I move:—
That the Government be requested to appoint a commission to inquire into and make recommendations as to what steps are desirable to increase the usefulness of the Civil Service to the community as a whole; that, in the opinion of the Seanad, the terms of reference to the commission should include inquiry into the methods of recruitment and promotion in the Civil Service, and the relations of that Service with outside organisations, especially those which deal with production or distribution.
The Civil Service is the administrative machinery of Government. Without an efficient, well-managed and loyal Civil Service no Government however good can carry out its policy nor indeed can it obtain the reliable information which is essential for the formulation of an effective legislative or administrative programme. If the Civil Service is inefficient or if it is hampered in its work by unsuitable or antiquated methods, no Government can be a good Government no matter how beneficent its intentions. In a democratic country the people govern themselves through a Parliament elected by them and an Executive Government responsible to it. In order to secure this measure of democratic control general elections are held periodically, and in normal times not more than five years can elapse without an election. (It is not intended to refer to the present subject of an election.)
If in a democracy such care is taken to see that the Government is subject to the wishes of the people and if, as I have said, the Government depends on the Civil Service, it should not be difficult to prove that similar care should be taken to see that the machinery of administration through which a Government functions should be subject to periodic revision in order to keep it responsive to changes and growths in the duties and functions which it has to perform. If it is important that this country should have the best possible Government and that each Ministry should be filled by the most suitable men available for the position, it is equally important that, not only the Civil Service as a whole, but each separate Department should be equal to its task and kept at the highest level of efficiency.
There is, therefore, a prima facie case for an examination into and revision of the Civil Service and its methods at least every eight or ten years.
The last Civil Service Commission was appointed in 1932. It presented an interim report to the Minister for Finance in February, 1934, and its final report is dated November, 1935. The work now required from civil servants in many Departments is very different from that required in 1934, and an inquiry held now would have many additional and different problems to consider.
Briefly stated, the reasons why I believe that a public inquiry should be held at an early date are as follows:—
(1) During the last decade there has been a very substantial increase in legislation by Government Order. This increase has been much accelerated by the emergency, but the annual growth in the number of Executive Orders was marked even before the outbreak of war. This means that a large proportion of the laws of this country are not discussed in Parliament until after they have come into operation and many of them are never discussed at all. Errors, therefore, cannot be rectified until some harm is done. This has added greatly to the responsibility of civil servants, whose general training has been to avoid individual responsibility.
(2) The emergency has led to a substantial increase in State interference both in production and distribution and the responsibility for many essential services and supplies which formerly rested largely on private enterprise now rests on the Government. Whether or not this was inevitable or desirable I do not now propose to discuss. That it is a fact will not be disputed. As a result civil servants have not infrequently to undertake tasks of a highly important and often technical nature for which their normal training has not fitted them and which were never thought of when the normal Civil Service machinery was designed.
(3) No one can foreshadow post-war developments with any degree of certainty but it is reasonably safe to say that everything seems to point to a continuance of State interference in industry both on its productive and distributive sides for a very considerable time to come. All the indications would seem to point to a period after the war during which all the essential commodities in the world may be under international control and trade and commerce be dependent to a great extent on inter-State negotiation and international co-operation. Under such conditions duties might conceivably be placed on our Civil Service which under present conditions and with its present personnel it would not be able to perform with the necessary knowledge and efficiency.
In my opinion, the welfare of this country for a generation or two may well depend on its capacity to mobilise, in the period after the war, the best brains and the most experienced persons which it possesses. It is not slighting the Civil Service to say that all the brain power and experience which we possess is not within its borders.
For these reasons I believe the reorganisation of some parts of our Civil Service, and particularly its relations with outside organisations, to be an urgent problem which cannot be shelved without serious consequences.
Before endeavouring to give my reasons in greater detail I would like to clear away all possibility of misunderstanding in one important respect.
I am not making an attack on civil servants as such. I have no sympathy with the irresponsible and casual attacks on the Civil Service which are whispered from time to time. State interference in trade, even if no errors are made, is bound to cause trouble and aggravation to individuals with consequent resentment, with the result that some people are inclined to blame the Civil Service for what after all is only the carrying out of Government policy.
I believe that the standards of loyalty, integrity and academic efficiency of our civil servants are as high as in any country in the world. Within the limited functions which the Service was devised to perform I believe the standard is very high. Like every other organisation of human beings, it has its misfits—I could without difficulty name a few individuals who seem to me to be in jobs which are too big for them—but my experience of our Civil Service during the last 20 years has impressed me not with the number of unsuitable or incompetent persons which it contains, but rather with the very large number of able, efficient, and conscientious persons to be found in it.
People who sneer at the Civil Service "mind" neither understand the calibre of the men who enter the service nor the excellent qualities which they so often display in it. It is not uncommon to hear the Civil Service spoken of in a contemptuous way, and I feel that there is a danger that a general hostility to it on the part of the public may grow up which could have nothing but ill results.
The inquiry which I would like to see made would therefore not be into the faults of civil servants, but rather into the use we make of them—the responsibilities we have placed upon them and the machinery under which we expect them to work. Such an inquiry should help to restore confidence, not to lessen it.
The reports of the commission appointed in 1932, presided over by Mr. Joseph Brennan, are interesting and instructive documents which have not received the attention which they deserve. This commission did not, however, deal with most of the problems which I now consider urgent, though of course the report of the commission may have indirect bearing on them. It could not have done so for two reasons —firstly—because many of the problems either did not exist at the time or had not become acute or of general public interest; and, secondly, because these problems could not have been dealt with without evidence from trade and industry and from the general public which was not offered to the commission. The report draws special attention to the fact that the commission endeavoured to obtain evidence from the general public but such evidence was not offered. The reason for this is, probably, that the general public had not at the time even dreamed of the extent to which State interference would develop in a short time and the extent to which the work of the Civil Service would directly affect the ordinary life of the people of the country and also its trade and industry.
The Brennan Report, therefore, deals mainly with what for the want of a better phrase I will call internal problems of the Civil Service and is based on evidence supplied from within the service itself. I do not think that a new commission is required to deal with these subjects, though, no doubt, if a commission is set up it may have to spend some of its time on internal problems which may have arisen in recent years. Its main problem would be to consider what changes are possible and desirable in the Civil Service to make it a more effective instrument to deal with modern State requirements in this country.
This involves consideration as to whether our Civil Service, which, in the words of the Brennan Report, is "in a highly organised condition which has been developed gradually from one stage to another over a long period of time in the light of lessons derived from practical experience", can suddenly and quickly adapt itself from within to meet entirely new circumstances where the whole economic life is likely to be subject to State control instead of dependent on private enterprise. Except for such changes as have taken place during the past 20 years, and these have not been very extensive as far as I know, the gradual development referred to by the Brennan Commission took place in a service designed for a highly industrial country of 48,000,000 with an empire of over 500,000,000. A State of 3,000,000 largely agricultural may well find that the "light of lessons derived from practical experience" is not the light most suitable to guide it during the critical years after the war. If this country is to hold its own in the post-war world it will have to depend on its ability to co-operate with and gain the friendship of other nations without sacrificing its own national characteristics and ideals. This will require enterprise, initiative, constructive ability and capacity to act promptly when necessary.
My general criticism of our Civil Service in action is its delay, its lack of initiative and enterprise and its inefficiency as an organisation, which I regard as distinct from the individual efficiency of its members.
These faults are, I believe, inherent in the system and will never be remedied by reform from within.
Individual enterprise and initiative in the business world usually lead to promotion. Not so in the Civil Service where the man who plays for safety and keeps strictly to the rules is far more likely to be promoted than the man who is willing to take risks in dealing with an urgent problem. Under the selection board system promotion is granted on general efficiency in carrying out service rules and length of service, and not in direct relation to any specialist qualification which may be required for the particular vacancy. Promotion by "merit" means "merit" according to Civil Service standards.
Business men often complain that as soon as an official has become fully conversant with the problem with which he has to deal, they find that he has been removed to another section of the Department, and that a new official has taken his place. Presumably this is one of the results of the present promotion system. This is a definite discouragement of specialisation and, therefore, leads to inefficiency. If the State is to control production or distribution in any industry it should be possible for an officer to gain experience in dealing with any one problem and in time become as efficient and experienced as any man engaged in private enterprise. To ensure this it should be possible for a specialist to rise to high rank in the service without ceasing to specialise, instead of as at present, when success in one direction will often lead to a change to another sphere in which the official has no specialised knowledge. It is possible, of course, that sometimes this tendency for change may be due to a jealous disposition on the part of a superior officer who does not like to see a junior officer getting too much specialist knowledge and experience which he himself does not possess.
It is difficult for an outsider to judge fairly what occurs inside the service as high civil servants are properly very reluctant to talk even about their grievances. My own experience in interviewing officers on many varying matters leads me to believe that a grave defect in the Civil Service is the frequent failure of the higher grades to give clear directions from above and then leave it to the lower grades to carry these out with despatch and promptitude. All kinds of matters even of minor importance have to be submitted for authority or approval with delays which make for inefficiency and which invariably aggravate the public. This may, of course, not be always due to the system but to a misplaced sense of dignity or prestige on the part of the higher official. The most successful business managers are those who can develop responsibility and initiative in those under them by a judicious delegation of authority while at the same time retaining essential control. While I do not suggest that business methods would in every case be suitable for adoption in the Civil Service I am of the opinion that the qualities required in a successful manager are very much akin to those required by men in the administrative grades in the Civil Service. If a junior official finds from experience that everything he puts up to a particular senior will be invariably altered or rejected, he soon loses all originality and plays for safety every time. The fact that promotion in the higher grades is largely based on reports of superior officers in rank creates a tendency to imitate the style of working and a moulding of ideas and mentality to those of the superior officer. This can only lead to mediocrity of outlook and is a definite barrier to reform and progress.
One important cause of delay and lack of individual responsibility and enterprise in the Civil Service is the system of "files." When a memorandum or letter reaches a Department it goes first to the central registry. The clerk who opens it decides to what division of the Department it should be sent and he is supposed also to go to the files to see if there are any relevant papers which he should attach to it. The document then commences its journey through the Department. Its journey will give in most cases plenty of visible evidence of detailed work by officials but it does not lead to prompt decisions.
Generally the official will avoid giving an answer if it can be passed on to some other section. He usually adds his memorandum and passes on the file. Unless an official can find an absolutely foolproof and cast-iron precedent he will play for safety and pass it on to a senior who often has less actual knowledge of the matter than the junior. Instead of investigation by 'phone or oral inquiries to enable prompt action, the file is transferred from one official to another with observations, opinions or comments. This system may have merits when permanent legislation is under consideration and when delays are meritorious rather than dangerous. This is not so where matters affecting trade or commerce are concerned, and the system of "files" may well be one of the causes for the dissatisfaction which exists at the present time. I do not, of course, suggest that an efficient filing system is not of first-class importance, but I do believe that the present system of "files" should be carefully examined in the interests of efficiency and prompt action.
I do not think that all our senior civil servants appreciate how serious delay may often be under present conditions. Everyone engaged in business knows that with the present shortage of supplies promptitude in decision is essential. Failure to act promptly means loss of supplies in nine cases out of ten.
If in the post-war period—to use the words of the Taoiseach—"State control and State intervention will tend to remain and to entrench itself in many spheres where formerly private enterprise alone held the field," it will be essential that some method be found to avoid the delays which seem inevitable under our present Civil Service system. The quotation from the Taoiseach ends at the word "field", although I read it as if he made the last remark, which was, of course, my own. This might well be one of the most important matters to be considered by a commission.
In order to make clear the harm that can be done by delay I will give one illustration. A quantity of raw material of which there is a serious shortage in this country became available in New York and a list of the stock was obtained by the Irish Consul there, dated 31st July. It was conveyed to this country through the Departmental machinery and did not reach the groups of Irish manufacturers who required the material until October 13th. I have no idea how many files it went through in its journey or how many memorandums were written on it.
Once it reached the Irish manufacturers concerned there was no delay. Consultation took place by telephone between the principal firms concerned and a cable was sent within six hours. As was to be expected the largest and most valuable part of the stock had been disposed of before the cable from the Irish manufacturers was received.
Another kindred matter that requires investigation is the Civil Service habit of requiring "forms" to be filled in for every conceivable purpose. If statistics were available showing the time spent and the paper used in the filling of forms during the last ten years which could have been dispensed with or which served no really useful purpose, I think everyone in this country would be astonished.
It must be recognised that State control and State planning are impossible without information. To obtain that information some forms are essential. The complaint against the Civil Service is not that it makes use of forms but that many of its forms are unnecessary and a large proportion of them incomprehensible. Even those who fill them in do not always understand them with the result that the information conveyed is neither reliable nor accurate. Forms are waste of time unless they convey accurate information to those who are to use them. This means that the phraseology used by the person who prepared the form must be understood by the person who is to complete it.
The preparation of a form is a highly technical matter and the man who prepares a form should have expert knowledge of the subject. He must know the mentality and phraseology of those who are to complete the forms. If, for instance, the forms are intended to enable a Department to control production or distribution in any industry the forms should be prepared by a person fully conversant not only with the problem but also with the usual practice in that industry. Simplicity of language and directness are essential in any well designed form.
I do not want to be uncomplimentary in any way to the Civil Service, but I do not think that amongst their many virtues, either simplicity of language or directness, are those for which they are most noted—certainly not in their letters or documents.
I am inclined to think that the reason why so many of the forms sent out by the Civil Service are either obscure or meaningless to the general public is that neither in their upbringing, their training nor in their daily work are civil servants brought into direct contact with the people for whom the forms are intended. Civil servants, to some extent, live and work in a world of their own apart from normal life. Their outlook is inclined to be city and suburban and too often their attitude is one of being on guard against the public rather than of co-operation with the public. Even if forms are well designed and accurately filled in, they have their limitations in practice. It is rarely possible to get an adequate view of a problem simply by studying statistics. This is particularly true where the individual studying the forms has no practical experience. It will never be possible for even the most efficient civil servant to plan the satisfactory control of production or of distribution in any industry simply by an examination of forms submitted to him. Some method should be found for close and continuous co-operation with persons with practical experience if State control is to meet with any real success.
This brings me to another important matter which I feel requires careful consideration by a commission. The resolution refers to the relations of the Civil Service with outside organisations. Trade and industry, both on their productive and distributive sides, are being organised to an increasing extent and most classes of manufacturers are now working together in associations of their own, or in groups within the Federation of Irish Manufacturers. If State control and interference with industry is to increase, it is of the utmost importance that some satisfactory method should be found by which close and effective co-operation can take place between representatives of industry and the Civil Service. The Minister for Industry and Commerce told the Federation of Irish Manufacturers that it was important to have an industrial organisation capable of providing sound technical advice to the Government. I fully agree, but I suggest that it is equally important to find really satisfactory methods of conveying that advice, and to include in the Civil Service a number of persons with the expert knowledge necessary to make the best use in the national interest of that advice.
One of the most urgent problems for consideration by a commission would be the place of the technically efficient person in the Civil Service. There is a very widespread feeling that during the emergency caused by the war, we have failed to find methods by which the State could make really effective use of the most experienced men in industry in the vital matter of securing essential supplies. Instead of close co-operation between trade and industry and the Department of Supplies there has been too often a kind of vague hostility. Instead of businessmen generally feeling that the Department was there to help them in vital problems of supply, and the Department feeling that the leaders of the business community were ready (as I know many of them were) to sacrifice personal interests during the emergency for the common good, there has been a feeling of mistrust. This is not the time to discuss the reasons for this in the past, but in my opinion there is blame on both sides. The duty of a commission would be, not to hold a post mortem, but to suggest a remedy.
The system of advisory committees to answer questions put to them by the Department and to consult on matters placed before them whenever summoned by the Department has proved a failure, and in any case the underlying principle is, in my opinion, all wrong. These committees were usually called only after the Minister had decided to act instead of being brought together to face a problem and advise the Minister in the national interest after all the available information had been examined and considered, and with a full sense of responsibility as experienced citizens of the State.
As a result these consultative committees sometimes went to the Department with the object of protecting themselves against inexpert and ill-considered interference, and the views they expressed were too often those of individuals thinking alone with a greater or less degree of self-interest and wishful thinking. The fact that on the one hand the committees rarely had confidence in the ability of the Department to act wisely and the fact, on the other hand, that the officials felt that they were faced with selfish and conflicting interests, sometimes led to extreme caution and delay, with the result that action was not taken as soon as it should have been. It also resulted in some cases in the Minister interfering in matters where better results could have been obtained by leaving it to the trades concerned to carry out negotiations subject only to very general supervision by the Minister.
If, instead of these consultative committees, definite boards or councils had been set up whose members were charged with the responsibility and with the duty of proposing a plan to the Minister under their own names with, of course, the secretarial and administrative assistance of the Civil Service, I believe the results would have been much better. Such boards might have had general supervision of the carrying out of plans proposed by them if such plans had the approval of the Minister. When businessmen are called in for consultation, and when they feel that whatever they may say is open to suspicion and that their advice or representations will be conveyed to the Minister by a civil servant who knows much less about the problem than they do, it does not make for good results and their sense of personal responsibility is lessened.
Where trade bargaining and arrangements with other countries are concerned the system of consultation by officials who are to carry out the negotiations has also been a failure. One of the greatest factors in obtaining supplies, i.e., the desire of traders outside this country to maintain their close and friendly trade relations with traders in this country, is lost if the negotiations are carried on by civil servants alone.
Recently a number of businessmen were invited by the Minister for Supplies to accompany civil servants to a conference in England at which supply problems in which they were vitally concerned would be discussed. When they reached England the businessmen found that they were only regarded as advisers and would not be allowed to be present at the more important meetings. The result was that nobody was satisfied and arrangements were made that since then have had to be revised. This to my mind is a good instance of how not to co-operate and a very unsatisfactory way of using expert knowledge and experience.
The problem of the technical advice which must be obtained by the Civil Service from time to time, whether from experts inside the Service or outside it, is a very difficult one. The present system is most unsatisfactory. The training of the Civil Service produces a tendency to minimise the value of technical experience and there is sometimes an inclination to treat expert opinion somewhat lightly.
The successful businessman knows the importance of technical advice, but he also knows its limitations and how to use it in the most practical way.
Normally, if a Minister needs technical advice, he goes to the administrative class, in which the expert has no place. The request for advice will be passed down until someone, probably a junior or assistant principal, goes to an expert, whether inside or outside the service, for an opinion. The expert will probably submit a memorandum, which may be re-written or commented upon by everyone concerned except the expert, before it reaches the Minister, who may make a decision without personally seeing the expert at any time. At each revision the expert's memorandum becomes less and less expert, because the officials who revise it are further and further removed from the actual realities of the problem. Surely it must be admitted that this system is inherently a bad one.
One difficulty in the present system of advisory committees which are consulted by civil servants is that, in many matters, it is only a technical or experienced mind that can really appreciate advice or representations from industrial representatives. If such advice can only reach the Minister through officers of the executive or administrative grades, it is almost certain that a number of errors will be made from time to time.
An inquiry into the Civil Service should, I feel, include an examination into the system of Parliamentary Questions and their effect on the efficiency of the Civil Service. Personally, I am convinced that, from the public point of view, the system of Parliamentary Questions has considerable value, and I would be very sorry indeed to see it completely abandoned. I am not sure, however, that it has not a rather unsatisfactory effect on Civil Service routine, which might be remedied, after careful consideration of the whole problem.
The fact that a Question may be asked about even the smallest detail reacts on the Civil Service in two ways. Firstly, the Minister, or the Secretary of the Department, will see that little, if anything, is done without his knowledge or sanction, and this results in an elaborate system of minutes, reports, submissions and Departmental conferences, which mean delay and a considerable amount of unnecessary work and effort on the part of officials. The effect on the officials is to cause them to be ultra-cautious in everything they do, knowing that any slip, however unimportant, if disclosed to the public, may be the cause of admonition and possibly loss of promotion. The result is that a decision which should take a matter of hours is often delayed for days or weeks, and every aspect is committed to paper and examined while all the possible reactions are considered carefully. Everything has to be set out, condensed, annotated and explained, so as to be easily assimilated by the Minister, who may have to reply to Supplementary Questions in the House.
It is inevitable that, even in the best managed concern errors will be made. Businessmen know that, when an error has been made, the wisest thing is to admit the error frankly and apologise, while taking every possible step to rectify it. This, in business, generally leads to making a permanent customer or client. Departments of the Civil Service rarely admit an error, and I have often wondered whether it is not regarded as a principle of some Departments that a fault should not be admitted in public. There is, therefore, a danger that the fact that Parliamentary publicity may be given to what was, after all, a minor error of judgment has the effect of producing ultra-caution and lack of initiative on the part of officials, which is not really in the public interests.
It would tax the patience of the House if I were to refer to all the various matters which might properly be considered by a commission. I have endeavoured to indicate in a general way what I consider urgent problems, the consideration of which is necessitated by the increase in State interference in trade and industry. It is obvious that these problems do not arise equally in all parts of the service and some of the criticisms I have made may apply to some Departments and not to others. It is also certain that some Departments are likely to play a more important part in future development than others. I have dealt mainly with trade and industry, because I know most about it, but I do not suggest for one moment that the scope of a commission should be confined to this aspect of the problem. I have not dealt with the problem of the steady increase in the size and cost of the Civil Service, which is a matter that must be faced some of these days. Personally, I do not see any way of preventing a further increase, except by introducing new methods and closer co-operation with outside organisations, where the State is assuming a right of interference and control.
Also, I have avoided dealing with the question of the increased power now being vested in civil servants. That is the fault of the Oireachtas and not of the Civil Service. The increase in bureaucracy in professedly democratic States is causing serious concern in many countries and might well be a desirable subject for a separate debate in the House. I am not discussing the power Parliament chooses to give to civil servants, but rather the question of their fitness for it and how they should use it.
As I have already pointed out, our Civil Service is largely based on that in Great Britain. It is significant that since 1922, there have been several inquiries into the subject in that country, but I do not think that much change took place until after the outbreak of war in 1939. It was only after the outbreak of war that the British Treasury showed any signs of recognising that the organisation of the administrative machinery of government was a subject requiring expert and specialised study. It was not until 1941 that the British Treasury developed its investigation section into an Organisation and Methods Division, which was available to help Departments of State in improving their organisation. It is interesting and significant to note that, this year, the British Government created an advisory panel of three experienced business men, acting on a part-time basis, in order to supervise the work of the Organisation and Methods Division.
The House of Commons Select Committee on National Expenditure, which has been examining the administrative machinery of Government, has presented a report dealing with the organisation and control of the Civil Service. I have not seen the report but only a résumé as published in the London Times, from which I gather that the Committee said that recommendations for improving the efficiency of the Civil Service in Great Britain have frequently been shelved during the past 25 years and that continuous and authoritative stimulus is required if effect in the spirit as well as in the letter is to be given to needed changes. It makes the very interesting and important recommendation that the House of Commons should set up a Select Committee, to be appointed each session, to conduct, on behalf of the House of Commons, a continuing review of the machinery of Government. It seems to me that much could be said for the appointment of a similar Committee of the Dáil or of both Houses. Anything which would add to the general confidence in the Civil Service and in its relations to the Oireachtas would be a step in the right direction.
Generally speaking, I doubt if Reports of British Committees will be of much value to us here. Our problems may have a certain similarity to those to be faced in other countries, but we must face them ourselves and solve them according to our own needs. If there is dissatisfaction, it is we who must deal with it. If there is inefficiency, it is we who will pay for it.
Before I close I would like to say a word with reference to the type of commission I would like to see appointed. It should be small, not more than ten, and its chairman should be a man of independent position and experience who is not a civil servant. It should include one or two men, if possible, with actual experience in the management of large businesses involving the employment of large staffs. It should not have more than two civil servants, and should rely on evidence from the Civil Service for its information on existing methods and organisation rather than from its own members.
Fortunately the Civil Service is not, and I hope never will be, a Party question in this country. This motion should not, therefore, be discussed on Party lines. I think I have shown the House that there is a problem, and that it is an urgent one. Normally I am not an enthusiast for the appointment of commissions, but in the case of a non-Party national question such as this I do not know of any better method of approaching it than by a small commission with adequate powers and with instructions to report as soon as possible.
