I move that the Bill be now read a Second Time. This is the second Bill of its kind to come before the House. Its object is to confirm and give the force of law to an Order which I have made under Section 9 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1953, relating to trade practices affecting the supply and distribution of building materials and components. The first Bill, relating to the trade in radio sets and accessories, recently received the approval of all Parties in the House and, as the principles underlying the present Bill are the same, I am sure that this measure will commend itself to the House, generally.
Deputies will be aware that the Fair Trade Commission undertook a statutory inquiry under Section 7 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1953, in relation to the supply and distribution of building materials and components. Subsequently, the commission furnished to me a report of the inquiry describing the conditions which obtain in the trade and indicating that, in the view of the commission, certain practices exist which interfere unfairly with competition and operate against the public interest. The report has been published and copies have been circulated to Deputies. However, to facilitate the House, I propose, at this stage, to give a résumé of the commission's report and of the recommendations which the commission make with a view to prohibiting the restrictive trade practices which are considered to be unfair or to operate against the public interest.
Deputies will understand that in referring to trade practices, I am referring to the position as it was stated in the commission's report and that I have no means of knowing to what extent, if any, practice has been altered in the meantime. According to the commission's report most building materials and components are manufactured in this country and are sold mainly through builders' merchants. The goods are for the most part supplied on the basis of a retail list price from which discounts and rebates are allowed at varying rates according as the purchaser is a merchant, a builder, a local authority or other type of user. Up to a short time prior to the commencement of the inquiry by the commission in December, 1953, purchasers had been confronted with a uniformity of prices that indicated collusion between merchants regarding the selling prices of a wide range of commodities essential to the building industry. About August, 1953, a measure of competition in prices between the merchants dealing in certain materials developed and gradually extended to an increasing range of materials.
At the time of the inquiry there was, nevertheless, a total absence of price competition between merchants on the resale of some materials while there was an understanding between merchants to avoid price competition where possible in the sale of certain other materials. Moreover, associations of merchants sought to establish arrangements with manufacturers and other suppliers with the object of regulating the channels of distribution. In some instances, the supply of building materials has been confined to certain approved distributors with the cooperation or acquiescence of the manufacturers.
The effect of these arrangements has been to discourage competition, and to fortify the position of established merchants. In the case of a number of imported commodities the local associations have endeavoured—in some cases successfully—to make arrangements with manufacturers and organisations in other countries for the limitation of supplies to firms approved by the local associations. There are, also, arrangements between associations providing for the suppression of competition by the territorial division of the market. Most of the building materials which were the subject of the inquiry are protected either by tariffs or other import restrictions and in certain cases the existence of protection appears to have facilitated the growth of restrictive practices.
A notable feature of the trade is the number of associations in which builders' merchants are organised. There are no fewer than 16 trade associations representing merchants handling building materials. The commission's report shows that there is a marked similarity of phrasing in the rules of some of these associations which was particularly evident in the changes made in certain rules after the introduction of the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill in 1952. There is interlocking membership between the associations. As the chairman of one association put it, the associations are dovetailed into one another. The regulation of the marketing of many items is a stated objective of a number of merchants' associations. There is a marked hostility of organised merchant opinion to price competition, which, where it is allowed to operate at present, is regarded as a lamentable retrogression from the position which existed prior to mid 1953. The modifications of policy which took place in 1953 were effected because of surreptitious competition and not from any desire on the part of merchants for price competition. The withdrawal effected in 1953 from certain longstanding restrictive practices is tentative, and there can be no confidence that such practices will not be resumed at a more opportune moment.
Dealing with interferences with price competition through the operations of combinations of merchants—in what are commonly known as price rings— the commission point out that it is obvious that any body of merchants, in fixing gross profit margins, will consult their own interests and that their interests do not necessarily coincide with the public interest. In the opinion of the commission, prohibition of competition in price between merchants results in an enhancement of price to the public, removes a vital incentive to economy in distribution, blunts the benefits to the consumer of competition between manufacturers, prevents or retards the development of potentially more efficient methods of distribution and leads to abuses of various kinds, such as collusion in tendering to public bodies.
These objections, in the opinion of the commission, are more than sufficient in themselves to justify the conclusion that any measures for the elimination of price competition between merchants in this trade operate against the public interest and should be prohibited. The views of the commission on horizontal price-fixing by "price rings" are fully set out in paragraphs 37 to 50, inclusive, of their report. With regard to price maintenance imposed by manufacturers, whether individually enforced or enforced by agreement with other suppliers, or with combinations of merchants, the commission point out that such price maintenance also denies to the public the benefit of price competition between merchants and removes the incentive provided by such competition to improved efficiency in distribution, and the conclusion of the commission is that the practice operates against the public interest. In some cases, as is pointed out in different chapters of the report, none of the considerations commonly urged in favour of price maintenance by manufacturers was relevant.
There is a further consideration relating to the trade in building materials which reinforces the importance of the considerations already mentioned, viz., the degree to which public policy has entailed the intervention of the State and local authorities in the financing of housing and other building construction. State subsidies of one kind or another, and contributions by local authorities, in respect of housing, have, in recent years, been of the order of £4,000,000 annually. Other social services involve very considerable annual expenditure by the State or local authorities on the construction of hospitals, sanatoria, schools, etc. Any arrangements which lead to an enhancement of the prices of building materials inevitably result in a reduction in the volume of housing and construction financed from a particular allocation of public moneys, and must, therefore, be of serious concern to the State.
The arrangements by associations governing entry to, and status in, the trade in building materials generally take the form of a classification of merchants and the establishment of conditions for entry into each class. Merchants are generally classed as "A" and "B", the "A" merchants being entitled to a higher trade discount than the "B" merchants. Entry into a class is governed by conditions which vary between different associations and between different commodities or groups of commodities, so that a merchant might be classed as a "B" merchant for the sale of one commodity and an "A" merchant for the sale of another commodity. Conditions of entry generally require the achievement of a certain turnover in the goods concerned in advance of entry and the performance of merchanting functions by the applicant.
In addition, the applicant is sometimes required to show that he maintains stocks of a certain magnitude and that he possesses adequate premises. In the opinion of the commission, the policies and practices adopted by the associations relating to entry into the trade in building materials are, in their general tendency, unfair. The restriction of supplies on trade terms to comparatively few merchants may seriously handicap an excluded merchant in his business generally. A merchant who is not in a position to supply, on appropriate terms to a builder, some of the goods normally provided by a merchant may lose that builder's custom altogether. A merchant prevented from obtaining the best terms is obviously handicapped in competition with the merchant in receipt of such terms because of the difficulty of providing a comparable service on a smaller gross profit margin.
The commission are of the view that on two principal grounds the practices of associations in relation to the supply of building materials are contrary to the public interest and should be prohibited. Firstly, by restricting the numbers of merchants trading in particular commodities, the practices limit competition and facilitate the control of prices by the associations concerned. Secondly, by strongly resisting the supply of the goods through alternative channels, the trade associations restrict competition and thereby prevent the interplay of forces which normally leads to the emergence of improved methods of distribution in response to changing circumstances and opportunities.
The commission consider that a manufacturer should not be prevented from developing his distribution system in the manner that seems best to him in the light of his requirements and responsibilities. They are of opinion that a manufacturer should, in his own discretion and without pressure from organised bodies of traders, be free to select channels of distribution for his products. In allowing freedom to the manufacturer in this respect, regard must be had to his position in the market. Where there is only one manufacturer of a particular product in Ireland it is especially important that the arrangements for the supply and distribution of the product should be equitable as between distributors generally, since distributors who may have reason to feel aggrieved have no alternative source of supply to fall back on.
The commission have had regard to objections advanced by merchants concerning the distributional arrangements of certain manufacturers and have suggested modifications in these arrangements with the object of removing what appear to the commission to be legitimate grievances. The commission consider that steps should be taken to ensure the avoidance of unfair conditions in the supply of goods while providing that any supplier may, on his own initiative, apply to the acceptance of orders for goods such terms and conditions as are reasonable in the interests of efficiency and economy in production and distribution or are necessary in the legitimate interests of the supplier, provided such terms and conditions are equitably applied.
With the object of removing the abuses which exist and restoring conditions of free and fair competition in the trade in building materials, the commission recommend in their report that an Order should be made prohibiting the particular practices which are considered to be harmful to the public interest. The commission recommend for instance, that resale price maintenance should be prohibited and that it should be made possible for merchants to determine their own selling prices in the light of their own operating costs. As regards arrangements and practices adopted by manufacturers and merchants with the object of regulating the channels of distribution, the commission recommend that it should be made unlawful for a manufacturer to withhold supplies from a merchant on the grounds that a merchant is or is not a member of a particular organisation or association or because the merchant's name does not appear on an approved list.
The commission recommend that individual or collective action against a supplier with the object of limiting him in his choice of channels of distribution or of customers or in his discretion in the grant of trade terms to any person should be prohibited. It is recommended by the commission that no manufacturer, trade association or organisation should be permitted to publish lists of approved or non-approved persons which are likely to restrict entry to the trade in building materials or to be used as a basis for regulating the supply and distribution of such materials. The commission recommend that it should be made unlawful for any person to secure a boycott of any manufacturer of building materials on the grounds that the manufacturer has refused to do any act which would be contrary to the terms of the Order. Agreements between suppliers, which provide for the suppression of competition by the territorial division of the market, should be prohibited and combinations of suppliers should be prohibited from being parties to any agreement to confine their orders to any suppliers outside the State.
There are, finally, two recommendations by the commission regarding the imposition by individual manufacturers of terms and conditions for the acceptance of orders. Firstly, it is recommended that a manufacturer should be permitted to impose certain conditions, including conditions as to the volume and frequency of orders, provided such conditions are reasonable, are equitably applied and are notified on request to the commission which may, if circumstances at any time so require, make fair trading rules in relation thereto. Secondly, it is recommended that there should be a prohibition against a manufacturer differentiating between customers who should in the normal way be supplied on the same terms and conditions having regard to the size and the frequency of their orders. The commission do not consider that a manufacturer should be prevented from advertising or specifying a resale price which is a maximum price or from withholding supplies from a merchant if the maximum price is exceeded. Any such specified price will not, however, be binding on merchants as a minimum price.
I have given careful consideration to the recommendations of the Fair Trade Commission. I am of opinion that the commission are fully justified in making the recommendations which are contained in their report and I agree entirely with these recommendations. I am satisfied that it is unfair that manufacturers of building materials, most, if not all, of whom have the benefit of tariff or other protection should discriminate against merchants by refusing to supply them on the grounds that the merchants are not approved by particular trade associations. I am of opinion also that it is wrong that it should be within the competence of vested merchant interests to restrict or regulate the right of new merchants to enter into the trade. I am satisfied that it is contrary to the interests of the consumer that the competition should be restricted both by the operation of arrangements between manufacturers and merchants to regulate the channels of distribution and by the enforcement of minimum resale prices for building materials. As I have already indicated, I have made an Order to give effect to the recommendations contained in the report of the Fair Trade Commission and a copy of the Order has been circulated to Deputies. Section 9 (3) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1953, provides that an Order of this kind shall not have effect unless it is confirmed by an Act of the Oireachtas.
The Bill now before the House is the Confirmation Bill which is necessary to give the force of law to the Order. Deputies are aware that proceedings have been initiated in the High Court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1953, the inquiry held by the Fair Trade Commission in regard to the supply and distribution of radio sets, and the Restrictive Trade Practices (Radios) Order, 1955 are unconstitutional. The hearing of the action has not yet commenced and I do not wish to say anything that might be regarded as prejudging the hearing, but I consider that, having regard to all the circumstances, it would be proper that the Oireachtas should proceed with its consideration of Bills for the confirmation of the Orders relating to restrictive trade practices.
In the case of Confirmation Bills of this kind, the arrangement is that the Order, which it is proposed to confirm, would not be capable of being amended by the House but would be accepted or rejected as it stands. The matters dealt with in the Order have been the subject of a detailed public inquiry by the Fair Trade Commission and the arguments in favour of adopting the provisions embodied in the Order are set out fully in the commission's report. I have no hesitation in commending to the House this Confirmation Bill which, on enactment, will, I hope, put an end to unfair restrictive practices in the trade in building materials.