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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 10 Dec 1958

Vol. 50 No. 3

District Justice's Conduct of Court Case: Motion.

Before we enter into consideration of this motion, it might be well if I reminded Senators that it is the rule of this House not to allow any discussion on either the merits or demerits of the judgments or conduct of a member of the judiciary except as a motion calling for his removal from office for stated reasons.

This motion refers to the function of the Minister for Justice under Section 21 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946, in relation to the setting up of a judicial inquiry. The only question before the House is the exercise of that function by the Minister, and the merits or demerits of the conduct of the district justice in question may not be discussed.

I move:—

That Seanad Éireann requests the Minister for Justice to institute a judicial inquiry into the reported conduct by District Justice Gordon Hurley of the case heard before him on September 15th, 1958, arising out of the assault, on June 26th, 1958, upon three street preachers in Killaloe.

I have listened with attention to the ruling of the Chair in this matter. The House will remember that I tried first to raise this question as a matter on the Adjournment some weeks ago, and it was indicated to me, in your own words, Sir, that "the better way would be to put down a motion". I felt at the time, and I said so, that a motion would be more satisfactory, and would give more people a chance to put their point of view, and, generally, would allow for a wider debate. My only fear had been on the question of delay. I should like to say now that I am grateful to the Chair and to the House for there having been no delay whatsoever between the time I put down the motion and the time when it is being debated here.

My contention, and the contention I shall try to support by evidence, is that prima facie there is cause for grave ministerial concern arising out of the conduct of this case, as reported. It has been so profoundly disturbing that it has stirred the public conscience to an extent fully sufficient to demand that the Minister shall have the facts judicially examined and established, and decide then, but not until then, whether or not action is required.

In saying that the public mind has been profoundly disturbed by this matter, I should like to state at the outset that my own conviction is that this is true of a very big section of the public. Decent people of all religious beliefs have been shocked by what appeared from the press reports, to have taken place, and by the manner in which it was reported to have been dealt with.

I should like to read two of the press reports of the matter at issue. My motion refers to the case as reported. The first of these reports is from the Irish Times of 16th September, this year, under a heading “Religion is above the Courts”. It reads as follows:—

"District Justice Gordon Hurley said in Killaloe yesterday: ‘Religion is above the courts, the main business of which is to preserve peace. When men come into an Irish village and provoke the people by foisting their views on them, they are abusing whatever rights they have under the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religious worship. Such action is bound to draw down the rod of the people whose hospitality they have received.'

He applied the Probation Act in a case in which Michael Boland and John (Christy) McKenna, of Ballyloughnane, Killaloe, and Patrick Daly, Killestry, Killaloe, were charged with unlawfully assaulting Robert Glen Lindsay, Samuel Glen Lindsay and Christopher Rowe on June 26th at Killaloe, thereby causing them actual bodily harm.

The defendants, who pleaded guilty, were represented by Mr. I. M. Houlihan, solicitor, and Inspector E. McDonnell prosecuted.

Mr. Houlihan said his clients were under great provocation. They were respectable farmers and had been attending a fair in Killaloe when they were confronted by three young men ‘vending Christianity'. His clients took offence, as it was the wrong time and place for these men —two of whom, he understood, came from Limerick, and a friend of theirs from England—to go foisting their special brand of Christianity on a people steeped in Christainity.

Furthermore, the position was aggravated by the fact that some time before, leaflets had been left in the confessional of the Catholic church in the parish from which his clients came, and the parish priest had protested from the altar, and asked for more vigilance from his parishioners.

Mr. Houlihan said that he did not want to associate the complainants with circulating these leaflets for the simple reason that it had not been proved, but it was not the first time that ‘pseudo-evangelists' had visited this area.

‘The judiciary in England have described those people as a sect of canting humbugs' went on Mr. Houlihan, who added that it was fantastic for these young men from Limerick to come into Clare vending Bible and Christianity on a people who were steeped in it. To say they were preaching Christianity to a people ignorant of it was only adding to the blaze. The Irish had Christianity since the time of Saint Patrick, and had spread all over the world.

Another of his clients, Mr. Boland, he said, was highly commended for coming to the rescue of a member of the Civic Guard when there was trouble before between members of some sect or other and the people.

Inspector E. McDonnell said the men came to Killaloe to hold a religious meeting on the steps of the church. Mr. Rowe held the Bible in his hand and this was taken from him by Mr. Boland, who gave it a couple of kicks down the street. The guards then had a conversation with the men and they went to their car, but the defendant got around by another street, intercepted him and hit them with their fists and sticks.

One of the Lindsays fell from a blow on the forehead and lost two teeth. He was unconscious for about 20 minutes. He was treated by his family doctor and taken to hospital next day. There were no serious injuries, but Lindsay had concussion for some time.

District Justice Hurley said the recalled a similar case in Limerick some time ago. He had gone into the matter very deeply then, and he still held the same views. As he saw it, that case was a precedent for future findings of the court. No costs were allowed."

A fortnight later in the Manchester Guardian, on October 1st, 1958, the following report appeared:—

"A fortnight ago at Killaloe, near Limerick, three men described as ‘respectable farmers' appeared in the district court charged with unlawful assault on three evangelists who had come to hold a religious meeting on the steps of the church. They were approached by the three defendants, one of whom seized the Bible from one of the evangelists and kicked it down the street. The evangelists drove off, but in another street were intercepted and attacked by the defendants. One of the preachers was knocked out and lost two teeth.

The defendants pleaded guilty, but their solicitor said they had acted under great provocation. They were attending the fair at Killaloe when they came upon the three young men ‘vending Christianity; they took offence because it was the wrong time and place for these men... to go foisting their special brand of Christianity on a people steeped in Christianity.

District Justice Gordon Hurley applied the Probation Act—a conviction was recorded, but there was no penalty. He justified his action by reference to a previous case and delivered this dictum:—

‘Religion is above courts the main business of which is to preserve peace. When men come into an Irish village and provoke the people by foisting their views on them they are abusing whatever rights they have under the Constitution which guarantees freedom of religious worship. Such action is bound to draw down the rod of the people whose hospitality they have received.'

The precedent to which the District Justice referred was a judgment of his own, delivered four years ago, when a party of men in a village near Limerick set upon two Jehovah's Witnesses. District Justice Hurley bound over the victims of the assault to keep the peace. The case aroused some comment at the time."

I believe that in the light of that kind of report, the Minister ought to be gravely concerned. There is no doubt there has been grave public concern in the matter.

In the same article, the Manchester Guardian quotes, and several other papers similarly quoted, the Most Reverend Dr. E. Hodges, Bishop of Limerick, as writing in the following terms about his own community:—

"Many members of the community will agree that that street preaching is undesirable. Many will question the adequacy and accuracy of the preaching proposed. These are side issues. The main question is: can the citizen of Ireland depend upon the protection of the law to preserve him from bodily harm if he expresses what are thought to be views unacceptable to the religious loyalties of persons who happen to be present in the public street when the words are used? Apparently not. He can be mobbed and battered with impunity by anyone who is ‘provoked' by the words used. Such at least is the ruling of the district justice involved.

The Bishop criticises in detail the terms of the judgment, in particular the justice's statement that the Constitution ‘guarantees freedom of religious worship', and claims that the Constitution guarantees something much more—‘recognition of the various branches of the Christian Faith.' Dr. Hodges speaks of the incident as an important one with serious and sinister implications.

Small wonder that this incident in a remote village will in many larger and more influential circles suggest the creaking of the ecclesiastical Iron Curtain closing down on thought and speech and action...

Dr. Hodges says the reaction of the Church of Ireland Clergy ‘and of those we represent' must be threefold:—

A sense of thankfulness and pride in the freedom to think and speak and act, at least within our communion;

A realisation that in matters even remotely connected with difference in religious belief a member of the non-Roman Church cannot be certain of justice;

A determination that the goodwill and friendliness which exist between us and out neighbours not of our form of Faith shall be maintained by our Church to the uttermost; and that no miscarriage of justice, no outbreak of religious zeal will break out faith in the innate kindness of the Irish people."

I quote that as a statement of a responsible citizen, with a long record in this country, indeed in this city, before he went to Limerick, as indicating grave public concern on the part of himself and of the many for whom he spoke.

I want to quote the words of a former judge of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black, expressing concern in similar terms:—

"The legal way to deal with street preachers—the civilised way—was to tell them to move away. This was what the Guards did. After they had walked away, they were attacked.

The district justice, said Mr. Black, applied the Probation of Offenders Act. He let the offenders off without a word of reprimand or without binding them over to the peace, and, for good measure, proceeded to pour the vials of his wrath not upon the miscreants, but upon their battered victims. The critics— and they were many, consisting of both religions—had condemned this, carried away he thought, by their indignation with the conduct of the district justice. They had been so carried away that they had overlooked, he thought, the most damning feature of the whole scandalous transaction. That was not what the district justice did, but the last eleven words of his allocution in which he said that this case was to be a precedent for future findings——"

The Senator is now proceeding to discuss the conduct of the justice in question, and I hold that is out of order.

I bow to your ruling, Sir. I feel I have now sufficiently established that there has been grave concern among responsible people in this country.

It was widely suggested and feared that the effect of the type of court report which I have read might be to encourage a repetition of the same kind of thing. That is suggested by both the people I have just quoted. That the fear is justified is demonstrated by a letter which appeared from one of the people who pleaded guilty to the assault in this case, in the Limerick Weekly Echo of 25th October, 1958:—

"The justice has been very bitterly criticised for applying the Probation Act in our case. It really makes no difference to us what the judge's decision was. We know our duty and will gladly do it again to-morrow if the necessity arises."

I feel that the widespread public concern I have indicated was shown again in the Dáil when on 29th October, Deputy Booth, in Volume 171, column 37, of the Official Report, asked the Minister the following question :—

"Mr. Booth asked the Minister for Justice whether he is aware of the disquiet that has been occasioned amongst various religious denominations by the recent case of an admitted assault on street preachers in Killaloe; and whether, having regard to the fact that the Constitution guarantees the free profession and practice of religion, he will make a statement on the matter."

To this the Minister, Mr. Traynor, replied:—

"I am aware that various religious denominations have expressed concern lest their rights should be infringed, and I, therefore, wish to say that the freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion which are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution will be safeguarded by every means in the power of the law officers of the State and the Garda Síochána. On the occasion in question, the Garda acted promptly—though they were unable to prevent a surprise attack on the persons who were assaulted and, when the papers were referred to the Attorney General, he at once directed that those concerned should be prosecuted on a charge of assault causing actual bodily harm.

The accused pleaded guilty and expressed through their solicitor, their regret for what had happened. The district justice applied the Probation of Offenders Act.

As regards the handling of the case by the district justice and the remarks which he is reported to have made, this is a matter on which, I think, it would not be proper for me to comment: to do so would inevitably tend to shake the confidence of the public in the independence of the judiciary. There is a way provided for under the Constitution and the law by which, in certain circumstances, a judge or district justice may, following a resolution passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, be removed from office; but, otherwise than as a part of that procedure, it would not be proper for me to do or to say anything that would appear to be an interference with the independence of the judiciary, the maintenance of which we regard as vital in the general public interest."

Just two points on that : it is obvious in the first place that the Minister was "aware" of widespread expressed concern and secondly, that he referred to the remarks which the district justice "is reported to have made". I submit that it is his duty to find out whether the district justice in question was correctly reported. I feel that to go beyond that to-day and to presume further is something that we cannot now do, until the facts are judicially established. It would not be fair.

On the question of "the independence of the judiciary", I certainly agree that the independence of the judiciary is of supreme importance in any democratic State, and I certainly would not suggest that the Minister should like to quote what Mr. Black has said on that principle of law, as quoted in the passage I mentioned before.

"The Minister for Justice has said that he could not comment because of the independence of the judiciary. The independence of the judiciary had nothing to do with what the Minister was asked to do. The independence of the judiciary meant that judges could not be removed from office by Parliament, unless for misbehaviour and they could not be spoken to or influenced while a case was sub judice. But when the case was finished and over everyone was free to criticise it, and he thought if the Minister had chosen to dissociate himself from this conduct of the district justice he would have acted wisely and well.”

On one final point I should like the attention of the judicial inquiry to be directed by the Minister, if and when he sets it up, and that is to the specific question as to what particular grounds were set out in the district justice's order of dismissal under the Probation of Offenders Act, whether it was on grounds of character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the person charged, or the trivial nature of the offence, or the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed. I believe that that is a matter also which must be gone into and judicially inquired into.

For all these reasons—on account of the reported unusual conduct of the case, on account of the widespread informed public comment and publicly expressed concern that the constitutional rights of citizens shall be effectively protected, and because the assaulters apparently interpreted the words of the district justice to mean that they now have full licence to "do it again to-morrow"—it seems to me imperative that the Minister should be deeply concerned to ascertain just precisely in what measure the whole conduct of the case by the district justice in question was accurately reported, and what are in fact the full, precise and legitimate implications of the district justice's words from the bench as actually spoken. The only way to ascertain this equitably is by the setting up of a judicial inquiry. This the Minister has full power to do. It is only in the light of the findings and report of such an inquiry that he or anyone else can equitably decide whether or not further action is required. I therefore respectfully urge upon him the necessity of setting up such a judicial inquiry forthwith.

I second this motion. I also endorse all of what Senator Sheehy Skeffington said and if I may be permitted to do so. I should like to commend his moderation. I do not propose to speak at any length. I shall say three things only. I agree with Senator Sheehy Skeffington that there is widespread public disquiet at the newspaper reports of the proceedings. Secondly, I believe—I know many citizens share this view—that there are full grounds for instituting a judicial inquiry. Lastly, I would urge the Minister to assert his powers in regard to what some of our citizens at least consider to be a grave infringement of constitutional rights and a grave breach of fundamental civil liberties.

This motion is in order because of the provisions of the Act of 1946 which gives power to the Minister for Justice to take steps which will eventuate in a judicial inquiry into the conduct of a district justice. The power the Minister has seems to me to be a power which he must decide to exercise or refuse to exercise. I am afraid he must do so without comment. Senator Sheehy Skeffington made an admirable speech in the circumstances in which, like the rest of us, he was precluded from criticising a district justice.

I think we should take a general view of this matter. The Constitution of the State and the practice since the State was founded guarantee the absolute independence of the judiciary in the exercise of their judicial functions. If my memory serves me right, the Act of 1946 which makes provision for this particular type of inquiry, in certain respects puts the district justice on the same plane as a High Court judge.

The independence of the judges is an excellent principle. It has been accepted by all our citizens and in practice, it is something which has worked extremely well. In particular, the system inaugurated shortly after the State was founded, of district justices, has given great satisfaction throughout the country. The system works well and that does not mean that every one of us at all times must be satisfied with every decision given or every observation made from the bench, but the system does work well and the disquiet in a certain circle about this particular matter indicates in its own way how well the system works generally. It works particularly well for ordinary people who have no influence and no power. It works well, as everybody knows, for minorities, no matter how one defines these minorities. Nothing should be done or said, or implied, which would take in any way from the independence of the judges, no matter what their rank.

If I may allude to one thing which Senator Sheehy Skeffington said, it seems to me to be nothing short of a mental aberration for a former Supreme Court judge to say that when a case has been decided in court, everybody is free to criticise it and the Minister in particular is free to criticise it. It would be an extraordinary state of affairs if the Minister for Justice, or any other Minister, considered himself free to criticise a decision given in court by a district justice or any other person holding judicial office. I am sure this Minister or any other Minister would not contemplate doing anything of that sort.

Therefore, I think that this inquiry should not take place. The Minister has already answered a question in the Dáil on the matter and he has given certain guarantees which I am sure will be carried out, and which have always been carried out. I do not want to express any view, and nobody on this side of the House wants to express any view, for or against anything that has been said or done by a particular district justice in a particular case. That would be improper here and highly undesirable. I should like to say that we do not agree that this is a case where a judicial inquiry should be set up. I think it is only right I should say that.

I should like to endorse what Senator Sheehy Skeffington has said and to look at the matter from the point of view of the regard we have for the judiciary. I think it would be in order to say that we have inherited, or perhaps really helped, to build a judiciary of which we are very proud and in which we have the greatest faith. I do not think there is anybody in this House who, if he were unjustly accused of a crime, would like to be tried under any other system of justice in the world than the one which we have here and in these islands. We all have the greatest respect for that system and for that judiciary, perhaps with the exception of the Leader of the Opposition in the Dáil, but that is beside the point now.

If we do not uphold that tradition and give it the support in this House that we feel it should get, according to the traditions of this House and of the country, then, as Senator Sheehy Skeffington said, we will lose one of the great bulwarks of democracy and of civilisation itself. It is with that viewpoint that I would suggest to the Minister that if there is a case of overstepping the line by a member of that judiciary that causes the public to be concerned and in fact in this case I think it has——

The Senator may not criticise a member of the judiciary or the decision of the justice in question.

Well, it is very hard to go between——

It is not to be permitted.

My point was that if there is public concern over a decision, then it is the Government's duty, through the Minister, to consider it and, if necessary, hold an inquiry into that decision. That is what this case boils down to. If the Minister considers there is enough public concern over any decision of the judiciary, then it is his duty to allay that concern in the interests of the judiciary and the country at large.

Senator Hayes to some extent has given the guidance to the House that I was anxious to give immediately after the seconding of the motion. Therefore I should like to begin by repeating what I said in reply to a question that was addressed to me in the other House that it would not be proper for me to comment on the handling of this case by the district justice and the remarks which he is reported to have made. To do so would inevitably tend to shake the confidence of the public in the independence of the judiciary and for a very obvious reason.

How could the judges or justices retain any semblance of independence if a member of the Executive were to act on the principle that he was free to express disapproval or, for the matter of that, approval of the way a judge or justice had acted in a particular case, seeing that it is within the power of the Executive to sponsor or support a resolution for a judge's removal from office, to increase judicial salaries and to promote a judge or justice from one judicial office to another on the occurrence of a vacancy which permits of this being done. Were such a principle to be acted on how could the public be sure that some judicial person had not been influenced in a subsequent case by such an expression of approval or disapproval?

It has been suggested that once a case has ceased to be sub judice comment is free and that it would not be an interference with the independence of the judiciary for the Minister for Justice to say what he thought of the way such a case had been handled. It does not need a lot of imagination to see where this doctrine would lead us or much reflection to detect the fallacy. Our civil liberties are inseparably associated with the independence of the judiciary but how could either endure if when a judge or justice had acquitted someone that the State had prosecuted he were to be told by the Executive that he ought to have convicted him or that having imposed one sentence he were to be told that he ought to have imposed another and does anyone suppose that a hint by the Executive as to how a judge or justice should act in the exercise of his functions is any less objectionable if it has been occasioned by the decision in a particular case the hearing of which has concluded?

I have made the foregoing remarks for the purpose of clarifying my position with respect to the precise question that has been raised. Is not this a case, the motion suggests, in which the Chief Justice should be requested by me to arrange for a judicial inquiry under the provisions of Section 21 of the Courts of Justice (District Court) Act, 1946? Let me remark in passing that if it were such a case, which, in my opinion, it is not, I could not prejudge the issue by lending myself to a discussion of the substance of the matter which was going to form the subject of such an inquiry. But having decided that this is not a case for a judicial inquiry, am I then free to go into the reasons for that decision? By no means, for this could not be done without saying something which might be taken to imply approval or disapproval of the way a justice had acted in court which, for the reasons I have already explained, is precisely what I am not prepared to do.

As the Senator knows, there is a way provided for in the Constitution by which a judge or justice may be removed from office by a resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas but, otherwise than as a part of that procedure, I am not prepared to do or say anything that would appear to be an interference with the independence of the judiciary, the maintenance of which I regard as vital in the general public interest. However, I would be less than candid if I did not add that nothing could be graver than a resolution of the kind and that I would regard it as wholly unwarranted in the present case.

I will not detain the House long. I am grateful for the manner in which I have been allowed to raise this matter, in which I have been allowed to put my case, and the way in which it has been received by the Seanad. I feel very strongly that Senator Cole has said the fundamental thing when he says that it is because we have the greatest respect for the judiciary that the present circumstances would demand a judicial inquiry, not a prejudging of the issue but an inquiry.

That leads me to the Minister's reply. The Minister insists that it would be most improper for him to comment, but I would remind him that the motion does not ask him to comment. It asks for a judicial inquiry. It is obvious that such an inquiry would send a report to him. It would investigate the facts—what did take place, what was in fact said, how the case was conducted—and make a report. It might easily report that the Press accounts were gross distortions, or that the Press reports were substantially correct, but that the conduct of the case was entirely unreprehensible, and that there was no cause for public concern; or, thirdly, that the conduct of the case was improper. Even were the last of these to be the conclusion of such a report, the Minister would not then be bound to act upon it, but he would be bound to consider such a report.

My motion asks not for a ministerial comment but for a judicial inquiry into the facts. The Minister reminds us that it would be possible for any of us to move a resolution demanding the removal of the district justice. In my opinion, that would be grossly unfair to the district justice in question, because sufficient facts are not before us. I would much prefer to have a judicial establishing of the facts, before suggesting any action or deciding to take any action. It is for that reason that I would press this motion and urge the Seanad to pass it, asking the Minister to set up a judicial inquiry to investigate the facts, and report back to the Minister.

Motion put and declared lost.

Would Senators who desire a division please rise in their places?

Senators Sheehy Skeffington, Stanford and Cole rose.

The Senators will be recorded as dissenting.

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