I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill 2010: Second Stage.
The Deputy has 40 minutes. Does he wish to share time?
I propose to share my time with Deputy Sherlock and Deputy Ó Snodaigh.
Is that agreed? Agreed. Perhaps the Deputy would wait for ten seconds until order is restored. Deputy Rabbitte should be allowed to speak without interruption.
That is the kind of solidarity I appreciate. Thank you very much. I ask the House to give a Second Reading to the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill 2010, which has been published in my name on behalf of the Labour Party. This Bill seeks to restore inquiry by parliamentary committee. The Labour Party believes that institutional reform — wider than Dáil reform — is necessary, but that must wait another day.
The Labour Party believes that a parliamentary power of inquiry is necessary and intrinsic to the proper functioning of a representative, responsible parliamentary democracy. We believe the State is the poorer — has functioned more poorly — in the absence of a system where those who exercise authority in the State can be called to account for their performance in office.
The Bill goes one step towards meeting the criticism of the effectiveness of the national Parliament. I am aware that very shortly there will be a test arising in this House concerning accountability. I just heard a pathetically self-exculpatory statement from the Minister for Defence, who told us that he acted innocently. Having crawled around Limerick spreading disgraceful rumours about a rival candidate running a brothel, he has the cheek to tell us he forgot it. He has the cheek to come into this House and say it was an innocent misrepresentation. I hope that when this House is given the opportunity in the motion of confidence, that the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Deputy Gormley, will revert to his formerly high moral stance. He will have the opportunity, with the Green Party, to vote in the confidence motion. We will see whether the national Parliament is capable of asserting accountability.
The powers conferred by the Bill will enhance the relevance of Dáil Eireann. It will help distinguish parliament from government and demonstrate the capacity of parliament not only to hold government to account but to seek and get answers on matters of concern to our citizens. It is very damaging to confidence in politics that the perception is abroad that Deputies who are not office holders are without influence and are used merely as lobby fodder to rubber stamp measures brought forward by Government.
As the economic crisis has deepened, so the criticism of Parliament and the practice of politics has grown. Yet the financial and banking crisis has exposed in a dramatic way that when the economic crisis threatens the collapse of economies, the last resort is the State. The nature of State intervention may well be the subject of political dispute but ultimately we rely on governments to lead the reconstruction. Politics does matter and public debate in Ireland at the moment is being steered towards the conclusion that we are in the mess we are in because of inherent failings in the political system. That is a convenient and self-serving conclusion for the party that has dominated Government for the past dozen years. We are in the mess we are in because of traceable actions by successive Governments led by Fianna Fáil and inspired by the neo-liberal politics of the Progressive Democrats. The functioning of the political system is far from perfect and is in need of constant reform but the political system is not responsible for the reckless decision making that has resulted in the Irish recession being worse than is being experienced throughout most of Europe.
Dáil reform is the mantra of the day. Critics inside and outside Parliament each have their own particular aspect of Dáil reform to which they would like to give priority. Others do not know what they mean by Dáil reform but it is a useful weapon to denigrate the political process. Oppositions, it must be said, are generally enthusiastic about radical reform only to see their ardour abate somewhat when they become the Government. Governments work hard to ensure they are not exposed to any greater degree of accountability than that with which they can get away. Some Governments, such as this one, resist reform as a principle of ideological conviction.
It is that power to inquire into public administration that is the focus of the Labour Party Bill. I expect the Government will not obstruct the Bill going to Committee Stage now that the threat of a public inquiry into the banking crisis no longer hangs over the it — or over the bankers. I regret very much — this House will rue the day — that we decided not to have an open, accessible public inquiry into the banking disaster. That, however, is not an argument for failing to address the defect identified by the Supreme Court in legislation governing the powers of the Dáil and Seanad through their committees to conduct inquiries into matters of public concern.
Lest there be any doubt, I acknowledge that Members of the House cannot and should not substitute for the normal process of the rule of law. We are not prosecutors. We are not judges and we are not juries, but we are legislators. Our job is to frame the laws by which the State is governed. We cannot do this in abstract, as if we were blindfolded or as if we knew nothing about the situation in the country. We must make laws on an informed basis and we must know how the laws we make are applied in practice. At the moment these Houses make laws on occasion that are not enforced or are capable of being ignored or that are in practice routinely ignored. That is why the Dáil and Seanad — the two Houses of the national Legislature — must have the power and the duty to acquire and consider information on how the laws we make are administered on a day to day basis. The Dáil of course, has additional duties.
It is the Dáil, under the Constitution, that elects the Government and it is to the Dáil the Government is responsible and accountable. It is the Dáil that must approve every Government proposal to raise revenue and it must approve every proposal to spend revenue. The Dáil has the job of scrutinising the accounts as to how, and how well, every item of public revenue was spent. All of those are reasons, especially the Dáil, must have powers to inquire into public administration, into how well the laws we pass work in practice, how well they are administered, what defects are obvious in our laws, what new laws we pass to change rules that do not work or bring in new rules where no proper rule applied before. All of those are self-evidently compelling arguments for why this House should have the power to inquire into matters of public concern.
Regrettably, the collapse of the Abbeylara inquiry has been treated as an excuse to collapse inquiry by parliamentary committee. That has suited Governments since 2002 whose propaganda machines have put abroad the insinuation that, arising from the Supreme Court decision on the inquiry into Abbeylara, inquiry by parliamentary committee is no longer feasible. Any fair analysis of the judgments given by the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara case would show that this was never intended to be the case. For example, Mr Justice Hardiman made plain that it was not the intention of the Supreme Court to attack the established practices of the Oireachtas when he clarified the scope of the challenge in the Abbeylara case as follows:
There is nothing in the constitution which would prohibit a committee of virtually any kind . . . from conducting an inquiry into a matter which it considered worth inquiring into . . .To adjudicate, in the sense that the term is used here, on the culpability of citizens in their conduct in my view be equated with the everyday search for knowledge of facts or expert opinions.
Mr Justice Geoghegan in his judgment acknowledged:
A legitimate inquiry by a committee of the Oireachtas which was directed towards a perfectly proper legislative purpose might in some circumstances inevitably and unavoidably lead to implied blame being attached to an individual. That would not necessarily render the inquiry ultra vires...It is also true that a legitimate Oireachtas investigation may inevitably result in a finding of fault in a management system which in some circumstances could involve an implied attachment of blame. That also might be legitimate.
The Chief Justice, Mr Justice Murray said:
I do not see any reason why the Oireachtas cannot conduct inquiries of the nature which they have, for practical purposes traditionally done including inquiries into matters concerning the competency and efficiency in departmental or public administration as well as such matters as those concerning the proper or effective implementation of policy to make findings accordingly. Also [in the case of] (sic.) a particular office holder such as the chief executive of a semi state body, who is by virtue of his appointment, whether by statute or contract, answerable to the Houses different considerations arise ... Furthermore ... it is possible for a parliamentary committee to conduct an in depth investigation of a large police operation and make extensive findings and recommendations of great public and legislative import without the necessity of making findings of personal culpability of individual police officers.
The question of personal culpability was struck down in the Abbeylara case because effectively if there was such a finding against a garda, it could amount to an unlawful killing. That is not appropriate to this House and nobody should argue that it is.
Dr. Gerard Hogan SC is well known to the House and he advises the Joint Committee on the Constitution on constitutional matters on a pro bono basis. He was quoted in The Irish Times on 23 December 2009 as being of the opinion “that Abbeylara, while causing difficulties, did not slam the door shut as many believe”. He highlighted the distinction where the Supreme Court held that “it was unconstitutional for the committee to make a finding that a named person committed an act of homicide” and an inquiry, for example, into the banking crisis. The article further stated, “Hogan says an Inquiry into the banking system could comfortably operate provided it was not making findings that somebody engaged in nefarious criminal conduct.”
I have taken the trouble to refer to these judgments because of noises coming from the Government. The usual ploy by Government when it cannot credibly oppose a Private Members' Bill is to allow it into committee and then bury it. This is what the Government parties successfully did before the 2002 general election with my whistleblowers Bill. They could not risk being seen to oppose it but they could and did kill it off in committee. Independent banking experts have since gone on the record to say that if there had been protection for whistleblowers, the practices in our banks might never have been allowed reach the point where the banks threatened our entire economy but the Government knew best.
The second ploy used to demonstrate that Government is the repository of all wisdom is for a Minister to deride the Private Members' Bill and to promise that he will bring forward his own Bill. This happens every month of the year. For example, when I introduced the Garda surveillance Bill, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform memorably dismissed it because he said he feared "it would alert the criminal fraternity to Garda investigative techniques". Of course, a year later a similar Garda surveillance Bill was brought forward to demonstrate not just the Minister's determination to fight crime but the originality of his legislative impulse.
The third ploy used by Governments to stymie the Opposition's legislative efforts is to take refuge behind the advisorial skirts of the Attorney General. Successive Attorneys General have regaled many a dinner table as the port was being passed around with stories of how their supposed advices are used by Ministers to deride Opposition legislative initiatives. In this Bill I have sought to anticipate such argument and I have taken care to obtain the advice of constitutional experts. I have frankly been told that there is a degree of confusion among academic lawyers as to where exactly one might find the beginning and end of the implications of the Abbeylara judgment. However, I am assured by the same expert that this legislation brings inquiry by parliamentary committee into compliance with the judgment.
The only way to proceed, I am advised, is to advance curative legislation designed to remedy the defect identified by the Supreme Court. If our legislation works, then governance in this State will be the better for it. If it does not, then we have no choice but to consider alternatives by way of constitutional referendum. According to my advice, once this Bill is in place, a constitutional referendum will not be necessary but there can be little doubt about the outcome of such a referendum if it were necessary.
The order made by the court in the Abbeylara case was "that the conducting by the Joint Oireachtas sub-committee of an inquiry into the fatal shooting at Abbeylara on the 20th day of April 2000 capable of leading to adverse findings of fact and conclusions (including a finding of lawful killing) as to the personal culpability of an individual not a member of the Oireachtas so as to impugn his or her good name is ultra vires in that the holding of such inquiry is not within the inherent powers of the Houses of the Oireachtas".
Two points, therefore, require to be made. Making an adverse finding equivalent to finding a specified person guilty of unlawful killing is not a matter for Members of the Dáil. On mature reflection, I suspect that even the surviving members of that sub-committee would accept that investigating shootings lawful or unlawful is not our business. Second, the order of the court is clear that "the holding of such an inquiry is not within the inherent powers of the Houses of the Oireachtas". This is a reference to the fact that Dáil Éireann has never conferred on itself the power to inquire into matters of public concern.
The Labour Party has studied and taken advice on the Abbeylara judgments in the absence of any concerted effort on the part of Government parties to do so since 2002. The first issue, therefore, that we deal with in our Bill is the question of legal authority on the part of the Houses of the Oireachtas, through their committees, to conduct inquiries. Although the Oireachtas enacted the Committees of the Houses of Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Bill in 1997, it wrongly assumed that conferring on committees the power to compel witnesses to attend for the purposes of an Oireachtas inquiry of necessity conferred the prior power to conduct an inquiry. The courts have held otherwise and we must address that defect. Both of these defects have been apparent since the Abbeylara judgment in 2002 but the Government has been satisfied not to address either of them in the eight years since then.
An Oireachtas stripped of power suits the Government but it does not suit the people. Both Houses, but especially the Dáil, are expected to investigate, appraise and criticise the actions of Government as well as to propose alterations. In other words, up to the Abbeylara case, the Dáil had assumed it had the power to inquire but had failed to confer that power on itself through its committees. The second issue we deal with is the question of such an inquiry impugning the good name of any person. It is made clear in our Bill that it is not, and it should never be, the function of an Oireachtas inquiry to conduct any form of Star Chamber witch-hunt. The Bill makes plain that an Oireachtas committee must not consider, and has no power to decide or report upon, findings that could reasonably be seen to attribute civil or criminal liability to any individual. Our only interest in putting forward this Bill is ensuring the Oireachtas is adequately equipped when it comes to policy making as opposed to taking a definitive view on the facts of a controversial issue to identify and "name and shame" an individual.
We recognise there may be times when a careful line must be drawn between an inquiry into policy, as distinct from an inquiry into culpability. The first is foremost properly a function of the Oireachtas, while the latter clearly is not. The judges of the Supreme Court recognised that distinction and, within the normal rules that require the courts to presume that powers conferred on other organs of Government will be exercised in an appropriate and constitutional manner, will afford a space to the Houses in the exercise of functions most appropriate to themselves. The majority of members of the Supreme Court did not exclude the possibility of an Oireachtas inquiry into the conduct of Ministers, who are made responsible by the Constitution; of other entities which are made responsible by statute, contract or otherwise; or of when appraising the performance of Ministers or other principals, bringing into account the conduct of staff operating under their direction.
Mrs. Justice McGuinness pointed to a number of previous parliamentary inquires and said, "These committees have relied on voluntary submissions and willing witnesses but there is in fact no reason why such enquiries should not use the powers of the 1997 Compellability Act to obtain necessary evidence and information". Mr. Justice Geoghegan added that an Oireachtas committee "may necessarily have to probe into management structures and there may consequentially be read into the report implied criticism of persons in existing management roles." The present Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Murray, stated: "I did not see any reason why the Oireachtas cannot conduct inquiries ... into matters concerning the competency and efficiency in departmental or public administration as well as such matters as those concerning the proper or effective implementation of policy, and to make findings accordingly."
In summary, then, there is a need to restore the status of Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive. A parliamentary power of inquiry is necessary and intrinsic to the proper functioning of a representative, responsible parliamentary democracy. This Bill corrects the defect identified by the Supreme Court by conferring a power to inquire. By way of belt and braces, the Bill provides that there should be no finding of civil or criminal liability attached to any individual. It enables a two-stage process in which an appropriate expert may be retained to compile a book of evidence. Section 6 allows for the appointment of a legal assessor to guide the work of the inquiring committee. Only a Government hostile to the proper functioning of Parliament can credibly oppose this Bill.
I have had no communication from the Department of the Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh, about the attitude the Government is taking. There is no amendment on the Order Paper. I sincerely hope the Minister of State will recognise, in the interest of the relevance of Parliament, that this Bill should be nodded into Committee Stage tonight with intent on the part of Government to see it work its way through the House. We have been avoiding the issue for eight years and only in times of tumult, when something like the necessity for a banking inquiry arises, do we resort to this.
The Government has been saying, facilely, that the Abbeylara inquiry has put an end to inquiries by parliamentary committee. That is clearly not the case, as has been testified to by a number of academic constitutional experts. I referred to public coverage in The Irish Times in respect of Dr. Gerard Hogan SC, and there are others. It is a necessary weapon in any Parliament that it has the right to inquire into the quality of public administration. I hope the Minister of State will permit this Bill to proceed to Committee Stage tonight.
I commend the Bill to the House.
The spectre of Abbeylara has hung over this House for some time, predating my membership. This Bill represents an honest approach to dealing with the legalities surrounding that judgment, which would put the issue to bed once and for all in order that the legislative functions we have relative to the Executive can be dealt with in a meaningful way. It is about time — I say this as somebody who entered the Dáil for the first time in 2007 — this issue was dealt with in a substantive way.
I wish to outline some of the principal features of the Bill. It is worth reading these into the record because they are so clear it is difficult to fathom why they would not be accepted by the Government. The purpose of the Bill is to address a pressing need to restore the status of the Oireachtas vis-à-vis the Executive. In particular, we need to address the view that the Supreme Court decision in the Abbeylara case has put an end to any possibility of inquiry by an Oireachtas committee. We reject the view that, short of constitutional change, there is now no lawful means of holding a parliamentary inquiry. We do accept, however, that legislation is required to address the defects identified by the court in that case, hence this Bill.
I stand before you, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle, as a member of the Joint Committee on Economic and Regulatory Affairs, which has dealt with a number of bankers in recent years. We have had the spectre of Abbeylara hanging over us in that every time a witness comes before the committee we need to be careful about how we question him or her. The issue of compellability also loomed large over the proceedings, as Members will see if they check the records of the committee from the past number of years.
Let us fast forward to the announcement by the Minister for Finance that a private inquiry would be held. It beggars belief that the Government would hide behind a Supreme Court judgment as an excuse for not holding such an inquiry in public. That is an affront to any Member of this House who puts his or her name on a ballot paper and seeks to represent the people. It allows for the possibility that people who may have been responsible for undermining our banking system and our very economic structures will hide behind such a judgment as an attempt not to answer questions in a public forum — what I would call the tribune of the people. The people demand that the issue be dealt with in a meaningful way, and this Bill does so. I ask that the Government seriously consider accepting the Bill.
It is right and proper — particularly from the point of view of the banking crisis — that Ministers for Finance, their officials, and various actors within the banking sector should be subjected to rigorous questioning in the public interest and within the public domain on the basis that the taxpayer has bailed out some of those very institutions, which have received a guarantee under the auspices of the State. It is only right that we have such proceedings in public. Any excuse that might be put forward by Ministers that they are restricted in doing so by virtue of a Supreme Court decision will be dealt with by this legislation, which will prevent any excuse for not having such public inquiries.
It is not right or proper that somebody who is a member of the Joint Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs, which has a particular remit in respect of the banking sector, would need to glean his information from the business pages of the Sunday papers. When I read The Sunday Times or The Sunday Tribune on any Sunday, the amount of leakage on issues surrounding Anglo Irish Bank tells me that the Government is selectively talking to journalists. That subverts the very role of a committee such as the Joint Committee on Economic Regulatory Affairs — or any other committee of the House. The Government, if it adopts a historical perspective — the Minister of State will be conscious of this — will admit that it must be seen by the people to be doing right, and the only way it can do this is by conducting its affairs in a public fashion.
Gabhaim buíochas le Páirtí an Lucht Oibre as an deis labhairt ar an mBille ríthábhachtach seo. Ba mhaith liom freisin mo thacaíocht don mBille seo a chur in iúl. Sa mhéid is gur féidir, léiríonn sé na gnéithe tábhachtacha a d'eascair as an gceist cathain is féidir le Tithe an Oireachtais fiosrúchán dlíthiúil a thionscnamh trí choistí fiosrúchán.
D'ardaigh cinneadh na Cúirte Uachtaraí i 2002 an cheist nuair a cuireadh deireadh leis an iniúchadh ag an bhfiosrúchán a tharla nuair a scaoil na gardaí John McCarthy in Abbeylara an 9 Aibreán 2000. Bhí stair de mheabhar-ghalar ar an Uas. McCarthy sular scaoileadh é agus tar éis dó féin a ghlasáil ina theach le gunna gan aon ghiall leis. Cuireadh garda le fíor-bheagán taithí i gceannas ar an stand off a tharla. Nuair a cuireadh an Emergency Response Unit isteach sa cheantar faoi stiúradh an gharda seo, tar éis 25 uair de stand off, maraíodh an tUas McCarthy. Is mór an trua sin agus ta comhbhrón fós ag dul dá chlann agus tá ceisteanna ríthábhachtacha nár freagraíodh go fóill faoin ghnáthbhealach agus procedures a bhí ag na gardaí nuair a bhí siad ag déileáil leis seo. Tá a lán tar éis tarlú ó shin, tá a lán athruithe tar éis tarlú sna gardaí agus tá súil agam gur fhoghlaim siad na ceachtanna a bhí le foghlaim de thairbhe an léigir seo agus an easpa cúraim a bhí ann.
Ceann de na ceisteanna ná cén fáth go raibh duine gan an oiread seo taithí i gceannas nuair a bhí duine le taithí ó thaobh déileáil le daoine, nó negotiators mar a deir siad i mBéarla? Bhí sé i gceannas ar feadh 20 uair a chloig gan stad ach ag an am céanna bhí 27 garda eile le níos mó taithí sa cheantar.
Cén fáth nach ndearnadh níos mó chun tacaíocht a thabhairt don Uas McCarthy, go háirithe nuair a bhí a fhios acu go raibh meabhar-ghalar air agus nach raibh dainséar d'aon duine eile ann ag an am? Cén fáth nach raibh iarracht déanta a dhlíodóir a fháil le dul i dteagmháil leis? Bhí ceisteanna eile maidir leis an ERU chomh maith.
Go bhfios dom go fóill, ní dhearnadh torthaí an fhiosrúcháin inmheánaigh ag na gardaí a fhoilsiú go hiomlán. Is trua sin mar chuirfeadh sin leis an obair a rinneadh sa Teach seo ó shin, in ainneoin an cinneadh ag an gCúirt Uachtarach, an obair a rinne grúpaí eile, an chlann agus an obair a rinneadh laistigh de na gardaí chun déanamh cinnte nach dtarlódh a leithéid de rud arís.
The initial reaction of any right-thinking person when faced with serious questions regarding the conduct of a public body such as the Garda Síochána is that public representatives should investigate any incident, learn lessons from it and decide whether systematic and-or legislative changes are required. Correctly, a sub-committee of both Houses was set up to investigate the issues raised by the Abbeylara incident. However, the High Court intervened to bring an end to the sub-committee's inquiry and, therefore, suppress any findings it would have reached. The High Court decided that the investigation was beyond the powers of the Oireachtas, an argument that was subsequently upheld. The High Court held that Standing Order 78, which empowers the Dáil to appoint a select committee to consider and, if so permitted, take evidence upon any Bill, Estimate or matter and to report its opinion for the information and assistance of the Dáil, did not apply in this matter due to the fact that the investigation being carried out by the committee had an injunctive function and could make findings of fact adverse to the good name and reputation of a citizen who was not a Member of the Oireachtas.
On the surface, this ruling seems to suggest the Oireachtas has no power to investigate matters regarding citizens outside the Oireachtas, which is crazy. A part of our function is to represent the public and ensure our legislative changes are in the public's interests. When legislative change is required, we must establish the facts to ensure we are using our legislative powers correctly.
The suggestion has been also made that constitutional issues could arise from the exercise of the powers under Standing Order 78. However, closer inspection of the High Court's ruling on the Abbeylara incident shows that this point was not established. The judgment of the divisional court, which was taken into account in the High Court's ruling, stated, "Although Articles 15 to 27 of the Constitution deal with ‘considerable particularity' with the Oireachtas, it was not contended that any express authority was to be found in the Constitution authorising an investigation of the type embarked on by the committee and, in addition, that no such authority had been conferred by legislation".
The main thrust of the ruling upheld by the court was not that the Oireachtas was prohibited from carrying out any type of inquiry, including the one investigating the Abbeylara incident, but that there was no empowerment implied by the Constitution or by any existing legislation to permit it to carry out this type of investigation. The High Court ruling expressly stated, "Article 15.10 of the Constitution clearly and emphatically recognises the right, and indeed the duty, of each House of the Oireachtas to make its own Rules and Standing Orders and it has never been in issue at any stage in these proceedings that the Joint Committee was lawfully established in accordance with those procedures." It is clear that the main issue was a lack of empowerment by legislation, such as the Bill proposed today, rather than it being a constitutional issue impeding the ability of the Oireachtas to undertake and investigate the matter fully. This overhanging judgment has prevented subsequent matters from being investigated, as legislation has not been forthcoming from the Government benches.
Where the Oireachtas was not expressly empowered to undertake this kind of investigation, the court felt compelled to rule against a potential conflict of interest regarding the right of a citizen not to be exposed to a ruling of a committee of the Oireachtas that may bring his or her good name into disrepute. Therefore, we welcome this Bill as a clarification of the rights of the Oireachtas to investigate such matters. The need for Oireachtas scrutiny of issues such as the Abbeylara incident to ascertain the necessity of any systematic or legislative change in the interests of the public good is vital and a logical extension of the fact that we are returned by the electorate on a regular basis. The High Court decision dealt with this matter. In its conclusions, it stated: "The right of persons in the position of the respondents to their good name must be balanced against the right, and indeed the duty, of the Oireachtas to inquire into and inform themselves as to matters which are relevant to the discharge by them of their constitutional functions." It is this balance that needs clarification in order that the rights of the individual do not take too much precedence over the need for the Oireachtas to perform functions that are in the interests of the wider public good.
The Bill goes some way towards addressing this issue. It confers on both Houses, and on both of them acting jointly, through committees the power to appoint inquiries and to commission reports into matters relevant to the exercise of legislative power in the State for the purpose of proposing legislation to remedy any defects and to make recommendations for the better regulation and governance of the State. If the focus of any Oireachtas inquiry is the identification of areas for legislative change, there is no reason a sensitive application of the powers outlined in this Bill should interfere disproportionately with an individual's right to his or her good name or prejudice any decision of the judicial system. We believe, however, the Bill could go further. If the Government agrees, we will table proposals on Committee Stage to strengthen the Bill.
I reiterate my support for this Bill. Clarification of the powers of the Oireachtas to initiate committees of inquiry is long overdue. I would like consideration to be given to any other possible legislative changes to address the issue of Government accountability, which have been outlined in this House by other Deputies and in recent times regarding the need for a proper investigative inquiry into the banking scandals and everything related to them.
I wish to share five minutes with Deputy Michael Ahern.
Is that agreed? Agreed.
Before setting out the Government's response to this Bill I wish to make a few preliminary comments. I have great respect for any Member of either House who produces a substantial Private Members' Bill, as this clearly is, and for which Deputy Rabbitte has made a strong case with his usual eloquence. The success rate of the Private Members' Bills under successive Governments has been relatively limited. I remember when Fianna Fáil was in Opposition under the rainbow Government in 1995-96 it was active in producing Private Members' Bills. The one that made it through, with many Government amendments to it, was the Criminal Assets Bureau Bill providing for the establishment of the bureau and the other major Private Members' legislation originating with the Opposition was Deputy Shatter's Bill. Even if a Bill is not accepted, the drafting of it can help inform subsequent legislation.
I am speaking on behalf of the Minister for Finance, Deputy Brian Lenihan, to articulate the Government's view of the Private Members' Bill, the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill 2010. I understand the Minister for Finance will speak to the House on this matter tomorrow.
The Government is opposed to this Bill. Notwithstanding this, I want to stress, as I have done, that it is entirely appropriate that proposals for improving the role of the Oireachtas should come from one of the main parties in the House. It is also clear that some thought has gone into considering how this role can be improved through this Bill. However, it is the Government's view that this Bill does not fully consider and address the important matters raised by the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara decision. It is for this and for other reasons, which I will set out for the House, that the Government is opposing this Bill.
It seems that the main purpose of this Bill is to address the legal implications of the findings of the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara case for inquiries undertaken by committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas. As Members of the House may recall, the declaration granted by the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara case states:
conducting by the sub-committee of an inquiry into the fatal shooting at Abbeylara on 20th April 2000, capable of leading to adverse findings of fact and conclusions (including a finding of unlawful killing) as to the personal culpability of an individual not a member of the Oireachtas so as to impugn his or her good name was ultra vires in that the holding of such an inquiry was not within the inherent powers of the Houses of the Oireachtas.
Several Deputies, including Deputy Rabbitte, have already referred to this.
The terms of the specific order, in the context of the Abbeylara inquiry, prohibited more than a finding of unlawful killing. Findings of personal culpability impugning the good name of a person were also prohibited. The essential basis for the Supreme Court decision was that an inquiry into past events which required establishing the truth of controverted facts and the making of serious findings of culpability was not an inquiry that was authorised by the Constitution. It is possible for an Oireachtas committee to make mere findings of fact as to the policy pursued and recommendations of change of policy and systems. However, even where the Dáil and-or Seanad have an inherent constitutional power to hold an inquiry because the subject matter of the inquiry relates to their constitutional functions, there are still constraints. It is clear that neither House could make a finding of criminal or civil liability against any person.
This Supreme Court ruling had significant implications for the conduct of inquiries by an Oireachtas committee under the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997. In an attempt to address these complex issues, the Bill, as tabled by Deputy Rabbitte, seeks to convey legal authority on committees of the Oireachtas to conduct such inquiries and confirms that such committees cannot decide or report on findings or opinions on non-Oireachtas individuals' civil or criminal liability or make findings which could reasonably be seen to attribute civil or criminal liability to any individual. It also provides that such committees can appoint assessors to advise, guide or assist and investigators to carry out preliminary investigations and report these investigations.
I again acknowledge the effort that went into crafting a Bill of this scope and nature and the genuine endeavours by the Labour Party to progress matters on the operation of committees in the wake of the Abbeylara judgment. I also share the concern that the legislative work already done on privilege and compellability and on the development of the parliamentary inquiry model, as evidenced in the DIRT inquiry, should not come to a standstill. However, the Bill has shortcomings and, while it could be used as a starting point regarding some of the issues, further examination and work would be required to address these shortcomings, particularly regarding sections 4 to 9, inclusive.
The Bill allows in section 4(3) for a committee of the Oireachtas not to be inhibited in the performance of its functions by the possibility of liability being inferred. It also provides such a provision in section 8 in regard to the performance of investigators. However, the advice from the Attorney General is that these provisions require further consideration relating to the issue of liability being inferred.
The Bill, as currently drafted, could be open to legal challenge. As Members of the House will appreciate, there are complex legal issues involved which are difficult to resolve and require further detailed examination and review.
There are already considerable powers available to the Oireachtas in order to conduct investigations appropriate to it. The Oireachtas may establish a committee to investigate a matter of significant public importance. It is worth recalling that the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 already contains provision for Oireachtas committees, whose terms of reference so provide, to permit the calling of persons and papers, statutory power to compel the attendance and co-operation of witnesses and the furnishing of documents. The 1997 Act also confers High Court privilege on all persons directed to give evidence or present documents to such committees. This is virtually identical to the absolute privilege enjoyed by Members of Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann. These two elements are essential to the legislation; powers to compel the giving of evidence and powers to grant privilege and immunity to those required to testify. The symmetry means that those compelled to answer questions must be given protection from any adverse legal consequences of complete responses.
Under the existing legislation virtually every citizen is compellable — members of the public, the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste, Ministers, Ministers of State and officials. However, in keeping with convention, the President and members of the Judiciary are exempt from the legislation. In addition, the compellability of the Attorney General is limited to the general administration of his office before the Committee of Public Accounts; the Attorney General is not compellable in his roles as legal adviser to the Government or as defender of the public interest. Also the Director of Public Prosecutions is compellable before the Committee of Public Accounts only for the general administration of his office and for statistical data published in a report. A partial restriction also applies to civil servants, gardaí and members of the Defence Forces who may not question or express comments on the merits, or the merits of the objectives, of Government policies.
The existing arrangements are a balance between, on the one hand, the rights of individual citizens to due process and fair procedures and, on the other, the entitlement of the national Parliament to investigate and examine questions of urgent public concern.
Very significant initiatives were taken to improve and strengthen accountability to the Oireachtas through the 1997 legislation. The intended effects of these strengthened accountability frameworks provided in the compellability legislation were to enable quicker, less costly inquiries of immediate public concern to be conducted by the elected Members of the Oireachtas. It now seems that more work is needed on the complementary mechanisms, legislative or otherwise, if we are to take this model further in the context of clarifying the power of the Oireachtas to hold inquiries.
Following on from the practical experience of the DIRT inquiry and the Abbeylara judgment, it is clear that a balance is needed between an arrangement that would allow a committee of the Oireachtas to investigate matters with powers to compel the attendance of witnesses and submission of documents, on the one hand, and the safeguarding of the rights of individual citizens to due process, fair procedures and the protection of their good name and character, on the other. Such a balance was struck in the DIRT inquiry by ensuring that crucial stages of the investigation were carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General who is a constitutional officer with involvement by the Committee of Public Accounts only when the Comptroller and Auditor General had completed his part of the investigation. It was provided that not all information that came to the attention of the Comptroller and Auditor General in his investigations would be passed on to the Committee of Public Accounts and the public domain. Confidentiality was protected in regard to certain information.
The approach taken in the DIRT inquiry also ensured that the investigation could be completed in a timely fashion, recognising that carrying out such an investigation involved a massive commitment by Deputies to the potential detriment of their other legislative and representational duties. Unfortunately, there is not such a robust process envisaged in the Bill proposed by the Labour Party that would recreate such safeguards.
Let me recall for the House that in his Second Stage speech on the DIRT inquiry legislation in December 1998, the then Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy, said that in the past there was "a belief among some Members that entrusting to themselves the kind of investigations which had traditionally been undertaken by tribunals would lead to inquiries being conducted more speedily, more effectively and with a greater awareness of public concern". The Minister noted that the 1997 Act went some way towards this but that in doing so, some Deputies had to be disabused of the idea that "procedures, generous time limits for responding to directions and safeguards on individual rights could be modified". Such safeguards were integral to the procedures used in the DIRT inquiry and subsequent developments clearly showed that the concerns the former Minister for Finance had in moving away from them were justified.
It was also the case that arrangements for the DIRT inquiry were tailor-made to fit a particular investigation necessitating modifications to the provisions contained in the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997. The Comptroller and Auditor General and Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Special Provisions) Act 1998 was a clear recognition that the precise conduct and terms of reference of inquiries by Oireachtas committees are inevitably dictated by the particular circumstances of the subject of the inquiry. The legislation proposed by the Labour Party would have permanent effect and is likely to be more open to challenge and costly reference to the courts.
The ruling in the Abbeylara case identified certain constraints on the current system and experience has shown that fair procedures and individual rights must be protected. Matters which require inquiries to be conducted tend to be complex and multi-layered and different factors need to be taken into account in deciding on the nature and type of inquiry and the role for the Oireachtas in each case. The process is evolving and it is clear that what may be termed a "one size fits all" approach is not appropriate.
The Private Members' Bill under consideration today was referred to on 20 January this year in the context of the Labour Party's Private Members' motion on an inquiry into the banking crisis and the desire for such an inquiry to be conducted in public by a committee of the Dáil. It is the Minister's view, as clearly set out in the House, that the proposed framework recently established by the Government provides the most effective way of getting to the heart of the issues in the banking crisis to inform the future management and regulation of the sector and also provides the most ample opportunity for the Oireachtas to have a substantial input at each stage of the inquiry process.
As the Minister informed the House at the time of that debate, the Government approved the framework for an investigation into the banking crisis and for its subsequent consideration by the Dáil. To recall the main elements for the benefit of the House, the inquiry will have two stages. First, the Government has commissioned two separate reports, with one from the Governor of the Central Bank on the performance of the functions of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator and the second from independent international experts Mr Klaus Regling and Mr Max Watson. They will conduct a preliminary investigation into the recent crisis in our banking system and inform the future management and regulation of the sector.
These reports will also consider the international, social and macroeconomic policy environment which provided the context for the recent crisis. Work on both reports has started and it is expected that both reports will be completed by the end of May this year and laid before the Houses shortly thereafter.
The second stage of the inquiry will be the establishment of a statutory commission of investigation, which will be chaired by a recognised expert or experts of high standing and reputation. The terms of reference for the commission of investigation will be informed by the conclusions of the two preliminary reports and consultation with the Oireachtas. The commission of investigation will examine and report on the causes of the systemic failures, such as corporate strategy, governance and risk management in the Irish banking sector. The aim will be for the commission to complete its work by the end of this year, and its report will then be laid before the Oireachtas for further consideration and action by an appropriate Oireachtas committee.
It is important to point out that the terms of reference for the statutory component of this investigation cannot be set until we have the benefit of the preliminary reports from the Governor of the Central Bank and from Mr Regling and Mr Watson, along with the views of the Oireachtas on them. In examining these issues, the commission of investigation will have the powers available to it under the relevant legislation, which the House will be aware are substantial. The mechanism for inquiry contained in the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 provides a robust framework which has already been tested in the investigation of matters of significant public concern.
Notwithstanding this, an Oireachtas committee will have a vital function in this process by assisting in the formulation of appropriate terms of reference with regard to where the inquiry goes at the conclusion of the scoping exercise and exercising its constitutional role of examining matters of public policy arising from the findings of the statutory inquiry. It is clear therefore that the Oireachtas will be involved at each stage of the planned inquiry process. Members of an appropriate Oireachtas committee — the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service probably being the most relevant — will meet with both the Governor and the independent expert at the outset of their work to be briefed on the members' priorities for investigation, and arrangements are being put in place for this to take place shortly. The two preliminary reports, when completed, will be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas and the Oireachtas committee will be invited to consider the findings of the reports.
The terms of reference and draft Government order to establish the statutory commission of investigation will be laid before the Oireachtas and the report of the commission of investigation will, when completed, be laid before the Oireachtas for further consideration by the committee. It is open to the committee to hold public hearings on the report.
There was extensive debate in both Houses a number of weeks ago on the appropriate role for the Oireachtas in the banking inquiry. For reasons that the Government has already set out, a committee of the Oireachtas is not best equipped to conduct a banking inquiry or investigation given the range and complexities of the issues involved and speciality of expertise required to investigate these issues. I will reiterate the reasons.
Unlike the Committee of Public Accounts DIRT inquiry, the issues in the banking crisis are significantly more complex and will require a greater range of expertise. A crucial feature of the DIRT inquiry was the fact that the PAC itself was able to draw upon a comprehensive investigation into the DIRT issue by the Comptroller and Auditor General. I also point out that the DIRT inquiry essentially involved a single issue, namely why the institutions did not comply with the law and pay DIRT which the Comptroller and Auditor General found should have been paid. In addition, the issues involved in the banking crisis continue to be current rather than issues simply of the recent and more medium past, and Members of these Houses continue to be engaged in debate on them. There could be some mitigation of these effects by confining the remit of the inquiry but this would clearly not satisfy the need for a comprehensive investigation of all of the relevant issues. These are matters in respect of which Members of this House are fully aware.
I have set out the reasons the Government considers the approach provided for in this Bill to be inappropriate to an inquiry into the banking crisis. I am confident that the framework recently announced by the Government is the right way to proceed in this matter. I am also confident that the Houses of the Oireachtas will have a substantial and influential role to play at each stage of the process.
The Minister does not consider it appropriate, necessary or prudent to proceed with a Bill of this nature for the purposes of the banking inquiry. Whereas the Bill goes some way to addressing issues arising from the Abbeylara Supreme Court ruling, it does not provide a complete solution and further consideration needs to be given to the issues involved. There are complex legal issues which need to be the subject of detailed review and examination.
I am pleased to have been given the opportunity to say a few words on this very important Bill. Especially since the Abbeylara case there has been much discussion on all sides of the House on the powers of the Oireachtas to call witnesses and insist on their attendance.
I do not pretend to know the detail of this Bill and the legal issues surrounding it. Having listened to the comments of both Deputy Rabbitte and the Minister of State and read some of the briefing, I am aware that there is a need for further examination of the Bill's legal aspects. I am sure that the Minister will take note of what the Labour Party has published in this Bill.
There are already considerable powers in the Oireachtas to conduct inquiries and investigations appropriate to these Houses. It is not widely known that the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunity of Witnesses) Act 1997 already contains provision for Oireachtas committees, whose terms of reference permit the calling of persons and papers, statutory power to compel the attendance and the co-operation of witnesses and furnishing of documents. The 1997 Act also confers High Court privilege on all persons directed to give evidence or present documents to such committees. This is virtually identical to the absolute privilege enjoyed by Members of the Houses. At committee sittings, the chairman always begins by stating that Members have absolute privilege, but that witnesses do not. This 1997 Act shows that they have a considerable privilege.
Powers to compel the giving of evidence and powers to grant privilege and immunity to those required to testify are the two elements essential to the legislation. The symmetry means that those compelled to answer questions must be given protection from any adverse legal consequences of complete responses. The committees in the Oireachtas have considerable powers, in spite of the view put forward that they did not have any powers such as those set out in the 1997 Act. The existing arrangements are a balance between the rights of individual citizens to due process and fair procedures, and the entitlement of the national Parliament to investigate and examine questions of urgent public concern.
The banking inquiry brought the issue to the fore again, which is why it is before the House tonight. The Government has already said that there will be an independent statutory commission of investigation, which will be established to identify, examine and report on the causes of the systemic failures in the Irish banking sector. Reports will be completed by the Governor of the Central Bank and by the two wise persons, Mr. Klaus Regling and Mr. Max Watson. These three men will appear before the finance committee in the next few weeks and they will listen to committee members' view and be briefed on our priorities for the investigation. They will also advise the committee of the methodology they will be using in their reports.
This Bill was drafted to facilitate an inquiry by a committee of the Oireachtas into the banking crisis, whereas the agreed framework of the inquiry will involve the Oireachtas at various stages. The Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service will meet the Governor and the independent experts and brief them on our priorities for investigation. When those preliminary reports are completed, they will be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas, and the committee will be invited to consider the findings in the reports. The terms of reference and the draft Government order to establish the statutory commission of investigation will be laid before the Oireachtas, and the report of the commission will also be laid before the Oireachtas. The committee will then give its consideration and it can hold public meetings on the report.
This Bill provides an opportunity for the views of the different parties to be made public. It provides an opportunity to the Minister of State to let people know what powers exist in the Oireachtas. It also provides an opportunity to make it clear that the banking inquiry is not a secret inquiry. There will be an input for Members of the Houses to discuss the reports that will be brought forward by the Governor of the Central Bank and the wise men. There will also be a discussion on the commission report when it comes before the Houses. This will provide people with an opportunity to examine and make their views known on the reports when they become public.
If ever I needed to be convinced of the need for a change of Government, I am utterly convinced after the Government's response this evening to the Labour Party Bill. The Government is so satisfied with the status quo that it does not even want to consider any change. In the Minister of State’s speech, he refers to the “existing arrangements or a balance, on the one hand, between the rights of the individual citizens to due process and fair procedure, and on the other, the entitlement of the national Parliament to investigate and examine questions of urgent public concern.” In other words, the Government is completely satisfied with the existing situation. He confirms this further by stating that “while the Bill goes some way to addressing issues arising from the Abbeylara Supreme Court ruling, it does not provide a complete solution and further consideration needs to be given to the issues involved.” Does the Government not realise what it is doing? It has this damp, cold hand that is there for years and years. It does not want to change anything. It is the party of the status quo and the message to the Opposition is not to upset that status quo.
This Bill is an extra tool in the arsenal of the Oireachtas, and it is therefore worthwhile. For that reason, I support it. I accept it is not a complete answer to the Abbeylara case. I would go much further, but my view would get into an area of constitutional ambiguity and possibly the need for constitutional change. I would not baulk at the notion of constitutional change. I believe we should be aiming in that direction, but it is no fault of the Labour Party that it has produced a Bill that is clearly within the constitutional parameters, yet does not provide the complete solution, as the Minister of State pointed out. It is not a complete solution because it cannot be the complete solution. The good is not the enemy of the best. The Bill improves the current situation and makes clear that the Oireachtas has an inherent power to conduct inquiries. That is an advance in itself, because some of the judgments in the Abbeylara decision suggested that was not even accepted.
I am quite appalled at the reaction of the Government, as expressed by the Minister of State, Deputy Mansergh. We are not talking about an academic exercise. This is not just a theoretical situation. Various issues crop up every week before the Oireachtas that could conceivably lead on to some form of an Oireachtas inquiry. Over the years I have seen issues of major concern arise that led the calls for public inquires. The tribunals were to be the answer to everything, but they led us into the sand. Days, weeks, months and years passed, reams of paper were used and, above all, dollops of taxpayers' money were poured down the drain chasing beef on the dolly carousel and elsewhere. Money is still being poured down the drain. We accepted that this approach was not the answer and when we examined what was being done in other countries we saw the benefits of having efficient parliamentary inquiries done fairly, expeditiously and at modest expense. I cannot understand how anybody who wants the democratic system to develop would not be imbued with the notion that we, too, should find a better way.
It is easy for the Minister to focus on whether the provisions of the Bill would send out the appropriate message regarding the banking inquiry. I will return to this issue because the Oireachtas could play a much greater role in the banking inquiry than has been provided for by the Government. That is not the issue, however. As a member of the Committee of Public Accounts, I am aware that the committee is restricted, hog-tied and constrained in terms of the work it is charged to do by parliament. It is unable to do its work as effectively as it should be done due to the constraints imposed on it.
What answer does the Government give when an honest attempt is made by Deputy Rabbitte on behalf of the Labour Party to advance the current position? It indicates it is satisfied with the status quo, we should not upset the apple cart and it will take time to consider these complex issues. These damn issues were considered by the Law Reform Commission in 2003 when it produced a report providing extensive advice on this matter. What action has the Government taken since the publication of the report? It has done absolutely nothing.
As I indicated, this is not a theoretical matter. The Fine Gael Party strongly believes a new approach to politics is required to prevent the democratic process from withering on the vine, as is occurring at present. We need to rejuvenate and reinvigorate politics by giving the Dáil a much more central role in the years ahead. The Government appears to take the opposite view.
Over the past 12 to 18 months on the Committee of Public Accounts, I have observed many difficulties. I do not propose, therefore, to focus on only one issue. However, given that a fair amount of information on the issue I propose to raise is available, even to Members who are not on the Committee of Public Accounts, as a result of the publicity associated with our investigation, I will speak of FÁS. There was clear evidence of unorthodox procurement practices — I choose my words carefully but Deputies will get the drift of my message — and a lax attitude to the disbursement of public moneys. These practices and this attitude gave rise to considerable concern among members of the cross-party committee whose members did not set out to make political capital out of the issue but sought to do their job of investigating the expenditure of taxpayers' money and whether it was being wasted. The committee does this job week in and week out in its dealings with various Departments and offices.
The issue on which I focus, however, is the accounts relating to the expenditure of more than €1 billion by FÁS. After extensive investigation and hearing of evidence, the committee wanted to arrive at conclusions. In doing so, however, it was constrained by the decision in the Abbeylara case. While in one sense everybody is willing to accept, as Deputy Rabbitte correctly noted, that an Oireachtas committee should not find someone guilty of unlawful killing, at the other extreme, a lawfully and properly appointed, all-party committee genuinely seeking to do an honest job and produce conclusions which appear to be fully justified by the evidence was constrained from so doing by the same decision. This highlights the need for change to improve the current position.
While I would go further than the provisions of the Labour Party Bill, I appreciate that in doing so, one would have to plan one's steps carefully. I utterly reject the Government approach that nothing should be done. That is not acceptable from the point of view of the democratic process, even if that sounds theoretical. Members are paid by the taxpayer to do a job and if we are constrained from doing it, we must ensure we change procedures and legislation and, if necessary, seek to change the Constitution to ensure we do our job properly. The alternative is to sit back and accept that we do not do our job properly. This attitude, which emanates from the Government benches, is not acceptable.
I indicated that arriving at a finding of blame creates ambiguity. While the Supreme Court judgment in the Abbeylara case was held by a majority of five to two, when reading their judgments different judges chose to emphasise different aspects of the case. While I accept that one cannot directly attribute blame to an individual, in certain circumstances one should change the procedures to enable one so to do. I accept, however, that in changing these procedures, one must take into account the views of the judges in the Abbeylara decision and the views of the judges In re Haughey, an earlier case arising from the investigation by the Committee of Public Accounts into the arms trial money. Essentially, the outcome of the latter case established the procedures for fair process. This leads into some complexities as to how one would establish such a fair process if one came to a view that blame could be attributable to a person other than an officeholder, a private individual or an employee of a State agency. One would have to establish a fair process so that the person would be fully aware of the charges and given an opportunity to defend himself or herself.
The overall picture is that the current position is unsatisfactory and does not allow parliamentarians to do the job we were elected to do. This leads me to the banking inquiry. It is not possible without some change in the law to get a decent outcome by a parliamentary inquiry but it could make some contribution to an open, transparent investigation into banking.
I do not intend to rehearse the ground regarding the approach adopted by the Government but is it a coincidence it does not permit any inquiry into decisions made by banks and regulators? Regarding the limitation of the time in which the investigation can be made, is there a possibility of investigating the tax, regulatory and other economic policies, particularly during the tenure of, say, the Taoiseach when he was Minister for Finance? It appears to me that there is not. Is it a coincidence that it is not possible under the present position? I do not believe so. That would not happen if we had a parliamentary inquiry because that would be more open and transparent. It would be in public; the commission of investigation will not be in public. If it were conducted in the same way as the Committee of Public Accounts it would be done in a fair way. I am very impressed by the attitude of colleagues on all sides in the Committee of Public Accounts where an honest effort is made to try to trace the truth rather than any effort to——
Take advantage.
——take political advantage out of a position. There is no reason a banking inquiry by the Oireachtas should not be conducted in a similar fashion.
Where do we stand now as a result of where the Government leads us? The approach, if not in the letter certainly in the spirit, leads to the Constitution being denied, and the Constitution clearly states that the Government shall be responsible to Dáil Éireann. When I say "the Government" I mean the members of the Government and the Government agencies being responsible. I do not believe that is possible with the way we are currently set up in regard to Oireachtas inquiries. The political reality, and this was touched on in the consultation paper of the Law Reform Commission, is that the Oireachtas is responsible to the Government because the Government controls the Dáil. It has a majority. The Government controls the Seanad. It probably has a majority already but Éamon de Valera made sure the Taoiseach's 11 nominees would provide for a Government majority in the Seanad. The Government controls the business of the Oireachtas.
I do not see the Government being genuinely responsible to the Dáil. That concerns me because in the time since I was elected, which is some time ago, I have seen more and more power draining from the Dáil and being seized by the Executive, and many of the processes and procedures of the Dáil aid that position. The inability generally to raise current matters other than on Leaders' Questions two days a week is an example, and the fact that in many instances parliamentary questions are treated virtually with contempt by many Ministers. In some instances parliamentary questions are not answered at all and are referred to some State quango. Some €15 billion — Deputy Rabbitte will correct me if I am wrong — is spent on health services throughout the country, most of it disbursed through the Health Service Executive, yet we cannot discuss the expenditure of that money on the floor of the House by way of parliamentary question or otherwise.
It is crazy.
That €15 billion is half the amount we currently raise in taxes.
I would like to see an all-party view emerge from this House that we do not accept the current position and that we should improve it. As a first step we should support the Labour Party Bill. It is only a first step but the notion of rejecting the Labour Party Bill, going back to base as far as the Government is concerned and forgetting about the issue is not acceptable.
There are ways even under existing instruments, and this arose in the discussion on the banking inquiry, where the Government can be much more positive in the way it addresses the constitutional and procedural problems that tie our hands in this House. Questions are raised under the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunity of Witnesses) Act 1997. It is purely procedural, limited in application and so on.
The question arises also of the attendance of, say, bankers in that they could not go before a parliamentary committee. It would be very simple to solve that. If we wanted to require the attendance of bankers before a parliamentary committee, we need not resort to the 1997 Act. We could make it clear, through an amendment to the scheme that accompanies the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act, which is due for renewal in the current year, that the continuing financial support of the financial institutions could be made conditional and dependent on full co-operation with any inquiries by the Oireachtas.
There are ways of solving all these problems. Daniel O'Connell talked about driving a coach and four through any legislation with which he did not agree coming from the House of Commons. We must have a mind to drive a coach and four through some of the complexities and the difficulties that are used as an excuse for doing nothing in dealing with the problems confronting the development of our democratic system.
Where does that leave us? I say on my own behalf, from my many years of experience here, and on behalf of my party that there is a major need for reform. "Reform" is a loose word which turns people so I will spell it out. We need to change the processes and procedures here. We have been talking about changing the Standing Orders almost from the time I was elected to this House. Why does the Government not do it? I challenge the Government to do that. It is holding up the process. Why do we not change the way we do the business in our Oireachtas committees and make them more effective? We can and should do that.
The Bill before the House does not just deal with an academic issue. It is not a theoretical issue. It is a practical issue as to the future of our democratic system. It is a test of us all as to the way we deal with the approach proposed by the Labour Party. With a heavy heart I say the Government has failed that test. I ask its members to examine their hearts and ask if they are committed to change. If they are, they should bring forward proposals. If they are not, they should get out and let some other parties into Government that will do a decent job for this country.
Debate adjourned.