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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 29 Apr 2009

Vol. 195 No. 3

Proposed National Asset Management Agency: Motion.

I move:

That Seanad Éireann,

noting the Government's proposal to establish a national asset management agency, NAMA, to purchase up to €90 billion of developer loans from banks;

noting the testimony from the Financial Regulator last October that at least €15 billion of these loans are secured only on the underlying lands-properties, and noting market reports that the value of these underlying lands and properties has declined by as much as 80%;

noting the inconsistency of the objectives for NAMA set by Government of (i) purchasing the distressed loans from the banks at a fair price; (ii) ensuring that the banks remain adequately capitalised; and (iii) keeping the banks in private ownership;

noting the vastly superior information available to senior bank executives in the valuation of these loans, and their incentives to over-value them;

noting that the establishment of so-called ‘bad banks' in other countries — such as the USA and Sweden — involved fundamentally different processes that did not create the same problems in bad loan valuation;

noting that the purchase of over-valued loans from the banks has the potential to further undermine Ireland's already damaged credit rating in international markets, and to drain resources away from vital public services over the next two decades,

calls on the Government

to reverse its decision to establish NAMA; and

to commission swiftly a study into Fine Gael's alternative, superior proposal to capitalise ‘good banks' that are ready to lend, and to minimise taxpayers' exposure to loan losses by ensuring that the vast bulk of banking losses are absorbed by the providers of risk capital and debt to the banks.'

I propose to share time with Senator Phelan.

The proposer cannot share time. The proposer will have 12 minutes but it is not the tradition to allow the proposer to share time. The seconder can share time.

I welcome the Minister of State to the House to discuss this matter. The discussion of NAMA in both Houses is incredibly important in light of the huge amounts of funding that is involved. We must keep in mind other options that we could consider. One option is the good bank, which has been tried out in other jurisdictions. Recently, I suggested using one of the smaller building societies to help out. There is a fully functioning building society with a relatively low level of toxic debt compared to the big banks that could be taken over by the Government without too much difficulty. The State could provide funding of €500 million and lending could start immediately after the summer. We should consider using the small and medium-sized enterprise unit in Anglo Irish Bank, which could work with the EBS to provide much funding to the business sector.

I do not mind stopping if the Minister of State wishes to discuss some matter. I accept that this is complex and he may want to talk to others about it. It is no problem if he requires time to do so.

We could use what we own already, Anglo Irish Bank, and its expertise in small and medium-sized businesses. We could also examine taking over the EBS and use Government funding to loan to that institution. Lending could start in the Irish banking sector very quickly compared with what the Minister wants to do.

In a recession a lower amount of lending takes place but the problem we experience is that solvent companies and businesses are experiencing difficulties in accessing credit. This could lead to their demise and must be dealt with urgently. Waiting for NAMA to be established is not good enough.

We did something similar to what I am proposing at ICI some years ago. The State took responsibility for this and got it going relatively quickly. It had an impact. When we take away the operational part of Anglo Irish Bank, we would be left with NAMA because the toxic debts at Anglo Irish Bank are massive, €60 billion to €70 billion. They are being managed by staff in Anglo Irish Bank. The EBS option is much cheaper for the taxpayer and could be up and running very quickly. This is along the lines of the good bank model, with the Government supporting it. It is not as big, complex or expensive as the Minister's option. If the Minister insists on NAMA, our proposal could be run in conjunction with it. The difficulty with NAMA is that it could take up to two years before it is functional. That would be too late for the Irish economy. This is just one of the Opposition proposals and I would like to hear the views of the Minister. He may agree or disagree. He may understand why there is a problem with it. The Government's policy, which is to bring about NAMA, is incredibly complex and we have not faced the practicalities of the proposed body.

If I was a big developer with €2 billion or €3 billion in assets, I would not manage such assets on my own. I would have a staff of between 50 and 100 people to help me out. If many of these assets were toxic — they are for many developers — my bank would work with me to try to get the best value from such assets. If NAMA takes over these toxic assets, neither the developer nor the banker will have responsibility to work these assets. The Minister of State knows getting assets to work means trying to develop and add value to them to get the best deal possible.

There are approximately 50 to 60 big developers holding most of these toxic assets. How will NAMA replace the financial, legal and property expertise that these 50 to 60 developers have at this time? It is a crucial question in explaining how NAMA will work for us. When the banks, developers and their staff are absolved of their responsibility in running these toxic debts, how will NAMA do it and where will the Government find the personnel for this? It is incredibly important that this question is answered.

The Government's proposed amendment states that the developers would have to repay those loans. In it the Government "notes that the developers will be required to repay their loans and to the extent that they have made losses, they would have to recognise those". It is a little simplistic to say that they must recognise their losses as I am sure they will do so. That is not to say that the Government will go after developers with regard to funding.

I am sure the Minister for Finance is well acquainted with many big developers and, as a barrister, I am sure he fully understands these individuals' constitutional and legal rights. I am sure the Minister of State also understands them. Will the Minister of State explain how NAMA will get over the constitutional and legal rights relating to contracts and property rights that the people concerned hold under the Constitution when the Government chases good assets as well as toxic assets? The Government could find itself in the courts for the next 20 years because of challenges in this regard. I am afraid that some of the tough talk coming from Government about how it will chase these developers is nothing more than talk.

The same truth applies to the levy which the Government will hit the banks with if NAMA fails to do its job. If NAMA buys the assets at too high a price and fails to pass on these assets in time, the Government is threatening to put a levy on the banks. This is ridiculous as it will be another issue for international investors and banks when they give loans to Irish banks. They will have a levy hanging over them that they will have no way of quantifying as it will depend on whether a Government organisation called NAMA is successful or a failure. That is a problem. How will the levy work and what is the potential cost to the banks? This will have a knock-on effect on the international market.

We are discussing putting a value on toxic loans so we will take one that is very prominent in most people's minds. What is the value of the Jury's Ballsbridge site where a developer wanted to build a little piece of England a number of years ago? Never mind the other half-finished housing estates or commercial parks right across the country, what is the value of the Jury's site? I would not be able to value it and I do not believe the Minister of State or anybody in the Department of Finance could do so. Who will value that site and all the others for NAMA?

The banks told us €3.5 billion in recapitalisation was enough but when the Department of Finance carried out due diligence, it found that an extra €1.5 billion was required. That means the banks are either incompetent or misleading the Minister because they answer to shareholders rather than the Irish taxpayer. The banks are not in a position to value these sites. Could the estate agents who are tied into banks and building societies value these sites? Could they really work for the Government? Who will value the sites to be purchased for €80 billion or €90 billion across the country? The question requires an answer.

Many of the ordinary men and women in this country are afraid that we are returning to a scenario like the actions of Larry Goodman, the beef tribunal and the events which brought that about. There may have been a valid reason for Charles Haughey to bail out Larry Goodman all those years ago and there may be a valid reason for the Government taking its present approach to the banking crisis. There is nevertheless a concern that the Government is not being as inquisitive as it should be with the bankers and developers, or that the Government is perhaps taking too much notice of what is important for bankers and developers rather than paying attention to what it should be watching over, which is how this will affect the taxpayer.

When we discussed the legislation nationalising Anglo Irish Bank a number of months ago, I moved an amendment which would have meant no more than €10 billion of taxpayers' money would be spent on the banking crisis. The response of the Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, in this House was that he did not envisage that amount of money being necessary to stabilise the banking crisis. That was only a few months ago but we are now committing ourselves to multiples of that figure. At the same time we are unsure as to what the Government is doing and the role NAMA will play, despite it probably being the single biggest investment made by any Government in the State's history. There is no clear direction on where the Government is going with it.

We need this debate as taxpayers will lose out significantly. We are not yet sure how shareholders in AIB and Bank of Ireland will lose out and it is quite possible that with the way NAMA is going, the Government will be left with no choice but to nationalise Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, no matter what the Minister of State indicates now. He may say that the Government is not interested in nationalising them but there may be no choice.

If these issues concern a functioning banking system or the survival of the current system, we must ask ourselves whether the taxpayer should be expected to pay for it, if the cost is too great, whether there are other options, to what extent have they been discussed and to what extent is the Government willing to discuss its own idea and alternatives with others in the country? I have made my questions fairly clear and straightforward. I must leave the Chamber for a moment but I will be back to hear the Minister of State's contribution.

I wish to share time with Senator Coghlan, with the permission of the House.

Is that agreed? Agreed.

I formally second the motion proposed by my colleague, Senator Twomey, and I welcome the Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh, to the House. I have some questions as this is the first time we have had an opportunity for a detailed discussion on NAMA since the mini-budget three weeks ago. The source of the problems from an Opposition perspective and that of the public is that there is not enough information available as to how NAMA will operate.

It is seen by many as another half-baked idea, although I do not necessarily believe that to be the truth. Nevertheless, there is a perception that the Government has had three or four bites of the cherry with budget proposals and the restructuring of our banking system but there is no confidence in this. The lack of information surrounding this proposal is fuelling that lack of confidence.

There is also the perception that the Government is supporting its friends in the banks to the tune of billions while small and medium enterprises, farmers, fishermen and different people across the country are suffering. I know what lies behind the Government's introduction of NAMA but I would like the Minister of State to address the lack of information on how the body will function.

Many or virtually all those small businesses across the country are having difficulty in accessing credit and it is clear that an economy cannot function without good credit lines, which we do not have at present. The Government must act to resolve that difficulty. I question the action the Government has taken to date. I also question whether establishing NAMA is the correct route to take or whether we should have taken the route proposed by Senator Twomey and Fine Gael. Perhaps the Minister of State might shed some light on the issues relating to NAMA.

The first part of the Government amendment states that Seanad Éireann "notes that the Government's proposed National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) will pay significantly less than the estimated €80 billion to €90 billion potential book value of the loans to be transferred to it". We have been informed that NAMA will pay significantly less but we have no idea of the amount it will pay. The potential liability that could be entered into on behalf of the taxpayer is massive. That is the nub of the problem and the first part of the Government amendment highlights this. Perhaps the Minister of State might shed some light on the matter.

Will the Minister of State also indicate who will be responsible for valuing the assets that will be purchased by NAMA? What criteria will be used in this regard? Clarity has not be forthcoming in respect of this matter. It is obvious that a write-down of anything over 20% could have potentially devastating consequences for either of the two main banks. It has been suggested in some quarters that losses incurred by NAMA will be recovered from the banks by means of some form of levy. Surely threatening to impose a such a levy defeats the purpose of trying to remove bad debts from the books of the banks. The position in respect of this matter has not been clarified.

As Senator Twomey stated, it is unclear whether NAMA will be in a position to extend new loans to borrowers in order that they might complete projects that are unfinished at present. NAMA will be a new State entity and I presume it will take some time to establish it. Information has not been provided with regard to how long the process of establishment will take.

There is a perception among many developers responsible for these bad debts that NAMA will be a soft touch. I hope the Minister of State will be in a position to indicate whether that will in fact be the case. Many of the developers in question seem to be of the view that NAMA will be easier to deal with than the banks which will no longer be pursuing them. Perhaps the Minister of State will clarify the position.

I welcome the Minister of State. I do not believe we should be arguing about this subject which is of critical national importance. The Minister for Finance should have discussed this matter with Deputies Bruton and Burton and reached an agreement in respect of it. The two concepts on offer are the same; it is just that we are of the view that ours is superior. However, an accommodation could have been reached in that regard.

Everyone is aware that stability in the banking sector is essential to our economic recovery. In the absence of such stability, it will not be possible to create the climate that will be conducive to such a recovery. The €80 billion to €90 billion in loans to be transferred to NAMA are spread over the six covered institutions and are merely an estimate. I would like to believe that the final amount to be transferred will be nothing of that order. We need to know the level of the write-downs and we must be able to identify the bottom line in respect of the banks' losses regarding these bad loans. As already stated, I am of the view that what might need to be transferred to NAMA might not have a book value of anything approaching €80 billion to €90 billion. The final figure may come to €20 billion less than that.

Whatever State asset management agency is put in place should not be obliged to take on loans with a book value of €80 billion to €90 billion, especially when one takes into account the write-down or haircut, so to speak, that will be applied. There is a State guarantee in place in respect of the banks and Bank of Ireland has already been recapitalised. AIB is due to be recapitalised on 13 May. The State asset management agency should continue to allow the financial institutions to administer these loans on an agency basis.

I agree with the suggestion regarding the interim board. This is not an ideal development but there is initial scoping work that must be carried out. My colleagues referred earlier to the difficulties involved in allowing experts to become involved in the valuation process. However, I am of the view that there is a sufficient number of professional valuers — members of reputable institutes such as chartered surveyors — who are suitably qualified and who can work with NAMA in this regard. Those to whom I refer are people of proven probity and integrity. These are the type of individuals who will have to serve on the board of NAMA. We cannot turn the latter into a monster agency that hires massive numbers of people. Whatever agency is eventually put in place will, as already stated, be obliged to use those in the banking industry who possess the relevant expertise to manage these bad loans.

We must move quickly because if we do not do so, further uncertainty will be created. As everyone is aware, a slack market will not be of assistance when it comes to pricing. The State will also be obliged to extend its guarantee to the banks beyond September 2010 as a result of the need to deal with a number of bonds which will come to maturity around that time.

I received an e-mail this morning from a concerned citizen. The e-mail in question relates to Bank of Ireland which has already been recapitalised. The person who sent it indicates that he received a price of €293,000 in respect of a sale in which he was involved. He also indicates that before signing a contract:

I sought written confirmation from the bank that they should accept 195,000 as the net sale proceeds. This written acceptance was obtained and I signed the contract and my solicitor gave the usual undertakings.

When the sale closed the bank sought a breakdown of the monies deducted and I duly got this done by my accountant. The bank then wrote to my solicitor saying they ‘would not release funds for accountants fees, VAT on rental income or capital gains tax.

This is clearly ridiculous as I cannot trade without being able to pay my advisers, VAT and capital gains tax. I took this up with the bank on the basis that they had their deposits guaranteed, [had been] given a 3.5 billion [recapitalisation] by the government and yet would not allow me retain funds to pay my taxes to the same government that gave them the [recapitalisation] in the first instance. I am waiting for their reply.

I have written evidence of all of the above and intend to go public shortly and would appreciate if you could raise this matter [at the earliest opportunity in the Seanad]

I am raising this matter because banks cannot be allowed to bring the economy to a halt. We put the recapitalisation in place to prevent the latter from happening. I await the Minister of State's comments on that matter and on the matter of the restructuring of the banking sector, which will be essential.

I move amendment No. 1:

To delete all words after "Seanad Éireann" and substitute the following:

notes that the Government's proposed national asset management agency, NAMA, will pay significantly less than the estimated €80 billion to €90 billion potential book value of the loans to be transferred to it;

notes that account will be taken of the loss in value of the underlying assets and that this will be reflected in the amount that NAMA will pay;

notes that the State will not take all of the risk in the acquisition of assets because they will be valued on a basis that is sustainable for the taxpayer and which will entail losses by the banks. In the longer term, if the agency were to fall short of recouping all of the costs, the Government intends that a levy should be applied to recoup any shortfall;

notes that developers will be required to repay their loans and to the extent that they have made losses, they will have to recognise those — it will not be the function of NAMA to "go easy" on them: NAMA's mandate will be a commercial one;

notes that banks have to take the appropriate write-down in value of loans, as the aim of NAMA is to operate commercially and optimise the return on such loans over time;

notes that the clear and consistent objective of NAMA is to provide the banks with stronger balance sheets, considerably reduced uncertainty over bad debts and as a consequence underpin the flow of credit on a commercial basis to individuals and businesses in the real economy;

notes that Government has had, and NAMA will have, expert financial, economic, legal and valuation advice;

notes that NAMA will not be a bank, it will not be taking deposits and it will not have a banking licence. It will be an asset management company dealing with a mix of loans, good and bad, transferred from banks;

affirms the importance for the Irish economy of a functioning banking system which includes banks having market presence, operating within market disciplines and constraints;

supports the Government's decision to establish NAMA as part of a structured and measured approach to the issues facing the financial sector. This approach includes:

the guarantee on deposits up to September 2010 to stabilise the funding position of the banks and add a further level of protection for depositors;

recapitalisation programme of Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland and the commitment to look at the needs of other institutions;

the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank, necessitated by particular circumstances at the time, to provide protection and support;

the Government also intends in line with its previous indication to put a State guarantee in place for the future issuance of debt securities with a maturity of up to five years;

review and reform of the structures, role and functioning of the Financial Regulator and the relationship with the Central Bank in light of the current situation; and

the ongoing commitment to work with the EU to frame a common approach to the issues faced by the financial services sector;

expresses its confidence in the Government's actions to stabilise and revitalise the banking system including establishment of NAMA as part of this range of considered measures.

I welcome the Minister of State. I am delighted to have the opportunity to comment on the proposed establishment of NAMA. I thank Fine Gael for using its Private Members' time to raise this issue.

I will begin by being somewhat facetious. I found it humorous when Senator Coghlan stated that his party's proposal is superior to ours. We in Fianna Fáil never think of ourselves as being superior, rather we look on ourselves as equals. That is the difference between our two parties historically.

I was referring to the merit of the proposal. I assure the House that I did not intend any offence.

Those of us on this side of the House support the Government decision to establish NAMA as a structured and measured approach to the issues faced by the financial sector. As everyone is aware, our amendment indicates that this approach includes the guarantee on deposits up to 2010 to stabilise the funding position of the banks and adding a further level of protection for depositors, the recapitalisation of Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks plc, the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank which was necessitated by particular circumstances at the time to provide protection and support, and the fact that the Government also intends, in line with its previous indication, to put a State guarantee in place for the future issuance of debt securities with a maturity of up to five years. In terms of the anecdotal evidence mentioned by Senator Coghlan, one of the main reasons for what we have been trying to do is to get the financial system working again, to get credit flowing. While there has been recapitalisation, and we need to see banks lending again, we still have an issue with the confidence of international investors investing in banks and apart from the interbank market, banks secured their money through depositors. They lend from the deposit base, not capital. There are still issues there that must be developed.

While there are many details to tease out, the principle is good. It will be the template for all economies in the EU to lead their countries out of the toxic debt problem. We all want to ensure that banks return to lending to the real economy as soon as possible, with a clean bill of health, strengthened balance sheets and reduced uncertainty over debts. NAMA will acquire the loans at an appropriate discount from the face value of the loans held on the banks' balance sheets. Developers whose loans are transferred to NAMA will, however, continue to be liable for the entire face value of the loan application. The income from the assets, and the proceeds from their eventual sale, will accrue to NAMA and these income streams will mitigate the cost to the Exchequer of servicing the additional debt. If, upon wind up, NAMA has made a profit, it will accrue to the State. If it makes a loss, however, the Government will apply a levy to the banks to recoup the short-fall.

The principle behind this is perfect. There are difficulties on the technical side so the Government should establish NAMA on an interim basis so we can proceed with relevant scoping and HR issues and find the appropriate personnel to get it up and running. There are huge difficulties for which we do not have the detail and I look forward to seeing it as soon as it can be worked out. How will cross-collateralisation of debts be worked out? There are many details and I hope the Minister for Finance and his advisors will come up with the answers as quickly as possible. I am glad, however, that they are not coming in with them today because these questions are far too complex to be answered in a number of weeks. We must proceed with this as soon as possible.

I support the remarks of my senatorial colleague in valuation, Senator Coghlan, on valuation. There are many fine firms within the State that can assist with the valuation process. I am not necessarily talking about auctioneers or surveyors but I have noted in certain quarters that it has been suggested we do not use national authorities. That is fundamentally wrong because that expertise exists here and those who are more informed of the situation in this country will contribute to the valuations. They can be cross-checked through different bodies, such as the professional institutes, so that we achieve optimum value. As there is no market for property at the moment, it is hugely difficult to place an accurate value on it. The true values will not be known until the assets are disposed of, which could take 20 years.

We would all like to hammer the developers and bankers for leading us into this mess, which many of us felt was unsustainable. We want our pound of flesh, where we pay at least 50% less than the €90 billion in assets. I disagree, however, because that would wipe out any equity investors might have. I do not know the appropriate discount but we must strike a balance between the pound of flesh and what needs to be done. Over a period, if these assets are managed well, their value would not equate to less than 70% of the supposed €90 billion. I would like to say I had the solution to the valuation issue, it is complex, but we must be careful about how we do this. We must use as many sources of advice as possible.

While it is not connected to this issue, we should do something to help those people who cannot make mortgage repayments at this time. There might be a provision where they could make any level of payment or make the term of the loan longer. There are a number of options that could humanely help some of the many hard luck stories at the moment. If families start to break up, it is a disaster for the State socially and economically. If all defaulters are punished within the 12 month period, we should think about a payment moratorium or come up with other innovative ways that take account of the genuine distress felt by families at present.

I support the Government amendment but I also thank Fine Gael for raising this issue and look forward to debating it on a continuing basis as other details become available.

I welcome the Minister of State and thank my colleagues in Fine Gael for putting down this motion. It is crucial but it is a pity it was left to the Opposition to put down for debate an issue of such national importance. The Government should be placing such issues in front of us and engaging with us on them.

I support the concept behind NAMA. I am not completely happy with the Fine Gael motion, or with the Government amendment. The problem is that we do not know enough, as Fine Gael has pointed out repeatedly. The attraction of the NAMA proposal is that we will own the property and the rights and that is an attractive idea. It is preferable to buying the banks, taking on their equity without being clear what our relationship with the property might be.

Apart from the quantum — I understand the Government could not disclose the figure involved — how will the process work? The Government can decide to value the property and hand the money to the banks or capitalise them against it. It could put money up front with a registered debt for the remainder to be collected through equities, profits or cash. There are so many different permutations that Fine Gael Senators are right when they call for an indication of some sort. There should be a discussion of the possible permutations.

Valuation is an interesting issue. Senator MacSharry's own profession should examine this question. I accept what he says but there must be ways of valuing that take account of more than the market value. Things have an intrinsic value. If I hold up a 32 carat diamond and no one buys it, it does not mean it is worthless; it has an intrinsic value. In France and in Italy, people put their houses on the market knowing what they are worth and will not settle until they receive that amount.

There are three elements to the cost of a property. We could use a property in Ballsbridge as an example. There are three elements to the cost of that property — the value of the site, the cost of building it and the cost of wages and salaries outside the building part and profit. The latter two can be worked out; it is easy enough to estimate how much it costs to put up a building at present and it is not difficult to estimate the appropriate level of profit and the cost of planning, engineering, architecture and so forth. That leaves the price of the site. At least one can arrive at certain values. One can create parameters and boundaries, and people should get active on that task. I am anxious to hear the Minister's views on the approach to that.

It is not all bad news for the Government. It behoves us to look at this both ways. I agree with Fine Gael that the Government made serious mistakes in depending on the construction sector for income and tax revenue, and that dependence has created a huge problem. People did shout "stop" and we ignored them. Everybody ignored them and I share some of that responsibility. On the other hand, the Government got it absolutely right with the deposit guarantee. It has been right so far in its approach to the banks. So far, it has not put the taxpayer any more at risk than might reasonably be expected. It can also be said in the Government's favour that the budget deficit is less than that of the UK and our debt to GNP ratio is less than that of the UK and far less than that of the US. At present — I stress that it is only at present — our unemployment rate is less than that of Spain and other countries.

Even if it is not all bad news, there is no point in denying that the issues mentioned are putting Ireland at the bottom of the league. I do not wish to have Ireland bunched with Iceland, Lithuania and the other countries mentioned this morning. That was hard to take. Let us be realistic and balanced. There are things the Government has done right and there are things that have not worked out. The economist John FitzGerald said six months ago that even if the Government had got everything right, the amount it could have impacted on the economy, irrespective of international trends, would be no more than 30%. I do not know why he came to that conclusion but I do not consider it unreasonable. However, I agree with Fine Gael that the Government has not inspired trust and confidence.

Certain things must be done. There must be a plan for the future. It must be a plan for job creation, to give a stimulus to the green economy and which examines the service level required of public services. I believe the Government should call the social partners to a meeting and say: "These are our objectives as a Government; this is what we want to achieve in terms of growth, job creation and the service level in health, education and other sectors; now, guys, tell us how to achieve it." There should be agreement on the objectives, after which people can put forward their proposals and show how each of their proposals brings us closer to the objectives.

I thank Senator O'Toole for sharing time with me. I welcome this debate and thank Fine Gael for putting forward this motion. I was at a business meeting in Stockholm yesterday and, naturally, the discussion was on the financial crisis hitting the world. Sweden has much more difficult figures than Ireland at present. It has experienced a huge drop in exports while we have not experienced the same drop. While the figures are bad, let us not talk ourselves into a worse depression.

It is interesting to recall that Sweden went through the same sort of problem in the early 1990s that the national asset management agency, NAMA, is now facing. It had a real crisis on its hands. Can we learn anything from what Sweden did? It came out of the crisis very well in the end. I believe we can too and the NAMA solution appears to be rather similar to the solution adopted by the Swedes.

There was also reference yesterday to Paul Krugman, who referred to "Erin go broke" last week in a newspaper column in the United States. One of the speakers at the conference yesterday had heard Paul Krugman speak last month. Mr. Krugman said that we must get the solution right because President Roosevelt did not get it right in the 1930s. He said that what happened was not a ten year recession, as we thought, but a 70 year recession due to the mistakes the Americans made in the 1930s. I am not sure if that is correct, but Mr. Krugman went on to say that if we do not get it right now, the depression could continue until 2079. That should wake us up.

I am aware that concern has been expressed about the large number of people needed to staff NAMA; there has been talk of 1,000 employees costing millions of euro every year. The agency denies this and says it is not planning to recruit large numbers. How will it do this? The agency is expected to rely on the same framework used for other bodies under the control of the State, such as the National Development Finance Agency. Those bodies employ outside contractors. Contracting out parts of the work is fraught with difficulty over control issues. Staffing would have to avoid any suggestions of conflict of interest. If somebody moved to the agency from a bank, for example, they could not be permitted to be involved in working on loans they were dealing with while they were employed by the bank.

At the beginning of the crisis I expressed concern about the controls that would be placed on the amount of remuneration if the State is to get involved in business, be it banking or otherwise. I said that if I was running a bank, I would wish to ensure that we employed the best person and if the best person needed to be paid more, we should do that. I have changed my mind on that now. There are so many ex-bankers available for work it will not be necessary to pay the outrageous sums that were paid on that basis previously.

The Government had to make a decision on the toxic loans held by the banks. It decided to create NAMA on the advice of Dr. Peter Bacon and his associates. The option is worthy of being given a chance. We should run with it. Hopefully, during further debates on the issue we will adjust, temper or amend it to improve it. Dr. Alan Aherne said last week that "commercial banks function better than State-owned banks". We might argue that commercial banks did not do a very good job in recent years but they were supposed to be overseen by the State-owned Central Bank, so let us not assume blame should automatically be placed there on that basis.

If there is to be a recovery from the financial crisis, it will have to be export led. We have not taken strong enough account of that. This is an issue that is not recognised. I believe the Minister of State understands that, but others do not. I am concerned by a report in the Sunday Business Post that smaller development loans may remain under the management of the country’s banks. This is intended to allow the NAMA to concentrate its resources on higher value lending relationships. It is obviously complex to take over a large number of smaller loans but it appears strange that when we need work such as this to be done through a new public sector body, we intend to recruit from the private sector when we have civil servants who are among the highest paid in Europe and far more of them than we require. It is understandable that the public gets cynical when moves such as this occur. Has it been decided for definite whether these smaller loans will be left to the banks?

Will the foreign-owned banks operating in Ireland, which have privately expressed interest in signing up for the new scheme, be part of NAMA? At what stage are the negotiations? I accept they are not yet concluded but this problem has confronted us for at least six months, as has the possibility of this occurring. We have taken our time on this issue. I am anxious to see some urgency on this scheme. When we get around to dotting the i's and crossing the t's, we will have had sufficient time to think about it. The motion tonight is worthy of being the first debate on that to take place.

Last weekend, at a Green Party event, I spoke about the need for co-operation in dealing with international as well as national economic problems. Obviously, we must work with other countries that find themselves in a similar situation. Earlier today I mentioned that Germany's economy has retracted by 6% and the 4 million figure for unemployment in Spain. We heard today that the first quarter figures for the United States indicate its economy has shrunk by 6%. That is the international context in which we are operating.

There is need also for co-operation among our social partners and while that has become difficult in respect of decisions made in recent months, I am confident that process, which has served us well in the past, is being restored somewhat in how we deal with the future.

We also need political co-operation, and when speaking at the event I mentioned I pointed out some of the difficulties we face in achieving that. In terms of Government expenditure and fiscal policies, there are obvious alternatives to a Fine Gael approach that wants to control public expenditure to a degree more than other political parties and a Labour Party approach that wants to protect the public sector and allow it operate as it is without any public input and in a way other political parties might not believe is acceptable. It will always be difficult to find a political consensus on those issues but the way we deal with toxic debt is the prime political issue that requires the greatest degree of political co-operation.

I will examine the alternatives available to us, the first of which is to allow banks to collapse. That would result in an immediate and large-scale cost to the taxpayer. Establishing a bad bank would also bring about an immediate cost to the taxpayer. On the nationalisation of banks, I read with incredulity some of the comments made regarding instant nationalisation. In terms of buying at current equity values, most of the financial institutions would cost €2 billion. That is the extent of the cost to this State, which is a nonsense because we would immediately acquire the bad debt, which would probably become accelerated in terms of the way that becomes redeemed, and the cost to the State would be even greater.

The national asset management agency model, as opposed to the bad bank and the nationalisation models, is the best option in terms of protecting the interest of the taxpayer because it takes the debt from commercial institutions, places it with a State agency, gives it a longer time perspective in which the market can appreciate and, depending on the success of the first part of that process, which is the discounting of the bad debt itself, allows the taxpayer to make a gain. In terms of a principle to understand, that is the argument we must make to the people. They must first understand that it is an action being done on behalf of the Government to make sure the interest of the Irish nation and the people is protected.

There is a desire to protect that interest in the Fine Gael motion but the reference to the cost of NAMA being €90 billion is unfair. It states also that Fine Gael has an alternative proposal, which is undoubtedly true, but to suggest that is superior does not help political debate. We must be more open and honest on issues such as this. There is a potential for public dialogue and a debate on the issues surrounding this because the decisions we make will last for generations and will impact not only on the current citizenry of this country but on generations to come. That is the reason we must conduct the debate in a proper context and be confident we are making the right decisions.

On the process of NAMA, in political debating terms people have talked about bail outs of banks and bail outs of developers. There is no doubt we are in this position because of a level of incompetency and undoubted greed that existed in many of our financial institutions, but without a dynamic financial sector we lack the means to have an engine by which we can recover our economy. Everyone in this Chamber is agreed about the need to restore the degree of activity needed in that sector.

In terms of these proposals, I am disappointed that people believe these proposals are somehow politically inspired. The people who are thinking through these proposals are representative of some of the best civil servants in this country. There will be a direct relationship with the National Treasury Management Agency, the body many accept as one of the most effective agencies we have in this State and one that has done an excellent job in trying to reduce and control our national debt in the past 20 years.

If people believe there is potential for NAMA to go off the rails, that presupposes there is a vote of confidence in the NTMA and what it has done. There will be an intricate relationship between those two bodies and because of that experience and that success, we can be happier that what NAMA will achieve will be better than the alternatives of direct nationalisation or allowing institutions to collapse.

In terms of those who want nationalisation now, they should consider the experience of other jurisdictions. I ask them to show me where that route has been taken. Other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and some European countries have pumped in additional resources in terms of buying equity in many of their main banks but none has taken the route of making sure such banks are 100% owned by their governments or countries.

The best example is the United Kingdom where its largest bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, has a potential ownership by the British Government, the British taxpayer, of 90% of its equity. There is still 10% in private hands. The logic of that is that if those banks are allowed to trade commercially and override the current economic circumstances to increase the value of their stock holdings because they continue to have a private and commercial element, it allows the state's stakeholding also to appreciate and that stock to be drip-fed into the market in terms of getting a return in the period that a body like NAMA would set in a situation like the one that pertains with our financial institutions.

Far from taking a headless chicken approach to solving the problems of our financial sector and how it operates internationally, this is a considered approach. It is not something that is bound up in the excesses or the mistakes of the past. It is a credible model which can most readily succeed if the principles behind it and its ability to function find the widest possible support in our political system because to compromise that by seeking a narrow political advantage from a short-term perspective is to play politics with the issue that is most at stake in terms of this country's viability and the prosperity of its citizens.

On that basis, while I accept the importance of moving the motion and the sincerity with which other political parties want the best possible model to be put in place, I also ask them to consider that the Government has given adequate and due consideration to this issue and its belief is that NAMA is also the best model we could have in place to meet our current needs.

I want to share time with Senator Healy Eames, five minutes to me and three minutes to the Senator.

Is that agreed? Agreed.

The decision to use taxpayers' money to buy out toxic loans is unjust and unwise on so many levels it is difficult to know where to start. First, the NAMA plan had a far from auspicious start in trying to estimate the real value of these toxic loans. The interim Financial Regulator told the Oireachtas economic and regulatory affairs committee in January that the amount of toxic development loans in Irish financial institutions was of the order of €39 billion. However, on a daily basis that figure is being revised upwards to the point where now some are suggesting it could be close to double that. Such confusion and uncertainty surrounding the real level of banking debt does not build confidence in any plan to get us out of the mess we are in.

If we are to ask what NAMA will cost us and the generations to come, the most honest answer at this point is that we simply do not know. Senator Boyle's statement that he believes the NTMA will have a major role in running NAMA and deciding policy within NAMA implies he does not know what type of corporate governance control will exist in NAMA.

The owner of any business, from a corner shop to a multinational corporation, would not make an investment on behalf of his or her family or shareholders without having all the facts available. We should not expose our people to this high risk strategy.

The Government now plans to buy the bad assets of our two major banks at a discount from their book value, but the key question is how big this discount will be. Analysts at Davy stockbrokers have suggested a discount of approximately 15% would be appropriate, but what would this mean for the taxpayer? If one considers that the total loan book of Bank of Ireland and AIB is of the order of €50 billion, then we would be looking at a discount of €7 billion. However, Goodbody Stockbrokers has estimated that upcoming loan losses at these two banks alone will be close to €19 billion. If the Government acquires these loans at a discount of only €7 billion, this would imply the taxpayer taking on losses in Bank of Ireland and AIB alone of €12 billion — a colossal amount of money when one considers that the recent swingeing budget cuts saved us a mere €3.25 billion this year.

The bottom line is that NAMA is a no-win proposal for the taxpayer, whose interests we should be seeking to protect. If we underpay for the banking assets the taxpayer will once again have to dig deep to recapitalise the banks. If we overpay for the assets, which is the more likely scenario, the risk to the taxpayer is colossal.

Of course we are being placated with an assurance that a levy system will be put in place to protect the taxpayer against any heavy losses in the eventuality that NAMA makes a loss over the long term. In other words, in ten years' time the Government may end up setting a levy on banks that they can then pay back over time. Once again, ask yourself how that corner shop owner would approach this arrangement. Would he or she borrow €100 at 6% to give to somebody who then promised to pay them back €5 a year for 20 years starting in ten years' time? They most certainly would not. It is this sort of basic business acumen that seems to be so sadly lacking in every move this Government makes.

Fine Gael has put forward a fair and more economically sound model for the stabilisation of our banking system. We propose a solution that does not put the innocent taxpayer first in line to suffer the losses, thus allowing institutions who knowingly took on these high risks for the promise of high return to walk away unscathed. Professor Paul Krugman, in a recent article outlining the banking options open to the US Government, agreed that a privately held banking system is the correct way to go but went on to say that a taxpayer-funded toxic bank is most certainly not private enterprise. He described it as lemon socialism, where banks get all the upside but taxpayers bear the risks.

It is now time to look at a different model, which would create good banks with clean balance sheets into which the taxpayers' recapitalisation would go. The Fine Gael proposal would involve separating from within each bank a new bank which would hold all the State guaranteed deposits and which would buy those parts of the loan book such as residential mortgage loans and business overdrafts which can be easily valued from the existing parent bank. A legacy bank would be left behind in each case which would no longer engage in any lending. Its role would be to manage the remainder of the loan book and recoup maximum value from it over time. The legacy bad banks would still be owned by their shareholders and would owe obligations to their bond holders. These groups, not the taxpayer, would then assume the risk they contracted for in the first place.

Terrence McDonough, professor of economics at NUI Galway, quite rightly suggested that one really attractive aspect of this proposal is that the existing management could be left to manage the remaining assets. If these managers are as clever as their bonuses imply, perhaps they can dig the legacy banks out, but if not, there is always the bankruptcy court with the owners, lenders and managers, rather than the taxpayer, squarely in the gun sights where they belong.

I ask that any new banking legislation would include a provision to immediately allow all borrowers on fixed interest rates the option of moving to a variable rate with little or no penalty. It galls me and many others to see the same banks that now depend solely on the taxpayer for their survival continuing to charge punitive interest rates on hard-pressed home and business owners. The Government guarantee, the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank and the recent €7 billion bail out of AIB and Bank of Ireland has not bought the taxpayer a single solitary modicum of influence on day-to-day banking policy. It is high time all our banking chiefs ate a little humble pie and, as a minimum gesture of gratitude to the taxpayer, immediately agreed to allow all borrowers on fixed rates to change to variable rates. It is the least that they should do.

I thank Senator Cannon for sharing his time with me. I support his point about fixed-rate mortgages. The setting up of NAMA provides an ideal opportunity for giving consideration to releasing fixed-rate borrowers so that they can renegotiate downwards in line with the ECB rate to more favourable fixed-rate or variable rate mortgages.

NAMA is an interesting concept which has potential, but only if implemented properly. By that I mean that it must be independent from all politicians. It must not have any political appointees on the board. That is critical. The board must be independent and it must have integrity. This country has seen where the opposite has been the case. For example, in the case of FÁS, where there were many political appointees, we saw much corruption. If we are to go forward, the right people must be at the top of this agency with a clear mandate. My first key point is that NAMA must be completely independent from politicians, and I would like to hear the response of the Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh, to that.

I also suggest strongly, and consistent with what the Information Commissioner, Ms Emily O'Reilly, suggested, that NAMA should come within the remit of the Freedom of Information Act. It will be a public body. It is time we extended the scope of freedom of information. If NAMA will come under the remit of the Freedom of Information Act, we will have confidence in it. It is ludicrous that currently neither the Financial Regulator nor the Central Bank comes within the remit of the Freedom of Information Act which means they are not publicly accountable, and we have seen the fall-out of that.

It is important the right people are put in place to conduct detailed analysis of the value for which the loans will be written down and assessment of the collateral behind each loan, and this must be done case by case.

One fear I would flag is the fall-out of NAMA for subcontractors. This has been brought to my attention by subcontractors who are quite worried about how, once the land banks and the assets are taken from the developers, they will get what they are due from the developers. To ensure they will get some money, these subcontractors, such as joiners, window providers and carpenters, are going to the courts to get winding-up orders and judgments. This involves an array of expense that they really should be spared. NAMA must take cognisance of the fall-out for those involved in the entire cycle of development.

We are trying to turn the banks into clean banks. That is the purpose of NAMA. Running alongside this, the State guarantee of deposits and international lending runs out in September 2010. Our goal should be that by September 2010 we should be able to lift that State guarantee and all banks should be clean banks by then so that we can release the taxpayers from the risk to which they are currently exposed. I thank the Minister of State for his time and look forward to hearing his responses.

I welcome the Fine Gael motion. It is important we respond positively and look at all options, which we are doing. It is obvious to any fair-minded person that the present banking system is not working and that we, as a Government, must deal with the loans drawn down from these banks which prevent them lending to small and medium businesses. I mentioned at the parliamentary party meeting last night that I received a letter from a company which has 25 employees, a substantial annual turnover and a €200,000 overdraft facility which it had not used for approximately 15 years. Its representatives went to the bank to have this overdraft facility put on order and was told it no longer existed. These are the kinds of difficulties being encountered in the current banking system. To move away from this, we are examining the establishment of NAMA. This is the correct course of action. Liabilities in the banking system can be removed from it, placed in NAMA and managed by the agency over a period. The banks can then be recapitalised to ensure proper lending to the business community and proper mortgage restructuring. At that stage, investment in the banks will return with their share prices improving.

Evaluating the land holdings in question will be a difficult process because the market is subdued. However, I am encouraged that over 30% of the lands in question are overseas in London, Manchester, Liverpool, America and Europe. That is good because we are likely to see faster upturns in land values in these areas because of the scarcity of land in them. Land is a finite but always a good investment. Its value may be down today but it is very much like gold; it does rise when there is a demand for it. We will see demand increase, maybe not in the next three years but certainly in five. The length of investment in NAMA is ten to 15 years.

The NAMA approach is the right way to go in that it protects the taxpayer. As Senator Healy Eames said, we should be in a position to moderate the guarantees we have given to the banks. People have not yet realised the importance of the bank guarantee scheme. It is our money and deposits from which the banks work. Without the guarantee, if there were a run on a bank in the morning, we would all have to go and withdraw our money. It must be recognised the Government's bank guarantee has stabilised and protected our banking system.

The six banks under the guarantee are still in working order. While we have nationalised one, I do not believe we should take the nationalisation route with the others because the State would be assuming all their debts. Nationalisation should be the last route. In the case of Anglo Irish Bank, we did not have a choice because we had to ensure the overall banking system was maintained. It is a cost to the taxpayer with certain risks. Putting NAMA in place will ensure the risk is minimised. If there were a long-term risk, the banks will have to pay some price for it.

Senator Healy Eames referred to freedom of information requests. However, the information that NAMA will handle will be very sensitive material and I do not believe it should be handed out. When the valuations are done, a bond could be created to sell to the European Central Bank for a period. This could also be invested for recapitalisation of the banks which would, in turn, stimulate their share prices. These are options that will ensure there is an upside to NAMA for the taxpayer.

There will be an upturn in the US, UK and European economies in which NAMA will have substantial land-banks. As Senator MacSharry stated the NAMA model may be the forerunner which other countries may later adopt. It should not be forgotten that Ireland was the leader in guaranteeing its banks. While we were criticised for doing so, it certainly worked in assisting our system.

NAMA is the right decision. It is also important that such decisions are measured and examined. I hope I have given the House an outline of my vision for NAMA. The main problem will be around the land valuations. I do not believe €90 billion is realistic. Property prices have fallen, by 50% in some cases. While we cannot devalue the properties and lands in questions that much because it would affect the banking system, we must get a middle valuation that would be of benefit to all — the bank and the taxpayer. NAMA will be established by legislation in which the House will have its input. I thank Fine Gael for putting down this motion which has led to a constructive debate. I hope it will provide a better insight into how NAMA can progress.

I welcome the Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh. He was one of the first on the Government side to acknowledge the economic security of our State was being threatened and questioned by many of the developments in the past six months. It is no secret to the Minister of State that our party would like to be on his side of the House but I am glad he has continued with this acknowledgement. While I differ with him on his answers to some of these economic problems, he at least knows they exist and is able to quantify their magnitude and point out the difficulty they might pose for our State.

My colleagues, Senators John Paul Phelan and Twomey, have detailed how Fine Gael's proposals for the NAMA model would be different to the Government's. We believe our proposals are superior and correct for the taxpayer and the future economic well-being of our State.

In my contribution, I want to focus on four questions that I would like the Minster of State to answer. The answers are important with regard to allowing our citizens to have more confidence in the proposal that has been laid out being the right way to go.

There are three features in particular of which we must be cognisant in the discussion we are having about NAMA and the current recession. The first is that the recession we are facing is unique in modern economic history in that it is balance sheet led. There is a huge amount of personal and private debt sitting either on the balance sheets of companies or on the credit cards or mortgages of individuals, and this will be at the root of the difficulty our country and the global economy has in emerging from our current difficulties.

This leads on to the second point, which provides part of the rationale for NAMA. Unless we find some way of dealing with the issue of toxic debt within our economy and the global economy, it will be the millstone that pulls us back in our efforts to recovery and to getting our economy back into sustainable growth. We must find some way of resolving the issue of how much debt exists and finding a way of liquidating that debt and getting it on to a healthier footing. Unless that is in place, the framework we need for the entire economy to prosper will not exist.

While I have been critical of NAMA, in many ways the idea of creating an institution to deal with this issue should be welcomed. One of the criticisms of the efforts to lead the world and Ireland to recovery up to this point is that the institutional innovation has not been in place to ensure we recognise that we are in a far more dangerous world than we have been in recent years. If one considers the efforts of President Roosevelt to lead the world out of the Great Depression in the 1930s, he was creating new kinds of institutions under political leadership every year in recognition of a different problem. We need new people to deal with these issues who will be accountable to the Government and will have the expertise to do this. If one considers the efforts to get out of difficulties following the Second World War, we saw the creation of the welfare state and brand new arrangements between the economy and the State to find a way to lead the world and this country out of the problems we were in at that time. Therefore, while we are supportive of the idea of a "good bank", it is very welcome to see Ireland stepping forward and saying we need a new way of dealing with the banking structure and our economy, and this is our contribution to doing it.

One of the four questions I will come back to is that many of the institutions I praised earlier were under political leadership and were accountable. Members from both sides of the House spend much time being critical of the HSE and its lack of political accountability or being critical of the difficulty politicians, even those in government, have in finding out what is going on in the country and our community. One of the questions that must be answered is how NAMA will work and what is the political structure within which it will be accountable. The quantity of debt we are dealing with will potentially be the millstone around the neck of future generations. It is not good enough to say this problem is so specialised that politicians cannot have anything to do with it. We are the ones who carry the responsibility for the welfare of our country and there must be some way of ensuring the organisation that will be in place has accountability to the Government and the Oireachtas.

This leads to the particular questions I would like to put to the Minister of State in regard to this new body. The first concerns how this organisation will work without at least the partial nationalisation of our two main banks. The reason I put the question is that one of the main jobs of NAMA will be the pricing of the so-called bad debt that exists. There will be a real contradiction because, on the one hand, the taxpayers will want the lowest price possible to ensure they are not weighted down with a vast amount of debt but, on the other, the banks will want the best price possible to ensure their capital value is not further undermined. The lower the price that NAMA agrees with the banks for the debt in question, the weaker the capital value of the banks. They will then turn around to the Government and say they need equity, otherwise the capitalisation and value of the banks will be further undermined. I cannot understand how we can have a process of valuing the debt in question which will not lead to at least the partial nationalisation of the two banks in question, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks. Again, it appears that a fair price for the taxpayer will be one that will undermine the capital value of the banks in question and, in turn, they will turn to the taxpayer seeking further capitalisation.

I find it odd to be arguing for this approach given my outlook on these issues. Nonetheless, one benefit of at least partial nationalisation is that the whole issue of how one values this debt will almost disappear because the Government as at least the partial owner of the bank would be able to determine what the debt will be and its value. The point I want answered is how this organisation will work without at least some nationalisation taking place.

My final question relates to the whole idea of moral hazard. One of the main reasons we are going down this route is that we have ended up with a couple of banks that we term as having structural value to the Irish economy — they are too big to fail and we cannot let them go under. We can never let this happen again. We can never find ourselves in a situation where any single bank or organisation is of such value to our country that it is unthinkable that it will go under. The reason for this is that the lessons we are learning are basically that if banks get involved in dealing that is not sustainable and that threatens the future value of the Irish economy, the taxpayer will bail them out. We cannot let ourselves be in a similar situation again. To ensure this happens, we must find ourselves in a situation where it is a viable option for banks to go bankrupt.

I note with interest that Martin Wolf, who is the columnist for the Financial Times and one of those who spotted this crisis on the way, said that an essential feature of the new banking system and landscape that emerges is that banks have to be allowed to go bankrupt. If we do not find a way of allowing that to happen, we condemn ourselves to history being repeated again and again. This is the one lesson we must learn and on which we must act in the future.

I am glad to be back in Seanad Éireann for what has been a very good debate. Obviously, it is dealing with a matter where some of the details and precise answers will be given in legislation but this debate may perhaps help to inform, in some part anyway, the drafting of that legislation. I will seek in the course of my remarks to take up as many of the large number of questions that have been raised by Senators. As a final preliminary remark, it is one of the good features of this House that even in a two-hour debate on Private Members' business, it is possible for up to a quarter of the Senators to participate.

The legislation will be brought forward as soon as possible, either this summer or early in the autumn, by which I mean September.

The recent global financial crisis has resulted in governments around the world having to react with extraordinary measures. Governments have intervened time and again to preserve financial stability and maintain their banking systems, and Ireland has been no exception. Though Irish banks are generally not exposed to complex structured products, concerns about which prompted this financial crisis, they have suffered from the severe tightening in international funding markets. The difficulties faced by Irish banks have been compounded by a sharp fall in domestic and UK property prices.

The Government's actions have been taken on the basis that the health of the economy is inextricably linked to the banking sector and vice versa. The continued flow of credit is vital for our economy. The Government’s objective is to ensure that the banks continue to lend to individuals and businesses in the real economy. The banking sector is the life-blood of the economy. The Government’s approach to the financial crisis has been structured and considered, with the Government demonstrating its commitment to preventing the failure of any systemic institution and to protecting deposit-holders.

The bank guarantee scheme was introduced to ensure that the banks would have sufficient liquidity to operate on a day-to-day basis. In the Minister for Finance's supplementary budget speech, he announced the Government's intention to put a State guarantee in place for the future issuance of debt securities with a maturity of up to five years. Access to longer-term funding in line with the mainstream approach in the EU and consistent with State aid rules will contribute significantly to supporting the funding needs of the banks and to securing their continued stability.

The disclosures relating to loans to directors undermined confidence in and weakened the funding position of Anglo Irish Bank. Furthermore, the due diligence exercise undertaken as part of the planned recapitalisation brought to light further concerns regarding corporate governance in the bank. The Government therefore decided to take Anglo Irish Bank into full public ownership with effect from 21 January 2009 to ensure the stability of the bank and the financial system generally.

Market expectations with regard to the capital that banks hold have altered significantly. As a result, banks have had to compete vigorously for deposits and other forms of funding in a weakening economic environment. Banks have also been forced to seek capital in a market unwilling to finance banks, resulting in an array of state recapitalisation programmes across the developed world. The recapitalisation of Bank of Ireland was approved at its EGM at the end of March 2009 and the National Pensions Reserve Fund has invested €3.5 billion into that financial institution in return for preference shares.

The AIB proposed that recapitalisation of €3.5 billion is to be put to the shareholders at its EGM on 13 May 2009. The Minister for Finance welcomes AIB's statement last Monday that it intends to strengthen its capital position by a further €1.5 billion over and above the State capital injection of €3.5 billion. This move will further boost confidence in AIB's ability to weather the financial storms we have experienced and to emerge in a stronger position when conditions improve. The strengthening of its capital position will improve the bank's balance sheet and better position it to lend to businesses in support of economic recovery. Similar stress tests that applied to Bank of Ireland under its due diligence did not indicate to the Minister a need for further capital beyond the €3.5 billion invested by the Government.

In Ireland, through the bank guarantee scheme, bank recapitalisation and the protection of public ownership, we have provided very substantial support to the banking sector. The bank guarantee scheme and the recapitalisation of AIB and Bank of Ireland were implemented to ensure there is sufficient liquidity in the system and that the banks are adequately capitalised. While this range of measures has gone a long way to supporting the banking sector and ensuring its stability, Ireland, like many developed countries around the world, is finding that this is not enough and there is a need to react with more radical measures. That is why the Minister for Finance announced earlier in the month the Government's decision to bring forward measures to address the issue of asset quality in the banking system. A national asset management agency, NAMA, will be established on a statutory basis under the aegis of the National Treasury Management Agency.

The principles of NAMA are clear. Certain assets will be transferred from bank balance sheets to NAMA at a significant discount. This process will bring certainty for international markets on the position of the banks enabling them to raise funds to maintain the flow of credit to the economy. By definition, detailed work will be required to determine the discount to be applied to transferred assets, but the overarching principle and rationale are clear. The objective of NAMA is to strengthen the banks' balance sheets, to considerably reduce uncertainty over bad debts and as a consequence ensure the flow of credit on a commercial basis to the real economy, to protect and increase employment, while also maximising and protecting the interest of taxpayers.

The potential book value of loans that will be transferred to NAMA is in the region of €80 billion to €90 billion, although the amount paid by the agency will be considerably less than that. The State will not take all the risk in the acquisition of such assets. In the first instance, the price of the assets will have regard to current and expected market value of the relevant assets, and what is sustainable for the taxpayer. In the longer term, if the agency were to fall short of recouping all the costs, the Government intends that a levy should be applied to recoup any shortfall incurred. The levy serves as a safeguard for taxpayers in the future on the assets taken on by NAMA in the short term. This does not conflict with the objective of giving certainty on the position of the banks because the levy would be applied in the future and over time. This is no more of an uncertainty for banks than, for example, changing tax rates or changes in the regulatory environment. The possibility of a levy ensures that two key objectives of NAMA are met — certainty on the position of the banks and protection for taxpayers.

Significant further detailed work and extensive due diligence on the loan books will be needed to ensure that the appropriate categories or portfolio of loans are transferred and that the banks are cleared of the identified riskiest loans by NAMA. The riskiest identified loan category for banks in Ireland is that of land and development and the largest aggregate exposures across the institutions. Entire portfolios of loans will be transferred to the agency, which will provide the banks with stronger balance sheets and considerably reduced uncertainty over bad debts.

The Government has received expert financial, economic, legal and valuation advice at every step of its measured response to the recent turbulence in the banking sector. Likewise, specialist expertise will be procured by NAMA in all relevant areas to ensure that NAMA is established in the most efficient manner so as to safeguard taxpayer interests. The Government has been clear that a significant discount will be applied to assets transferred from the banks to NAMA. Detailed work will be required to determine the exact discount to be applied, but it goes without saying that the Government's objective will be to set a fair economic price and ensure protection for taxpayers. NAMA will manage the overall process, including valuations. Necessary expertise whether relating to determination of land values, asset quality or any legal issues arising will be sourced to ensure that the valuation process is thorough and accurate. There are important legal issues to be considered and these can be considered in full in the process of legislating for NAMA. There will be more debate on this matter.

The Government is prioritising the setting up of NAMA. While the full process of transferring assets to NAMA will take time, this is not unexpected. International markets will have confidence in an asset management process that is well executed and well managed rather than rushed and hastily assembled.

With a question of legal challenge it is important to be clear that this is not a bail out for developers. Their debts, whether held by the banks or NAMA, will remain unchanged. The only discount in question is that for the State in taking on the management of certain assets. While it cannot be anticipated whether certain legal challenges will be erased, these could be thought to be akin to the normal legal issues encountered in the proper and efficient management of property debts in banks.

I must stress, in this context, that developers will continue to be required to repay their loans in full. Where borrowers have made losses, they will be required to recognise and take such losses. It will certainly not be the function of NAMA to go easy on them. NAMA will operate on a full commercial basis and will be determined to recover moneys owed to it to the fullest extent possible.

No decision has yet been taken on whether NAMA should directly manage or supervise the management of smaller development loans. As has been noted, there will be staffing and resource implications as well as questions on how to best extract maximum value from the assets to consider in working out the details of NAMA's operation.

NAMA will not be a toxic bank. It will not be a bank in that it will not take deposits and it will not have a banking licence. NAMA will have loans on its books based on real physical assets and while some of these will undoubtedly be of better quality than others, they will be a mix of good or performing loans and bad or non-performing loans. The stream of income from the assets and the proceeds from the eventual sale of the underlying asset or the repayment of the loan will accrue to NAMA. This will be used to pay interest on the bonds issued to pay for the assets and eventually to repay these bonds.

NAMA will be developed and implemented within the common EU framework detailed in the European Commission guidance on the treatment of impaired assets, working closely with the European Commission to obtain prior state aid approval. By drawing on the best advice and experience available internationally, we are committed to ensuring that this very significant measure will be an example of best practice and meets all the objectives that the Government has set for it.

It is universally accepted that bank regulation on a global scale is in need of reform. Ireland is no exception in this regard. A well regulated financial system is essential for a proper functioning banking system that will stimulate economic recovery. The actions of those who have tarnished the reputation of Ireland will be dealt with through the appropriate processes. As the Minister for Finance announced in his Budget Statement, the role of the Central Bank of Ireland will be reformed to place it at the centre of financial supervision and financial stability oversight, providing for full integration and co-ordination of the prudential supervision and stability of individual financial institutions with that of the financial system as a whole. The Central Bank of Ireland will in the future be headed by a commission, chaired by the governor.

The Minister for Finance has asked the former deputy governor of the Bank of England and former member of the UK monetary policy committee, Sir Andrew Large, to advise on the process to select a new head of financial regulation within the new institutional structure. This search will be wide-ranging and the person chosen will be of the calibre, reputation, experience and expertise to lead the reforms of financial regulation that the Minister has outlined.

There is much media debate proposing the nationalisation of Irish banks, particularly AIB and Bank of Ireland. The Government's strategy is to ensure that the lending needs of the real economy are met. A commercially focused banking system, which includes banks having a market presence, operating within market disciplines and constraints, is best equipped to achieve this aim. The Minister for Finance considers that where banks are of systemic importance, viable and sustainable, they should, where possible, be maintained as market listed public limited companies open to private investment. Internationally the prospect of wholesale nationalisation would be very damaging to Ireland's reputation and attractiveness to international investors. No country is currently adopting a policy of wholesale bank nationalisation and there is no reason for Ireland to adopt such a policy. Nationalising a small institution, as has been suggested in the course of this debate, would not provide for the country's credit needs. NAMA is a system wide approach which will enable all participating institutions to provide credit to the economy.

There has been much talk about creating a "good bank" system. This is based on a concept which proposes separating the "good bank" aspects from within each bank. The proposal does not, however, identify what is to happen to the "bad" parts of the banks. NAMA, on the other hand, is a solution whereby the banks will have a stronger balance sheet and considerably reduced uncertainty over bad debts and, as a consequence, will underpin the flow of credit on a commercial basis to individuals and businesses in the real economy.

On the question of costs to the taxpayer, the key point is that NAMA will manage assets over time. The assets will not need to be written down and losses realised up-front, as would be the case for banks and for the various loss projections that exist currently. As economic conditions improve, and as the property market reopens, NAMA will be able to maximise the economic return on the assets it holds. This feature, contained within the substantial framework to be applied to transferred assets, and the safeguards of a levy in the future will protect taxpayers while ensuring the health of our tax system.

On the question of how the board of NAMA will be nominated, that must be decided under the legislation that implements NAMA. It is unlikely, however, that this information will be released under freedom of information requests as it will include much commercially sensitive information that is not normally released under the Act.

Senator Cannon raised an issue referred to in an earlier debate about fixed interest mortgages being converted to variable ones. This was asked in almost the same breath as extolling a business approach to issues. Inevitably, if the Government was to take an attitude on that issue, that would further burden the banks which we are trying to get back up on their feet. That is not a realistic approach. People entered these arrangements. There were pros and cons to the arrangements at the time and it is not possible for the Government to convert them, however desirable that might be from the social and environmental point of view.

I am reminded in much of this debate of one of the founding theses of the school of economics or economists in the 18th century, that land is the source of all wealth. In those days they meant territorial land or agricultural land. Nowadays, and listening to this debate, one would think development land was the source of all wealth. However, we are trying to get away from that situation and to not return to it in the future. It would be lovely if, as Senator Donohoe recommended, we could get to a situation where, in future, even systemically important banks would be allowed to go bankrupt by the State. I am sceptical as to when and whether we will reach that Utopia.

The creation of the national asset management agency is part of a range of considered measures introduced by the Government to stabilise and revitalise the banking system. The Irish economy needs a functioning banking system that enjoys the trust of depositors, international markets and the community at large to withstand the current economic and financial position. The strategy pursued is the best way to secure the position of the financial services sector while keeping in mind the requirements of the EU and the interests of the State. I commend this counter motion to Seanad Éireann.

I wish to share time with Senator Ross.

Is that agreed? Agreed.

The Minister of State was dismissive of the point made by one of my colleagues with regard to freedom of information, but whatever about this applying in the case of NAMA, what proposals does the Government have, if any, to ensure some measure of transparency for the public and taxpayers with regard to what will occur? The Minister has regularly said that there will be a considerable discount on these assets. In other words, they will be purchased at a considerable discount. That is the objective. I understand that and it is a laudable objective. We can all see why the Government makes that point.

I understand it is impossible to say when we will know what the discount is. Presumably, we will reach a stage, whether next month or next year, when there will be some clarity as to what the discount is, if indeed there is a discount. By what mechanism will the taxpayers who are carrying the can and paying the bill know this? How will they get the information as to what precisely the discount is? Whether through freedom of information or otherwise, it is clear the Government will have to declare and come clean with the public so we can understand and know what is being done in our name with our money, our earnings and our future. We need either freedom of information or something far more robust.

It is no use for the Minister of State or the Minister to say with certainty that the amount that will be paid by the agency will be "considerably less than" €80 billion to €90 billion. They have no more of an idea than we have. That is an aspiration. It is a genuine aspiration on their part, and no more than that. However, it is said with a tone of certainty.

The Minister of State referred to the promise of a change to the Central Bank and regulatory institutions. He stated: "As the Minister for Finance announced in his Budget Statement, the role of the Central Bank of Ireland will be reformed to place it at the centre of financial supervision and financial stability oversight, providing for full integration and co-ordination of the prudential supervision and stability of individual financial institutions with that of the financial system as a whole." What was it supposed to be? Is this new? When I studied economics, I believed this was what the Central Bank was, namely, at the centre of financial supervision and stability oversight "providing for full integration and co-ordination" and so on. Is this a new idea of what a Government bank should be? Suggesting that the Government will do this, as if to gift a newly discovered approach to the people, is ludicrous. Have central banks not been doing this for the past 50 or 60 years? The suggestion that it has only been discovered now is extraordinary.

The Minister of State referred to nationalisation, a matter in which I am interested. We proposed an amendment to the Fine Gael motion, although it cannot be moved in accordance with the rules of the House. I have no particular difficulty in that regard. The question of nationalisation is a serious element of this debate. Senator Donohoe was correct and the Minister of State should answer his question on how this measure can be delivered without at least partial nationalisation of the two main banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland. Many people believe that this will occur in any event.

The Minister of State's words were an example of giving hostages to fortune. He and the Government are constantly telling the Opposition to be careful about the language used. He stated: "Internationally the prospect of wholesale nationalisation is very damaging to Ireland's reputation and attractiveness to international investors." The word "wholesale" was a nice distinction to make as no one else has used it. The apparent point is that nationalisation would damage Ireland's reputation and attractiveness to international investors. If this is what the Government must do in six months' time, what will he say then? The difficulty is that these words can be thrown back at him.

On 15 September 2008, for example, the Minister of State's colleague, the Minister, Deputy Brian Lenihan, stated:

Our banking system has shown resilience in the face of such banking trends. Our banks uniquely have weathered the storm to date despite many more venerable institutions being unable to do that.

Several months later, in reference to recapitalisation, the Minister stated: "There will be no exposure to the taxpayer on this because, as a result of the good times, we do have substantial money amassed in the pension fund." We must have spent that four or five times. According to the Minister, there is no question of a fresh expense being incurred. These comments were made in December 2008.

I draw the House's attention to a ministerial statement on the report of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator on 29 November. It stated:

The report confirms that the capital position of each of the institutions reviewed is in excess of regulatory requirements as at 30 September 2008. The report also concludes that even in certain stress scenarios the capital levels in the financial institutions will remain within regulatory requirements in the period to 2011.

The Senator is taking time from Senator Ross.

On hostages to fortune, I respectfully advise the Minister of State not to say that nationalisation would damage Ireland's reputation, as it may, for perfectly good and legitimate reasons, be necessary in a few months' time.

I thank Senator Alex White for giving me two minutes of his time. I will continue in the same vein. I agree with virtually everything he said as this is just another step in the Government's retreat in the face of the banks. I can do nothing except express my shock at this measure. Senator Alex White has eloquently referred to the hostages to fortune given by the Government. Every time it justified what it did, it claimed that it would not do the next thing, at which point it proceeded to do exactly what it stated was so dangerous. Nationalisation is probably coming.

Why was there an extraordinary blanket guarantee? The banks put the gun to the Government's head. It was not a voluntary situation. Rather, the banks came to Merrion Street one night and claimed that if the guarantee was not given, Anglo Irish Bank would go bust. The Government agreed to the guarantee. When the banks stated that they would not need recapitalisation, the Government was fine that there would not be another cost. However, each of the two main banks has been given €3.5 billion and AIB needs another €1.5 billion. Apparently, the latter amount will be raised by AIB, but I doubt that it will be. Rather, the Government will need to do it.

NAMA, a final bail out, will be set up. The Minister of State and his senior Minister do not like us discussing bail outs, but this is what NAMA is. It tells the banks that they will go bust if they hold on to their toxic debts. I agree with the Minister of State that it is not a toxic bank, but it is a toxic institution. The Government and the taxpayer will pick up the bill. The liability is extraordinary in light of the liability taken on under the guarantee. It is a mad gamble with taxpayers' money that puts the taxpayer at risk. Why has the Government in stage after stage surrendered to the banks' wishes at the expense of the taxpayer?

I wish to share time with Senator Callely.

There will not be much time left. Is that agreed? Agreed.

As I look for a political home at this point in my career, something is for sure, namely, that it will not be in the Labour Party or socialism. I was listening to——

The Senator does not need to worry.

She is lost so.

She should keep shopping around.

Senator Alex White referred to giving hostages to fortune. Our actions have consequences, but we must remember that, had we taken the Labour Party's position in October, we would be dealing with a collapsed economy.

What have we now?

The banking sector would have collapsed. The Labour Party has the luxury of not needing to deal with this in opposition. Thankfully, the Government does not need to deal with it either as the right decision was taken at the time.

I accept the comments of Senators Alex White and Ross on the Government moving its position. However, this situation is unprecedented. Since Senator White has had the good fortune of studying economics and, no doubt, banking, I am sure he knows that every textbook on banking has been thrown out the door. It is no wonder that the Government has changed its tack. The wisest counsel says that when circumstances change, people change their opinions.

I welcome NAMA's establishment as it is important that the banking sector is cleansed. As we know, it is in a state of inactivity. While deposits in banks remain high thanks to the Government guarantee, which is overlooked, the money in question is not being leveraged and brought into the economy. This is due to the uncertainty surrounding the banks' debts. Funding for our system will be acquired internationally and, through NAMA's establishment, the Government is taking steps to cleanse the system. In future, a reversion to traditional banking practices will be necessary.

A fair price must be paid for the assets to be transferred to NAMA. Senator Donohoe referred to this by stating we are caught in a bind, which is the case. The taxpayer must be protected in respect of the cost of the asset and equally so that it does not jeopardise the capitalisation of the banks. The Government and whoever will run NAMA must toe this fine line and we must have faith in this regard. I agree with the Minister of State's comment that this is a highly commercially sensitive area and that such information cannot be subject to freedom of information requests. This commercial sector is vitally important to the State and NAMA must be given the requisite strength to cleanse the system and reignite the banking sector.

If possible, I wish to share the final two minutes of my time with Senator Hanafin.

The Senator must be quick as less than two minutes remain to him.

I welcome the opportunity to participate in this Private Members' debate on the establishment of NAMA. It is important in our approach to address the current financial crisis to have a clear understanding of the realities of the present financial and banking system that prevails in Ireland and the world around us. The global financial crisis is a serious challenge that affects nearly every country in the world. The short answer regarding the cause of the crisis is that it was caused by over-stretching of financial liberalisation, lack of regulation and lack of oversight of the financial markets. The impact of this financial crisis is that the world's economy is in severe recession, which has serious political and social consequences.

This crisis is akin to the global economic crisis of the 1930s, which led to widespread insecurity and a threat to human rights. In responding to the current crisis, it is important to keep our history in mind. Not only should those lessons provide a sense of urgency to national governments in implementing an effective and co-ordinated approach to recovery, but it is equally important to monitor carefully the related social and political upheaval and to respond appropriately. The consequences of failing markets and policies have grave financial and political outcomes. The political consequence is that governments are likely to face an increasingly insecure population, as unemployment increases and standards of living decrease.

The prescription for the current crisis must involve job creation, providing social supports where necessary and developing alternative industries that will spur growth and diversity in the markets. Infrastructure spending designed to stimulate economies will have a positive effect as it addresses critical projects and creates employment. Such actions would release cash into the market and would drive economies towards a fresh start. However, this is only part of the answer. The continued availability of money from the banks is vital for the economy. We must ensure that the financial institutions lend money to individuals and businesses. This is the reason the prescription must include the medicine to absorb the toxic debt and to allow the financial institutions to recover from such negative investments. The final dose of medicine might look different from what constitutes current thinking. However, it is most likely to involve a combination of medication.

My understanding in respect of current thinking on NAMA is that it is to correct our banks' balance sheets and books, remove the toxic debt and therefore ensure a flow of credit to the banks from international credit lines, which in turn will place our banks on a solid footing to open their doors for real business by lending money to individuals and businesses. What remains to be seen is how each individual country, Europe and the rest of the globe adapt to the international crisis and whether they have the ability to ride out the storm.

One minute now remains to the Senator.

Countries around the globe have been putting in place plans to stabilise their own financial markets, some of which may complement each other but others of which may impede global recovery. Given the large number of bail outs in individual countries' responses to certain sectors, it is likely to place some more open to doing business since they have greater resources. While this will free up markets as intended, it could impede growth. My view is that much more work must be done. For example, the G20 meeting in London concluded with several positive steps. It received some innovative proposals, particularly in respect of the new global economic council. However, the solution to the current global crisis must involve both what Ireland is doing with NAMA, which I gather has been approved in principle by Europe, and a globally co-ordinated recovery effort shaped to account for the many unique economies involved.

I thank my colleague for sharing time. In a nutshell, the upshot of the financial crisis in the world meant that the World Bank and the bankers' federation decided in Basel that there would be an increase in the tier one capital ratios for banks. In other words, banks would be obliged to hold more cash in reserve. This was decided at the time when banks' loan books were tied up with non-performing assets. If we are to move forward and get the economy moving again, the only way to get money to business is through the banks. To so do, the Government was obliged to free up the toxic assets. In this way, the Government has afforded itself the opportunity to buy such assets at a discounted rate, with a guarantee that when the economy turns again, as it inevitably will as night follows day, and if there is a shortfall, the Government will be able to revert to the banks and ensure it gets the difference between what may or may not have been lost. However, I draw Members' attention to the Swedish experience. When the world economy picked up again, the Swedish Government made a significant profit.

Other Members, such as Senator John Paul Phelan, pointed out the hardship that Irish people will endure on foot of increased taxes and pension levies, as well as the losses of their jobs and businesses. Agriculture, fishing and mortgage holders with fixed rates are not being bailed out and elderly people will not receive Christmas bonuses. It is amazing that 50 to 60 developers, egged on by a few select bankers and Fianna Fáil Ministers, got us into this mess. It should not be forgotten in any debate that 50 to 60 individuals cost the taxpayer a sum that eventually will exceed €40 billion.

The Minister of State was incorrect to state, when asked about fixed mortgage rates for individuals, that it somehow had nothing to do with the Government. Bankers also broke their contracts with their shareholders and bondholders, as well as with the people of Ireland, when they got their institutions into such a mess. We are bailing them out even though they broke their contracts. Although many others have done what they were not meant to do, we are bailing them out. Consequently, it is a bit rich to dismiss this issue as though it is tough luck because it only pertains to the little people and the Government's purpose is to bail out the big people.

The Minister of State must acknowledge the Government is moving too slowly in respect of this banking crisis. The Government must demonstrate what it envisages and how it will work and must provide Members with the nitty-gritty detail. While macroeconomics is great and macroeconomic solutions always look very easy on paper, when one delves into the microeconomic realm as to how one might actually implement such solutions, one suddenly learns how messy and difficult it can become. Members must be provided with more microeconomic detail as to how the Government intends to handle such issues. For example, I asked the Minister of State how the Government intends to transfer the legal, development and financial personnel to NAMA, from where will they come and how it intends to deal with the constitutional and legal issues. The Government must answer those important questions.

I would appreciate an answer from the Minister of State on the initial proposal I put to him regarding the use of an institution such as the EBS or Anglo Irish Bank's small and medium business unit to speed up the process of lending money to those who seek it. NAMA will take too long and other solutions exist. While such solutions are not as extensive, big or complex, I seek a response in this regard from the Minister of State. I raised this issue in the House a couple of times and while it might be a little boring for the Minister of State, I would appreciate his opinion in this regard. While the Government perseveres with NAMA — who knows where that eventually will go or how much change to it will come about — I would appreciate the Minister of State's opinion on the other proposals we could use.

Amendment put.
The Seanad divided: Tá, 28; Níl, 19.

  • Boyle, Dan.
  • Brady, Martin.
  • Butler, Larry.
  • Callanan, Peter.
  • Callely, Ivor.
  • Carty, John.
  • Cassidy, Donie.
  • Corrigan, Maria.
  • Daly, Mark.
  • de Búrca, Déirdre.
  • Ellis, John.
  • Feeney, Geraldine.
  • Glynn, Camillus.
  • Hanafin, John.
  • MacSharry, Marc.
  • McDonald, Lisa.
  • Ó Domhnaill, Brian.
  • Ó Murchú, Labhrás.
  • O’Brien, Francis.
  • O’Donovan, Denis.
  • O’Malley, Fiona.
  • O’Sullivan, Ned.
  • O’Toole, Joe.
  • Ormonde, Ann.
  • Phelan, Kieran.
  • Walsh, Jim.
  • White, Mary M.
  • Wilson, Diarmuid.

Níl

  • Bradford, Paul.
  • Burke, Paddy.
  • Buttimer, Jerry.
  • Cannon, Ciaran.
  • Coffey, Paudie.
  • Coghlan, Paul.
  • Doherty, Pearse.
  • Donohoe, Paschal.
  • Fitzgerald, Frances.
  • Hannigan, Dominic.
  • Healy Eames, Fidelma.
  • McFadden, Nicky.
  • Phelan, John Paul.
  • Prendergast, Phil.
  • Regan, Eugene.
  • Ross, Shane.
  • Ryan, Brendan.
  • Twomey, Liam.
  • White, Alex.
Tellers: Tá, Senators Camillus Glynn and Diarmuid Wilson; Níl, Senators Maurice Cummins and Liam Twomey.
Amendment declared carried.
Motion, as amended, put and agreed to.
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