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Special Committee Defence Bill, 1951 debate -
Tuesday, 8 Apr 1952

SECTION 140.

I move amendment No. 182:—

To delete paragraph (b), lines 48 and 49, page 65, and lines 1 and 2, page 66.

I move this amendment for what I consider very good reasons. We had a long discussion on the redress of wrongs and the procedure. The greatest freedom should be given to a man to make his case. Even in a court of law a man who is making a defence may give evidence which the court may think is perjured evidence, but it is only one case in 10,000 he is charged with perjury. The man's story may be that everybody else is telling lies against him and he fights his own case. If you leave that section in—it is a new section—it will frighten people off from putting forward their own case under the redress of wrongs section. It says: " knowingly makes a false statement ", but a man may make a statement falsely without knowing that it is false and he runs the risk of being charged and tried for it.

When dealing with Section 113 on the redress of wrongs we were all very anxious that every freedom should be given to a person to make his case right up to the Minister if need be, but here we are holding a pistol to his head and saying: " Unless everything you say is perfectly correct, if you knowingly make a false statement about the character of your commanding officer or anybody else, or suppress any material fact, in other words, if you do not make your case as a lawyer would make it for you, knowing all the facts, you are liable to be punished." I would ask the Minister not to insist on this completely new provision. Nothing has happened that I know of to make it necessary, and I am not in favour of it.

It is not altogether new because sub-section (1) of Section 55 of the 1923 Act reads:—

" The offence of knowingly making any statement which by reason of falsity or the suppression of material facts, is calculated seriously to injure or affect the character of any other person subject to military law."

I am sure that the Committee will agree that when an officer or man is given the statutory right to prefer allegations against a superior officer, that officer should be given some protection against the person with a persecution complex or the malicious or reckless liar.

An appeal to the civil court for damages in a case of that kind would be practically useless because the man would probably be a man of straw, and in any case the Army rightly considers that it should be possible to settle these matters within the Army. Paragraph (b) provides the necessary protection and I think that if the Committee will look at the last paragraph of the section they will see that conviction by a court-martial makes an individual liable to suffer only imprisonment or any less punishment awardable by a court-martial, so that in fact a person who made malicious and false statements against a superior and who was proved to have made them might get away with a small fine or some such punishment, but he would have put the unfortunate officer against whom the charges were made in the position of having to defend himself and having a certain amount of suspicion always cast on him as a result.

I repeat that the section is entirely new. It is put in deliberately with particular reference to a person availing of the machinery for the redress of grievances for the purpose of frightening soldiers and officers from making their case. In the old Act, the section to which the Minister refers is a section which refers to anyone who knowingly makes a false statement—and I have no objection to that section being in—" which, by reason of falsity or suppression of material facts, is calculated seriously to injure or damage the character of any other person subject to military law ". That is an offence. Let it still be an offence. It will still catch the man out who does what the Minister says he should not do, but I do not want it to be related specifically to the redress of wrongs because, if it is, I say that it is putting a pistol up to the man to prevent his availing of the machinery we are giving him for the redress of wrongs.

Admitting the point which the Minister makes—and it is a good point—is there not also a point in making sure that the other parties concerned in the transaction, the command officer against whom the person wronged has appealed, should also have the same duty with regard to strict truth and care in allegation? I know that to some extent it is covered by (a), but it is not linked with the seeking of redress. It is bad enough to make a false accusation knowing it to be false, but if it is bolstered up by further false misrepresentation or suppression of material facts when the man has appealed to the Minister or when the machinery for the redress of wrongs is put into operation, it is a more serious thing. I agree with all the Minister says from the point of view of the man making an appeal but there is another side to it.

But if an officer made false accusations against a man the same position would obtain. The section relates to false accusations against an officer or man.

That relates to a false accusation—a false statement " affecting the character of " is a different thing. I would agree with the Minister that that provision might stand, but I certainly would put it like this : " Who when seeking redress under Section 113 or in the case of an officer or superior dealing with the seeking of redress knowingly makes a false statement . . ." In other words, you give the protection—and I am all with the Minister—to the officer who is appealed against but also give the protection to the man doing the appealing.

It was unfair to put it in that way—deliberately referring to the redress of grievances. I am quite prepared to give the Minister all the powers in the old Act in regard to making accusations against anybody, whether in the redress of grievances or not. What will happen in the Army is, that legal officers in the military college and in the recruit training depot lecturing officers and soldiers on military law will say : " You have these rights but Section 140 (2) says that if you make a false statement you can be court martialled and are liable to suffer imprisonment." A lot depends on the way the stress is put on that and we will all agree from experience that the stress will not be put in favour of the man but in favour of authority.

We will consider the point and have it examined.

There are two approaches—one is the approach Deputy Cowan suggests and the other the approach I suggest. In view of what Deputy Cowan has said, it might be better to put it as relating to all cases without leaving it in danger of being used as a threat where the redress of wrongs is concerned.

There must be special protection provided for the officer because, in the main, the complaints are against officers. We all know what exaggerated complaints can be made against an officer, how complaints can be highly coloured, and the bad effect that they can have on an officer's reputation. If it can be proved that they are completely and entirely false, it is desirable that the person making the allegation should be punished.

We agree. We feel that this is a case where we should bring strongly to the notice of the Executive the temptation to the Executive to cover their angle and not see completely the other side.

We will have it examined.

Amendment No. 182, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 183 not moved.
Section 140 agreed to.
Business suspended at 6.10 p.m. and resumed at 8.30 p.m.
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