Courts Bill, 1980: Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Mrs. Cassidy

The lack of sufficient input of social services into the legal system, particularly in matters relating to family law, causes many problems. There is little use in providing a couple seeking a divorce with a marriage counsellor at the door of the courthouse. Having brought themselves to this point, there is little likelihood of them changing their minds. There is no point in closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. Such counselling, if it is to be effective, must be given at an early stage. How many marriages end up in court due to lack of such advisory services is still very much a matter of speculation. Here we are concerned only with dealing with people who need an easier and faster way of obtaining the reliefs provided for their problems by the law. The court system needs to be a developing and an evolving one to keep pace with the needs of the people it serves. The Minister has emphasised in his speech that one of the principal aims of the Bill before the House is to enlarge the jurisdiction in family law matters in order to provide easier access to the courts. I will therefore confine my remarks to the two sections, sections 5 and 15, which deal with the law as it relates to family matters.

Section 5 proposes to give to the Circuit Court the jurisdiction that up to now has been vested in the High Court to grant on petition a divorce a mensa et thoro which means literally from bed and board and contrasted with divorce ex vincula which is forbidden by the Constitution and means literally breaking of the chain or total dissolution of the marriage. A person who obtains a divorce a mensa et thoro is discharged from all matrimonial obligations to his or her spouse but may not remarry. The granting of this jurisdiction to the Circuit Court will make it easier to obtain this type of relief. If a couple, for example, from Dingle want to obtain a divorce, they can now do so at a local Circuit Court rather than having to travel to the High Court in Dublin. This, of course, will also result in an increase in the number of such petitions sought.

If the Circuit Court is to have the jurisdiction to grant divorce, it follows that it should also have jurisdiction in matters concerning custody and guardianship of children. This constitutional jurisdiction is conferred on the Circuit Court in section 15 of the Bill. As I read the Bill, the Circuit Court will now have jurisdiction under Part II of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, to deal with custody and guardianship matters previously reserved to the High Court and the District Court will now have the power to enforce such orders made under this jurisdiction. If a mother, for example, is awarded the custody of young children and if their father drives up in a taxi and spirits them away, she may now, as I understand it, apply to the District Court in order to enforce the order rather than wait for the next sitting of the Circuit Court. The District Court may also make monetary awards in guardianship matters up to £30 per week.

However, it does appear that the new legislation also gives the District Court jurisdiction to determine fundamental rights defined and protected in express terms by the Constitution. The constitutional rights of the child, which certainly include the question of its custody, are described in the Constitution in such terms as "imprescriptible and antecedent and superior to all positive law". That such rights are now to be adjudicated on by a court of summary jurisdiction could involve that the constitutionality of the measure will be challenged in the courts. All the judicial cases say that the paramount consideration is the welfare and the benefit of the child; and in a tug-of-love situation who is to protect the child except the judge? Decisions of such fundamental importance need the deep and serious and thorough consideration of a court of competent jurisdiction with experience in such matters.

It is appropriate, now that the jurisdiction in custody and guardianship matters is being enlarged, to make two general observations. It has never been the custom of our courts, and I hope it never will be, for custody of children to be awarded on the basis of the "guilt or innocence" of the parent. I use these words in parentheses and in the legal sense only because to me they seem singularly inappropriate in the circumstances. The welfare and benefit of children is the principle on which the Act of 1964 has operated. Children are not to be regarded as a good conduct prize.

The second observation I would make is that, in matters concerning their welfare, children have the right to be heard. It can never be assumed that a child is not necessarily the best judge of what is good for him. In a situation of marital stress, who can tell what the full facts are? Marriage is a very positive relationship. It either works, or it does not. Who knows what goes on behind anybody's front door? For example, a marriage which has become intolerable to the wife because of her husband's alcoholism or drunkenness does not necessarily impinge to anything like the same extent on the lives of her children. Not every drunken father sends his family scuttling for shelter under their beds when he appears. In fact, the children may blame their mother for breaking up their home and they may resent her for it. Children, as Oscar Wilde said in one of his less sentimental moments, begin by loving their parents, then they judge them; rarely, if ever, do they forgive them; and it is one of the most salutary lessons for parents to realise that they have exchanged the unquestioning affection of their babies for the harsher judgments of young adults. Children's judgments of their parents, although harsh, are invariably valid and should not be discounted in custody matters. Children can also, quite successfully, resist the emotional blackmail of their parents to make them take sides in marital squabbles.

There are many other matters of a more complex, though not necessarily of a more important nature, that have been dealt with more than adequately in the debate. I welcome the measures in the Bill which are designed to make the courts more accessible to people who need the relief of the law. But it is a sad commentary on the state of our family laws that most of the Bills going through the House, including this one, are mainly concerned with the need to protect the individual members of the family from one another.

Professor Murphy

The Minister, in his opening statement, suggested that the Bill would make it easier for the citizen to have access to justice. This reminds us how very nominal a lot of our rights and freedoms are. In a parliamentary democracy we are still in a stage of development. People talk about freedom of speech and freedom of travel, ignoring the fact that for most people these are freedoms more illusory than real, that very few people, in fact, can benefit from these so-called freedoms. And so it is with the question of equality.

Equality of opportunity in education still has to be achieved in many respects. Perhaps, of all equality deficiencies, so to speak, most important is inequality before the law. Indeed, it is not too cynical a view to maintain that, in many respects, the law and justice protect society as it is, protects the status quo, and the ordinary citizen is frequently in a very difficult and unjust position vis-á-vis the law. He finds physical access to the law difficult, as has been pointed out in this debate. If the justice he seeks is geographically remote from him, it militates against the citizen of poor means and, more generally, the ordinary citizen does not as yet have anything like financial access to justice, educational access to justice in the sense that many citizens simply do not understand what the law is all about, but perhaps most of all, the ordinary citizen is at a psychological disadvantage vis-a-vis the law and the courts. Equality before the law is still very much an aspiration, not a fact.

Without wishing to cast aspersions on my legal colleagues here, it seems that the legal profession itself frequently carries some measure of responsibility for the fact that we do not have real equality before the law. One only has to go by chance into any average court session to realise what an extraordinary, archaic atmosphere confronts the ordinary citizen when he goes to court. The practitioners of the law, from the judge to the legal men who plead before him, seem to be participating in some strange, archaic ritual, using mandarin language and there is a general atmosphere of mediaeval flummery that must surely add to the ordinary citizen's distress in what must be, for him in any case, a traumatic experience. Senator Cassidy touched on this aspect of our courts in her contribution.

It is very interesting at the moment to note that journalists who are attending the Stardust tribunal have pointed out that, despite the great contrast in education, class and accent between the lawyers and the witnesses, nevertheless, the absence of the usual flummery — the fact that the members of the tribunal are not clad in legal robes and so on — has to a great extent established an easier atmosphere at the tribunal and has caused the witnesses to feel at ease.

I have read with interest the contributions of Senators on the last day and, like Senators Harney and Cassidy, I feel like Saint Paul, who used to use the phrase occasionally "speaking as one less wise". One hesitates to venture into this regiment of lawyers. At the same time, a number of points are of general interest. I am not convinced by the argument that the retention of civil juries in cases where compensation is to be decided is a disadvantage. That argument appears to be made from a particular interested standpoint. It is not a convincing argument to say that they have done away with it in England since World War II. I appreciate many of the objections or, at least, the reservations many Senators have about the Bill, and I share their objections to the present state of squalor in our courtrooms, to the fact that family law is being dealt with very unsuitably and under very inappropriate circumstances.

I also share their disquiet at what was already proverbial in Shakespeare's time—the law's intolerable delay. It is incredible that accident claims should drag on for three or four years, for example. I also share the general disappointment at the inadequacies of the free legal aid scheme. However all these reservations do not seem adequate reasons for not welcoming this Bill. At the very least, it is a move in the direction of decentralisation of our legal system, and that alone is a good thing.

As I said at the outset, we have a long way to go in making access to justice available to all citizens. This is only a small step, but it is certainly welcome.

Mrs. Honan

I welcome this Bill. The Bill should give people more convenient and cheaper means of help, but as a person in public life for quite a number of years down the country I wonder if this Bill will help when you see the troubles people have with the smallest problem. However, I thank the Minister for at least trying. It is hard for an outsider like myself to speak on this Bill. It should help to avoid some of the delays that the Minister is concerned about. However, even if the Minister does all he hopes to do, will the professional people serving in the field change with this obviously badly needed Bill?

My father-in-law, the late Senator T. V. Honan, during his long and distinguished public life gave advice to people who came to him with some problem with the law, saying "Live without letting them know you are around". I wonder was he right? Firstly, the whole scene of the courthouse, courtroom or some of the places that were described here last week certainly need improvement. At any price, the person with some of the problems would prefer to stay outside.

One thing was confirmed in my mind in this House last week, when I listened to, I think, five lawyers, solicitors or barristers of the other side speaking and only one lawyer from this side, that I certainly was a member of the party of the people and that I am at the right side of the House. I liked Senator Cooney's reference to the fact that all top jobs in the legal world were made by the Government and that he was so glad to see this work so well. Of course it does work well, because any Government, no matter who they are, will put the right people in such responsible jobs, whatever party they may belong to.

It will take time to see if what the Minister has tried to do today in this Bill will make it less difficult, less time-consuming and less expensive for the ordinary man and woman to have recourse to the courts, instead of waiting sometimes up to two months, as I well know. This has happened to people who have come to me with some of their problems. Then they go to a solicitor or some such person and arrive back to me again, to try to find the answer.

May I make a suggestion to the Minister? I do not know whether I am in order—usually I am not—but I am going to make the suggestion anyway. May I suggest after this Bill is passed, that the Minister have published a booklet like the Summary on Social Insurance from the Department of Social Welfare, so that people will know the improvements that he has tried to bring to their world and to the world of law. This Bill affects the lives of a lot of people. There is a great mystique about the world of solicitors and lawyers which frightens ordinary persons, the people that I deal with.

I welcome the Bill and hope it succeeds. The Department of Social Welfare booklet is an excellent one. Every ordinary person like myself can read and understand it. I suggest that the Minister might do something like that in his Department.

Minister of State at the Department of Justice (Mr. Doherty)

I would like to thank the Senators for their contributions to this debate and I am glad that the Bill has been welcomed generally by both sides of the House, though there may be differences on some aspects of it. I will try to deal with the general points that have been raised in the course of the debate, but will leave matters of more detailed importance for Committee Stage.

First of all, I would like to make clear to Senators the nature of this Bill. It is a jurisdiction Bill, whose aim is to make new arrangements as to the courts in which the remedies which the law provides at present can be taken. The aim in doing this is primarily to make it easier for people to obtain access to these remedies, and a side-effect will be to relieve pressure on the High Court.

The Bill is not a Family Law Bill in a sense and it does not purport to deal with substantive family law. It does not, and is not intended to, alter the nature of existing remedies, or create new ones. Its principal contribution to the development of family law in this country will be to make remedies, which are at present available only in a diffuse and fragmented way, more easily accessible to those who require them. This will be brought about by drawing together in a rational way the remedies which relate to family strife and marital breakdown, and giving jurisdiction in these matters to courts which sit in venues throughout the country where costs are reasonable and procedures are uncomplicated. The Circuit Court is to have jurisdiction in relation to all this "package", the District Court will have an appropriately limited jurisdiction to grant all these remedies except divorce a mensa et thoro.

The Bill has been criticised by a number of Senators because it does not make substantive changes in the law relating to various remedies. I would like to point out once again that it is a Courts Bill, not a Family Law Bill, and it would be most inappropriate in the context of a Bill of this type to make that sort of change. That does not mean, of course, that the important aspects of substantive law are being neglected. As Senators are aware, there are two Bills before the Oireachtas dealing with some of these cases.

Much has also been said about the establishment of special family tribunals and the fundamental question of the suitability of the adversary system for the hearing of family disputes. The Minister for Justice has dealt with these questions on a number of occasions in the past—in-deed, he answered a Parliamentary Question on the subject as recently as 2 April (Columns 998 to 100, Question No. 25). The position is, as he stated, that these questions are being considered by the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure and by the Law Reform Commission.

I would like to point out that, even if we did have a Utopian system with advisers, negotiators, social workers, psychologists, child experts, referees and conciliators at the beck and call of every married couple in the country, we will always need courts jurisdiction for the simple reason that in many, if not most of these cases ultimately the parties are truly in contention. The time to sift out those who are not in contention, or to change the minds or ways of the parties so that there is contention no longer, is well before the law is invoked—indeed, some would say that the time in many cases is before the marriage is entered into. A discussion of such questions is, however, clearly an attempt to broaden the discussion into the area of family breakdown, and that question is far beyond the scope of this Bill.

Indeed, many of the points raised may well be outside the scope of the law itself. There is a basic fallacy underlying many of the arguments put by Senators. That is the assumption that the law can be or should be made to be, a means of solving all or substantially all family problems. It is not, nor can it ever be, that; and it would be wrong to give the impression that all we have to do is to introduce facile changes in the law so as to remedy the situation. The real danger is that this would only make matters worse.

We are all agreed that much of our court accommodation is in need of modernisation and improvement. I am grateful to Senator Molony for acknowledging that this unsatisfactory situation is not the fault of this Government alone but something that has developed over a long period of time. Senators will be aware that responsibility for the provision and maintenance of court accommodation, with certain exceptions in the Dublin area, is vested by law in local authorities. Senator McGuinness seems to dismiss this as if is were a trivial aspect of the matter; but, of course, any Member of the Oireachtas who has had responsibilities in the area will know from experience that it is at the core of the problem. It is, of course, true that most local authorities are conscious of their obligations in this regard and the process of improving court accommodation is ongoing. In a number of cases within the past year particular local authorities have provided improved accommodation for District Courts in their areas by obtaining the use of premises such as community halls on a rental basis.

Quite extensive repairs and improvements are planned for a number of courthouses—for instance, Kilmainham, Bray, Wicklow and Galway—and less extensive work is in hands in a number of other locations. As far as facilities such as consulting and waiting rooms considered desirable for dealing with family law business are concerned, I am not satisfied that the volume of this business will ever be such as to justify the cost of providing these facilities at all court venues. I think that it would be a useful exercise for Senators who spoke with a certain amount of passion on this aspect to put the matter into perspective. A statistical analysis of the 1,744 family law cases in 1979 shows that in respect of 257 out of 259 venues outside the Dublin area for which figures are available, in 116 venues there was no such case heard; 34 had one case each; 85 had less than one case on average per sitting, and another 12 had an average of fewer than two cases per sitting. This leaves only ten venues throughout the country with two or more cases per sitting.

One solution to this problem might be to direct all family law business to one or two venues in each district where the required facilities either exist already or can be provided without too much difficulty, and this possibility is being examined. Indeed, these facilities have recently been provided at Tralee and Waterford courthouses.

With regard to the capacity of the courts to absorb the additional business which will accrue as a result of the provisions in this Bill, I repeat here the undertaking already given in the Dáil in this regard: that, if as a result of the close watch I will be keeping on the workloads after the new jurisdiction limits take effect, a need is established for extra judicial posts or staffing, then I will take the necessary steps to ensure that they are made available. I am fully satisfied that the available court accommodation can take the additional business, because outside of Dublin none of the accommodation is fully utilised. The busier provincial venues have more than one courtroom, which gives them ample capacity; and most other District Court accommodation is in use less than one day per month.

I also repeat that the whole question of courthouse accommodation is being actively pursued at present and, while I am not in a position to give any details of the proposals which may emerge, I can say that these are being pressed forward as quickly as possible and will be brought to the Government without delay.

Senator Molony had some critical things to say about the civil legal aid scheme which the Minister for Justice introduced over a year ago. Other Senators also commented on the subject. As regards the availability of legal aid services, I want, first of all, to make it clear, as the Minister himself has done on numerous occasions already, that there is no intention to limit the number of law centres operated by the Legal Aid Board to seven. The board intend, and the Government scheme requires, that services under the scheme can be availed of by any person anywhere in the country who is eligible for them. The initial seven law centres which the board set up merely represent the first phase of their activity. The board have responded already to clear evidence of the need to expand services in Dublin by increasing capacity at their existing two Dublin centres earlier this year and the Minister for Justice gave his consent recently for the establishment of a further large centre in Dublin this year.

I am also aware that the board wish to establish some additional law centres outside Dublin and will be making proposals soon. In addition the board are empowered under the civil legal aid scheme to make services available in any area on a part-time basis if they consider that to do so would be in the interests of providing reasonable access to legal services for persons who would otherwise find it difficult to gain access to those services.

The Legal Aid Board's dynamic approach to the provision of services under the scheme ought to be sufficient assurance for anyone of a firm intention to provide reasonable access to their services on a nationwide basis, and even if this were to involve some people in travelling a distance to avail of these services it should be borne in mind that many people already travel not inconsiderable distances to avail of other services provided by the State.

The suggestion that the scheme of civil legal aid should be widened to include the legal services available from private practitioners hardly conceals the inherent matter of self-interest to the solicitor's profession which has been agitating for this very measure for some time. This, of course, they are entitled to do. However, I want to be quite frank about this. The Government decided against including the private practitioner in the scheme mainly to ensure that the financial effects of the scheme could be kept under control. As the Minister pointed out when opening the Dublin law centres, the Government were concerned at the possibility that, without this feature, the scheme might mushroom into something far beyond the capacity of the community to sustain. It is hardly necessary to spell out how that could happen, nor do I think it necessary to apologise because the tax-payer's protection arose in the Government's consideration of the matter.

It has also been asserted that the scheme is inadequate to cater for the needs of persons in the area of family law. I can only assume that the Senators who make this point are under the impression that in some way the scheme does not extend to some cases in this area or that the financial contributions required are too onerous. I am informed by the board that — certainly since the eligibility criteria were altered with effect from 1 February 1981 — there is no foundation whatsoever for such criticisms.

There has been also a suggestion that the proposals contained in the Bill have been framed with the object of reducing State spending on the provision of legal aid. I have already made it quite clear that the objective of this Bill is to make justice more accessible and less expensive for all potential litigants whether legally aided or not. If this results in keeping down the cost to the taxpayer of civil legal aid, then it is to be welcomed and I cannot see why Senators should object.

I cannot see why procedures which were found by an eminent body of lawyers to be unwieldly, over-elaborate and time consuming — and, ipso facto, expensive — should suddenly be found justified simply because it is the taxpayer who is to foot the bill.

Senator Cooney expressed the fear that, by giving the Circuit Court the substantially increased jurisdiction proposed, we might run the risk of attracting senior counsel into that court on a much wider scale than at present. Senator FitzGerald also spoke of the necessity to limit costs if the whole purpose of the Bill was not to be defeated. I recognised this possibility and I am prepared to face up to the challenge which it presents. The present statutory position is that the function of fixing scales of costs to be applied in the Circuit Court is a function of the appropriate rule-making body, which is the Circuit Court Rules Committee with the concurrence of the Minister for Justice.

Senator FitzGerald drew attention to the fact that giving jurisdiction to the Circuit Court in divorce a mensa et thoro will not go very far in relieving the High Court of the burden of work which it has at present. He is perfectly correct in what he says: the incidence of such cases as a proportion of the total workload of the High Court is negligible. But I think that we must again come back to the main aim of the proposals in this Bill: that is, to make this and the other remedies more easily accessible to those who require them in the future. Most of us in public life will be aware of unfortunate domestic situations where one or other of those remedies would have been sought but for the expense of seeking them or the sheer inconvenience of facing a stay in Dublin and leaving one's farm or business untended during the hearing.

By making divorce a mensa et thoro available in the Circuit Court, with the advantages of a local venue, lower costs and straightforward procedures, many more people than at present will be in a position to regard that as a realistic option when considering the best remedy for their difficulties. It is only reasonable to expect that this Bill, in conjunction with the legal aid scheme, will have a marked impact on the number of cases in the family law area which will actually reach a courtroom, rather than fester under the surface of our society. The impact of this on work-loads will not be entirely negligible, but, as I have said in another context, this is something which we simply will have to take into account, along with other changes affecting work-loads, when monitoring the effects of these measures in the future. That is, I am satisfied, the best approach. It is unfortunate that some of the criticisms levelled at this Bill in the course of this debate seem to indicate that some at least of the learned legal Senators do not appear to have read the basic documents involved. The jurisdiction proposals before the House are based on recommendations made by the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure in their 20th Interim Report. This report has been laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas and is available not only to members of the general public but also from the Oireachtas Library. In that report are contained the answers to some of the specific questions raised by these Senators.

They complained that there would be no benefit in giving to the Circuit Court jurisdiction in divorce a mensa et thoro as the procedures to be followed in the High Court in this type of action were extremely complicated. I would direct the Senators' attention to paragraph 21 of the committee's report which deals with this question:

So far as the recommendation for the vesting in the Circuit Court of jurisdiction in applications for divorce a mensa et thoro is concerned it is recommended that the necessary statutory changes should be made to enable this to be done by a civil bill rather than by the complicated form of proceedings which at present exist in the High Court commencing by way of petition.

I have indicated on previous occasions, and I will make it clear yet again, that this recommendation is one of many matters which will fall to be considered by the appropriate rule-making body in the interval between the passing of the Bill and the coming into effect of its main provisions.

I might mention in passing that Senator McGuinness read into the Bill that the guardianship jurisdiction provisions would be excluded from the 12-month moratorium. That is simply not the case. Section 33 is perfectly clear on the point.

Senator Robinson, in a more general way, referred to the 20th Report and asked whether other "professional bodies" had made submissions on the proposals in the report. Once again, the answer is available in the report — Appendix IV — and lists the Incorporated Law Society and the body representing her own branch of the legal profession as having made submissions. I regret that Senator Robinson is not here.

The only conclusion that one can draw from questions such as this is that she has not read the report in question. This apparently was the position in regard to her attack on the Government's position on the law of domicile which she put on the record of this House on 11 March last and which was based on a totally incorrect claim by Senator Robinson that the Law Reform Commission working paper on the subject contained material to back her stance. When the commission pointed out publicly that their paper contained no such material, the Senator acknowledged her error in newspaper correspondence, but as far as I am aware nothing has been done until now regarding the record of this House.

There are, of course, some who differ to a greater or lesser degree from what is proposed or some of what is proposed. It is normal that there would not be total unanimity on matters such as these and I have already indicated what the position is. I, for one, would consider it unhelpful, to say the least, to engage in Parliament in a review of the position taken by different authorities, particularly named individuals, in this regard. What the Courts Committee have done in formulating their recommendations is to take all the various points of view into account; this is really what they are there for. Similarly, the Government sought and took into account a wide spectrum of views when arriving at the proposals now before the House. One Senator seemed to cast an aspersion on the ability and competence of the Courts Committee in this regard. This I reject immediately. Successive Governments have been well served by the skill and impartiality of the committee and I have no doubt whatsoever that it is a matter of vital public interest that the committee should continue to serve Government, Parliament and the people in this way.

Senator FitzGerald raised a point as to the increase from £100 to £200 in the limit for valuation of land in Chancery cases. He points out that rateable valuation of land is not affected by inflation, and once again he is correct. But the point of these proposals is that the new limits, both monetary and valuation, are intended to give to the District and Circuit Courts a substantial real increase in jurisdiction over and above what is necessary to compensate for inflation alone.

The Senator also spotted what he suspected might be a loophole in section 22, in that a defendant by careful timing of a settlement offer or a lodgment into court might escape from paying any interest before judgment. I must compliment him on his perspicacity, but I fear I must disappoint him. The provision at section 22 is substantially the same as a provision in English law, although there are quite significant differences, and my understanding is that techniques of a procedural nature exist in that jurisdiction to ensure that a plaintiff is not hard done by in this respect. I am not aware of any reason why similar techniques could not evolve here.

A number of Senators raised the issue of appeals, both the manner of their hearing and the courts in which they are heard. As to the suggestion that appeals from decisions of the Circuit Court should be direct to the Supreme Court, I am not convinced that there would be any advantage over the present system of appeal to the High Court: likewise, on the question of appeals by way of transcript alone rather than complete rehearing. These questions raise some fundamental issues, and would also represent a major break with practice as established in the lower courts. Nonetheless, the points raised by Senators are valid and I would accept that much of the benefit of these proposals would be lost if, in a substantial proportion of cases, there has to be a High Court rehearing. Of course much will depend on the way in which the High Court will deal in practice with such appeals, and the outcome of the appeals, particularly in the initial stages of the new disposition. It must be remembered that while appeals will be on a rehearing basis this will be before a judge without a jury and, in addition, the appeals will also be heard locally. As the Courts Committee pointed out in their 20th Report, such an appeals system has advantages for the litigant. I have indicated my intention of keeping a close watch on the operation of the courts when the new jurisdiction arrangements take effect, and the suggestions made in this debate will certainly ge among the possible alternatives considered if it appears necessary in the light of experience to modify the appeal procedures. The question of jury trials in civil actions is one which gives rise to forceful arguments both for and against. The position in this jurisdiction is that there has always been a right to jury trial in High Court civil actions. This right was done away with in the Circuit Court by the Courts Act, 1971, which incidentally also raised the tort jurisdiction limit to its present level of £2,000. The main reason for abolisiing civil juries in the Circuit Court was that the right was seldom exercised. Because of the present low level of the Circuit Court jurisdiction relative to the cost of repair or replacement of a motor-car, most running-down actions fall within the jurisdiction of the High Court alone.

Debate adjourned.

Seanad Éireann debate - Wednesday, 15 Apr 1981