Skip to main content
Normal View

Select Committee on Legislation and Security debate -
Wednesday, 6 Dec 1995

SECTION 27.

I move amendment No. 33:

In page 14, subsection (3), lines 8 to 10, to delete "so that the decision of the Taxing Master or the County Registrar is manifestly unjust".

The purpose of section 27 of the Bill appears to be to give additional powers to the Taxing Master of the High Court. I have no difficulty with that and I unequivocally welcome it. However, under subsection (3) of this section the power of the court to review a decision of the Taxing Master would appear to be unnecessarily limited. As we know, at present a court can alter the amount fixed by the Taxing Master if it concludes that such amounts are excessive. There is no requirement on the court to find manifest injustice. In inserting these words there is an unnecessary fettering of the discretion of the court and that it dilutes the spirit and intention of the entire section. That is why I am moving this amendment.

I have some concerns about this amendment. The whole thrust of section 27 is to give reasonable and adequate powers to the Master of the High Court and County Registrars to consider, examine and adjudicate on Bills of costs. There have been a number of actions, particularly in the High Court, over the years in relation to the powers of the Taxing Masters. These have identified serious deficiencies in their powers, for example, in relation to the taxation of counsel fees. While the Taxing Masters seem to have significant powers in relation to taxing solicitors fees, the High Court cases would show that their powers in relation to taxing counsel fees are quite restricted.

Case law indicates that the Taxing Master must ask himself or herself what a reasonable solicitor would have agreed to have paid counsel in a case. I know there are plenty of reasonable solicitors around. The Taxing Master, who is after all a solicitor with a minimum of ten years experience, cannot ask himself or herself what they would have allowed in this particular case. Therefore, his or her discretion is limited.

Subsections (1) and (2) of section 27 represent an effort to change that situation. The Deputy has not sought to amend those two subsections which will allow the Taxing Master to reach a decision on counsel costs and other costs based on his or her own judgment. It is particularly appropriate because the Taxing Masters are experienced solicitors themselves and have a good knowledge of what is a fair and reasonable rate for the job.

The Taxing Masters have available to them the decisions of their predecessors and, of course, their own previous decisions on taxation. They have a wealth of knowledge available in relation to fees and costs. They are unique in this regard. They are in fact the specialists in the area and it is appropriate that they should be able to make a judgment on what are fair, reasonable and appropriate charges for particular services.

The Deputy's amendment would significantly reduce the powers of the Taxing Masters proposed in subsections (1) and (2). I am not suggesting that Taxing Masters are omnipotent in this area of costs nor am I suggesting that their decisions should not be subject to appeal. Of course they should be subject to appeal but even with subsection (3) as it is in the Bill, their decisions will be subject to judicial review. Like any other person exercising quasi-judicial functions, they have to act in accordance with constitutional justice and fair procedures. Therefore, they can never be the final arbiters in matters relating to costs as they will always be subject to supervisory orders of the High Court.

Deputies will remember that the Courts (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1961, makes it clear that the Office of the Taxing Master is attached to the High Court. The Office of Taxing Master is, therefore, part of the structures of the High Court.

Subsection (3) makes it clear that if a Taxing Master has erred as to the amount he or she has allowed in respect of a charge, fee or disbursement in a way that is manifestly unjust, that decision can be reviewed by the High Court. Therefore, on top of the requirements that the Taxing Master must observe in any event in regard to constitutional justice and fair procedures, they are also required by this section to behave in a just manner in carrying out their functions. If they act unjustly, and that is clear, their decisions can be reviewed.

I am concerned that Deputy O'Donoghue's amendment would allow any person dissatisfied with the decision of the Taxing Master to challenge it in the High Court as a matter of course. I do not think that is a desirable situation. The problem in this area is that any party who has to pay costs — be it a solicitor-client basis or a party and party cost basis — is never going to be happy with whatever decision is handed down. That is the reality of life. If every decision of the Taxing Master is to be appealable to the High Court as a matter of course then one would have to ask whether we need a Taxing Master at all. Can they all go straight in? We have to have confidence in the Taxing Masters to perform their duty. With their background as practitioners and their daily experience of adjudicating on costs, Taxing Masters are the appropriate people to adjudicate on bills of cost to ensure that everybody is treated fairly.

There is a provision in subsection (3) to enable the High Court — apart from any other powers it has — to review the decision of the Taxing Master. We should leave it to the High Court to determine what is unjust if they are requested to do so. For that reason the Deputy might consider withdrawing his amendment.

I understand the Minister's objectives in this but it has been my experience in this House that whenever legislation has come before it dealing with the issue of Taxing Masters and solicitors' costs, the officials within the Department of Justice who know the theory of the way things work, do not always appreciate or understand what happens in practice.

It is clear that Taxing Masters must be able to exercise their jurisdiction and determine whether costs charged by solicitors or barristers are appropriate to the work undertaken. As I understand the position, at the moment an appeal can be made to the High Court by either side on the basis that a Taxing Master has erred on a principle of law or that he has not acted reasonably in his assessment of an issue.

I want to correct one thing. People do not willy nilly appeal from the Taxing Master to the High Court for one very basic and simple reason. Whether you are an applicant to have costs determined, if you have been a successful litigant in a High Court case and the other side has to pay yours costs, and the Taxing Master determines how much should be paid, then if you are dissatisfied with how much you are going to get you can appeal to the High Court; or, if you are dissatisfied with how much is awarded against you you can appeal to the High Court. The disincentive against appealing is that you do not appeal unless you have a reasonable case and think you are going to succeed. If you appeal and do not succeed you end up being penalised by the High Court that makes an order for costs against you.

If, as a successful litigant, I decide my solicitor should be paid more or he furnishes me with an extra bill which Taxing Master has not said the defendant should pay, I would be warned as a litigant that if I appeal it to the High Court and lose, an order for costs will be made against me. If the defendant does not like what he has been told he must pay, he is also warned if he appeals an order for costs will be made.

In my experience as a practitioner for 20 years, only a small proportion of decisions made by the Taxing Masters are appealed to the High Court because of that barrier, that is, knowing one will be penalised. I am concerned that the proposal in subsection (3) is based on the assumption that when an award for costs is made, the person who will benefit will automatically appeal because they want more. We want to stop people appealing unnecessarily. That is not necessarily the way the system works.

If an award for costs is made it may be that the sum ordered to be paid is reasonable based on the work done and that there is no reason to appeal. The award may be reasonable from the plaintiff's position but not the defendant. In the past Taxing Masters, including some who have retired, have made decisions of great eccentricity — in some cases awarding costs which were lower than they should have been, while in others they were too high.

I am concerned not with the word "unjust" but with the word "manifestly". An order for costs is made in favour of a successful litigant who has been justified in going to court and who has been proved right by winning their case. If a Taxing Master makes an order for costs, the view may be that the successful litigant will not have the full bill paid; that it is unjust, but not manifestly unjust. There is a difference between something unjust and something manifestly unjust. The costs awarded may be a little high and it is unjust that a defendant should pay them, but not manifestly unjust. That word "manifestly" means something additional. I do not know why it is included.

The High Court should have a right to review decisions made by Taxing Masters which are unjust or inappropriate. It can exercise a punishment on those who bring spurious appeals by awarding costs against them. I am concerned that the word "manifestly" may perpetrate an injustice. It may result in a case where an additional award of costs should have been made but had not been because the court said it was unjust that a person did not get an extra couple of thousand pounds, but not manifestly unjust. A couple of thousand pounds to someone of limited means who has had to go to court to defend their rights or because they have been involved in a personal accident is a substantial sum of money. I ask the Minister to look at the word "manifestly" before Report Stage. It is a double edged sword and there could be problems.

At present the provision which applies to these appeals is to allow the High Court to amend decisions of Taxing Masters on a principle of law as well. I am anxious that this section does not exclude a variation of a decision where a principle of law is involved. That is an important issue which should be addressed. There is a danger that by addressing a problem we may create a new one or an area of uncertainty in relation to the law where there have been difficulties in the past but where it is now functioning properly.

I support Deputy O'Donoghue's amendment. I listened with interest to Deputy Shatter who has a great deal of expertise in this area. The Minister said she did not want people to appeal to the High Court as a matter of course. As Deputy Shatter said, people do not appeal from the Taxing Masters to the High Court as a matter of course. We could take this further and say that people to not go to the Taxing Master as a matter of course even if the feel they have been hard done by. That is why we included a provision in the Solicitors Act to allow the Law Society to make determinations on costs.

The section suggests that if the High Court believes that costs charged to a litigant are unjust, it cannot do anything about it because it is not manifestly unjust. The High Court cannot overrule an award made by the Taxing Master which it believes to be too high if it does not represent gross overcharging. That could result in, and is a recipe for, an injustice. We are excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with something which it believes is unfair or unjust because it is not manifestly unjust or does not represent gross overcharging. The Minister should accept this amendment and I would welcome a positive response.

If a Member of the Committee tables an amendment seeking the deletion of a word, in this case "manifestly", it is possible to do so. Having listened to arguments made I am willing to remove that word and this will assist Members who made a submission on this complex area in the courts system. I take the point that the word "manifestly" does not add anything and that it may be a problem. Deputy Shatter asked that I come back on Report Stage.

I do not see the need for the words "manifestly" or "unjust". The court has always had discretion without these words. If this is as far as the Minister is willing to go, then I propose that the word "manifestly" be removed. I reserve the right to come back on Report Stage.

I propose that in page 14, subsection (3), line 9, to delete the word "manifestly". Is that agreed? Agreed.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

I move amendment No. 34:

In page 14, subsection (5), line 21, to delete "unless and".

Section 27(5) requires vouchers to be provided before a certificate of taxation would be issued. While this is reasonable, it should not apply where the parties agree or where the Taxing Master decides it is not necessary. This is practical from an administrative point of view. If every practitioner must look for receipts and vouchers for everything, it will make life miserable. I am pleased the Minister will accept what I consider to be a pragmatic amendment.

I accept the amendment; it is a valid point.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment No. 36 is an alternative to amendment No. 35 and both may be discussed together. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 35:

In page 14, subsection (5), lines 23 and 24, to delete "or the County Registrar as the case may be" and substitute "or unless the parties agree or the Taxing Master decides that proper vouchers or receipts for disbursements need not be provided".

This amendment is similar to amendment No. 36 and will have the same effect. The certificate of taxation shall not issue until proper vouchers or receipts for disbursements have first been produced and accepted by the Taxing Master or unless the parties agree or the Taxing Master decides that proper vouchers or receipts for disbursements need not be provided. The amendment is in ease of the parties. As it has the same effect as amendment No. 36, I trust it will be accepted.

Amendment agreed to.
Amendment No. 36 not moved.

Members have a note which states that amendments Nos. 37 and 37a are grouped. I have a note which manifestly makes it clear that they are no longer grouped for discussion purposes. Amendment No. 37 will be discussed separately.

I move amendment No. 37:

In page 14, lines 25 to 40, to delete subsections (6) and (7).

Section 27(6) and (7) provides that a solicitor or a legal costs accountant will not be paid any fees, expenses or costs arising from the taxation of a bill of costs or a review of same even when they are successful.

Where a solicitor must prepare a large bill, it is clear from my practical experience that he will find it necessary, and may have no alternative whatsoever, to retain a costs accountant. The solicitor concerned will, in all probability, have to attend for taxation and he may then have to attend for a review and perhaps an appeal. In some cases, he may have no alternative but to engage costs accountants to act as expert witnesses on his behalf. He may also have to get other solicitors or counsel to act as expert witnesses on his behalf. Under the provisions of the subsections as they stand, the costs of these parties will not be recovered.

This is unjust if, for example, it is found that the bill was reasonable in all respects by the Taxing Master at first hearing and subsequently at review or on appeal. In those circumstances, the successful party would not be entitled to indemnity. This is manifestly unjust and it is probably also unconstitutional. It appears to provide an incentive, perhaps unwittingly, to a party to challenge all bills of costs. Given the extensive new powers conferred on the Taxing Master to examine the nature and extent of the work done, the costs involved in defending a bill could be very substantial. The amendment should be accepted on the basis that all it does is delete the offending subsections. These subsections appear to commence with the presumption that all bills of costs will be unjust and that even if they are subsequently found to be just, there were unjust from the outset. We cannot proceed on that basis and I put down the amendment to ensure justice for everybody.

It is important to outline what subsections (6) and (7) are attempting to achieve. I understand it has long been the case that a solicitor who employs a costs drawer to prepare a bill of costs for a client is required to pay that bill himself or herself. This stems from the concept, which is understandable and reasonable, that a solicitor should be expected to prepare his or her bill of costs in the same way as one would expect one's doctor or other professional from whom one received services to do. Members would not welcome a situation where a professional providing services included a specific charge in the bill relating to the cost of preparing the bill for presentation to the client.

The preparation of a bill for a client, whether for services provided by a solicitor, architect or engineer, is part of the service provided. It is part of the cost the professional providing the service must meet as part of the running costs of their business. The purpose of subsections (6) and (7) is to make it clear in statute what I understand has been the practice in regard to the preparation of bills of costs in this country since the foundation of the State and previously. We are including in statute what is essentially long standing practice. This has the benefit of providing clarity and putting the matter beyond any doubt. I understand that from time to time some doubts have been expressed about who is responsible for meeting the costs of preparing a bill of costs. The subsections will put that matter to rest and beyond doubt.

I am aware, as Deputy O'Donoghue is aware, that some concern was expressed in relation to a similar, but not the same, provision in the 1994 Bill, particularly section 27(7). There was a doubt that a solicitor who engaged witnesses, such as costs accountants acting as experts, or other solicitors or counsel acting as expert witnesses, in an appeal to the court against the decision of a Taxing Master or County Registrar would not be entitled to recover those costs, even if the court found in favour of the solicitor's bill of costs. Therefore, subsection (7) of this Bill is significantly different from the corresponding provision in the 1994 Bill in that it leaves it to the discretion of the court to decide if the costs incurred by a solicitor in defending his or her bill of costs in court should be paid.

This differs significantly from the corresponding provision in the 1994 Bill which was unfair, even if unintentionally. If that Bill had reached Committee Stage, I am confident the provision would have been amended along the lines provided in section 27(7). There was an opportunity to re-examine the original section and we have tidied it up in the way in which it would have been done if the previous Bill had proceeded. I ask the Deputy to consider this point and withdraw his amendment.

As the taxation of party to party costs, which are costs ordered by a court that must be paid by the loser of the litigation, stands at present, the court makes an order for costs and Government stamp duty is payable on what is known as the certificate of taxation. A substantial sum of money is payable to the Government in this regard. As I understand the position — and I am open to correction — the person in whose favour the order for costs is made must pay the stamp duty to take up the certificate of taxation. One cannot enforce the order for costs without the certificate. The successful litigant pays the stamp duty. I do not want to pretend I have more expertise on this than I have, so I am open to correction but as I understand it the stamp duty itself is ultimately recovered from the defendant in the court proceedings.

I am concerned about the reference in this subsection which states ". . . no solicitor or legal cost accountant or other cost drawer retained to present the bill of costs to the Taxing Master or a County Registrar shall be entitled to be paid any fees, disbursements, charges or expenses in relation to the taxation of costs. . . ". I emphasise the reference to "charges or expenses in relation to the taxation of costs" which is open to the interpretation that a successful litigant may have to pay their own stamp duty on the certificate of taxation and the stamp duty would not then be recoverable from the defendant who was ordered to pay costs. The stamp duty may be interpreted as being a charge arising out of the taxation.

That could substantially change the law in a manner which is to the detriment of litigants. There is sometimes a view of legislation of this sort that one is trying to penalise wayward solicitors for overcharging clients. I am all in favour of penalising wayward solicitors for doing that. However, the legislation is also about seeking to ensure that people who have to resort to the courts are treated fairly and that successful litigants — people who have had to go to court to defend their rights — recover from the person who wronged them the proper expenses of their court action.

If this provision was to prevent the recovery of stamp duty on taxation it would create a situation where many litigants who were successful would end up settling for a far lesser sum than they would be entitled to recover on costs: they would end up with a liability to their own solicitors which would have to be met and they would effectively be stuck with their own stamp duty.

With a view to Report Stage I would indicate to the Minister that this section requires an entirely separate subsection which makes it clear that a successful litigant who has an order for costs made in their favour is entitled to recover the stamp duty charged on the certificate of taxation, and that the stamp duty is not to be regarded as a charge or expense within the terminology of subsections (6) and (7).

As a practising solicitor who, obviously, has an interest in this matter, I think there is a degree of unreality in relation to the manner in which the taxation of costs is dealt with in this Bill and is discussed on a regular basis. I accept the view that any solicitor who provides a service to their client, like any other professional, should be able to draw up a bill of costs which they submit to their client and which their client can assess as to the validity of the charges. An engineer or a builder might prepare their bill in-house, without the assistance of anyone else but what happens in the legal profession is unique, particularly in the context of successful litigants. The cost accountant serves two functions. The first is the preparation of a bill; the second is that the cost accountant effectively acts as an advocate before the Taxing Master.

The Taxing Master performs a judicial function and the cost accountant is an expert. When someone contests a bill, as they are entitled to do, two solicitors do not argue their case before the Taxing Master. Two cost accountants — one for each side who are professionally trained and have a great deal of expertise, argue why a bill is right or wrong. At that stage the cost accountants do not draw up bills; they do not perform the same function of any other professional for the purpose of charging clients. They act as advocates before a court which is a subsidiary court of the High Court. Ultimately, the litigant who has been successful often has to pay the fees of their own cost accountant. They cannot get an order that those fees be paid by the other side.

In my view many taxations take place because defendants are being "a bit thick" about it. They try to put off the day when they have to meet their obligations as ordered by the courts. They know that if a bill goes for taxation it may take six or seven months before the matter is heard and then the certificate of taxation has to be taken up; they can, perhaps, get away with not paying an order for costs for up to a year.

A properly submitted bill may go to taxation and the Taxing Master may confirm the bill in its entirety as submitted by the successful litigant or makes a minor adjustment to the bill. The sort of minor adjustments that can be made may be, for example, where a medical doctor might charge an attendance fee for court of £700 and the Taxing Master might consider it only reasonable the doctor gets £500; that is something outside the control of the solicitor or client. However, where there is a very minor adjustment made to a bill it is wrong the law does not provide that the defendant who forced the taxation is not required to pay the costs, not the costs of the preparation of the bill but those for the cost accountant acting as advocate before the Taxing Master processing it.

The present system acts as an incentive to recalcitrant litigants who have lost their cases and who are trying to put off the day when they have to properly comply with court orders for costs. There is a need for new thinking in this area, not in the interests of the legal profession but to protect people who have properly gone to court, who have had orders for costs made in their favour, whose lawyers have prepared bills of costs which are deemed ultimately to be entirely accurate or to which only minor modifications are required, and who might have to pay £2,000 or £3,000 themselves to their taxing cost accountant to have the matter determined before the taxing master. It is wrong that people who are successful in litigation should be penalised in that way.

I have had that experience in the area of civil litigation and also in the area of family law where people have been through judicial separation cases in the Circuit Court or the High Court. It relates particularly to wives who have been through cases where the husbands have been unsuccessful, orders for costs have been made in favour of wives and there is a reluctance to meet the costs. At the end of the day, because a reasonable bill has gone to the Taxing Master and been upheld, the wife ends up having to foot a bill of anything from £1,000 to £3,000 or £4,000 for her own cost accountant. Often the reasons the bills are so large is that the wife might have succeeded in having the family home transferred into her name and the case is regarded as having a certain value by the court. It might be a modest family home in Dublin terms worth £80,000 with a mortgage on it and has been put in the wife's name. The wife ends up having to pay cost accountants to do a proper job in order to have the legal costs the husband should have paid recouped.

There is a need to look at this. It is an issue which has never been properly debated in the Oireachtas. it arose when the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994, came before us. We succeeded then in having some modifications made. People steered away from the issue because there is a general lack of familiarity with the problems that affect people in this regard. We look at the issue too frequently in the context of the recalcitrant solicitor and not the recalcitrant litigant who uses the system to generate unnecessary expense for someone who has succeeded in the courts, be it in a family case or another case.

It was suggested that we adjourn at 8 p.m. Is that agreed? Agreed. We will meet tomorrow at 2.30 p.m. Perhaps we could decide tomorrow how long we will sit. We must get through the Bill. We made progress today and if Members are in the same humour tomorrow we will get through it quickly.

The Select Committee adjourned at 8 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Thursday, 7 December 1995.

Top
Share