compensation for disablement. It appears that, in the case of a non-earner aged 18 years or over, the total amount of compensation is to be 18/-. I wonder if that puts the non-earning widow and the earning widow in completely different positions. It seems to me that it does. Eighteen shillings is the maximum that can be got and one cannot claim from any other source. The non-earning widow is at present receiving 10/- widow's pension. If, unfortunately, she is totally disabled, the amount rises to 18/- under this order and her children's allowances continue, as before, under the Widows' Pension Acts. On the other hand, if a widow who happens to be an earner —a school teacher whose husband is dead and who is supporting a family; a doctor or a nurse—is totally disabled, her income drops to 30/-, no matter what it was before, no matter how many children she has and no matter what her liabilities may be. That seems to me to be unfair.
Section 9 (2) of this order provides that when a person is granted compensation, after the qualifying injury, he cannot receive any other pay, pension, or allowance from unemployment assistance or otherwise or any sum paid by his employer which would bring him to a higher figure than the figure contemplated by this order. I fail completely to understand why that should be so. Why should an employer be prevented from recognising the good services of an employee who may have been a long time in his service? As I understand this order, the employee of a firm like Guinness could not get any compensation from the firm which would bring him to a figure greater than that contemplated by this order nor could his widow receive such compensation or pension, if he were to die. It is characteristic of the Department of Finance, if I may say so from long acquaintance, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is adopted in its entirety when it is against the interests of the claimant, but is not so adopted when it favours him. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act a man can get compensation and can also receive any amount which his employer may choose to give him.
Under this order, a man cannot get anything extra without having that money taken out of the State grant. The State considers the amount given and the State benefits accordingly. Of course, that can be evaded and avoided, but it cannot be evaded or avoided by big firms such as Guinness, to which I have referred. I do not understand why the word employer is put in there. I could understand the Minister saying that, after all, compensation from State funds comes from the same source, and that, therefore, the total amount to be got from local and State funds should be so and so. That is arguable. One might say that the amount was small, but the principle would be sound. But why an employer who wants to recognise an employee's service should be prevented from doing so, as he is under this section, I cannot understand.
Section 10 of the order deals with payment of medical fees. It has one very peculiar repercussion which I do not think has been provided for. Section 10 provides that the Minister may, out of the compensation paid, make a payment of £25 to a medical practitioner or hospital, or, presumably, divide it between them. But take the case of a child under 14 years of age. In the case of a child under 14 years who is injured, no compensation becomes payable until the child attains its 14th birthday. That is an extraordinary provision. How is a child of eight who is injured to be maintained between eight years and 14 years? If, as we must unfortunately contemplate, the child is in need of medical and surgical attention, how is that attention to be paid for eight, six, five or two years? The maximum figure appears to be £25. I do not know if the Minister can enlighten us and say that the matter has been seen to and that this is his real decision. I doubt very much if that decision would have been reached if the situation, as I put it, had been adverted to.
With regard to Part 3 of the order, which deals with compensation in fatal cases, it is contemplated that members of the family may be dependants. There is one notable exception to members of the family which, I think, is included in other cases, the adopted child. No provision is made here for the adopted child. I think such provision should be made. When the point is made to the Minister he will, probably, agree because everybody knows cases of people who have adopted a child legally.