I would go further and say that a Senator is rendering service to the nation not only when he is in the House or in the precincts of the House, but also when he is, perhaps, serving the State on commissions of various kinds in respect of which he receives no emoluments whatever, and even by the general public activities which he exercises both in a private capacity and in his capacity as a Senator. For example, soon after I became a member of this House in 1938 an opportunity was presented to me of going to Montreal to attend a conference of agricultural economists. My attendance there cost me, personally, about £20 or £30. I accepted the invitation because I felt it to be part of my public duty to do so. I probably would not have got the invitation and would not have gone there if I had not been a member of this House. I consider that the work I did by going to Montreal to attend that conference was a genuine part of my work, and of my obligations, as a Senator. You cannot draw the line anywhere and say that the service of a Senator begins and ends at a certain point—that he should be paid so much for that and nothing for anything else.
Another question then arises, and that is should Senators be paid in proportion to the financial value of the contributions which they make to the service of the State? It might be argued by certain Senators that the ideas which they recommend and the policies which they advocate are so terrifically important not only to the Government but to the nation that if adopted they would result in adding millions of pounds to the total national income. In such an event Senators might be able to build up a case on some sort of marginal productivity theory that they ought to get a substantial rake-off from the added national wealth which resulted from their wit and wisdom. I mention that, not by way of a serious contribution to the debate, but merely to indicate how difficult and impossible it would be to calculate the rates of payment for Senators on these lines. After all, how would you estimate the additional contribution to the nation's wealth resulting from the wisdom of any particular Senator? Would any tribunal be regarded as sufficiently competent and impartial to arrive at a fair determination of that important matter; I think it is true to say you would get nowhere by adopting that particular method.
Yet, I think the remuneration of Senators must be regarded in some sense as payment for the expert services which they render to the nation in their public capacity, and must be justified, if at all, only on the grounds that unless that payment is forthcoming the services in question would not be available at all, or at any rate would not be available to an adequate extent. Payment then is a condition, a sine qua non, of rendering certain services which are regarded as valuable and important to the nation, but is it possible, by any objective method, to say what the financial value of these services is?
Then, of course, not all members of the House are in the full vigour of life. Some of us may have rendered valuable services to the nation in the past, but may not now any longer be able to render such services, so that in their case payment must be regarded as an honourable tribute paid by the nation in recognition of past services and quite regardless of any services which they are capable of rendering at the present moment. I think that is a principle of payment which is honourable alike to the donors and to the recipients and ought to be so regarded. In most cases, the payment is a necessary condition to make possible the rendering of certain types of services to the nation. It must be regarded as compensation for the individuals rendering those services and for the incidental sacrifice of leisure and of other possible sources of income which they incur, as well as to enable them to keep up a certain position of dignity. It is right that they should be put in a position to maintain that position of dignity, because they are in a true sense the representatives of the nation. No doubt, the principal representative of the nation is the President, but every member of the Oireachtas is, in some sense also, a representative of the nation, differing from the position of the President only in degree and not in kind. Therefore, the same argument that justifies a liberal payment to the President of the nation justifies some payment to members of the Oireachtas to enable them to behave worthily as public representatives of the national life.
From that point of view, payment should be regarded as equally honourable to those who give and to those who receive, and should not be a matter for spiteful criticism. That brings us to the real difficulty—how great should be the remuneration of Senators? Here we must face the fact that, whatever level of payment is fixed, it must be the same for all Senators. You cannot pay one man £500 a year, another man £300 and yet another £100. Yet that same principle of equality of monetary remuneration under the present system certainly involves serious inequality of real reward, for the circumstances of Senators differ considerably with regard to their various other sources of income. What might be a matter of comparative indifference to one Senator, already a well-to-do person, might be the sole means of living of another Senator who happens to be less well-to-do, so that the same monetary payment is not consistent with the same reality of real reward.
If you fix the rate of remuneration of Senators on too low a level, then you rule out from the possibility of serving in this House all that element in the population who are unable, owing to private circumstances, to play a part in the life of the House because the rate of remuneration would in that case be too little for them—they would sacrifice too much and simply could not afford it—and you will rule out many persons who might be able to render valuable service in the Seanad and might be truly representative of important vocational interests. On the other hand, if you fix the rate of payment on too high a level, you run the risk of encouraging a mercenary spirit on the part of would-be candidates for membership of this House, and, perhaps, attracting people to seek membership of this House whose real object is not public service but the acquisition of money by what looks like being an easy job.
That risk is one, I think, which we run in any event even on the present rate of payment and the true remedy for it is not in the hands of the Government, but in the hands of the electorate. It is the duty of the electorate to estimate as closely as they can the private motives and personal character of the various people who seek their suffrages, and if they think candidate A is primarily "on the make" and not out to render disinterested public service, then it is their duty to refuse to vote for him and to vote for some other more worthy candidate. That, I think, is the only remedy for that particular problem.
It has been said that by fixing too high a rate of remuneration we run the risk of professionalising the business of politics both in the Dáil and in the Seanad. I would hate to do anything which would bring that honourable word "professional" into disrepute, and I think it would be a fine thing for politics if it could be professionalised in the best sense of the term. After all, there is nothing disreputable about the profession of law or medicine, and why should not the profession of politics be equally honourable and equally honoured? Would it not be a grand thing if it could be looked upon as an honourable profession, and if its standards could be admitted to be as high in the public estimation as the other professions which are proudly called professions?
Under normal conditions—and we have been emerging from a period of serious impoverishment—I would be inclined to take the risk of fixing the remuneration of Senators too high rather than too low. But, in present circumstances, I am not unaware of the fact that it would be undesirable to give the impression outside that we are in politics for what we can get out of it; while, at the same time, I think we should try and do away with that whole point of view and not give in too much to that tendency on the part of our fellow-countrymen to develop an attitude of envy, malice and uncharitableness to us who should be regarded as their servants and as people whose well-being is also their well-being. However, I admit the weaknesses of human nature and the fact that our position is one which gives rise to a great deal of unfair and malicious criticism. So that, while in general the argument for fixing a liberal remuneration for Senators is pretty strong, in particular I must say that the Government were rather courageous to introduce this Bill at this particular time and raise the allowances of members of the Oireachtas, as is proposed to be done.
I think it is very difficult for a Senator to say what is an adequate remuneration for any other Senator. Everyone knows his own personal circumstances, but it would be presumptuous to say what is enough for the other 59 Senators. All I can say is that I find the present rate of remuneration quite adequate for me, personally. I am quite willing to believe that many other Senators find the present rate of remuneration quite inadequate to them in their own personal circumstances. Therefore, I would hate to lay down the law for other Senators in that particular matter.
I come back now to the point I originally made, and that is, that while we must have equality of monetary remuneration all round, it is very undesirable that the equality of remuneration should be synonymous with real inequality of reward on account of the variation in the circumstances of individual Senators. The only remedy I see for that inequality underlying nominal equality of monetary reward is if the mechanism of the income-tax machine is applied to the remuneration of Senators. I think there are no arguments in logic or reason against regarding payments received by members of the Oireachtas as salaries rather than as allowances and that as such they should be subject to income-tax, just like any other payments for professional service. By that method the Revenue Commissioners could make the real difference between the circumstances of different Senators which the present system does not make. For example, if our allowances were salaries and were subject to income-tax it is quite likely that certain Senators would lose a substantial proportion of their Senatorial payment in the form of income-tax, and, quite possibly, certain other Senators, who are not so well off from other sources of income, would be able to keep practically the whole of their allowances or salaries as Senators. In that way the Revenue Commissioners could lessen the real inequality of real reward, which, I think, is the principal criticism of the present system.
But, if that were so, and if Senatorial remuneration was subject to income-tax, it would be necessary to redraft the income-tax law and to have a very liberal interpretation of that particular part of the income-tax law which allows exemption from income-tax for all those expenses which are wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred in securing a certain income. For example, the £20 or £30 that I spent in going to Montreal in 1938 would certainly not be regarded under the existing income-tax law as a legitimate expense to be excluded from income-tax. Under the law as it should be in reference to this matter, I think that kind of expense should be treated as an expense in reference to which no income-tax should be paid.
There is a further and very good reason why the remuneration of both Senators and Deputies should be recalculated on a new basis and made subject to income-tax, especially from the point of view of members of the Dáil, and that is because they have a lot to do with imposing income-tax on their fellow citizens. It is a real grievance that, when they do that, they themselves are not always as income-tax conscious as they would be if they had to pay income-tax themselves in respect of their own salaries. It is most desirable that members of the Dáil especially should be aware of what exactly happens when income-tax is raised by 1/- in the £ or lowered by 1/- in the £ and have it brought home to themselves in their own personal experience.
If this proposed payment of £468 per year to members of the Seanad were made subject to income-tax, it would probably mean a real gain to certain Senators whose income from other sources is not very great, and it would certainly mean that certain other Senators would gain little or nothing, in fact, even might lose as compared with the present situation under which we get £360 a year free of tax. The result of it all would be that, with the same nominal payment all round, there would be less inequality of reward for the service rendered in this House.
