I regret that I cannot give a welcome to this legislation. I express my sympathy to the Minister of State who I know is a decent and forthright man for I am sure it must be of some embarrassment to him that he is placed in the position of introducing legislation which certainly appears to carry an implication of political or Civil Service camouflage. I have to say that because it seems quite extraordinary, and I am surprised that my valued and distinguished colleague, Senator Doyle, did not underline this more, that of the recommendations of the task force no less than 29 out of 30 dealt with the nature of the gas supply, and only one with the nature of the buildings affected. The response of the Government seems directed principally at this less significant element of the construction of buildings. This is absolutely to be deplored.
We hear the engineering profession warmly praised, and rightly praised in my opinion, because we have a very fine tradition in the engineering profession. It is remarkable in the light of this to note the ease with which those on both sides of the House appear to dismiss the findings of Cumann Innealtóirí na hÉireann, the Association of Consulting Engineers of Ireland. Senator Fitzsimons pointed out that it was this body who, in section 10 of their report, indicated that they would benefit financially from the provisions of this Bill but he omitted to give the context in which this statement was made which was, that despite the fact that they stood to benefit financially from this Bill, they still completely dissociated themselves from its provisions and they are the most senior body, technically speaking and professionally speaking, dealing in this area.
The first item of this press statement as opposed to the final item which Senator Fitzsimons read states that "The Association of Consulting Engineers of Ireland believes that the proposed legislation regarding multi-storey buildings is ill conceived, inappropriate and not in the best interests of the public" and this despite the fact that they stand to benefit financially from it. There is clearly a crux here and a very interesting one. It is one I believe that it is the absolute obligation of this House to examine.
If we go back we will see that this Bill emerged from a tragic occurrence on 1 January 1987 when there was an explosion in a block of flats in Ballsbridge. I do not intend to rehearse the whole history, although this is gone into in the very extensive report produced by Cremer and Warner which has already been referred to and which consists of two sections, the main report and the technical appendices, Part B. There is a subsequent third report which deals with the tragic coincidence that there was a further gas explosion in Dolphin House during the hearing of the inquiry. This occurred at 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 25 February of that year.
I would like to direct the attention of the House to some highly unusual things and I would like to get an explanation. I would, of course, have to place on the record that I do not hold the present Minister personally or morally responsible, but I do believe that he is caught in an unsavoury situation. If I look, for example, at the terms of reference under which Cremer and Warner Limited operated, they give some interesting information in their introductory material. They say:
On 2nd January 1987 the Minister for Energy appointed Cremer and Warner Limited (CWL) to undertake an independent investigation of the explosion at Raglan House.
Let us remember that it was the Minister for Energy who called for the report. Why? The reason seems to be perfectly clear because the principal source of danger lay not in the building but in the nature of gas supply and also the work practices of Dublin Gas. This was understood right at the beginning.
I might remind the House that the principal reason for concern by the public was this matter of gas supply and that this concern could not possibly be allayed by this Bill, however well intentioned it was. The Minister concluded his remarks by saying he is confident that the provisions of this Bill will bring a greater level of reassurance to the public about the safety of multi-storey buildings. I do not believe it will reassure the public because the question at issue is not multi-storey buildings, we are not dealing with Ronan Point, we are dealing with a quite different situation. We are dealing, in particular, with the nature of the gas supply. Until the last few years, as the Minister and the House know, the town gas supply for the city of Dublin consisted of gas derived from coal, in other words, it was a bituminous gas with bituminous tarry deposits forming on the lining of the walls of the pipes which effectively helped to seal the pipes. When the changeover was made to natural gas, no provision was made to replace this tarry element that had the effect of sealing the pipes.
Natural gas not only does not contain this bituminous element but actually operates as a cleaning agent and so the defects in ageing pipes were very clearly exposed and subject to risk and that, I believe, is the reason 29 out of 30 recommendations concern the nature of the gas supply. It is clearly an inadequate response on the part of the Government to produce legislation that deals with the supposed defects of multi-storey buildings in a re-active situation, dragging up, for example, things like Ronan Point and placing it in the context of a debate where we have heard of the wonderful qualities of Irish engineers. They themselves state that all buildings are at an unacceptable risk until the level of safety in the gas supply is dealt with and brought up to international standards of safety and when they say — this is really an important point:
There is no case in Ireland where a building is known to have suffered disproportionate damage following an accident. This includes the case of Raglan House. A building designed to the most modern structural design codes (or indeed certified as required under the proposed legislation) could not be relied on to resist a gas explosion of the severity of the one that occurred in Raglan House.
Perhaps the Minister could tell me, in the light of that comment, precisely why I should be reassured because I live near the top of a five-storey building that has lasted somewhat shakily, I suppose, from the 18th century. I have gas, to my great grief I may say. I changed from oil fired central heating to gas central heating and I rue the day, but why should I be reassured when what is stated here by the senior professional technical body with an interest in this area is to the effect that certifying, examining, scrutinising, providing certificates — even if they only cost £150 per unit — would not affect the situation? A building that was properly, legitimately certified under this legislation would still collapse if affected by a similar explosive force so why should I be reassured? I do not at all feel reassured and I doubt very much if the Irish public, who are a whit more intelligent than they are sometimes given credit for, will be reassured either.
I would like to point out that we have had a forewarning of this situation. It occurred also in Clonmel, County Tipperary, where there was a change in the nature of the gas supply and Dublin Gas Company were perfectly well aware, they were advised prior to the accident, of this probable outcome. They decided on economic grounds not to alter the chemical composition of the gas they were supplying and that is a particular principal scandal that the Minister for Energy, who is the man who commissioned this report, should be dealing with and should be addressing. Why is it that in response to these reports we have legislation introduced from the Department of the Environment? It looks to me — and, of course, I am a very naive person and it takes a lot to make me feel cynical — as if somebody somewhere is trying to shift a nasty little keg of worms out of his or her box and into somebody else's. That is what I believe.
The terms of reference of the Cremer and Warner investigation were:
1. To investigate and determine the cause of the explosion(s) which occurred on 1st January 1987 at Raglan House, Serpentine Avenue, Ballsbridge, Dublin 4.
2. To examine the Dublin Gas Company codes of practice both as to standards and implementation in relation to the investigation of suspected gas leaks.
3. To comment on the manner in which these codes were complied with at relevant times in relation to Raglan House.
4. To assess all other relevant issues including features of the design of the building which may have a bearing on the safety of gas usage.
5. The report should detail the findings, draw conclusions and make recommendations on how such incidents might be avoided in future, and should be with the Minister for Energy by 23 January 1987.
Then you get the following rather interesting remark:
Given these wide terms of reference CWL in agreement with the Department of Energy (DOE), restricted their examination to matters relating to Raglan House, or similar types of multi-storey buildings and occupancy.
Why? They were asked to investigate four things and in the fifth section they were given the framework under which their conclusions could be provided and they went instantly for one element in section 4. Were they given direction to do this? Was the specific intention to divert from the principal cause to something that I might describe really as more the political effect? That seems to me to have been happening here in this case and that is why I am so concerned about this.
The summary of the conclusions of Cremer and Warner gives a history of the building and a history of the explosion that occurred. There were two explosions, the first caused the collapse of four flats above flat 1, leaving the rear flats mainly intact but poorly supported. There was a subsequent second small explosion about 20 minutes later in the void under flat 2, as a result of the ignition of natural gas and air which had accumulated in the void beneath the ground floor and then just before midday the rear flats of Raglan House collapsed. The collapse of the building, following the first explosion, can be likened to a collapse of a "house of cards", i.e. ‘'progressive collapse". There was no frame or other system to support the upper part of the building when a particular structural member failed.
I put this together with what the Association of Consulting Engineers say. A comparison or parallel from this evidence with anything like Ronan Point is inappropriate because of the conclusion reached here, that the gas explosion was of such magnitude that no building could have withstood it so that the progressive collapse was caused not by a design fault, but by the nature und volume of the explosion itself aided and abetted by a very poor level of work practice by the employees of Dublin Gas. In view of the seriousness with which we must all take the loss of human life, this has got to be placed on the record. It does not give me any great pleasure to do so, but it must be done.
Cremer and Warner say they examined absolutely everything. I am not going to read the list into the record but the Minister and the House will be aware of that. I am sure Senators interested in participating in the debate will have read the very extensive and technical reports on that incident. Cremer and Warner tested for every possibility and they were drawn, inevitably, to the conclusion that there was very probably a specific problem involved in Raglan House. In their report they refer to the backfilling of a ditch containing a pipe. They say:
The evidence clearly points to a gas escape from a fracture in a 100 mm diameter cast iron service pipe supplying natural gas to Raglan House being the cause.
One has to ask if this would have occurred to the same magnitude of intensity if the gas used had been the gas used at the time when the supply was laid in the first place, that is coal derived town gas, rather than natural gas. The report continues:
This pipe was poorly laid and back filled, with the ground below providing little support to the gas service above. CWL discount the theory that the pipe failed as a result of movement of heavy vehicles over the pipe after the explosion, as it is inconsistent with the overall evidence.
The report went into some technical detail which I will omit and then stated:
There was evidence of a gas escape in the area of Raglan and Clyde Houses for several days before the explosion. On the 24th December 1986 a strong smell of gas was noted by many people outside Raglan House and reported to the Dublin Gas Company. DGC personnel measured 20 per cent gas in the gravel outside Flat 1 in Raglan House, excavated a small hole outside Flat 1 and drilled holes (commonly known as ‘barholes') in the car park and driveway. This allowed the gas to vent, but the source of the leak was not identified and no check was made for gas inside flat 1.
On the 28th December, gas was for the first time smelt inside the Raglan House flats. On the 29th December, First Management, the managing agents for the owners, reported the leak to DGC, who state that there is no record of any call being received.
Clearly, the attention of Cremer and Warner was directed by the Minister for Energy to certain areas of investigation. I am referring to the practices of the gas company. The report continues.
He checked the excavation and barholes made on the 24th December and obtained a reading of 20 per cent of the Lower Explosive Limit. No checks were made inside Raglan House (where the smell of gas had been detected).
The conclusion is highly significant:
At Raglan House, on both visits, DGC personnel did not adhere to DGC standing instructions on the procedures necessary to investigate effectively a reported gas escape. The actions undertaken were directed more at alleviating the symptoms than identification of the source of the leak.
That is a very serious criticism and it has nothing whatever to do with the kind of provisions which the Government consider an appropriate response. Basically what they are saying is that somebody in Raglan House complained of a smell of gas, that they were concerned about their safety and the Dublin Gas Company sent out somebody with an air freshener. That does not reassure me and I very much doubt that it would reassure anybody else. The report continues:
The DGC leak investigation practices carried out leave much to be desired, and are contrary to the written procedures and the training received. Some other practices, e.g. the widespread practice of backfilling temporary repairs, should be discontinued, except in very exceptional circumstances, since it endangers public safety.
The main issues highlighted by CWL on the Raglan House investigation are: (a) the need to tighten up DGC procedures, practices and management control; and (b) the need to establish effective control over the design of multi-storey buildings to prevent progressive collapse if an accident occurs.
I should like to draw the attention of the House again to the fact that item No.1 deals with the need to tighten up procedures. Despite the fact that they have been given a clear instruction to keep their noses out of these areas and to deflect public attention onto this chimera about multi-storey buildings, nevertheless, even given these terms of reference, Cremer and Warner return to this notion that there is a serious problem with regard to the Dublin Gas Company procedures and also the nature of the gas supply involved.
The main recommendations of the report are that the Dublin Gas Company should:
Issue revised leak investigation procedures, which were prepared for the Raglan House explosion, and ensure all relevant DGC personnel are trained in their use. Develop an annual safety action plan, setting priorities and target dates, with clear management accountability.
Another five or six recommendations are listed. The Minister, who is always well briefed, may have the answer to those questions and he may be able to give specific concrete reassurances to the House to amplify the vague umbrella of the reassurance given to Senator Doyle when he, in a very public spirited way, raised this issue on the Adjournment, and was given the bland assurance that 50 per cent of these recommendations were being implemented currently. I would like to know which 50 per cent, which practices, chapter and verse, in regard to those matters. We are talking about the safety, the lives and well-being of citizens many of whom in the city of Dublin use the domestic gas supply.
I should like to add that in Part B — Technical Appendices, Cremer and Warner return to what seems to have been the direct cause of the specific explosion when they refer to the discovery of an earlier trench, containing very loose backfill material, which intersects the 100 mm (4") service pipe trench at the location of the fracture, and runs east of the intersection towards the now collapsed corner of Raglan House, is particularly significant.
To continue briefly this line of investigation I should like to state that it is worthy of notice that dealing with the report on the investigation of the explosion at Dolphin House, Rialto, on 25 February 1987 the concluding paragraph of this summary states:
At Dolphin House, the service pipe-laying was inadequate and contrary to good industrial practice. A connection was made by a contractor's crew, (but under DGC supervision) with the piping "live" thereby allowing the gas to escape to the atmosphere and enter the flats. This was unnecessary, as fittings were available in the DGC stores which permitted the service to be pressure tested and connected to the "live" main with hardly any escape of gas to the atmosphere. This adds further weight to the CWL conclusions and recommendations concerning DGC working practices and supervision; these being detailed in full in the Raglan House Report, Part A.
I have read quotations from the latter into the record. I should like to consider in some further detail the briefing documents supplied to Senators by Cumann Innealtóirí na hÉireann, the Association of Consulting Engineers of Ireland. I believe that if we accept, as has been said in the House, that they are the professionally competent body, it behoves us to listen to what they have to say. Otherwise there is absoutely no point in their existence. In their statement they indicate that, as the senior professional body, in the aftermath of the Raglan House explosion they took the very responsible step of instituting two committees, one dealing with the aspect of gas supply and the other considering the implications for structural design of buildings. It is important to note the order of priority, first dealing with the nature of the gas supply and, secondly, with the buildings.
The Association of Consulting Engineers say that they are surprised at the continued general lack of appreciation of the significance of the findings of these committees. A study of the report of the committee of nine engineering experts who considered structural safety of multi-storey buildings clearly shows that all of the aspects of the Raglan House incident that had been and continue to be highlighted as being causes for general concern were either misrepresented or misunderstood. They wish to assure the general public that there is very little cause for concern with regard to the structural safety of these buildings. That is very important. If they are right and there is not a great deal to worry about and even if the most stringent application of this legislation proposed by the Minister were in force, the Raglan House incident still would not be avoided. It would still have exactly the same results. The Minister recognises in his speech that the structural upgrading of an existing building is seldom economically viable. What is the point in having examinations which have no practical effect other than requiring an upgrading which the Minister himself regards as economically not viable. It seems to be quite absurd.
I am very concerned about safety. I do not want it to be thought that I am not so concerned but I believe that our attention is being deflected from the real source of anxiety which is the gas. In addition to this there is a real cause for concern by the owners of apartments in these sorts of blocks, a very practical, down to earth, mundane one. In the light of this kind of diversion of interests from the real source of anxiety, that is the gas, to some kind of inflated notion of the dangers of apartment blocks — most apartment blocks are at least five storeys high and there is going to be a serious impact on the resale value of these premises. While this legislation does virtually nothing to improve the physical capacity of a building other than keeping a register — the Minister knows as well as I do that paper and ink will not keep a building standing for very long — there is very little that is practical in this legislation. People will be worried that the property they live in will be devalued.
Paragraph 5 of the consulting engineers' statement, which I take very seriously, states that the proposed legislation will cause unwarranted concern and distress to owners and occupiers of multi-storey buildings, particularly apartment buildings. It says that it will also result in unwarranted expenditure of money in an ineffective way by the owners of apartments and other multi-storey buildings who have not been shown to be responsible in any way for a problem that exists. These are responsible professional people who stand to benefit by this waste of money. I would like to salute them because it is remarkably altruistic for a professional body to say: "Do not create a situation in which you are throwing money at us and it is not going to have any impact".
The vets in this country have been creaming off millions of pounds in a totally futile TB eradication scheme. They have no such conscience in this area. The engineers, I am glad to say do appear to have. Property values will probably be seriously affected and many of the specified buildings may not be insurable not because there is reason to consider them structurally inadequate but because they do not comply with the terms of the proposed legislation. This is another crux that I would like the Minister to deal with in his reply. He acknowledges with great clarity and honesty, as I would expect from him, that some of the recommendations of the task force cannot be implemented in ordinary commercial terms because they are not economically viable, given the life span of these buildings and given the occupancy, the turnover and the income from them. The result of this is that the people inside these buildings will not be able to get insurance. That is a nice little nest egg for some retired couple to face up to. Paragraph 6 states:
The report of the Government task force and other reports of similar stature have clearly identified the defective gas network as the primary danger and main risk for building collapse. The arbitrary structural appraisal requirements in the proposed legislation for buildings of a particular height, type and age range as a legally acceptable alternative to ensuring that the gas supply system is safe is fundamentally illogical.
That is the main burden of what I have been trying to say here this morning. We are responding to a related series of what could have been really major urban disasters and yet according to the Association of Consulting Engineers in Ireland we are not addressing the problem at all. They make an irrefutable point when they say that the arbitary requirement regarding structure as a legally acceptable alternative to ensuring that the gas supply system is safe is illogical. I could perhaps use stronger words than that: I would be tempted, if it was not unparliamentary, to say dishonest, but of course I could not possibly allow myself this freedom, so I will not say that.
Paragraph 7 says that a distinguished committee of experts, a joint committee of engineering institutions, JCEI, comprised of engineers with experience in the design of multi-storey buildings and drawn from the Institution of Engineers of Ireland, the Institution of Structural Engineers and the Association of Consulting Engineers of Ireland examined the evidence relating to building structures in the official report of the Raglan House incident. This committee concluded that there is no evidence that any general problem exists regarding the structural resistance of buildings to explosion or other accident. What are we doing with this legislation? We have heard this morning that the Government side in particular are aching to be off with their buckets and spades. Why are we staying here discussing this if it does not actually address the problem? It seems to be a nonsense.
The report of the JCEI Committee is the most authoritative technical analysis of the problem. The JCEI provided the Government task force at their request, with specialist advice on multi-storey buildings necessary for the task force to carry out their work. In other words they are the source of the technical information which we are expected to implement in this Bill, while the people who provided the information disagree with it. I will come back to that again because it is so fascinating. These are the people who provide the information and give the authoritative evidence, who specifically and clearly direct the attention of the Government and the public away from the notion that there is a structural design problem and towards the problem of the nature of the gas supply and so on. They provide the following welcome to the Minister. They say that the proposed legislation is ill-conceived, inappropriate and not in the best interests of the public. The Minister blandly states that everybody is going to be reassured and we are all going to welcome the Bill and he commends it to the House. I am afraid his blandishments, even in the familiar ancestral accents of Laois-Offaly, will not wash with me.
In the latest report of the proposed legislation the JCEI have reiterated their finding that the main cause of concern is the gas network and that there is no evidence of a general problem in relation to mutli-storey buildings and accidental damage. The committee state explicitly that the proposed legislation is inappropriate. Item No. 9 states that there is obviously a need to upgrade the gas supply system to ensure it meets internationally accepted standards of safety. The ACEI welcome the Minister's reassurance in this regard that the upgrading of the gas system is well in hand. That is the problem and I must say that it causes me very considerable anxiety and concern that there should have been this illogical splitting of responsibilities, this illogical diversion of the attention of the legislators and the general public away from what has been clearly demonstrated to be the principle cause of the difficulty and towards something that bears very little direct or clear scrutiny.
I would have to say that far from welcoming this Bill in the light of what I have placed on the record of the House today, I sincerely hope that it will be voted to blazes away out of this House to where it belongs, in the bin, and that the Government will stand reproved in this House today for not having taken seriously the best advice they got and for not having addressed what is the principal problem underlying this whole situation. I will be very interested to find out if there are further and more authoritive views. I am not clear where they would come from with regard to the question of structural design faults which the Minister has been bewitched into getting involved with, I think very inappropriately in the circumstances. I hope that I will be in the House to hear the Minister's reply and I would ask him to excuse me for any apparent discourtesy if I am not here because I have been engaged to give a lecture in Cork later today. I hope to be back to the House before I go away to hear part at least of what the Minister has got to say and I thank him for his patient endurance in resisting what must have been a strong temptation to interrupt some of the pretty blunt remarks I had to make. I know that he would be aware that they are not intended personally and that I exculpate him from any blame in this matter but I do think that it is a matter for blame.
It is a matter for regret that legislation, which in the opinion of so many competent people is inappropriate and dodges and fudges the problem, should have been inflicted upon this particular Minister. I sincerely hope that there will be a vote on this and I hope that there will be an opportunity to register disapproval for these tactics which are, in football, known as kicking for touch. This is the clearest example of kicking for touch that I have seen in the 18 months that I have been a Member of this House.
